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In October of 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued its 
starkest warning yet: we have around 12  years to avoid the worst effects of 
anthropogenic climate change. The consumption of fossil fuels, the reckless 
destruction of forests and other natural ecosystems, and the release of powerful 
greenhouse gases have already caused around 1.0  °C of warming above pre-
industrial levels.
Continuing at the current rate, we are likely to reach 1.5 °C by 2030 – and all the 
evidence suggests that a world beyond 1.5 °C is not one we want to live in.
While making the 2016 documentary film, Before the Flood, I witnessed first-
hand the impacts of an already-changing climate: the rapid melting of ice in the 
Arctic Circle, massive bleaching of coral reefs in the Bahamas, and rampant defor-
estation in Indonesia and the Amazon. Better than ever, we understand the heart-
breaking impact of human activity on our natural world. It is estimated, for example, 
that 60% of animals have been wiped out since 1970.
Higher temperatures and extreme weather events will cause ever more severe 
harm to biodiversity and ecosystems and even greater species loss and extinction. 
And when we lose biodiversity, we lose resilience. Currently, natural ecosystems 
absorb about half of human-caused carbon dioxide emissions. If we continue to 
degrade the natural world, we could lose completely the Earth’s ability to adapt to 
climate change.
A passion for nature conservation and animal protection has driven much of my 
foundation’s work over the past 20 years. Ultimately, however, the climate crisis is 
a humanitarian one. If business-as-usual continues, the impact on human beings 
will be immeasurable. Water supplies will become more insecure. Sea level rise will 
profoundly impact islands, low-lying coastal areas, and river deltas. Small island 
communities like those I visited in the South Pacific are already preparing for 
migration to safer lands. Fatal floods, droughts, hurricanes, and wildfires are the 
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new normal, and happening closer to home. An estimated 41 million Americans live 
within a 100-year flood zone. Texas saw its third 500-year flood 3 years in a row.
Poor air quality is a public health emergency across the world and now the 
fourth-highest cause of death  – contributing to strokes, heart attacks, and lung 
cancer – causing public unrest in countries like China and India, where the poorest 
find themselves at the mercy of pollution from industrial facilities and the burning 
of biomass. In states like Texas, Colorado, and North Dakota, communities are 
fighting back against gas drilling operations near playgrounds or soccer fields, 
where children breathe in poisonous gases.
These health impacts are only part of the story. Climate change, as the US 
Pentagon notes, is a national security threat. In a 2017 report by the Environmental 
Justice Foundation, senior US military experts pointed to the likelihood of tens of 
millions of climate refugees displaced by extreme weather  – in a world already 
struggling with a refugee crisis. We already know that many conflicts are driven by 
environmental factors and access to natural resources. The truth is that, where 
ecosystems collapse, societies collapse too.
Politically, there has been a monumental failure to grasp the scale of this problem. 
Climate scientists still face disinformation campaigns and a press corps that often 
draws a false equivalence between those who support the scientific consensus for 
human-caused climate change and those who do not. Surveys suggest that most 
Americans do not know a scientific consensus exists, and scientists like Michael 
Mann, who spoke to me for Before the Flood, face abuse for exposing the truth. As 
a result, scientific research programs, critical to better understanding and addressing 
climate change, are often attacked or defunded.
Nevertheless, in the face of these challenges, some progress is being made. With 
the growth of the environmental movement, public awareness of the climate crisis 
has increased significantly. Governments and the private sector are beginning to 
ramp up their efforts. Renewable energy is booming. And the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals, ratified by 193 countries, now call for a halt to deforestation 
and land degradation by 2030. After decades of climate negotiations, the Paris 
Agreement now calls upon the world’s governments to keep warming “well below 
2°C” while striving for 1.5°C.
While we are beginning to move in the right direction, the reality is that these 
efforts are simply not ambitious enough to address the climate crisis at scale. The 
IPCC warns that to avoid the worst consequences of climate change, we must stay 
below the 1.5 °C limit. But what does that mean in practical terms?
Determined to find solutions, my foundation supported a 2-year research program 
led by a team of international climate and energy experts to develop a roadmap for 
how we can actually stay below this critical climate threshold. The findings, outlined 
in this book, give cause for optimism. With a transition to 100% renewable energy 
by mid-century and a major land conservation and restoration effort, it is possible to 
stay below the 1.5 °C limit with technologies that are available right now. It will be 
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a lot of work, but the costs will be far less than the $5 trillion per year governments 
currently spend subsidizing the fossil fuel industries responsible for climate change.
The climate model and energy transition pathways compiled in this book offer an 
exciting, positive, and achievable vision of a better world in which we are no longer 
dependent on fossil fuels and where the conservation and restoration of nature is 
treated as indispensable to our survival. This is not fantasy. This is science.
Science is showing us the way forward, but you do not need to be a scientist to 
understand that climate change is the defining issue of our time. If our world warms 
past 1.5 °C, our way of life will profoundly change for the worse. Why not manage 
the transition in a way that is orderly and equitable? Human beings caused this 
problem, but with our vast knowledge and ingenuity, we can also fix it.
We are resilient. We can adapt. We can change.
Leonardo DiCaprioChairman of the Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation
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Executive Summary
Abstract An overview of the motivations behind the writing of this book, the sci-
entific background and context of the research. Brief outline of all methodologies 
used, followed by assumptions and the storyline of each scenario. Presentation of 
main results of the renewable energy resources assessment, transport scenario, long-
term energy pathway, the power sector analysis, employment analysis and an assess-
ment for required metals for renewable energy and storage technologies. Key results 
of non-energy greenhouse mitigation scenarios which are developed in support of 
the energy scenario in order to achieve the 1.5 °C target. Concluding remarks and 
policy recommendations including graphs and tables.
Introduction The Paris Climate Agreement aims to hold global warming to well 
below 2 degrees Celsius (°C) and to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 °C. To accom-
plish this, countries have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) outlining their post-2020 climate actions (Rogelj 2016). This research 
aimed to develop practical pathways to achieve the Paris climate goals based on a 
detailed bottom-up examination of the potential of the energy sector, in order to 
avoid reliance on net negative emissions later on.
The study described in this book focuses on the ways in which humans produce 
energy, because energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the main drivers 
of climate change. The analysis also considers the development pathways for non- 
energy- related emissions and mitigation measures for them because it is essential to 
address their contributions if we are to achieve the Paris climate change targets.
State of Research—Climate Beyond reasonable doubt, climate change over the 
last 250  years has been driven by anthropogenic activities. In fact, the human- 
induced release of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere warms the planet 
even more than is currently observed as climate change, but some of that greenhouse- 
gas- induced warming is masked by the effect of aerosol emissions.
xiv
Carbon dioxide emissions are so large that they are the dominant driver of 
human-induced climate change. A single kilogram of CO2 emitted will increase the 
atmospheric CO2 concentration over hundreds or even thousands of years. Since the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report, the 
finding that cumulative CO2 emissions are roughly linearly related to temperature 
has shaped scientific and political debate. The remaining permissible CO2 emissions 
that are consistent with a target temperature increase of 2 °C or 1.5 °C and their 
comparison with remaining fossil fuel resources are of key interest.
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report concluded that beyond 2011, cumulative CO2 
emissions of roughly 1000 GtCO2 are permissible for a “likely below 2.0 °C” target 
change, and approximately 400 GtCO2 are permissible for a 1.5 °C target change. 
However, the recently published IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 °C target suggests 
substantially higher carbon emissions of 1600 GtCO2 will achieve a 2.0 °C change 
and 860 GtCO2 will achieve a 1.5 °C change, which must be reduced by a further 100 
GtCO2 to account for additional Earth system feedback over the twenty- first century. 
One of the key reasons behind this difference is definitional: how far do we consider 
that we are away from 1.5 °C warming? While that question seems simple, it is sur-
prisingly complex when the observational data on coverage, the internal variability 
and the pre-industrial to early-industrial temperature differences are considered.
This study does not resolve the differences in opinions about carbon budgets, but 
it does provide emission pathways that are consistent with the 1.5 °C target increase 
in the 1.5 °C Scenario, or with the “well below 2.0 °C” target increase in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario consistent with other scenarios in the literature and classified as such by 
the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C.
Global Trends in the Energy Sector In 2017, the ongoing trends continued: solar 
photovoltaics (PV) and wind power dominated the global market for new power 
plants; the price of renewable energy technologies continued to decline; and fossil 
fuel prices remained low. A new benchmark was reached, in that the new renewable 
capacity began to compete favourably with existing fossil fuel power plants in some 
markets. Electrification of the transport and heating sectors is gaining attention, and 
although the amount of electrification is currently small, the use of renewable 
technologies is expected to increase significantly.
The growth of solar PV has been remarkable and is nearly double that of the 
second-ranking wind power. The capacity of new solar PV in 2017 was greater than 
the combined increases in the coal, gas and nuclear capacities. Renewable energy 
technologies achieved a global average generation share of 23% in the year 2015, 
compared with 18% in the year 2005. Storage is increasingly used in combination 
with variable renewables as battery costs decline, and solar PV plus storage has 
started to compete with gas peaking plants. However, bioenergy (including 
traditional biomass) remains the leading renewable energy source in the heating 
(buildings and industry) and transport sectors.
Since 2013, global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil 
fuels have remained relatively flat. Early estimates based on preliminary data 
suggest that this changed in 2017, with global CO2 emissions increasing by around 
1.4% (REN21-GSR 2018). These increased emissions were primarily attributable to 
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increased coal consumption in China, which grew by 3.7% in 2017 after a 3-year 
decline. The increased Chinese consumption, as well as a steady growth of around 
4% in India, is expected to lead to an upturn in global coal use, reversing the annual 
global decline from 2013 to 2016.
In 2017, as in previous years, renewables saw the greatest increases in capacity 
in the power sector, whereas the growth of renewables in the heating, cooling and 
transport sectors was comparatively slow. Sector coupling—the interconnection of 
power, heating and transport and particularly the electrification of heating and 
transport—is gaining increasing attention as a means of increasing the uptake of 
renewables in the transport and thermal sectors. Sector coupling also allows the 
integration of large proportions of variable renewable energy, although this is still at 
an early stage. For example, China is specifically encouraging the electrification of 
heating, manufacturing and transport in high-renewable areas, including promoting 
the use of renewable electricity for heating to reduce the curtailment of wind, solar 
PV and hydropower. Several US states are examining options for electrification, 
specifically to increase the overall renewable energy share.
Methodology for Developing Emission Pathways The complete decarbonisation 
of the global energy supply requires entirely new technical, economic and policy 
frameworks for the electricity, heating and cooling sectors as well as for the trans-
port system. To develop a global plan, the authors combined various established 
computer models:
• Generalized Equal Quantile Walk (GQW): This statistical method is used to 
complement the CO2 pathways with non-CO2 regional emissions for relevant 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols, based on a statistical analysis of the 
large number (~700) of multi-gas emission pathways underlying the recent IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report and the recently published IPCC Special Report on 
1.5 °C. The GQW method calculates the median non-CO2 gas emission levels 
every 5 years—conditional on the energy-related CO2 emission level percentile 
of the “source” pathway. This method is a further development under this 
project—building on an earlier Equal Quantile Walk method—and is now better 
able to capture the emission dynamics of low-mitigation pathways.
• Land-based sequestration design: A Monte Carlo analysis across temperate, 
boreal, subtropical and tropical regions has been performed based on various 
literature-based estimates of sequestration rates, sequestration periods and areas 
available for a number of sequestration options. This approach can be seen as a 
quantified literature-based synthesis of the potential for land-based CO2 
sequestration, which is not reliant on biomass plus sequestration and storage 
(bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, BECCS).
• Carbon cycle and climate modelling (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse 
Gas-Induced Climate Change, MAGICC): This study uses the MAGICC climate 
model, which also underlies the classification used by both the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report and the IPCC Special Report on 1.5  °C in terms of the 
abilities of various scenarios to maintain the temperature change below 2 °C or 
1.5 °C. MAGICC is constantly evolving, but its core goes back to the 1980s, and 
Executive Summary
xvi
it represents one of the most established reduced-complexity climate models in 
the international community.
• Renewable Resource Assessment [R]E-SPACE: RE-SPACE is based on a 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) approach and provides maps of the solar 
and wind potentials in space-constrained environments. GIS attempts to emulate 
processes in the real world at a single point in time or over an extended period 
(Goodchild 2005). The primary purpose of GIS mapping is to ascertain the 
renewable energy resources (primarily solar and wind) available in each region. 
It also provides an overview of the existing electricity infrastructures for fossil 
fuel and renewable sources.
• Transport model (TRAEM): The transport scenario model allows the 
representation of long-term transport developments in a consistent and transparent 
way. The model disaggregates transport into a set of different modes and 
calculates the final energy demand by multiplying each transport mode’s specific 
transport demand with powertrain-specific energy demands, using a passenger 
km (pkm) and tonne km (tkm) activity-based bottom-up approach.
• Energy system model (EM): The energy system model (a long-term energy 
scenario model) is used as a mathematical accounting system for the energy 
sector. It helps to model the development of energy demands and supply 
according to the development of drivers and energy intensities, energy potentials, 
future costs, emission targets, specific fuel consumption and the physical flow 
between processes. The data available significantly influence the model 
architecture and approach. The energy system model is used in this study to 
develop long-term scenarios for the energy system across all sectors (power, 
heat, transport and industry), without applying cost-optimization based on 
uncertain cost assumptions. However, an ex-post analysis of costs and investments 
shows the main economic effects of the pathways.
• Power system models [R]E 24/7: Power system models simulate electricity 
systems on an hourly basis with geographic resolution to assess the requirements 
for infrastructure, such as the grid connections between different regions and 
electricity storage, depending on the demand profiles and power-generation 
characteristics (Teske 2015). High-penetration or renewable energy-only 
scenarios will contain significant proportions of variable solar PV and wind 
power because they are inexpensive. Therefore, power system models are 
required to assess the demand and supply patterns, the efficiency of power 
generation and the resulting infrastructural needs. Meteorological data, typically 
in 1 h steps, are required for the power-generation model, and historical solar and 
wind data were used to calculate the possible renewable power generation. In 
terms of demand, either historical demand curves were used, or if unavailable, 
demand curves were calculated based on assumptions of consumer behaviour in 
the use of electrical equipment and common electrical appliances. Figure  1 
provides an overview of the interaction between the energy- and GIS-based 
models. The climate model is not directly linked with it but provided the carbon 
budgets for the 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C Scenarios.
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Besides the climate and energy models, employment effects and the metal 
resource requirements for selected materials have been calculated. Now that the 
methodology has been outlined, the next sections present the results and assumptions 
for the nonenergy GHG mitigation scenarios, followed by the energy sector 
scenarios
Nonenergy-GHG Mitigation Scenarios The most important sequestration 
measure could be large-scale reforestation, particularly in the subtropics and tropics 
(see yellow pathways in Fig. 2). The second most important pathway in terms of the 
amount of CO2 sequestered is the sustainable use of existing forests, which basically 
means reduced logging within those forests. In subtropical, temperate and boreal 
regions, this could provide substantial additional carbon uptake over time. The time 
horizon for this sequestration option is assumed to be slightly longer in temperate 
and boreal regions, consistent with the longer time it takes for these forest ecosystems 
to reach equilibrium. The “forest ecosystem restoration” pathway is also important, 
which basically assumes a reduction in logging rates to zero in a fraction of forests.
Overall, the median assumed sequestration pathways, shown in Fig. 2, would 
result in the sequestration of 151.9  GtC.  This is approximately equivalent to all 
historical land-use-related CO2 emissions and indicates the substantial challenges 
that accompany these sequestration pathways.
Given the competing forms of land use throughout the world today, the challenge of 
reversing overall terrestrial carbon stocks back to pre-industrial levels cannot be 
underestimated. There would be significant benefits, but also risks, if this 
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Fig. 2 Sequestration pathways—annual sequestration over time
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sequestration option were to be used instead of mitigation. However, the benefits 
are clearly manifold, ranging from biodiversity protection, reduced erosion, 
improved local climates, protection from wind and potentially reduced air pollution.
Assumptions for Scenarios Scenario studies cannot predict the future. Instead, 
scenarios describe what is required for a pathway that will limit warming to a certain 
level and that is feasible in terms of technology implementation and investment. 
Scenarios also allow us to explore the possible effects of transition processes, such 
as supply costs and emissions. The energy demand and supply scenarios described 
in this study have been constructed based on information about current energy 
structures and today’s knowledge of energy resources and the costs involved in 
deploying them. As far as possible, the study also takes into account potential 
regional constraints and preferences.
The energy modelling used primarily aims to generate transparent and coherent 
scenarios, ambitious but still plausible storylines, out of several possible techno- 
economic pathways. Knowledge integration is the core of this approach because we 
must consider different technical, economic, environmental and societal factors. 
Scenario modelling follows a hybrid bottom-up/top-down approach, with no 
objective cost-optimization functions. The analysis considers key technologies for 
successful energy transition and focuses on the role and potential utility of efficiency 
measures and renewable energies. Wind and solar energies have the highest 
economic potential and dominate the pathways on the supply side. However, the 
variable renewable power from wind and PV remains limited to a maximum of 
65%, because sufficient secured capacity must always be maintained in the 
electricity system. Therefore, we also consider concentrating solar power (CSP) 
with high-temperature heat storage as a solar option that promises large-scale 
dispatchable and secured power generation.
The 5.0 °C Scenario (Reference Scenario): The reference scenario only takes into 
account existing international energy and environmental policies and is based on the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook (IEA 2017). Its 
assumptions include, for example, continuing progress in electricity and gas market 
reforms, the liberalization of cross-border energy trade and recent policies designed 
to combat environmental pollution. The scenario does not include additional policies 
to reduce GHG emissions. Because the IEA’s projections only extend to 2040, we 
extrapolate their key macroeconomic and energy indicators forward to 2050. This 
provides a baseline for comparison with the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
The 2.0 °C Scenario: The first alternative scenario aims for an ambitious reduction 
in GHG emissions to zero by 2050 and a global energy-related CO2 emission budget 
of around 590 Gt between 2015 and 2050. This scenario is close to the assumptions 
and results of the Advanced E[R] scenario published in 2015 by Greenpeace (Teske 
et  al. 2015). However, it includes an updated base year, more coherent regional 
developments in energy intensity, and reconsidered trajectories and shares of the 
deployment of renewable energy systems. Compared with the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
Executive Summary
xx
2.0 °C Scenario allows for some delays due to political, economic and societal pro-
cesses and stakeholders.
The 1.5  °C Scenario: The second alternative scenario aims to achieve a global 
energy-related CO2 emission budget of around 450 Gt, accumulated between 2015 
and 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario requires immediate action to realize all available 
options. It is a technical pathway, not a political prognosis. It refers to technically 
possible measures and options without taking into account societal barriers. 
Efficiency and renewable potentials need to be deployed even more quickly than in 
the 2.0  °C Scenario, and avoiding inefficient technologies and behaviours is an 
essential strategy for developing regions in this scenario.
Global Transport Transport emissions have increased at a rapid rate in recent 
decades and accounted for 21% of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2015. The 
reason for this steady increase in emissions is that passenger and freight transport 
activities are increasing in all world regions, and there is currently no sign that these 
increases will slow in the near future. The increasing demand for energy for transport 
has so far been predominantly met by GHG-emitting fossil fuels. Although (battery) 
electric mobility has recently surged considerably, it has done so from a very low 
base, which is why in terms of total numbers, electricity remains an energy carrier 
with a relatively minor role in the transport sector.
The key results of our transport modelling demonstrate that meeting the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, and especially the 1.5  °C Scenario, will require profound measures in 
terms of rapid powertrain electrification and the use of biofuels and synthetically 
produced fuels to shift transport performance to more efficient modes. This must be 
accompanied by a general limitation of further pkm and tkm growth in the OECD 
countries.
The 5.0 °C Scenario follows the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) scenario 
until 2040, with extrapolation to 2050. Only a minor increase in electrification over 
all transport modes is assumed, with passenger cars and buses increasing their 
electric vehicle (EV) shares. For example, this study projects a share of 30% for 
battery electric vehicles (BEVs) in China by 2050 in response to the foreseeable 
legislation and technological advancement in that country, whereas for the world car 
fleet, the share of BEVs is projected to increase to only around 10%. Growth in the 
shares of electric powertrains and two- and three-wheel vehicles in the commercial 
road vehicle fleet will be small, as will the rise in further rail electrification. Aviation 
and navigation (shipping) are assumed to remain fully dependent on conventional 
kerosene and diesel, respectively.
In the 2.0 °C Scenario minimal progress in electrification until 2020 will occur, 
whereas a significant increase in electrification of the transport sector between 2020 
and 2030 is projected. This will occur first in OECD regions, followed by emerging 
economies and finally in developing countries. Battery-driven electric passenger 
cars are projected to achieve shares of between 21% and 30%, whereas heavy 
commercial electric vehicles and buses could achieve even higher shares of between 
28% and 52% by 2030. This uptake will require a massive build-up of battery 
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production capacity in coming years. Two- and three-wheel vehicles—mainly used 
in Asia and Africa—will be nearly completely electrified (batteries and fuel cells) 
by 2030. Looking ahead to 2050, 60–70% of buses and heavy trucks will become 
(battery-driven) electric, and fuel-cell electric vehicles will increase their market 
share to around 37%. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, developing countries in Africa and 
countries in the oil-producing countries of the Middle East will remain predominantly 
dependent on internal combustion engines, using bio- or synthetic-based fuels.
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, an earlier and more rapid increase in electric powertrain 
penetration is required, with the OECD regions at the forefront. The emerging eco-
nomic regions must also electrify more rapidly than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. On a 
global level, internal combustion engines will be almost entirely phased out by 2050 
in both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In OECD regions, cars with internal com-
bustion engines (using oil-based fuels) will be phased out by 2040, whereas in Latin 
America or Africa, for example, a small share of internal combustion engine inter-
nal combustion engine (ICE)-powered cars, fuelled with biofuels or synthetic fuels, 
will still be on the road but will be constantly replaced by electric drivetrains 
(Fig. 3).
Efficiency improvements are modelled across all transport modes until 2050, 
resulting in improved energy intensity over time. We project an increase in annual 
efficiency of 0.5–1% in terms of MJ/tonnes km or MJ/passenger km, depending on 
the transport mode and region. Regardless of the types of powertrains and fuels, 
increasing the efficiency at the MJ/pkm or MJ/tkm level will result from the follow-
ing measures:
 – Reductions in powertrain losses through more efficient motors, gears, power 
electronics, etc.
 – Reductions in aerodynamic drag
 – Reductions in vehicle mass through lightweighting
 – The use of smaller vehicles
 – Operational improvements (e.g. through automatic train operation, load factor 
improvements)
Transport performance will increase in all scenarios on a global scale but with dif-
ferent speeds and intensities across modes and world regions. Current trends in 
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transport performance until 2050 are extrapolated for the 5.0 °C Scenario. In rela-
tive terms, all transport carriers will increase their performance from the current 
levels, and in particular, energy-intensive aviation, passenger car transport and com-
mercial road transport are projected to grow strongly. In the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
1.5 °C Scenario, we project a strong increase in rail traffic (starting from a relatively 
low base) and slower growth or even a decline in the use of the other modes in all 
world regions (Fig. 4).
The modal shifts from domestic aviation to rail and from road to rail are mod-
elled. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, passenger car pkm must decrease in the 
OECD countries (but increase in the developing world regions) after 2020 in order 
to maintain the carbon budget. The passenger car pkm decline will be partly com-
pensated by an increase in the performances of other transport modes, specifically 
public transport rail and bus systems.
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
5.0°C 2.0°C
1.5°C 
0%
50%
100%
150%
T
ra
ns
po
rt
-E
vo
lu
tio
n
200%
250%
300%
350%
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Freight Train Truck
Passenger Train Aviation (Domestic) Passenger Car Bus 2- & 3-Wheeler
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Global Renewable Energy Potential To develop the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, 
the economic renewable energy potential in a space-constrained environment was 
analysed. Land is a scarce resource. The use of land for nature conservation, agri-
cultural production, residential areas and industry, as well as for infrastructure such 
as roads and all aspects of human settlement, limits the amount of land available for 
utility-scale solar and wind projects. Furthermore, solar and wind generation 
requires favourable climatic conditions, so not all available areas are suitable for 
renewable power generation. To assess the renewable energy potential based on the 
area available, all scenario-relevant regions and subregions were analysed with the 
[R]E-SPACE methodology to quantify the available land area in square kilometres 
with a defined set of constraints:
 – Residential and urban settlements
 – Infrastructure for transport (e.g. rail, roads)
 – Industrial areas
 – Intensive agricultural production land
 – Nature conservation areas and national parks
 – Wetlands and swamps
 – Closed grasslands (as the land-use type)
In addition to this spatial analysis, the remaining available land areas were cor-
related with the available solar and wind resources. For CSP, a minimum solar radi-
ation of 2000 kilowatt hours per square meter and year (kWh/m2 year) is assumed 
to be the minimum deployment criterion, whereas the onshore wind potential under 
an average annual wind speed of 5 m/s has been omitted.
The 2.0 °C Scenario utilizes only a fraction of the available economic potential 
of the assumed suitable land for utility-scale solar PV and CSP plants. This estimate 
does not include solar PV rooftop systems, which have significant additional 
potential. India has the highest solar utilization rate of 8.5%, followed by Europe 
and the Middle East, each of which utilizes around 5%. Onshore wind potential has 
been utilized to a larger extent than solar potential. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, space- 
constrained India will utilize about half of all the onshore wind energy utilized, 
followed by Europe, which will utilize one fifth. This wind potential excludes 
offshore wind, which has significant potential, but mapping the offshore wind 
potential was beyond the scope of this analysis.
The 1.5 °C Scenario is based on the accelerated deployment of all renewables 
and the more ambitions implementation of efficiency measures. Thus, the total 
installed capacity of solar and wind power plants by 2050 is not necessarily larger 
than it is in the 2.0  °C Scenario, and the utilization rate is in the same order of 
magnitude. The increased deployment of renewable capacity in the OECD Pacific 
(Australia), the Middle East and Africa will be due to the production of synthetic 
bunker fuels based on hydrogen or synthetic fuels (synfuels) to supply the global 
transport energy for international shipping and aviation.
Key results of the global long-term energy scenarios show that the efficiency 
and uptake of renewable energy are two sides of the same coin. All sectors, including 
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transport, industry and all commercial and residential buildings, must use energy 
efficiently and from a huge range of renewable energy technologies. Compared with 
the 5.0  °C Scenario, which was defined using assumptions from the IEA, the 
alternative scenarios require more stringent efficiency levels. The 1.5 °C Scenario 
involves the even faster implementation of efficiency measures than in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario and the decelerated growth of energy services in all regions, in order to 
avoid a further strong increase in fossil fuel use after 2020.
Global energy intensity will decline from 2.4 MJ/US$GDP in 2015 to 1.25 MJ/
US$GDP in 2050 in the 5.0 °C Scenario compared with 0.65 MJ/US$GDP in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 0.59 MJ/US$GDP in the 1.5 °C Scenario. This is a result of the 
estimated power, heat and fuel demands for all sectors, with more stringent efficiency 
levels in the alternative scenarios than in the 5.0  °C case. It reflects a further 
decoupling of the energy demand and gross domestic product (GDP) growth as a 
prerequisite for the rapid decarbonisation of the global energy system.
Total final energy demand is estimated based on assumptions about the demand 
drivers, specific energy consumption and the development of energy services in 
each region. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the global energy demand will increase by 57% 
from 342 EJ/year in 2015 to 537 EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final 
energy will be 19% lower than the current consumption and will reach 278 EJ/year 
by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will be 253 EJ, 26% below 
the 2015 demand, and, in 2050, will be 9% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario.
Global electricity demand will significantly increase in the alternative scenarios 
due to the electrification of the transport and heating sectors, which will replace 
fuels, but will also be due to a moderate increase in the electricity demand of 
“classical” electrical devices on a global level. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity 
demand for heating will be about 12,600 TWh/year from electric heaters and heat 
pumps, and, in the transport sector, there will be an increase of about 23,400 TWh/
year due to electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and 
 high- temperature process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels for transport 
will add an additional power demand of 18,800 TWh/year. The gross power demand 
will thus rise from 24,300 TWh/year in 2015 to 65,900 TWh/year in 2050 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario, 34% higher than in the 5.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
gross electricity demand will increase to a maximum of 65,300 TWh/year in 2050.
Global electricity generation from renewable energy sources will reach 100% by 
2050  in the alternative scenarios. “New” renewables—mainly wind, solar and 
geothermal energy—will contribute 83% of the total electricity generated. The 
contribution of renewable electricity to total production will be 62% by 2030 and 
88% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 9500 GW by 
2030 and 25,600  GW by 2050. The proportion of electricity generated from 
renewables in 2030  in the 1.5  °C Scenario is assumed to be 73%. The 1.5  °C 
Scenario will have a generation capacity of renewable energy of about 25,700 GW 
in 2050.
From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV to 7850 GW and 
12,300 GW, respectively, will be complemented by the generation of up to 2060 GW 
of solar thermal energy as well as limited biomass-derived (770 GW), geothermal 
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(560 GW) and ocean-derived energy (around 500 GW) in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both 
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to the generation of high proportions (38% 
and 46%, respectively) of energy from variable power sources (PV, wind and ocean) 
by 2030, which will increase to 64% and 65%, respectively, by 2050. This will 
require a significant change in how the power system is operated. The main findings 
of the power sector analysis are summarized in the section below.
Calculated average electricity-generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) 
were around 6 ct/kWh. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, these generation costs will increase, 
assuming rising CO2 emission costs in the future, until 2050, when they reach 
10.6 ct/kWh. The generation costs will increase in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios 
until 2030, when they will reach 9 ct/kWh, and then drop to 7 ct/kWh by 2050. In 
both alternative scenarios, the generation costs will be around 3.5  ct/kWh lower 
than in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 2050. Note that these estimates of generation costs 
do not take into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, storage and 
other load-balancing measures.
Total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C Scenario will increase from today’s 
$1560 billion/year to more than $5 500 billion/year in 2050, due to the growth in 
demand and increasing fossil fuel prices. In both alternative scenarios, the total 
supply costs will be $5050 billion/year in 2050, about 8% lower than in the 5.0 °C 
Scenario.
Global investment in power generation between 2015 and 2050  in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario will be around $49,000 billion, which will include additional power plants 
to produce hydrogen and synthetic fuels and the plant replacement costs at the end 
of their economic lifetimes. This value is equivalent to approximately $1360 billion 
per year on average, which is $28,600  billion more than in the 5.0  °C Scenario 
($20,400 billion). An investment of around $51,000 billion for power generation 
will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario ($1420 billion per 
year on average). In both alternative scenarios, the world will shift almost 95% of 
its total energy investment to renewables and cogeneration.
Fuel Cost Savings Because renewable energy has no fuel costs other than biomass, 
the cumulative savings in fuel cost in the 2.0  °C Scenario will reach a total of 
$26,300 billion in 2050, equivalent to $730 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel 
costs in the 2.0 °C Scenario will be equivalent to 90% of the energy investments in 
the 5.0  °C Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5  °C Scenario will sum to 
$28,800 billion or $800 billion per year.
Final energy demand for heating will increase by 59% in the 5.0 °C Scenario 
from 151 EJ/year in 2015 to around 240 EJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 36% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, relative to that in the 5.0 °C case, and by 40% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Global Heat Supply In 2015, renewables supplied around 20% of the final global 
energy demand for heating, mainly from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 
42% of the world’s total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 56% in the 
1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat 
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demand in 2050. This will include the direct use of electricity for heating, which 
will increase by a factor of 4.2–4.5 between 2015 and 2050 and will constitute a 
final share of 26% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 30% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Estimated investments in renewable heating technologies to 2050 will amount to 
more than $13,200 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments for plant 
replacement after their economic lifetimes)—approximately $368 billion per year. 
The largest share of investment is assumed to be for heat pumps (around 
$5700 billion), followed by solar collectors and geothermal heat use. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies. However, the 
lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0  °C Scenario) will result in a lower 
average annual investment of around $344 billion per year.
Energy demand in the transport sector will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario from 
around 97 EJ/year in 2015 by 50% to 146 EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
assumed changes in technical, structural and behavioural factors will reduce this by 
66% (96 EJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. Additional modal 
shifts, technological changes and a reduction in the transport demand will lead to 
even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 74% (or 108 EJ/year) in 2050 
compared with the 5.0 °C case.
Transport Energy Supply By 2030, electricity will provide 12% (2700 TWh/year) 
of the transport sector’s total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and, in 2050, 
this share will be 47% (6500 TWh/year). In 2050, around 8430 PJ/year of hydrogen 
will be used as a complementary renewable option in the transport sector. In the 
1.5 °C Scenario, the annual electricity demand will be about 5200 TWh in 2050. 
The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a hydrogen demand of 6850 PJ/year by 2050. 
Biofuel use will be limited to a maximum of around 12,000 PJ/year in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario. Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be 
introduced, with a maximum amount of 5820 PJ/year in 2050. Because of the lower 
overall energy demand in transport, biofuel use will decrease in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
to a maximum of 10,000 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount 
to 6300 PJ/year.
Global primary energy demand in the 2.0  °C Scenario will decrease by 21% 
from around 556 EJ/year in 2015 to 439 EJ/year. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
the overall primary energy demand will decrease by 48% by 2050  in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario (5.0  °C, 837 EJ in 2050). In the 1.5  °C Scenario, the primary energy 
demand will be even lower (412 EJ) in 2050 because the final energy demand and 
conversion losses will be lower.
Global Primary Energy Supply Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly 
phase out coal and oil, after which renewable energy will have a primary energy 
share of 35% in 2030 and 92% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
renewables will have a primary share of more than 92% in 2050 (this will include 
nonenergy consumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy is 
phased out in both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy 
consumption of natural gas in the 5.0  °C Scenario will sum to 5580  EJ, the 
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cumulative coal consumption will be about 6360 EJ, and the crude oil consumption 
to 6380  EJ.  In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand is 3140  EJ, the 
cumulative coal demand 2340 EJ and the cumulative oil demand 2960 EJ. Even 
lower fossil fuel use will be achieved under the 1.5 °C Scenario: 2710 EJ for natural 
gas, 1570 EJ for coal and 2230 EJ for oil. In both alternative scenarios, the primary 
energy supply in 2050 will be based on 100% renewable energy (Fig. 5).
Bunker Fuels In 2015, the annual bunker fuel consumption was in the order of 
16,000 PJ, of which 7400 PJ was for aviation and 8600 PJ for navigation. Annual 
CO2 emissions from bunker fuels accounted for 1.3 Gt in 2015, approximately 4% 
of the global energy-related CO2 emissions. In the 5.0  °C case, we assume the 
development of the final energy demand for bunkers according to the IEA World 
Energy Outlook 2017, Current Policies scenario. This will lead to a further increase 
in the demand for bunker fuels by 120% until 2050 compared with the base year 
2015. Because no substitution with “green” fuels is assumed, CO2 emissions will 
rise by the same order of magnitude. Although the use of hydrogen and electricity 
in aviation is technically feasible (at least for regional transport) and synthetic gas 
use in navigation is an additional option under discussion, this analysis adopts a 
conservative approach and assumes that bunker fuels are only replaced by biofuels 
and synthetic liquid fuels. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, we assume the limited 
use of sustainable biomass potentials and the complementary central production of 
power-to-liquid synfuels.
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, this production is assumed to take place in three world 
regions: Africa, the Middle East and OECD Pacific (especially Australia), where 
synfuel generation for export is expected to be most economic. The 1.5 °C Scenario 
requires even faster decarbonisation, so it follows a more ambitious low-energy 
pathway. The production of synthetic fuels will cause significant additional 
 electricity demand and a corresponding expansion of renewable power-generation 
capacities. In the case of liquid bunker fuels, these additional renewable 
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power- generation capacities could amount to 1100 GW in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
more than 1200 GW in the 1.5 °C Scenario if the flexible utilization of 4000 full-
load hours per year can be achieved. However, such a scenario requires high elec-
trolyser capacities and high-volume hydrogen storage to ensure not only flexibility 
in the power system but also high utilization rates by downstream synthesis pro-
cesses (e.g. via Fischer-Tropsch plants).
Annual global energy-related CO2 emissions will increase by 40% in the 5.0 °C 
Scenario, from 31,180 Mt in 2015 to more than 43,500 Mt in 2050. The stringent 
mitigation measures in both alternative scenarios will cause annual emissions to fall 
to 7070 Mt in 2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 2650 Mt in the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
with further reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative 
CO2 emissions from 2015 until 2050 will sum to 1388 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C 
and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 
will be 587 Gt and 450 Gt, respectively. Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
will decrease by 58% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and by 68% in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
compared with the 5.0 °C case. Thus, a rapid reduction in annual emissions will 
occur in both alternative scenarios.
Global Power Sector Analysis
Global and regional long-term energy results were used to conduct a detailed power 
sector analysis with the methodology described in Sect. 1.7 of Chap. 3. Both the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios rely on high proportions of variable solar and wind 
generation. The aim of the power sector analysis was to gain insight into the stability 
of the power system in each region—subdivided into up to eight subregions—and 
to gauge the extent to which power grid interconnections, dispatch generation 
services and storage technologies are required. The results presented in this chapter 
are projections calculated based on publicly available data. Detailed load curves for 
some subregions and countries were not available, or, in some cases, the relevant 
information is classified. Therefore, the outcomes of the [R]E 24/7 model are 
estimates and require further research with more detailed localized data, especially 
regarding the available power grid infrastructures. The power sector projections for 
developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia, assume unilateral access to 
energy services by the residential sector by 2050 and require transmission and 
distribution grids in regions where there are none at the time of writing. Further 
research, in cooperation with local utilities and government representatives, is 
required to develop a more detailed understanding of the power infrastructure needs.
Development of Global Power Plant Capacities The size of the global market for 
renewable power plants will increase significantly under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The 
annual market for solar PV power must increase by a factor of 4.5, from close to 
100 GW in 2017 to an average of 454 GW by 2030. The annual onshore wind mar-
ket must expand to 172 GW by 2025, about three times higher than in 2017. The 
offshore wind market will continue to increase in importance within the renewable 
power sector. By 2050, offshore wind installations will increase to 32 GW annu-
ally—11 times higher than in 2017. Concentrated solar power (CSP) plants will 
play an important role in the generation of dispatchable solar electricity to supply 
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bulk power, especially for industry, and to provide secured capacities to power sys-
tems. By 2030, the annual CSP market must increase to 78 GW, compared with 
3 GW in 2020 and only 0.1 GW in 2017.
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the phase-out of coal and lignite power plants is acceler-
ated, and a total capacity of 618 GW—equivalent to approximately 515 power sta-
tions (1.2 GW on average)—must end operation by 2025. This will mean a phase-out 
of two coal power plants per week from 2020 onwards, on average. The replacement 
power will come from a variety of renewable power generators, both variable and 
dispatchable. The annual market for solar PV energy must be around 30% higher 
than it was in 2025, as under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The onshore wind market also has 
an accelerated trajectory under the 1.5 °C Scenario, whereas the offshore wind mar-
ket is assumed to be almost identical to that in the 2.0 °C Scenario, because of long 
lead times for these projects. The same is assumed for CSP plants, which are utility-
scale projects, and significantly higher deployment seems unlikely in the time 
remaining until 2025.
Utilization of Power Plant Capacities On a global scale, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the shares of variable renewable power generation will increase from 4% 
in 2015 to 38% and 46%, respectively, by 2030, and will increase to 64% and 65%, 
respectively, by 2050. The reason for the variations in the two cases is the different 
assumptions made regarding efficiency measures, which may lead to lower overall 
demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. During the same period, 
dispatchable renewables—CSP plants, bioenergy generation, geothermal energy 
and hydropower—will remain around 32% until 2030 on a global average and then 
decrease slightly to 29% under the 2.0 °C Scenario (and to 27% under the 1.5 °C 
Scenario) by 2050. The system share of dispatchable conventional generation 
capacities—mainly coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy—will decrease from a global 
average of 60% in 2015 to only 14% in 2040. By 2050, the remaining dispatchable 
conventional gas power plants will be converted to operate on hydrogen as a 
synthetic fuel, to avoid stranded investments and to achieve higher dispatch power 
capacities. Increased variable shares—mainly in the USA, the Middle East region 
and Australia—will produce hydrogen for local and the export markets, as fuel for 
both renewable power plants and the transport sector.
Development of Maximum and Residual Loads for the Ten World Regions The 
maximum load will increase in all regions and within similar ranges under both the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The load in OECD countries will rise most strongly in 
response to increased electrification, mainly in the transport sector, whereas the load 
in developing countries will increase as the overall electricity demand increases in 
all sectors.
The most significant increase will be in Africa, where the maximum load will 
surge by 534% over the entire modelling period due to favourable economic 
development and increased access to energy services by households. In OECD 
Pacific (South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), efficiency measures will 
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reduce the maximum load to 87% by 2030 relative to that in the base year, and it 
will increase to 116% by 2050 with the expansion of electric mobility and the 
increased electrification of the process heat supply in the industry sector. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario calculates slightly higher loads in 2030 due to the accelerated electrifica-
tion of the industry, heating and business sectors, except in three regions (the Middle 
East, India and Non-OECD Asia Other Asia), where the early application of effi-
ciency measures will lead to an overall lower demand at the end of the modelling 
period, for the same GDP and population growth rates.
In this analysis, the residual load is the load remaining after the variable renew-
able power generation. Negative values indicate that the energy generated from 
solar and wind exceeds the actual load and must be exported to other regions, stored 
or curtailed. In each region, the average generation should be consistent with the 
average load. However, maximum loads and maximum generations do not usually 
occur at the same time, so surplus electricity can be produced and must be exported 
or stored as far as possible. In rare individual cases, solar- or wind-based generation 
plants can also temporarily reduce their output to a lower load, or some plants can 
be shut down. Any reduction in energy generation from solar and wind sources in 
response to low demands is defined as “curtailment”. In this analysis, curtailment 
rates of up to 5% by 2030 and 10% by 2050 are assumed to have no substantial 
negative economic impact on the operation of power plants and therefore will not 
trigger an increase in storage capacities. Figure  6 illustrates the development of 
maximum loads across all ten world regions under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
Global Storage and Dispatch Capacities The world market for storage and dis-
patch technologies and services will increase significantly in the 2.0 °C Scenario. 
The annual market for new hydro-pumped storage plants will grow on average by 
6 GW per year to a total capacity of 244 GW in 2030. During the same period, the 
total installed capacity of batteries will increase to 12 GW, requiring an annual mar-
ket of 1 GW. Between 2030 and 2050, the energy service sector for storage and 
storage technologies must accelerate further. The battery market must grow by an 
annual installation rate of 22 GW and, as a result, will overtake the global cumula-
tive capacity of pumped hydro between 2040 and 2050. The conversion of gas infra-
structure from natural gas to hydrogen and synthetic fuels will start slowly between 
2020 and 2030, with the conversion of power plants with annual capacities of 
around 2 GW. However, after 2030, the transformation of the global gas industry to 
hydrogen will accelerate significantly, with the conversion of a total of 197 GW gas 
power plants and gas cogeneration facilities each year. In parallel, the average 
capacity of gas and hydrogen plants will decrease from 29% (2578 h/year) in 2030 
to 11% (975 h/year) by 2050, converting the gas sector from a supply-driven to a 
service-driven industry.
At around 2030, the 1.5 °C Scenario will require more storage throughput than 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, but the storage demands for the two scenarios will be equal at 
the end of the modelling period. It is assumed that the higher throughput can be 
managed with equally higher installed capacities, leading to full-load hours of up to 
200 h per year for batteries and hydro-pumped storage.
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Trajectories for a Just Transition of the Fossil Fuel Industry The implementation of 
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will have a significant impact on the global fossil 
fuel industry. While this may appear to be stating the obvious, current climate 
debates have not yet led to an open debate about the orderly withdrawal from the 
coal, oil and gas extraction industries. Instead, the political debate about coal, oil 
and gas is focused on the security of supply and price security. However, mitigating 
climate change is only possible when fossil fuels are phased out.
Coal: Under the 5.0  °C Scenario, the required production of thermal coal—
excluding coal for nonenergy uses, such as steel production—will remain at 2015 
levels, with an annual increase of around 1% per year until 2050. Under the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, coal production will decline sharply between 2020 and 2030 at a rate of 
around 6% per year. By 2030, global coal production will be equal to China’s annual 
production in 2017, at 3.7 billion tonnes, whereas that volume will be reached in 
2025 under the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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Oil: Oil production in the 5.0 °C Scenario will grow steadily by 1% annually 
until the end of the modelling period in 2050. Under the 2.0 °C Scenario, oil produc-
tion will decline by 3% annually until 2025 and then by 5% per year until 2030. 
After 2030, oil production will decline by around 7% per year on average, until the 
oil produced for energy use is phased out entirely by 2050. The oil production 
capacity of the USA, Saudi Arabia and Russia in 2017 would be sufficient to supply 
the global demand in 2035 calculated under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The 1.5 °C Scenario 
reduces the required production volume by half by 2030, reducing it further to the 
equivalent of the 2017 production volume of just one of the three largest oil produc-
ers (USA, Saudi Arabia or Russia) by 2040.
Gas: In the 5.0 °C Scenario, gas production will increase steadily by 2% a year 
for the next two decades, leading to an overall production increase of about 50% by 
2050. Compared with coal and oil, the gas phase-out will be significantly slower in 
the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios. These scenarios also assume that the gas 
infrastructure, such as gas pipelines and power plants, will be used afterwards for 
the hydrogen and/or renewable methane produced with electricity from renewable 
sources. Under the 2.0 °C Scenario, gas production will only decrease by 0.2% per 
year until 2025, by 1% until 2030 and, on average, by 4% annually until 2040. This 
represents a rather slow phase-out and will allow the gas industry to gradually 
transfer to hydrogen. The phase-out in the 1.5 °C Scenario is equally slow, and a 
4%/year reduction will occur after 2025.
The trajectories predicted by the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios for global coal, oil 
and gas production are consistent with the Paris Agreement targets and can be used 
to calculate possible employment effects, in terms of job losses in the fossil fuel 
industry, job gains in the renewable energy industry and options for transitioning the 
gas industry into an industry based on renewably produced hydrogen.
Employment The transition to a 100% renewable energy system is not just a tech-
nical task, it is also a socially and economically challenging process. It is imperative 
that this transition is managed in a fair and equitable way. One of the key concerns 
is the employment of workers in the affected industries. However, it should be noted 
that the “just transition” concept is concerned not only with workers’ rights but also 
with the broader community. This includes considering, for example, community 
participation in decision-making processes, public dialogue and policy mechanisms 
that create an enabling environment for new industries to ensure local economic 
development. Although it is acknowledged that a just transition is important, there 
are limited data on the effects that this transition will have on employment. There is 
even less information on the types of occupations that will be affected by the transi-
tion, either by project growth or declines in employment. This study provides pro-
jections for jobs in construction, manufacturing, operations and maintenance and 
fuel and heat supply across 12 technologies and 10 world regions, based on the 
5.0 °C, 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Projected employment is calculated regionally, 
but the results are presented at the global level.
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Employment—Quantitative Results The 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will generate 
more energy-sector jobs in the world as a whole at every stage of the projection. The 
1.5  °C Scenario will increase renewable energy capacities faster than the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, and, therefore, employment will increase faster. By 2050, both scenarios 
will create around 47 million jobs, so employment will be within similar ranges.
• In 2025, there will be 30.9 million energy-sector jobs under the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
45.5 million under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 52.3 million under the 1.5 °C.
• In 2030, there will be 31.7 million energy-sector jobs under the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
52.9  million under the 2.0  °C Scenario and 58.5  million under the 1.5  °C 
Scenario.
• In 2050, there will be 29.9 million energy-sector jobs under the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
48.7  million under the 2.0  °C Scenario and 46.3  million under the 1.5  °C 
Scenario.
Under the 5.0 °C Scenario, job will drop to 4% below the 2015 levels by 2020 and 
then remain quite stable until 2030. Strong growth in renewable energy will lead to 
an increase of 44% in total energy-sector jobs by 2025 under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
66% under the 1.5 °C Scenario. In the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, renewable energy 
jobs will account for 81% (86%) in 2025 and 87% (89%) in 2030, with PV having 
the greatest share of 24% (26%), followed by biomass, wind and solar heating.
Employment—Occupational Calculations Jobs will increase across all occupations 
between 2015 and 2025, except in metal trades, which display a minor decline of 
2%, as shown in Fig. 7. However, these results are not uniform across regions. For 
example, China and India will both experience a reduction in the number of jobs for 
managers and clerical and administrative workers between 2015 and 2025.
Mineral and Metal Requirements Under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios Within 
the context of the increasing requirements for metal resources by renewable energy 
and storage technologies, the rapid increases in demands for both cobalt and lithium 
are of greatest concern. The demands for both metals will exceed the current 
production rates by 2023 and 2022, respectively. The demands for these metals will 
increase more rapidly than will that for silver, partly because solar PV is a more 
established technology and silver use has become very efficient, whereas the 
electrification of the transport system and the rapid expansion in lithium battery use 
have only begun to accelerate in the last few years. The potential to offset primary 
demand is different depending on the technology. Offsetting demand through 
secondary sources of cobalt and lithium has the most potential to reduce total 
primary demand, as these technologies have a shorter lifetime of approximately 10 
years. The cumulative demands for both metals will exceed current reserves, but 
with high recycling rates, they can remain below the resource levels. However, there 
is a delay in the period during which recycling can offset demand, because there 
must be sufficient batteries in use and they must exhaust their current purpose before 
they can be collected and recycled. This delay could be further extended by strategies 
that reuse vehicular batteries as stationary storage, which might reduce costs in the 
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short term and increase the uptake of PV. The efficiency of cobalt in batteries also 
significantly reduces its demand, and this reduction is already happening as manu-
facturers move towards lower cobalt chemistries.
Increasing the efficiency of the material used is potentially the most successful 
strategy to offset the demand for PV metals, and recycling will have a smaller 
impact on demand because the lifespan of solar PV panels is long and their potential 
for recycling is low. Although the increased demand for silver by 2050 will not be 
as extreme as that for cobalt or lithium, it will still be considerable. This is important, 
especially when considering that solar PV currently consumes approximately 9% of 
end-use silver. It is possible to create silver-less solar panels, but these panels are 
not expected to be on the market in the near future.
Examination of the Climate Implications of Our Scenarios
One of the Paris Agreement’s most outstanding achievements has been the consensus 
by 195 countries to limit climate change to well below 2 °C and to pursue their best 
efforts to limit it to 1.5 °C. Together with the goal to reduce emissions to net zero 
levels, the international agreement clearly sets a framework in which regional and 
national emission trajectories can be designed and evaluated. The strong focus on a 
<2.0 °C temperature increase is partly driven by the knowledge that 2 °C warming 
does not equate to a safe climate: not for small islands that are threatened by rising 
seas, not for farmers dependent on rainfall in drought-stricken areas and not for 
communities that are threatened by extreme rainfall events or more intense cyclones.
Here, we use probabilistic methods to examine the scenarios that have been 
developed to evaluate their implications for long-term temperature and sea-level 
rises, using models and settings that are also used in the recent IPCC Special Report 
on 1.5 °C warming. Our lowest scenario has—by design—an approximate 50% or 
higher chance of a 2100 temperature level that is below 1.5 °C—after a slight over-
shoot. In contrast to the SSP1_19 scenario, which is the main 1.5  °C-compliant 
scenario in the next IPCC Assessment Report, our 1.5 °C Scenario does not rely on 
massive net negative emissions. Even the most stringent mitigation scenarios devel-
oped in this study are unable to halt sea-level rise. In fact, a 30 cm rise in sea level 
by 2100, which will continue thereafter, seems to be the unavoidable legacy of our 
past use of fossil fuels, unless we remove this CO2 from the atmosphere in much 
larger amounts than even the complete reforestation of the planet would permit.
Faced with the grim challenge of ongoing climate risks on the one side and the 
many positive effects and economic benefits of switching from fossil fuels to 
renewables on the other, the path is clear. A rapid shift towards a new era of smart, 
renewable and sector-coupled energy supply, combined with clever demand-side 
measures and adaptations to the impacts of climate change, will allow us and our 
children to address the legacy of our past reliance on fossil fuels.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Sven Teske and Thomas Pregger
Abstract Brief introduction to the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and its main goals, 
followed by the project background, motivation and objectives. Presentation of the 
specific research questions for the energy and climate scenario development. Short 
overview of published 100% renewable energy scenarios and the main differences 
between those scenarios and the newly developed 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C scenarios pre-
sented in the book. Overview about the basic assumptions in regard to technology 
preferences in future energy pathways. Discussion of the advantages and limitations 
of scenarios in the energy and climate debate.
UNFCCC Paris Agreement, Article 2:
 1. This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, 
including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat 
of climate change,in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty, including by:
 (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2.0 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the tem-
perature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that 
this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;
 (b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate 
change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emission 
development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and
(continued)
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2The Paris Climate Agreement aims to hold global warming to well below 2.0 °C and 
to “pursue efforts” to limit it to 1.5 °C. To accomplish this, countries have submitted 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) outlining their post-2020 
climate actions (Rogelj et al. 2016). The aim of this research is to develop practical 
pathways to achieve the Paris climate goals in an economically feasible and sustain-
able matter.
The study described in this book focuses on changing the ways in which humans 
produce energy, because energy-related CO2 emissions are the main driver of cli-
mate change. The analysis also considers the developmental pathways of non- 
energy- related emissions and mitigation measures because it is essential to address 
their contributions if we are to achieve the Paris climate change targets. The analysis 
considers options or ‘scenarios’ for the transition to net zero emissions across all 
sectors that allow unnecessary techno-economic, societal, and environmental risks 
to be avoided.
Scenario studies are an important way of linking expected or assumed anthropo-
genic activities and their resulting emissions with environmental effects, such as 
global warming. They also provide important insights into these techno-economic, 
societal, and political options and their various effects. Therefore, they are widely 
used to analyse possible carbon emission pathways, to guide decision-makers, and 
to motivate or justify interventions and developments. However, comprehensive, 
transparent, and robust results and conclusions are required as the bases for such 
decision-making. Ideally, this information will come from scenario studies that 
investigate a broad range of possible conditions and available options. Such studies 
must adopt a holistic approach and integrate comprehensive state-of-the-art back-
ground knowledge, including about the impacts of sectoral and technological 
changes, the influence of market developments, and the effects of certain pathways.
Existing global scenario studies do not provide a comprehensive view of the pos-
sible development pathways and technological options required to achieve these 
ambitious climate targets. Each study usually provides a few selected pathways, 
representing a narrow range of possible energy futures. One reason for this is that 
most scenario models are based on objective cost-optimizing functions, which over-
emphasize the cost efficiency based on uncertain cost assumptions. Another reason 
is that disruptive developments are not usually considered in scenario narratives. 
The history of scenario-based systems analysis is littered with many examples of 
misleading and fallacious ‘optimized’ scenario pathways and derived policy recom-
mendations (see e.g., Mai et al. 2013; Mohn 2016).
 (c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low green-
house gas emissions and climate-resilient development.
 2. This Agreement will be implemented to reflect equity and the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in 
the light of different national circumstances.
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3Furthermore, in most existing 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios, achievement of the 
climate targets is based on technologies that have significant, and to some extent 
unknown, disadvantages. These technologies include nuclear power generation, car-
bon capture and sequestration, and geoengineering (see e.g., Rogelj et  al. 2018; 
Kriegler et al. 2015). Such scenarios involve considerable risk. Moreover, the reader 
is usually given only limited access to the model assumptions and results, and 
 therefore has limited information about the transparency and traceability of the fac-
tors that influence these model-based analyses and the conclusions drawn from them.
The primary objective of this report is to provide a holistic picture of what will 
be involved in the transition to 100% renewable energy. This report examines power, 
heat, and fuel supplies on a global scale. Its main focus is on the role of efficiency 
and renewable energies. We aim to contribute a different and complementary view 
of the global transition to renewable energy. We provide two exemplary develop-
ment pathways for each of the 10 regions of the world. We consider both pathways 
to be achievable, based on the current state of knowledge, and both are consistent 
with the “well below 2.0 °C” climate target.
In addition to scenario building, we assess the major economic and infrastruc-
tural implications of the two pathways in comparison with a 5.0 °C ‘reference’ sce-
nario based on the International Energy Agency (IEA)‘s Current Policies scenario 
published in the Word Energy Outlook 2017 (IEA-WEO 2017). We do not claim that 
our scenarios are optimal with regard to the economy or society. We want to provide 
a transparent basis for the further concretization and development of energy system 
transformation, and to demonstrate the enormous challenges we face and the need 
for action. In contrast to most other studies, we have excluded options with large 
uncertainties about the economic, societal, and environmental risks associated with 
technologies such as nuclear power, unsustainable biomass use, CCS, and 
geoengineering.
Another important objective is to combine bottom-up energy scenarios with non- 
energy greenhouse gas (GHG)-mitigation scenarios to construct a complete picture 
of possible climate mitigation pathways and the contributions of the illustrated strat-
egies to achieving the Paris targets. Land-use changes and emissions of other GHGs 
and aerosols are the focus of this analysis. Finally, GHG concentrations, radiative 
forcing, and the implications of global mean temperature and sea-level rises are 
modelled by applying a feasible model with reduced complexity, which is fre-
quently used for integrated assessment models, as the climate model.
Any scenario building on a global scale must severely simplify the complex tran-
sition processes and their interrelations. The introduction of different new technolo-
gies occurs under very different conditions and at different scales, and an in-depth 
analysis is required in each case to identify the optimal or feasible solutions. Global 
governance will also be required for the fast and deep decarbonisation of the world’s 
energy systems, especially in relation to carbon pricing and efficiency standards.
However, all perspectives need a common understanding of what is required to 
meet the ambitious Paris climate targets. We believe that the results of this study 
will contribute to such a common understanding and will demonstrate how urgent is 
the need to act.
1 Introduction
4The 2.0  °C Scenario represents a far more likely pathway than the 1.5  °C 
Scenario. Whereas the 2.0 °C Scenario takes into account unavoidable delays due to 
political, economic, and societal processes and stakeholders, the 1.5 °C Scenario 
requires immediate action. Under the 1.5  °C Scenario, efficiency measures and 
renewable energy options must be deployed, and the further development of energy 
services must be limited and constrained. Furthermore, for the 1.5 °C Scenario to be 
achievable, it will be essential for developing countries to avoid inefficient tech-
nologies and behaviours.
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Chapter 2
State of Research
Sven Teske, Malte Meinshausen, and Kate Dooley
Abstract This chapter sets the context for the climate and energy scenario develop-
ment. The first part summarizes the scientific status quo of climate change research 
and explains how the global climate has changed over recent decades and the likely 
outcomes if we continue with business as usual and fail to drastically reduce GHG 
emissions.
The second part reviews the development of the global energy markets during the 
past decade. Trends in the power-, transport- and heating sector in regard to technolo-
gies and investments are provided for the year of writing (2018). The developments 
put the energy scenarios presented in the following chapters into a global context.
2.1  Scientific Status Quo of Climate Change Research
A summary of the latest scientific publications explains how the global climate has 
changed in recent decades and the likely outcomes if we continue with ‘business as 
usual’ and fail to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
2.1.1  Basics of Climate Change and Radiative Forcing
The Earth’s current climate is the result of a delicate balance between incoming short-
wave solar radiation and outgoing long-wave radiation that moves back to space. 
Roughly half (165 W/m2) the incoming short-wave radiation (340 W/m2) reaches the 
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6surface of the Earth. The rest is reflected back to space by clouds, aerosol particles, or 
scattering gases, such as N2 and O2 (100 W/m2) or is absorbed by the troposphere 
(75 W/m2) (Stephens et al. 2012). With the exception of clouds and aerosols, this win-
dow to incoming solar radiation onto Earth’s surface is relatively transparent, so that 
most of the Sun’s energy that comes towards Earth is absorbed either in the atmosphere 
or on the Earth’s surface. This window is our basic heating engine, and the incoming 
radiation that is our energy source is somewhat dimmed by aerosol emissions and by 
changes in the amount of sunlight reflected back to space by changes in land use. 
However, these are not humanity’s greatest influences on the Earth’s climate.
There is a second window for radiation, through which outgoing long-wave radi-
ation passes, and we are much more effectively closing this window than the one for 
incoming solar radiation. We can imagine that this second atmospheric window 
already has a thick curtain across it, largely formed by water vapour. That curtain 
prevents surface long-wave radiation from going directly to space. In other words, 
that curtain acts like a thick blanket. The long-wave radiation that the Earth loses 
back into space originates not from its surface but from much higher atmospheric 
layers, which tend to be colder. Without absorbers of long-wave radiation in the 
atmosphere, the Earth’s surface would be much colder and inhospitable to humans.
To the parts of the outgoing radiation window that are not yet covered by water 
vapour, humanity is now adding more layers of absorbers of other long-wave radia-
tion in the form of GHGs. By adding an assortment of GHGs, we are thickening the 
existing curtain and closing the curtain further across the long-wave radiation win-
dow. Compared with the overall incoming solar radiation at 340 W/m2, the ‘curtain’ 
generated by human-induced increases in the concentrations of long-lived green-
house gases (CO2, CH4, halocarbons, N2O and fluorinated gases) appears to be of 
little importance, as it “only” amounts to 2.83 W/m2. The addition and subtraction 
of many other smaller human influences results in a slightly reduced net current 
(year 2011) forcing of 2.29 W/m2.
2.1.1.1  Anthropogenic Contribution
Beyond reasonable doubt, climate change over the last 250 years has been driven by 
anthropogenic activities. In fact, the human-induced release of GHGs into the atmo-
sphere has the potential to cause more than 100% of the currently observed climate 
change. The reason that climate change is not even greater than it is that some 
human-induced changes mask some of the warming attributable to elevated GHG 
concentrations. This masking effect arises from the emission of cooling aerosols 
and changes in land use that increase the reflectivity of the Earth’s surface.
2.1.1.2  Carbon Budget and Future Warming
Although the anthropogenic contribution to climate change occurs via a large set of 
GHG emissions (the current emission scenarios that feed into CMIP6 include 43 
GHG emission species), and multiple aerosols and land-use changes, there is one 
dominant influence: carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
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7It is not only the magnitude of the anthropogenic emissions of CO2 that makes it 
such a significant driver of human-induced climate change. There is also an inherent 
difference between CO2 and almost all other GHGs and aerosols. Over the time 
scales of interest here, CO2 does not have a finite lifetime in the atmosphere. All 
other gases react chemically, become photo-dissociated in the stratosphere, or are, 
for example, consumed by the bacteria in soils. However, once CO2 is released from 
the near-permanent carbon pools of fossil fuel reservoirs, it only travels between a 
set of ‘active’ carbon pools. These active pools are the land biosphere, the ocean, 
and the atmosphere. Therefore, if CO2 is added to one, the level in all three pools 
will rise and over time, a new, higher equilibrium concentration is reached. For 
example, whereas CO2 is consumed by plants during the photosynthesis process and 
then built into plant tissue as carbon, this same carbon is released again as CO2 
when forests burn, when organic matter in the soil decomposes, and when humans 
and other animals oxidize the food they eat. Therefore, a kilogram of CO2 emissions 
will increase the atmospheric CO2 concentration for hundreds or even thousands of 
years. Initially, the average CO2 concentration will shoot up by that kilogram, and 
then drop relatively quickly again before a new equilibrium is slowly re-established 
by the redistribution of carbon into the land biosphere and the ocean.
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report highlighted this key difference between CO2 
and other GHGs. The airborne fraction of CO2 emissions diminishes over time, as 
for other GHGs. However, the airborne CO2 fraction does not decline to zero over 
100 years, 1000 years, or even longer periods. Furthermore, carbon-cycle feedback 
mechanisms mean that higher CO2 concentrations cause more carbon to remain in 
the atmosphere. Acting in the other direction, any extra amount of CO2 in the atmo-
sphere will have less and less effect on radiative forcing, i.e., how much each CO2 
molecule contributes to the warming of the planet. These factors act in concert with 
another feature of the climate system: the Earth’s inertia to warming. When the 
thermostat of your kitchen oven is set to 220 °C, the oven will take a while to heat 
to that level. The situation is much the same with the Earth’s climate. The IPCC 
Fifth Assessment Report notes that three effects (the carbon cycle and its feedbacks, 
the saturation effect of forcing, and the delayed response of the atmosphere to 
warming) combine to create what is almost a stepwise function in the warming 
caused by CO2 emissions. In other words, every extra kilogram of CO2 produces a 
slightly greater increase in temperature than the preceding kilogram, and the warm-
ing effect is much the same 10 years after the emission of that kilogram as it is after 
100 or 500 years. Over time, less of the CO2 will remain in the atmosphere, but the 
Earth’s inertia will still cause the temperature to reflect the extra warmth arising 
from the initial emission.
This feature of the Earth’s warming and the carbon cycle can be exploited to 
derive a very simple linear relationship between cumulative carbon emissions and 
warming. In fact, the resultant warming is a simple function of the sum of all the 
CO2 that has ever been emitted, largely independent of when a certain amount of 
CO2 was emitted in the past. Based on this understanding, we can compute the car-
bon budgets for specific levels of warming. As a complication, of course, an 
unknown amount of warming arises in response to other GHG emissions and aero-
2  State of Research
8sols. When deriving carbon budgets, this extra level of warming is normally derived 
from a range of future emission scenarios. Therefore, the ultimate level of warming 
is the sum of the linear CO2-induced warming level (often described as the ‘tran-
sient climate response to cumulative emissions of carbon’) and a smaller and some-
what uncertain contribution that depends on the other GHGs and aerosols.
2.1.2  Carbon Budgets for 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C Warming
The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report used the results of earth system models to derive 
its carbon budgets. Earth system models are the most complex computer models we 
have of how the Earth, its atmosphere, oceans, and vegetation are interacting with 
each other. The IPCC investigated the amounts of cumulative carbon emissions (in 
a multi-gas world) that would be consistent with, for example, temperatures main-
tained below either 1.5 °C or 2.0 °C higher than to pre-industrial levels. The recently 
published IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 °C degree target cites different carbon 
budget numbers, depending on whether a low estimate of historical temperatures is 
assumed or surface air temperatures are consistently applied. Therefore, there is 
some complexity and uncertainty around the carbon budget, which is related to the 
fact that different interpretations can be made about how far we are still away from 
the 1.5 °C target (for example). If we assume that we are still 0.63 °C away from 
1.5 °C warming (a very optimistic estimate, which is unfortunately based on a too 
optimistic account of historical emissions), from January 2018 onwards, we can still 
emit 1320 GtCO2 before reaching 2.0 °C warming (66% chance) and 770 GtCO2 
before reaching 1.5 °C warming (50% chance). These figures must be reduced by a 
further 100 GtCO2 to account for the additional Earth system feedback that has 
occurred over the twenty-first century. However, when a more realistic measure of 
historical temperature evolution is used (i.e., calculated by consistently using prox-
ies for surface air temperatures over the land and ocean, rather than by mixing ocean 
surface water temperatures with air temperatures over land), the carbon budgets are 
no longer very high. Specifically, the carbon budget required to maintain the Earth’s 
temperature below 2.0  °C, with 66% probability, then decreases to 1170 GtCO2 
from 1 January 2018 onwards and to 560 GtCO2 for a 50% chance of staying below 
1.5 °C (before the extra 100 GtCO2 that must be subtracted for additional Earth 
system feedbacks is taken into account; see Table 2.2 in the IPCC Special Report on 
1.5 °C warming).
The substantial difference between these two sets of figures (and also their dif-
ferences from earlier IPCC estimates of the carbon budget) is the focus of a current 
intense scientific debate, which is unlikely to be settled in the next few months (see 
e.g., Schurer et al. 2017, 2018; Hawkins et al. 2017). As already mentioned, one of 
the key factors in deriving a carbon budget is the estimated current level of warm-
ing. Among other reasons, the recent warming ‘hiatus’ in temperature may explain 
why the recently derived carbon budgets are more relaxed than expected. When the 
‘hiatus’ period substantially influences the level of warming that is taken as a start-
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9ing point, the ‘distance’ from 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C might seem larger than it is. The 
recent upswing in the global mean temperatures gives us an idea of how much natu-
ral variability is superimposed on the long-term warming trend. Other points for 
discussion in the determination of carbon budgets include the pre-industrial warm-
ing level and the already-mentioned amount of warming induced by non-CO2 gases.
This study does not aim to resolve the differences in opinions about carbon bud-
gets, but it does provide emissions pathways that can be considered to be consistent 
with both a target level of 1.5 °C warming in the case of the 1.5 °C scenario, and 
with a “well-below 2.0 °C” target level in the case of the 2.0 °C scenario.
Whatever the precise carbon budget, recent effects of climate change provide 
another set of stark reminders that it is more urgent than ever to replace fossil fuels. 
If we wait for the wild-fire seasons that will occur at global warming levels of 
1.5 °C or 2.0 °C, with intensified droughts or ever-more intense hurricane, it might 
be much too late to avoid their widespread catastrophic impacts. Even at 1.5 °C 
warming, there is a risk that the continuous melting of the Greenland ice sheet will 
cause sea levels to rise by meters over the coming centuries. Fossil fuels have 
undoubtedly allowed great growth in prosperity across the globe, but their replace-
ment with the cleaner, cheaper and emission-free technologies that are available 
today is overdue.
2.2  Development of Energy Markets—Past and Present
Renewable energy technologies have been developing rapidly since the beginning 
of the century, and they have emerged from niche markets to become mainstream. 
This section provides an overview of the development of renewable energy in the 
power, heating, and transport sectors up to the year of writing (2018). These devel-
opments will put the energy scenarios presented in the following chapters into a 
global context. The research and data in Sect. 2.2.1 are based on the REN21 
Renewables 2018—Global Status Report Renewables.
2.2.1  Global Trends in Renewable Energy in 2018
In 2017, ongoing trends continued: solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind power domi-
nated the global market for new power plants, the price of renewable energy tech-
nologies continued to decline, and fossil fuel prices remained low. A new benchmark 
was reached, in that the new renewable capacity began to compete favourably with 
existing fossil fuel power plants in some markets (Malik 2017). Electrification of 
the transport and heating sectors is gaining attention, and although the amount of 
electrification is currently small, the use of renewable technologies is expected to 
increase significantly.
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The growth in solar PV has been remarkable, nearly double that of second- 
ranking wind power, and the capacity of new solar PV is greater than the combined 
increases in the coal, gas, and nuclear capacities (FS-UNEP 2018). Storage is 
increasingly used in combination with variable renewables as battery costs decline, 
and solar PV plus storage has started to compete with gas peaking plants (Carroll 
2018). However, bioenergy (including traditional biomass) remains the leading 
renewable energy source in the heating (buildings and industry) and transport 
sectors.
Renewable energy’s share of the total final energy consumption has increased 
only modestly in recent years, despite tremendous growth in the modern renewable 
energy sector. There are two main reasons for this. One is that the growth in the 
overall energy demand (except for the drop in 2009 after the global economic reces-
sion) has counteracted the strong forward momentum of modern renewable energy 
technologies. The other is the declining share of traditional biomass, as people 
switch to other forms of energy. Traditional biomass makes up nearly half of all 
renewable energy used, and its use has increased at a rate lower than the growth in 
total energy consumption.
Since 2013, the global energy-related CO2 emissions from fossil fuels have 
remained relatively flat. Early estimates based on preliminary data suggest that this 
changed in 2017, with global CO2 emissions growing by around 1.4% (REN21- 
GSR 2018). These increased emissions were primarily due to increased coal con-
sumption in China, which grew by 3.7% in 2017 after a 3-year decline (ENERDATA 
2018). This increased Chinese consumption, as well as steady growth of around 4% 
in India, is expected to lead to an upturn in global coal use, reversing the annual 
global decline observed from 2013 to 2016 (ENERDATA 2018).
In contrast to the upturn in global coal use, in 2017, 26 countries joined the 
Powering Past Coal Alliance, which is committed to phasing-out coal power by 
2030, with new pledges from Angola, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom (Carrington 2017). An increasing number of companies who 
owned, developed or operated coal power plants have moved away from the coal 
business (Shearer 2017). Also in 2017, 26 of 28 European Union member states 
signed an agreement to build no more coal-fired power plants from 2020 onwards, 
and the Port of Amsterdam, which currently handles 16 million tonnes of coal per 
year, announced plans to become coal-free by 2030 (Campbell 2017).
The global oil price averaged USD 52.5 per barrel in 2017, equivalent to about 
half the record high prices that occurred between 2011 and 2014, although it was 
still almost double the prices from 1996 to 2005 (Statista 2018). Natural gas prices 
fell from 2013 to 2016, and early indicators suggest that prices remained low or 
decreased further in 2017 (BP 2017). Low fossil fuel prices have challenged renew-
able energy markets, especially in the heating and transport sectors (IEA-RE 2016).
The value of direct global fossil fuel consumption subsidies in 2016 was esti-
mated to be about USD 360 billion, a 15% reduction since 2015—but still more 
than 20% higher than the total renewable industry turnover in 2017 (IEA-WEB 
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2018). The value of fossil fuel subsidies also increases by an order of magnitude if 
externalities are considered (IMF 2015). Although the Group of Twenty (G20) reaf-
firmed their 2009 commitment to phasing-out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in 
2017, progress has been slow and there are calls from large investors, insurers, and 
civil society to both increase transparency and accelerate the process (G20-2017). 
The main problems identified include that the G20 has not defined ‘inefficient sub-
sidies’; there is no mandatory reporting; and there are no timelines for phase-out 
commitments (Asmelash 2017).
At the global policy level, international climate negotiations have continued to 
influence energy markets. Following the 2015 Paris Agreement of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a technical meet-
ing on its implementation took place in Bonn, Germany, in November 2017 at the 
23rd Conference of the Parties (COP23) (UNFCCC 2017). Although renewable 
energy figured prominently in a large proportion of the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) that countries submitted in the lead-up to COP22 in 2016, the 
climate negotiations in 2017 were unable to resolve the question of how NDCs 
should be organized, delivered, and updated, leaving uncertainty about how national 
renewable energy commitments could be ramped up (Timberley 2017).
Despite these uncertainties, an increasing number of communities, cities, and 
regions have introduced 100% renewable energy targets. The number of cities pow-
ered by at least 70% renewable electricity has more than doubled in 2 years, from 
42 in 2015 to 101 in 2017. These cities now include Auckland, Brasilia, Nairobi, 
and Oslo (CDP-WEB 2018).
Carbon pricing policies, which include carbon taxes and emission trading 
schemes, were in place in 64 jurisdictions around the world in 2017, up from 61 in 
2016. In December 2017 (REN21-GSR 2018), China launched the first phase of its 
long-awaited nationwide carbon emissions trading scheme, which will focus on the 
power sector. Carbon trading will be based in Shanghai and will include about 1700 
power companies emitting more than 3 billion tonnes of CO2 annually (Xu and 
Mason 2017). For comparison, the emissions trading scheme of the European Union 
included around 1.7 billion tonnes of CO2 in 2016 (EC 2017). Reforms to the 
European Union scheme were agreed upon at the end of 2017, which will reduce the 
number of emission certificates issued and accelerate the cancellation of surplus 
certificates (Agora 2018).
The global investment in renewable energy in 2017 (excluding hydropower 
plants larger than 50 megawatts [MW]) was USD 280 billion (REN21-GSR 2018), 
up by 2% from 2016, but 13% below the all-time high, which occurred in 2015. It 
is noteworthy that each dollar represents more capacity on the ground as prices per 
GW decrease. Nearly all the investment was in either solar PV (58%) or wind power 
(38%). Developing countries accounted for the largest share of investment for the 
third consecutive year, at 63% of the total investment. China alone accounted for 
45% of global investment, with a 30% increase since 2016. The United States was 
next, with 14%, followed by Japan (5%) and India (4%). Investment remained 
steady or trended upwards in Latin America and the USA, but has been falling in 
Europe since about 2010, with a drop of 30% from 2016 to 2017 (UNEP-FS 2018).
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Pressure to diversify and stable growth in the renewables sector over the past 
decade has increased the interest of the fossil fuel industry in renewables. Large oil 
corporations more than doubled their acquisitions, project investments, and venture 
capital stakes in renewable energy in 2016 relative to those in 2015. This increased 
the investment in clean energy companies to USD 6.2 billion over the past 15 years, 
with more than 70% of deals involving solar PV or wind, and 16% involving biofu-
els (Bloomberg 2017). However, this is dwarfed by the spending of these companies 
on fossil fuels. One estimate is that renewables account for about 3% of the total 
annual spending (around USD 100 billion) by the world’s five biggest oil companies 
(Schneyer and Bousso 2018). Bank finance for fossil fuels increased in 2017 by 
11% relative to that in 2016, after a significant decline in 2016 (RAN 2018).
In 2017, as in previous years, renewables saw the greatest increases in capacity 
in the power sector, whereas the growth of renewables in the heating, cooling, and 
transport sectors was comparatively slow. Sector coupling—the interconnection of 
power, heating, and transport, and particularly the electrification of heating and 
transport—is gaining increasing attention as a way to increase the uptake of renew-
ables by the transport and thermal sectors. Sector coupling also allows the integra-
tion of large shares of variable renewable energy, although this is still at an early 
stage. For example, China is specifically encouraging the electrification of heating, 
manufacturing, and transport in high-renewable areas, including promoting the use 
of renewable electricity for heating to reduce the curtailment of wind, solar PV, and 
hydropower. Several USA states are examining options for electrification, specifi-
cally to increase the overall renewable energy share (NEEP 2017).
2.2.1.1  Trends in the Renewable Power Sector
The capacity for generating renewable power saw its largest annual increase ever in 
2017, with an estimated 178 GW of capacity added. The total global renewable 
power capacity increased by almost 9% relative to that in 2016. Solar PV additions 
reached a record high and represented about 55% of newly installed renewable 
power capacity in 2017. The increase in the solar PV capacity was greater than the 
combined net additions to the fossil fuel and nuclear capacities. For the first time, 
the installed solar PV capacity surpassed the global operating capacity of nuclear 
power. Wind and hydropower installations were in second and third positions, con-
tributing about 29% and 11% of the increase in renewable generation capacity, 
respectively (REN21-GSR 2018).
In 2017, renewables accounted for an estimated 70% of net additions to the 
global power-generating capacity, up from 63% in 2016 (REN21-GSR 2018). The 
cost-competitiveness of renewable power generation continued to improve. Wind 
power and solar PV are now competitive with the generation of new fossil fuel 
energy in many markets, and even with existing fossil fuel generation in some mar-
kets. The costs of bio-electricity, hydropower, and geothermal power projects com-
missioned in 2017 were mostly within the range of the cost of fossil-fuel-fired 
electricity generation. Offshore wind prices also fell significantly in 2017, as com-
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petitive tenders in Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands resulted in bids that were 
competitive with new conventional power generation.
By the end of 2017, the countries with the greatest total installed renewable elec-
tric capacities were China, the USA, Brazil, Germany, and Canada. When only solar 
and wind capacities are considered, the top countries were China, the USA, and 
Germany, followed by Japan, India, and Italy, and then by Spain and the UK, which 
had about equal amounts of capacity by the year’s end.
Seventeen countries have more than 90% renewable electricity, with the majority 
supplied almost completely by hydropower. However, three of these, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica, and Ethiopia, also have significant contributions from wind power 
(32%, 10%, and 7%, respectively) (REN21-GSR 2018). Increasing proportions of 
variable renewable electricity (VRE) must be integrated into electricity systems, 
and VRE penetration reached locally significant levels in 2017. The countries lead-
ing the way with wind and solar penetration are Denmark (52%), Uruguay (32%), 
and Cape Verde (31%), with another three countries at or above the 25% VRE pen-
etration mark. Several countries and regions integrated much higher shares of VRE 
into their energy systems as instantaneous shares of the total demand for short peri-
ods during 2017, e.g., South Australia (more than 100% of load from wind power 
alone, and 44% of load from solar PV alone on another occasion), Germany (66% 
of load from wind and solar combined), Texas (54% of load from wind alone), and 
Ireland (60% of load from wind alone) (Parkinson 2017).
Curtailment—the forced reduction of wind and solar generation—is an indicator 
of grid integration challenges. In six of the jurisdictions with the highest VRE pen-
etration, the curtailment rates were low (0–6%) in 2016 (Wynn 2018). Although 
curtailment initially tends to increase as the VRE share increases, some jurisdictions 
have successfully introduced measures, such as transmission upgrades, that have 
significantly reduced curtailment (Wynn 2018). Integration challenges have led to 
high curtailment rates in China, the world’s largest wind and solar PV market (ECNS.
CN 2018). These were reduced in 2017, with the average curtailment of wind power 
for the year at around 12%, down from 17% in 2016, and the average curtailment of 
solar PV was 6–7%, down 4.3% relative to that in 2016 (Haugwitz 2018).
The ongoing increase in the growth and geographic expansion of renewable 
energy was driven by the continued decline in the prices for renewable energy 
 technologies (in particular, for solar PV and wind power), caused by the increasing 
power demand in some countries and by targeted renewable energy support mecha-
nisms.44 Solar PV and onshore wind power are now competitive with new fossil fuel 
generation in an increasing number of locations, due in part to declines in system 
component prices and to improvements in generation efficiency. The bid prices for 
offshore wind power also dropped significantly in Europe during 2016 (FT 
12.9.2017).
Such declines in cost are particularly important in developing and emerging 
economies, and in isolated electric systems (such as on islands or in isolated rural 
communities) where electricity prices tend to be high (if they are not heavily subsi-
dized), where there is a shortage of generation, and where renewable energy 
resources are particularly plentiful, making renewable electricity more competitive 
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relative to other options. Many developing countries are racing to bring new power- 
generating capacities online to meet rapidly increasing electricity demands, often 
turning to renewable technologies (which may be grid-connected or off-grid) 
through policies such as tendering or feed-in tariffs, in order to achieve the desired 
growth quickly.
Approximately 1.06 billion people, most in sub-Saharan Africa, lived without 
electricity in 2016, 223 million fewer than in 2012 (IEA-WEO 2016; IEA-EAO 
2017). Distributed renewables for energy access (DREA) systems were serving an 
estimated 300 million people at the end of 2016, and they comprised about 6% of 
new electricity connections worldwide between 2012 and 2016 (IRENA-P 2017). In 
places where the electricity grid does not reach or is unreliable, DREA technologies 
provide a cost-effective option to improve energy access. For example, about 13% 
of the population of Bangladesh gained access to electricity through solar home 
systems (SHS), and more than 50% of the off-grid population in Kenya is served by 
DREA systems (Dahlberg 2018). Off-grid solar devices, such as solar lanterns and 
SHS, displayed annual growth rates of 60% between 2013 and 2017 (Dahlberg 
2018).
2.2.1.2  Heating and Cooling
Energy use for heating and cooling is estimated to have accounted for just over half 
of the total world final energy consumption in 2017, with about half of that used for 
industrial process heat (IEA-RE 2017). Around 27% of this was supplied by renew-
ables. The largest share of renewable heating was from traditional biomass, which 
continued to supply about 16.4% of the global heat demand, predominantly for 
cooking in the developing world (IEA-RE 2017). Renewable energy—excluding 
traditional biomass—supplied approximately 9% of the total global heat production 
in 2017, up from about 6% in 2008 (REN21-GSR 2018).
Renewable heating and cooling receives much less attention than renewable 
power generation, and has been identified as the ‘sleeping giant of energy policy’ 
for the past decade (IEA-Collier 2018). The use of modern renewable heat has 
increased at an average rate close to 3% per year since 2008, gradually increasing 
its share of heat supply, but it lags well behind the average annual increase of 17% 
in modern renewables for electricity (IEA-RE 2017). Renewable energy technolo-
gies for heating and cooling include a variety of solar thermal collectors for differ-
ent temperature levels; geothermal and air-sourced heat pumps; bioenergy used in 
traditional combustion applications or converted to gaseous, liquid, or solid fuels 
and subsequently used for heat; and any type of renewable electricity used for heat-
ing. Heat may be supplied by on-site equipment or by a district heating network.
A wide range of temperature requirements exist, from temperatures of around 
40–70  °C for space and water heating in buildings, to steam at several hundred 
degrees Celsius for some industrial processes (Averfalk et  al. 2017; USA-EPA 
2017). The variety in renewable heating systems and applications is much greater 
than in the renewable power sector, which makes standardization to reduce costs by 
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economies of scale more challenging, and makes it difficult for policy makers to 
find effective mechanisms to increase the renewable share. Trends in the use of 
modern renewable energy for heating vary according to the technology, although 
the relative shares of the main renewable heat technologies have remained stable for 
the past few years. In 2017, bioenergy (excluding traditional biomass) accounted for 
the greatest share, providing an estimated 68% of renewable heat, followed by 
renewable electricity at 18%, solar thermal at around 7%, district heating at 4% 
(which was nearly all bioenergy), and geothermal at 2% (REN21-GSR 2018). 
Although additional bio-heat and solar thermal capacities were added in 2017, the 
growth in both markets continued to slow. The trends in direct geothermal heating 
are unclear.
Bioenergy systems provide individual heating in residential and medium-sized 
office buildings, either as stand-alone systems or in addition to an existing central 
heating system, and bioenergy also accounts for 95% of district heating (IEA-RE 
2017). District heating systems are suitable for use in densely populated regions 
with an annual heating demand during ≥4 months of the year, such as in the north-
ern part of China, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, the UK, and 
the northern United States (IRENA-RE-H 2017). However, district heating supplies 
a very small proportion of global heating needs. The majority of district heating 
systems are fuelled by either coal or gas, with the share of renewables ranging from 
0% to 42% (IRENA-RE-H 2017). Switching existing districting heating systems 
from fossil fuels to renewables has considerable potential (IRENA-RE-H 2017). 
Since the 1980s, Sweden has progressively switched from an almost entirely fossil- 
fuelled heating supply to systems supplied by 90% renewables and recycled heat 
(Brown 2018). District heating can combine different sources of heat, and can play 
a positive role in the integration of VRE through the use of electric heat pumps.
Solar thermal collector installations continued to decline globally in 2017, with 
a reduction of 3% (REN21-GSR 2018) compared with 2016, but the markets in 
China and India remained strong. In Europe, hybrid systems, in which solar thermal 
systems are used in combination with gas-fired central heating or bioenergy, are 
becoming more common, with specialized companies offering standardized 
technology.
Electricity accounts for an estimated 6% of the total heating and cooling con-
sumption in buildings and industry, with about half of that electricity estimated to 
be renewable (IEA-RE 2017). The further electrification of heating and cooling 
drew increasing attention in 2017, particularly in the United States and China. 
Residential solar PV systems are also increasingly connected to electricity-using 
heat pumps in buildings rather than feeding the energy into the public electricity 
grid, especially when feed-in tariffs for solar electricity are reduced or have been 
entirely phased out.
Space cooling accounts for about 2% (REN21-GSR 2018) of the total world final 
energy consumption, and is supplied almost entirely by electricity (IEA-RE 2017). 
Solar-based space-cooling systems are still in the minority compared with conven-
tional air-conditioning systems.
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2.2.1.3  Transport
The global energy demand for transport increased by an average of 2.1% between 
2000 and 2016, and is responsible for approximately 29% of the final global energy 
use and 24% of GHG emissions (IEA-WEO 2017). The vast majority (92%) of 
global transport energy needs are met by oil, with small proportions met by biofuels 
(2.9%) and electricity (1.4%) (IEA-WEO 2017).
There are three main entry points for renewable energy in the transport sector: 
the use of 100% liquid biofuels or biofuels blended with conventional fuels; natural 
gas vehicles and infrastructure (these can run on upgraded biogas); and the electri-
fication of transport (if the electricity is itself renewable), which can be via batteries 
or hydrogen in fuel cells.
Biofuels (bioethanol and biodiesel) make by far the greatest contribution to 
renewable transport. The overall renewable share of road transport energy use was 
estimated to be 4.2% in 2016, with nearly all of that from biofuels (IEA-RE 2017). 
In 2017, global bioethanol production increased by 2.5% relative to that in 2016, 
with a slight decline in Brazil offset by increases in the USA, Europe, and China 
(IEA OIL 2018). Biodiesel production remained relatively stable in 2017, following 
a 9% increase in 2016 relative to 2015 (IEA OIL 2018).
The technology for producing, purifying, and upgrading biogas for use in trans-
port is relatively mature, and the numbers of natural gas vehicles (NGVs) and the 
associated infrastructure are increasing slowly but steadily internationally. Many 
countries have relatively well-developed NGV infrastructures, and NGVs provide a 
good entry point for biogas in the transport sector (IRENA-RV-2017). The largest 
producers of biogas for vehicle fuel in 2016 were Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK, and the USA (IRENA-RV-2017). The main barriers to the further expansion 
of biogas for transport are economic, with supply costs of USD 0.22–1.55 per cubic 
metre (m3), compared with natural gas prices, which are as low as USD 0.13 per m3. 
However, the lack of consistent regulation and access to gas grids are also signifi-
cant barriers (IRENA-RV-2017).
Historically, the electrification of the transport sector has been limited to trains, 
light rail, and some buses. In 2017, there were signs that the entire sector would 
open to electrification. Fully electric passenger cars, scooters, and bicycles are rap-
idly becoming common-place, and prototypes for heavy-duty trucks, planes, and 
ships were released in 2017 (Hawkins 2017).
The number of electric vehicles (EVs) on the road passed the three million mark 
in 2017 (Guardian 25.12.2017). Annual sales are still only a very small proportion 
of the global total (1%), but this is set to change. In 2017, partly influenced by the 
scandal over diesel emissions cheating, five countries announced their intention to 
ban sales of new diesel and petrol cars from 2030 (India, the Netherlands, and 
Slovenia) or 2040 (France and the UK) (Bloomberg 11.2017). The announcement 
of electric product lines by car manufacturers in 2017 was another breakthrough. 
However, the number of EVs on the road is dwarfed by the number of electric bikes. 
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The global fleet was estimated to be around 200 million at the end of 2016, most of 
them in China, and 30% of bicycles sold in the Netherlands were e-bikes in 2017 
(Wang 2017). Electric two- and three-wheel vehicles account for less than 0.5% of 
all transport energy use, but they account for most of the remaining renewable share 
after biofuels (IEA-RE 2017).
Further electrification of the transport sector will potentially create a new market 
for renewable energy and ease the integration of variable renewable energy, if mar-
ket and policy settings ensure that the charging patterns are effectively harmonized 
with the requirements of electricity systems. There are already examples of coun-
tries and cities supplying electricity for both heavy and light rail from renewable 
electricity, including the Netherlands (BI 2017), Delhi (Times of India 2017), and 
Santiago de Chile (CT 2017).
Road transport accounts for 67% of global transport energy use, and two-thirds 
of that is used for passenger transport.
Aviation accounts for around 11% of the total energy used in transport 
(US-EIA- 2017). In October 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), a UN agency, announced a landmark agreement to mitigate GHG emis-
sions in the aviation sector. By the end of 2017, 106 states representing 90.8% of 
global air traffic had settled on a global emissions reduction scheme (Guardian 
6.10.2016). Together with technical and operational improvements, this agreement 
will support the production and use of sustainable aviation fuels, specifically drop-
in fuels produced from biomass and different types of waste (ICAO 2018). In 2017, 
Norway announced a target of 100% electric short-haul flights by 2040 (Guardian 
18.1.2018).
Shipping consumes around 12% of the global energy used in transport 
(US-EIA-2017) and is responsible for approximately 2.0% of global CO2 emis-
sions. There are multiple entry points for renewable energy: ships can incorporate 
wind (sails) and solar energy directly, and can use biofuels, synthetic fuels, or 
hydrogen produced with renewable electricity for propulsion. China saw the launch 
of the world’s first all-electric cargo ship in 2017, and in Sweden, two large ferries 
were converted from diesel to electricity in 2017 (China Daily 14.11.2017). In 2017, 
the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) approved a roadmap (2017–2023) to develop a strategy for 
reducing GHG emissions from ships. The roadmap includes plans for an initial 
GHG strategy to be adopted in 2018 (IMO 2017).
Rail accounts for around 1.9% of the total energy used in transport and is the 
most highly electrified transport sector. The share of rail transport powered by elec-
tricity was estimated to be 39% in 2015, up from 29% in 2005 (IEA-UIC 2017). Just 
over a third of the electricity (9% of rail energy) is estimated to be derived from 
renewable sources (IEA-UIC 2017). Some jurisdictions are opting to ensure that the 
proportion of energy from renewable sources in their transport sectors is well above 
the share of renewable energy in their power sectors. For example, the Dutch rail-
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way company NS announced that its target to power all electric trains with 100% 
renewable electricity was achieved ahead of schedule in 2017 (Caughill 2017), and 
the New South Wales Government in Australia announced a renewable tender for 
the Sydney’s light rail system.
Following the historic Paris Climate Agreement in December 2015, the interna-
tional community has focused increasing attention on the decarbonisation of the 
transport sector. At the climate conference in November 2017 in Bonn, Germany, a 
multi-stakeholder alliance launched the Transport Decarbonisation Alliance (UN-P 
2018). France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Costa Rica, and the Paris Process on 
Mobility and Climate (PPMC) are members of the Alliance, which includes coun-
tries, cities, regions, and private-sector companies committed to ambitious action on 
transport and climate change (UN-P 2018).
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Chapter 3
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Abstract A detailed overview of the methodologies used to develop the 2.0 °C and 
1.5 °C scenario presented in this book. Starting with the overall modelling approach, 
the interaction of seven different models is explained which are used to calculate 
and developed detailed scenarios for greenhouse gas emission and energy pathways 
to stay within a 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C global warming limit. The following models are 
presented:
• For the non-energy GHG emission pathways, the Generalized Equal Quantile 
Walk (GQW) method, the land-based sequestration design method and the 
Carbon cycle and climate (MAGICC) model.
• For the energy pathways, a renewable energy resources assessment for space 
constrained environments ([R]E-SPACE, the transport scenario model (TRAEM), 
the Energy System Model (EM) and the power system model [R]E 24/7.
The methodologies of an employment analysis model, and a metal resource 
assessment tool are outlined. These models have been used to examine the analysis 
of the energy scenario results.
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Achieving the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) will require 
the total decarbonisation of the energy system by 2050, with a global emissions 
peak no later than 2020 (Hare and Roming 2016) and a drastic reduction in non- 
energy- related greenhouse gases (GHGs), including land-use-related emissions 
(Rogelj and den Elzen 2016). Over the past decades, numerous computer models 
have been developed to analyse different emissions pathways and to investigate the 
effects of changes in policy and technology and adjustments in global and regional 
economies. A wide range of climate models is used to calculate non-energy-related 
GHG emissions pathways and their impacts on the global climate. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that “Climate models 
have continued to be developed and improved since the AR4 [published in 
2007-author], and many models have been extended into Earth System models by 
including the representation of biogeochemical cycles important to climate change” 
(Flato and Marotzke 2013). Whereas climate models analyse the effects of a variety 
of GHG emissions, energy scenarios only cover energy-related CO2. Their purpose 
is to investigate future energy systems to identify feasible technological and/or eco-
nomic pathways. Like climate models, energy models are diverse and vary signifi-
cantly in their methodologies. The IPCC’s Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation states that there is “enormous variation in 
the detail and structure of the models used to construct the scenarios” (Fischedick 
and Schaeffer 2011). Energy scenarios with high penetrations of variable renewable 
power generation—solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power—require a higher 
degree of time resolution to assess the security of 24/7 electricity supplies than 
those with mainly dispatchable power generation.
Modelling the energy system involves a variety of methodological requirements, 
which pose specific challenges when addressed on the global level: the quantitative 
projection of developments in (future) technologies and potential markets; a consis-
tent database of renewable energy potentials and their temporal and spatial distribu-
tions; reliable data on the current situations in all regions; an assessment of energy 
flows and emissions across all energy subsectors, such as industry, transport, resi-
dential, etc.; and a comprehensive assessment of all CO2 emissions, in order to assess 
the impact of the energy system on climate change. Finally, analysing and assessing 
the energy transition require a long-term perspective on future developments.
Changes to energy markets require long-term decisions to be made because 
infrastructural changes are potentially required, and are therefore independent of 
short-term market developments. The power market cannot function optimally 
without long-term infrastructure planning. Grid modifications and the roll-out of 
smart metering infrastructure, for example, require several years to implement. 
These technologies form the basis of the energy market and allow energy trading. 
Therefore, the time required for infrastructure planning and other substantial trans-
formation processes must be considered in the scenario-building approach.
Although numerous energy scenarios that provide 100% renewable energy at the 
community, state, and national levels have been published in the past decade 
(Elliston and MacGill 2014; Teske and Dominish 2016; Klaus et al. 2010; Teske and 
Brown 2012), only a handful of analyses have been performed on a global level. The 
main research projects on 100% renewable energy supplies published between 2015 
and 2018 were:
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 – A Road Map to 100 Percent Renewable Energy in 139 Countries by 2050, Mark 
Jacobson, Charles Q.  Choi, Stanford Engineering, Stanford University, USA, 
2017 (Jacobson and Choi 2017);
 – Internet of Energy, A 100% Renewable Electricity System, Christian Breyer, 
Neo Carbon Energy, Lappeenranta University of Technology, Finland, 2016 
(Breyer 2016; Breyer and Bogdanov 2018);
 – Energy [R]evolution—A sustainable World Energy Outlook 2015, Greenpeace 
International with the German Aerospace Centre (DLR), Institute of Engineering 
Thermodynamics, System Analysis and Technology Assessment, Stuttgart, 
Germany (Teske and Pregger 2015).
All the studies listed above share the same modelling horizon until 2050 and focus 
clearly on the fast and massive deployment of renewable energy resources (RES). 
Options with large uncertainties in terms of techno-economic, societal, and environ-
mental risks, such as large hydro power, nuclear power, or unsustainable biomass use, 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), and geoengineering are excluded. However, each 
of these studies has a specific strength. On the one hand, the analyses from Stanford 
University and the University of Technology Lappeenranta include an hourly simula-
tion of power demand and supply, in addition to the pathway modelling. On the other 
hand, the Energy [R]evolution study covers the complete energy sector, with detailed 
insights into the heat and transport sectors. However, all these studies cover only CO2 
emissions from the energy system, without further investigation of other GHG sources.
Therefore, our project combines these strengths into a single approach by com-
bining a set of models. The approach is based on the scenario modelling used for the 
Energy [R]evolution scenario series developed by the authors between 2004 and 
2015. It models scenarios of comprehensive pathways for power, heat, and fuel sup-
ply in 5-year steps, and includes specific insights from a transport model. The sce-
nario building is also complemented by a simulation with hourly resolution to 
calculate the electricity storage demand and to increase the spatial resolution from 
10 to 72 regions. Another significant improvement over existing studies is its com-
bination with a climate model. The interaction between non-energy GHG pathways 
and a high-resolution integrated energy assessment model (IAM) provides addi-
tional information on how to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement.
3.1  100% Renewable Energy—Modelling Approach
The complete decarbonisation of the global energy supply requires entirely new 
technical, economic, and policy frameworks for the electricity, heating, and cooling 
sectors, and the transport system. Such new framework conditions and the political 
and regulative interventions necessary for their implementation are widely discussed 
in the literature. However, assessing their feasibility and effectiveness requires an 
in-depth analysis of specific regional and national conditions and mechanisms. 
Therefore, societal frameworks, measures, and policy interventions are not explicitly 
discussed in this scenario analysis, but they are implicit elements in the definition of 
the narratives and assumptions as core step of scenario development (see Chap. 5).
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Modelling Approach
To develop a global plan, the authors combined various established computer 
models:
• Global GHG Model: The non-energy GHG emissions scenarios are calculated 
with the following models:
 – Generalized Equal Quantile Walk (GQW): This statistical method is used to 
complement the CO2 pathways with the non-CO2 regional emissions for the 
relevant GHGs and aerosols, based on a statistical analysis of the large num-
ber (~700) of multi-gas emission pathways underlying the recent IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report and the recently published IPCC Special Report on 
1.5 °C. The GQW method calculates the median non-CO2 gas emission levels 
every 5 years, conditional on the energy-related CO2 emission level percentile 
of the ‘source’ pathway. This method is further developed in this project—
building on an earlier ‘Equal Quantile Walk’ method—and is now better able 
to capture the emission dynamics of low-mitigation pathways.
 – Land-based sequestration design: A Monte Carlo analysis across temperate, 
boreal, subtropical, and tropical regions has been performed based on various 
literature-based estimates of sequestration rates, sequestration periods, and the 
areas available for a number of sequestration options. This approach can be seen 
as a quantified literature synthesis of the potential for land-based CO2 sequestra-
tion, which is not reliant on bioenergy with sequestration and storage (BECCS)
 – Carbon cycle and climate modelling (MAGICC): This study used the 
MAGICC climate model, which also underlies the classification of both the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and the IPCC Special Report on 1.5  °C in 
terms of the ability of various scenarios to limit the temperature increase to 
below 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C. MAGICC is constantly evolving, but its core goes 
back to the 1980s, and it represents one of the most established reduced-
complexity climate models in the international community.
• Renewable Resource Assessment [R]E-SPACE: This is based on a Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) approach and provides maps of the solar and wind poten-
tials in space-constrained environments. GIS attempts to emulate processes in the real 
world, at a single point in time or over an extended period (Goodchild 2005). The 
primary purpose of GIS mapping is to ascertain whether renewable energy resources 
(primarily solar and wind) are sufficiently available in each region. It also provides an 
overview of the existing electricity infrastructures for fossil fuel and renewable sources.
• Transport model (TRAEM): The transport scenario model allows the representa-
tion of long-term transport developments in a consistent and transparent way. 
The model disaggregates transport into a set of different modes and calculates 
the final energy demand by multiplying the specific transport demand of each 
transport mode with the powertrain-specific energy demands, using passenger–
km and tonne–km activity-based bottom-up approaches. The model applied is an 
accounting system, without system or ownership cost-optimization.
• Energy system model (EM): The scenario model is a mathematical accounting 
system for the energy sector that applies different methodologies. It aims to 
S. Teske et al.
29
model the development of energy demand and supply according to the energy 
potentials, future costs, emissions, specific fuel consumptions, and physical 
flows between processes. The data available and the objectives of the analysis 
significantly influence the model architecture and approach. It is very important 
to differentiate between an energy model and a scenario. An energy model is the 
technical basis for a scenario. Scenarios are the results of the energy model, 
which have been calculated with different input data and assumptions. The 
energy model is used in this study to develop long-term scenarios for the energy 
systems across all sectors (power, heat, transport, and industry) without the 
application of cost-optimization based on uncertain cost assumptions. However, 
an ex-post analysis of costs and investments shows the main economic effects of 
the pathways.
• Power system model [R]E 24/7: This simulates the electricity system on an 
hourly basis and at geographic resolution to assess the requirements for infra-
structure, such as grid connections, between different regions and electricity 
storages, depending on the demand profiles and power-generation characteristics 
(Teske 2015). High-penetration or renewable-energy-only scenarios will contain 
significant proportions of variable solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power 
because they are inexpensive. Therefore, a power system model is required to 
assess the demand and supply patterns, the efficiency of power generation, and 
the resulting infrastructural needs. On the generation side, meteorological data, 
typically in 1 h steps, are required and historical solar and wind data are used to 
calculate the possible renewable power generation. On the demand side, either 
historical demand curves are used, or—if unavailable—demand curves are cal-
culated based on assumptions of consumer behaviour, the electrical equipment 
and common electrical appliances.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the interactions between the energy- and 
GIS-based models. The climate model is not directly connected but provided the 
probabilistic temperatures for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The land-use and 
non-CO2 emissions modules provide information on additional gases based on the 
energy-related CO2 emissions (output of the energy model). Besides the climate and 
energy models, the effects on employment and the requirements for selected metal 
resources have been calculated (see Sects. 3.6 and 3.7).
3.2  Global Mapping—Renewable Energy Potential in Space- 
Constrained Environments: [R]E-SPACE
The primary purpose of GIS mapping is to ascertain the renewable energy resources 
(primarily solar and wind) available in each region. It also provides an overview of 
the existing electricity infrastructures for fossil fuel and renewable sources.
In this project, mapping was undertaken with the computer software QGIS. QGIS 
is a free, cross-platform, open-source desktop GIS application that supports the 
viewing, editing, and analysis of geo-spatial data. It analyses and edits spatial infor-
mation and composes and exports graphical maps, and was used to allocate solar 
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and wind resources and for demand projection for each region analysed. Open- 
source data and maps from various sources were used to visualize each country and 
its regions and districts. The regions and districts are divided into clusters. The 
regions are divided along geographic boundaries, using the IEA regions as a guide. 
Some of the larger countries, such as China and India, have been extracted to create 
individual scenarios. The clusters are also divided on geographic and political bases. 
A list of regions and their respective clusters is given in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Overview of regions and sub-regions used in the analysis
Regions Cluster/Sub-regions Regions Cluster / Sub-regions
North 
America
USA-Alaska
West Canada
East Canada
North-West USA
North-East USA
South-West USA
South East USA
Mexico
Mexico
Eurasia Central Asia
Eastern Europe
East Caspian
West Caspian
Kazakhstan
Mongolia
Russia
Latin 
America
Argentina
Brazil
Caribbean
Central America
Central—South 
America
Chile
North Latin America
Uruguay
Non-OECD 
Asia
Asia West: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, 
Bhutan
Sri Lanka
Asia Central North: Viet Nam, Laos and 
Cambodia
Asia North West: Bangladesh, Myanmar, 
Thailand
Asia South-West: Malaysia, Brunei
Pacific Island States
Indonesia
Philippines
Europe Balkans & Greece
Baltic
Central Europe
Nordic
Iberian Peninsula
Turkey
UK & Ireland
India East India
North India
Northeast India
South India including Islands
West India
Africa Central Africa
East Africa
North Africa
South Africa
Southern Africa
West Africa
China Central China
East China
North China
Northeast China
Northwest China
South China
Taiwan
Tibet
Middle East East ME
North ME
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Saud Arabia
UAE
OECD Pacific South Korea
North Japan
South Japan
North New Zealand
South New Zealand
Australia—NEM
Australia—SWIS
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Wind speed data at different levels, in metres per second (m/s), were obtained 
from Vaisala 2017. For this analysis, wind speed at a height of 80 m was used to 
determine the electricity-generation potential. Wind speeds are categorized and 
mapped within the range of 5–12 m/s to gain an understanding of the potential gen-
eration across the regions. Speeds under 5 m/s are ignored when plotting optimal 
sites. Land-cover types were constrained to bare soil and grasslands. The model 
only accounts for the onshore wind-generation potential.
Land-cover data were obtained from the Global Land Cover 2000 project (Global 
Land Cover 2015), hosted by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. 
The classification was based on the FAO Land Cover Classification System.
Similarly, solar resource data were obtained from the Global Solar Atlas (Global 
Solar Atlas 2016), owned by the World Bank Group and provided by SolarGis. Data 
categorized by direct normal irradiation were mapped to estimate the potential PVs 
in the different regions. To avoid conflict with competing uses of land, only the land- 
cover types ‘bare soil’ and ‘grasslands’ were included in the analysis.
The area of land available for potential solar and wind power generation was 
calculated at the cluster level using the Geometry tool in the QGIS-processing tool-
box. Intersects (overlapping areas between different layers) were created between 
the transmission-level layers and the solar/wind utility vector layers to break down 
the total land area available into clusters. A correction was put in place manually for 
sites that intersected the cluster boundaries and were part of two clusters.
For some maps (India, China, the Middle East, and OECD Pacific) with large 
data files, the analysis was performed using raster files for land use and renewable 
potentials. The raster tools ‘clipper’ (used to cut a raster file to the size of the clus-
ter) and ‘merge’ (used to extract common areas between two layers) were used. This 
input was fed into the calculations for the [R]E 24/7 Model.
The regional maps illustrate the different clusters that were identified for sce-
nario modelling. The existing infrastructure maps highlight the power plants and 
transmission networks in the regions. The wind and solar potential maps indicate 
the land available for new power generation given the current land-use patterns. 
These maps show utility-scale installations. There are much larger expanses of land 
available for small-scale distributed energy generation.
The following types of maps were created for 10 world regions:
Regional breakdown into a maximum of eight clusters:
The example given in Fig.  3.2 shows OECD North America—one of the 10 
world regions—broken down into eight sub-regions (clusters). The [R]E 24/7 power 
system analysis (see Sect. 3.5) calculates an electricity demand and supply scenario 
for each of those eight clusters. The clusters can exchange electricity with each 
other (see Sect. 3.8).
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Fig. 3.2 OECD North America broken down into eight sub-regions
Fig. 3.3 Current electricity infrastructure in China
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Current electricity infrastructure
The example given in Fig.  3.3 shows the current electricity infrastructure—
power plants generating > 1 MW—and high-voltage transmission lines in China. 
For the development of future electricity scenarios, it is important to know whether 
the generation capacity for dispatch and the transmission capacity to transport elec-
tricity from utility-scale wind and/or solar power plants to demand centres are 
available.
Potential sites for onshore wind power
Figure 3.4 gives an overview of the potential onshore wind-power-generation 
sites in Africa. Only the blue areas are available for new wind development, whereas 
the remaining regions are used for nature conservation, agriculture, settlement, or 
other forms of land use that do not allow the installation of wind farms. The darker 
the blue area, the better the wind potential.
Potential sites for utility-scale solar power plants
Figure 3.5 shows the suitable sites for utility-scale solar power sites in Central 
and South America. The scale from yellow to orange to red indicates increasing 
available solar radiation. Red areas—in this example, the Atacama Desert in Chile—
indicate the best solar resources and are suitable for both solar PV power plants and 
concentrated solar power plants.
Fig. 3.4 Potential sites for onshore wind generation in Africa
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3.3  Transport Energy Model-TRAEM
3.3.1  Transport Model Structure
The transport scenario model TRAEM (TRAnsport Energy Model) allows the mod-
elling of long-term transport developments for the 10 world regions. It is divided 
into several sub-models according to the transport modes, which are discussed 
below. All 10 world regions are aggregated in the world model using a passenger–
km (pkm) and tonne–km (tkm) activity-based bottom-up approach. The model cal-
culates the final energy demand by multiplying the specific transport demand of 
each transport mode with the powertrain-specific energy demands. This gives the 
annual energy demand for electricity, fossil fuels (diesel, petrol), natural gas, bio- 
based fuels, synthetically produced fuels (also called ‘synfuels’), and hydrogen for 
each of the 10 world regions. The calculation is performed in 5-year steps, from 
2015 to 2050.
For all scenarios (5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C), the 2015 energy demand by region 
was adjusted to the IEA World Energy Balances 2017 and is therefore identical in 
all scenarios. The projected total energy demands for the reference scenario (5.0 °C) 
from 2020 until 2040 follow the IEA World Energy Outlook 2017 Current Policies 
Scenario (IEA 2017b). The total energy demands by region for the years 2045 and 
2050 were extrapolated linearly based on the 2035–2040 change rates. The 2.0 °C 
Fig. 3.5 Existing and potential solar power sites in Central and South America
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Scenario was adjusted from 2020 onwards to 2050 in line with the carbon budget of 
the 2.0 °C pathway and the 1.5 °C pathway.
In the transport model, the CO2 emissions from biofuels are given a GHG emis-
sion factor of zero, because the downstream emissions level out with the upstream 
emissions. The CO2 emissions from synthetic fuels are also given a value of zero, 
because the CO2 used for producing the fuels upstream level out the downstream 
emissions. The upstream emissions from electricity and hydrogen production and 
all other fuels are factored into the energy system model described in Section 5 with 
which the transport model has a data interface. The model distinguishes between 
road, rail, aviation, and maritime passenger and freight transport modes.
Road passenger transport modes include:
 – Light duty vehicles (cars): automobiles, vans and sports utility vehicles with 
up to eight seats for private transport, which are further distinguished into 
small, medium and large cars;
 – 2- and 3-wheel vehicles: includes rollers, motorbikes, and rickshaws;
 – Busses: urban, suburban, and long-distance buses and minibuses serving pub-
lic and private-company transport services.
Rail passenger:
 – Urban metro/light rail vehicles;
 – Regional/intercity trains;
 – High-speed trains.
Aviation (passenger):
 – Small and medium aircrafts for domestic flights;
 – Medium and large aircrafts for international flights, distinguishing narrow- 
body, wide-body, and regional jets.
Road freight:
 – Light-duty trucks (< 3.5 t gross vehicle weight [GVW]);
 – Medium-duty trucks (3.5–15 t GVW);
 – Heavy-duty trucks (> 15 t GVW).
Rail freight:
 – Ordinary freight, intermodal, and low-density high-value freight trains are 
distinguished.
Navigation (freight):
 – Inland navigation;
 – Coastal ships for domestic navigation and maritime shipping are distinguished 
in the model.
We assume that energy efficiency improves over time. The changes in the pow-
ertrain shares over time are mainly driven by fleet electrification. Energy intensities 
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per pkm and per tkm are region-dependent, based on the occupancy rates of the 
passenger transport modes and the loading factors for freight vehicles. The energy 
demands of all transport modes (passenger and freight) are summed to the total 
energy demand by region.
Backcasting transport scenarios are modelled iteratively by fitting the drivetrain 
shares, transport performance (pkm or tkm), and modal shares until the specific 
downstream CO2 budgets of the world regions are met. The emission reductions are 
based on a combination of technical, operational, and behavioural measures during 
modelling—such as powertrain electrification, the use of biomass-based and syn-
thetically produced fuels, efficiency increases within transport modes, and modal 
shifts towards more-efficient modes.
The replacement of internal combustion engines by electric powertrains is priori-
tized in our modelling. However, the rapid electrification of fleets is quantity- 
restricted over the immediately subsequent years until the capacities for battery 
production, battery recharging, hydrogen production, and refuelling stations have 
ramped up ubiquitously. Therefore, a shift towards more energy-efficient and elec-
trified passenger and freight transport modes, such as railways, is required and is 
therefore one measure implemented in the model. Such modal shifts are especially 
required in the OECD countries, to reduce carbon emissions while maintaining 
transport performance at the current levels. Supply constraints on biomass and espe-
cially synfuel production will also limit rapid decarbonisation right from the start, 
and motivate modal shifts and general restrictions to overall transport activities by 
carbon-intensive transport modes. The 1.5  °C Scenario requires electrification, 
modal shifts, and alternative fuel uptake to start earlier than the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
particularly the 5.0 °C Scenario, and their more rapid implementation. However, 
because electrification will remain quantity-restricted until the 2020s in any case, 
widespread modal shifts and changes in mobility behaviour are modelled more 
stringently within the 1.5 °C Scenario. The detailed modelling results are discussed 
in Chap. 6.
3.3.2  Transport Data
We have derived historical and current data on transport activities (pkm, tkm) and 
total energy consumption levels according to transport mode from statistical agen-
cies, governmental and intergovernmental organizations, etc., including:
 – IEA Mobility Model;
 – OECD statistics;
 – World Bank Open Data;
 – National and supranational statistical bodies;
 – UIC IEA Railway Handbook;
 – UIC Railway Synopsis;
 – Railway operators data;
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 – HBEFA (Handbuch Emissionsfaktoren);
 – EIA Open Data.
However, statistical data are often unavailable or lack consistency with other 
derived data (for example, on vehicle stock or occupancy rates in certain world 
regions). In these cases, we applied best guesses based on the scientific and grey 
literature. Data for energy intensity per transport mode were derived from the 
German Aerospace Centre (DLR) vehicle databases and the state-of-the-art 
literature.
3.3.3  Transport Model Output
Based on the TRAEM model, energy consumption and CO2 emissions can be calcu-
lated for each transport sub-category.
The final energy demand (ED) of the passenger and freight transport modes is 
calculated for every world region and all powertrains in 5-year steps from 2015 to 
2050 in the following way:
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with:
 – SECF tm i
wr
, ( ) : specific freight mode energy consumption of powertrain i and 
mode m in world region wr at time step t [MJ/tkm]
 – SECP tm i
wr
, ( ) : specific passenger mode energy consumption of powertrain i and 
mode m in world region wr at time step t [MJ/pkm]
 – TPF tm i
wr
, ( ) : freight transport performance of powertrain i and mode m in world 
region wr at time step t [tkm/a]
 – TPP tm i
wr
, ( ) : passenger transport performance of powertrain i and mode m in 
world region wr at time step t [pkm/a]
 – TTED(t): total transport (final) energy demand at time step t [PJ/year]
The estimated plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, battery electric vehicles, and fuel-
cell-electric vehicles stocks are considered mode by mode, using their respective 
battery capacities, vehicle-specific life expectancies, total battery capacity by mode, 
world region, and year, to estimate the total transport battery demand (Chap. 11).
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3.4  Energy System Model (EM)
The focus of this study is the development of normative, long-term scenarios. The 
scenarios are target-oriented. Starting from the identified desirable future in 2050, 
they use a backcasting process to deliver potential transformation pathways for the 
energy system. Technical bottom-up scenarios are developed to meet the climate 
targets in terms of cumulative CO2 emissions and are then compared with a refer-
ence case. The scenarios are based on detailed input data sets that consider defined 
targets, renewable and fossil fuel energy potentials, and specific parameters for 
power, heat, and fuel generation in the energy systems. The scenarios are repre-
sented in the Energy System model (EM) developed by the DLR, which is imple-
mented in the energy simulation platform Mesap/PlaNet (Seven2one 2012; 
Schlenzig 1998). Mesap/PlaNet is an accounting framework that allows the calcula-
tion of detailed and complete energy system balances, from demand to energy sup-
ply, in 5-year steps up to 2050. The model consists of two independent modules:
• a flow calculation module, which balances energy supply and demand annually, 
and
• a cost calculation module for the calculation of the corresponding investment, 
generation, and fuel costs.
The strength of the model framework is in its flexible and transparent modelling 
of different normative paths. The approach requires exogenously defined expansion 
rates and market shares. It explicitly renounces economic optimization because of 
the uncertainty of long-term cost assumptions. Therefore, scenario development 
using this modelling approach is mainly based on background knowledge and 
derived narratives, and the experience and knowledge of the scenario developer is 
essential to the success of the scenario-building process. The model acts as a frame-
work for integrating a wide variety of aspects of the transformation of energy sys-
tems, and therefore differs fundamentally from optimization models. The 
standardized cost calculation for the power sector is used for the ex-post evaluation 
of the scenarios. The modelling framework combines a database with a graphical 
programming interface. The database allows the management of both the input 
parameters and the simulation output for the different scenarios calculated. The 
graphical interface allows the definition of the structure of the modelled system and 
the quantitative interdependences between the individual structural elements at dif-
ferent structural depths.
The scope of the scenario model allows the increasing electrification processes 
in the heating and transport sectors to be considered, such as electric vehicles, elec-
tric boilers, heat pumps, and hydrogen use. Co-generation in different sectors is also 
explicitly represented in the model. The EM is implemented in this framework and 
Figure 3.6 gives an overview of its structure.
Details of the structure and relevant model equations were also recently described 
by Simon et al. (2018). The model calculates the energy flows of a system on an 
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annual basis. These flows connect a set of technologies in each sector and for all 
relevant energy carriers, using linear equations. The equation system is solved 
sequentially and the model thus balances demand and supply. This approach is 
applied over the scenario period in 5-year steps until 2050. Ultimately, the overall 
final energy is calculated as described in the following equations:
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with:
• FDss,fe(t): demand of (final) energy carrier fe in sub-sector ss1 at time step t [PJ/
year]
• FDss,fe(t): total demand of (final) energy carrier fe at time step t [PJ/year]
• TFD(t): total final energy demand at time step t [PJ/year]
1 The sub-sectors include ‘heat’ and ‘non-heat electrical appliances’ in the sectors ‘Industry’ and 
‘Residential and other’, aviation, road transport, navigation, rail transport, non-energy consump-
tion, the conversion sector, and storage and transmission losses for power and district heat. 
Conversion losses are taken into account in the calculation of the primary energy demand.
Input ResultsEnergy System Model
Sectors: Final energy
demand
• transport (see TM)
• industry
• residential & service
etc.
power demand
Heating technologies: 
• direct heating: fossil 
burner, biomass burner, 
heat pump, solar 
collectors, electric heat
• district heating: CHP & 
heat plants
Power sector:
• power plants: fossil, 
nuclear, renewable
• CHP plants: fossil, fuel cell
• biomass, geothermal, 
Primary energy
supply:
• fossil: coal, gas, oil
• nuclear
• renewable: hydro, 
wind, solar, 
biomass, 
geothermal, wave
heat demand
CO2- emissions
Drivers:
GDP, 
population
Technology database: 
efficiency, emission 
factors, allocation factors, 
costs (power sector)
LCOE
Fuel production:
• H2-production
• biofuels
• refineries etc.
fuel
demand
emissions
costs
energy
intensities
Fig. 3.6 Overview of the energy system model (EM) as implemented in Mesap/PlaNet
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• UEDss(t): useful energy demand / transport services in sub-sector ss at time step 
t [PJ/year]
• MSsset(t): market share of end-sector technology et in sub-sector ss 
[dimensionless]
• ηfeet(t): efficiency of end-sector technology et using energy carrier fe2 at time step 
t [dimensionless]
• t: time step
The indices denote:
ss: sub-sector
fe: (final) energy carrier
et: end-sector technology
The primary energy demand (without exports) is calculated as follows:
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with
• PDpe(t): total demand of (primary) energy carrier pe at time step t [PJ/year]
• TPD(t): total primary energy demand at time step t [PJ/year]
• MSfect(t): market share of conversion technology ct in the generation of final 
energy carrier fe [dimensionless]
• ηfect(t): efficiency of conversion technology3 ct using the final energy carrier fe at 
time step t [dimensionless]
The indices denote:
• pe: (primary) energy carrier
• ct: conversion sector technology4
The drivers of energy consumption include forecasts of population growth, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and energy intensities. Specific energy intensities are 
assumed for:
• electricity and heat consumption per person and per GDP;
• the ratio of industrial heat demand to GDP;
2 Note that some technologies (e.g., electric heat pumps) require two energy carriers as inputs 
(electricity and environmental heat), with a specific efficiency for each energy carrier.
3 Some conversion technologies produce more than one output, e.g. CHP plants, leading to con-
straints on efficiencies or market shares.
4 Power and district heat generation, biofuel, synfuel, and H2 generation, and refineries.
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• demand for energy services, such as useful heat;
• different transport modes based on the Transport Model (see Sect. 3.4).
The model consists of a broad technology database across the heat, fuel, and 
power sectors, including sector coupling via combined heat and power (CHP), 
power-to-heat, and power-to-fuels technologies, and electric mobility.
For both heat and electricity production, the model distinguishes between differ-
ent technologies, characterized by their primary energy sources, efficiency, and 
costs. Examples include biomass or gas burners, heat pumps, solar thermal and 
geothermal technologies, and several power-generation technologies, such as PV, 
onshore and offshore wind, biomass, gas, coal, nuclear, and CHP. In the transport 
sector, the model is directly linked to the results of the transport model (Sect. 3.3). 
For each technology, the market share with respect to total heat or electricity pro-
duction is specified according to a range of assumptions, including targets, potential 
costs, and societal, structural, and economic barriers. The model eventually calcu-
lates the annual energy flows for a set of energy carriers.
The main inputs of the Energy System Model are:
• IEA World Energy Balances 2017 (IEA 2016a) for the calibration of the model 
for each world region in the years 2005–2015;
• IEA World Energy Outlook 2016/2017 (IEA 2016b, 2017a) for the parameteriza-
tion of the model for the reference case (5.0 °C Scenario);
• various studies and statistics used for the assumption of further specific values, 
such as the power-to-heat ratios of co-generation plants, coefficients of perfor-
mance of heat pumps, and the efficiency of hydrogen electrolysers and synthetic 
fuel production plants;
• narratives and assumptions regarding the further development of demand and 
supply technologies in line with the climate targets and by taking into account 
RES potentials and costs, stable market developments, and the constraints 
imposed by production capacities and regional implementation. These assump-
tions and narratives are described in detail in Chap. 5, Sect. 4.
The main outputs of the model are:
• the final and primary energy demands, broken down by fuel, technology, and 
energy sectors, as defined by the International Energy Agency (IEA)—industry, 
power generation, transport, and other (buildings, forestry, and fisheries);
• the results broken down by the three main types of energy demand—electricity, 
heating, and mobility (transport); specifically, the energy required, technology 
deployment, and financial investment for each of these energy demand types;
• total energy budget, which is the total cost of energy for the whole power 
system;
• energy-related CO2 emissions over the projected period.
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3.5  [R]E 24/7 (UTS-ISF)
The long-term scenarios calculated with the EM for 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050 
(see Sect. 3.4) are used as the input data for the dispatch modelling described in this 
section. The [R]E 24/7 model transforms a long-term scenario for a specific year 
into hourly load and generation curves. The annual electricity demand is trans-
formed into an hourly load curve (see Sect. 3.2) and the annual power generation is 
transformed into a generation time series for variable power generation from 
regional solar and wind data and dispatchable power-generation data via inter-
changeable dispatch orders (see Sect. 3.7). The [R]E24/7 model is an accounting 
framework used to calculate the complete power system balance at 1 h resolution, 
and consists of two modules:
 1. a flow calculation module, which balances the energy supply and demand; and
 2. a cost calculation module, which calculates the corresponding generation and 
fuel costs.
The [R]E 24/7 model examines the influence of the dispatch order of power- 
generation technologies, the storage technologies, and the interconnection of up to 
eight regions. It calculates the impact of these variables on the overall system costs. 
[R]E 24/7 also calculates load curves for the residential, industry, and transport sec-
tors based on the sector-specific energy intensity factors and applications that are in 
use. The factors and applications used depend on the GDP and population (see Sect. 
3.2).
3.5.1  [R]E 24/7—Model Structure
Teske (2015) has developed a three-level grid model called ‘[R]E 24/7’ as a grid 
analysis tool that differentiates between four voltage levels. For this analysis, the 
model has been simplified to eight interconnected clusters to reduce the data volume 
and the calculation time. High resolution, with multiple voltage levels, is impracti-
cal for a global energy scenario, because the required input data would not be avail-
able for all regions and—if the data were available—the calculation time would be 
extremely long. Therefore, the simplified [R]E 24/7 model uses eight clusters that 
can exchange electricity on an hourly basis with a user-defined interconnection 
capacity (see Sect. 3.8). Different voltage levels are not calculated. Figure 3.7 pro-
vides an overview of the different modules of the [R]E 24/7 model. In the first step, 
a database provides the main input data for the base year, including socio-economic 
parameters, the currently available power generation, and the energy infrastructure. 
The data are partly with the GIS tool (see Sect. 3.2) and partly from other informa-
tion resources, such as publicly available databases of populations (UN PD DB 
2018), GDP (CIA 2018; ST 7-2018), and energy efficiency indicators (WEC 2018), 
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and statistical data on renewable power generation from IRENA (REN21-GSR 
2018) and the World Resources Institute (WRI 2018).
3.5.2  Development and Calculation of Load Curves
Energy demand projections and the calculation of load curves are important factors 
in calculating supply security and the dispatch and storage capacities required, espe-
cially for energy supply concepts with high proportions of variable renewable power 
generation. The [R]E 24/7 model calculates the development of the future power 
demand and the resulting possible load curves, because:
 (a) Actual demand curves are not available for all countries and/or regions and are 
sometimes classified information.
 (b) Future load curves with high penetration of storage, electric heating systems 
and electric mobility will have a very different shape than current load curves.
 (c) For developing countries with low access to energy rates or little access to suf-
ficient data, the curves must be calculated based on a set of assumptions because 
actual curves are neither available nor representative of future load curves.
The model generates load curves and the resulting annual power demands for 
three different consumer groups/sectors:
1. Calculation of each cluster
2. Identifies over/under supply
Capex, Opex, Fuel costs
LCOE
Standard Report
5. Result Analysis
Base year, 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050
in hourly resolution
4. Records results 
3. Connects clusters
Mac ro
5. Connection to standard report
Region DistributionDemand and Load
Calculation Module
Matching Demand + Supply
Generation data
Distribution of
calculated load curves
Dispatc h Module
generation capacity> by region
Soc io ec onomic data
Region Distribution
Distribution of
Household Demand
Interc onnec tion
Storage
Capacity by region
Calculation of load curves
Power Generation
and Infrastructur
3. Graphs and tables 
4. Key results costs
1. Hourly results - Demand
storage capacity
Resulting Demand
by addition of 3 load curces
> by technology
to sub-regions (clusters)
Capacity by technology
installed capacities 
2. Hourly results - Supply & Storage
by subregions 
Energy Consumer data Transport Demand
Cost Calc ulation
average annual demand
GDP, total & by sector Industry Demand
Capacity by region
Calculation Module
Capacity by technology
> selection of dispatch order
Base year
Population, Household-size Calculation module
Generation
Regional Database
Curve Projec tion
Fig. 3.7 Schematic representation of the [R] E24/7 model structure
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• households;
• industry and business; and
• transport (public and individual electric mobility).
Although each sector has its specific consumer groups and applications, the same 
set of parameters is used to calculate load curves:
• electrical applications in use;
• demand pattern (24 h);
• efficiency progress (base year 2015) for 2020 until 2050, and individual effi-
ciency input for each year.
The calculations involve detailed bottom-up projections of the increased use of 
electricity for heating in buildings, for industrial process heat, for electric mobility, 
and for the production of synthetic fuels and hydrogen. They also include increased 
access to energy in developing countries based on the applications used, the demand 
patterns, and the household types. This allows detailed demand projections to be 
made.
Infrastructure needs, such as power grids combined with storage facilities, 
require in-depth knowledge of local loads and generation capacities. In this project, 
the annual electricity demand for each of the 10 world regions was calculated with 
the long-term EM. The [R]E 24/7 model breaks each region into up to eight sub- 
regions (or clusters) to calculate hourly load and generation curves.
3.5.3  Load Curve Calculation for Households
The model differentiates nine household groups, with various degrees of electrifica-
tion and equipment:
• Rural—phase 1: Minimal electrification stage
• Rural—phase 2: White goods are introduced and increase the overall demand
• Rural—phase 3: Fully equipped western-standard household with electrical 
cooking and air conditioning and electric vehicle(s)
• Urban single: Single-person household with minimal equipment
• Urban shared flat: 3–5 persons share one apartment; fully equipped western 
household, but without electric vehicles
• Urban—Family 1: 2 adults and 2–3 children; middle income, middle western 
standard
• Urban—Family 2: 2 adults and > 3 children and/or higher income, full western 
standard
• Suburbia 1: average family, middle income, full equipment, high transport 
demand due to extensive commuting
• Suburbia 2: High-income household, fully equipped, extremely high transport 
demand due to high-end vehicles and extensive commuting
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The following electrical equipment and applications can be selected:
• Lighting: 4 different light bulb types (LED, three efficiency classes of CFLs),
• Cooking: 10 different cooking stoves (2+4 burners, electricity, gas, firewood)
• Entertainment: 3 different efficiency levels of computers, TV, and radio types
• White goods: 2 different efficiency levels each for washing machine, dryer, 
fridge, freezer
• Climatization: 2 different efficiency levels each for fan, air-conditioning
• Water heating: A selection of direct electric, heat-pump, and solar heating 
systems
3.5.4  Load Curve Calculation for Business and Industry
The industrial sector is clustered into eight groups based on widely used statistical 
categories:
• Agriculture
• Manufacturing
• Mining
• Iron and steel
• Cement industry
• Construction industry
• Chemical industry
• Service and trade
Each sector has a definite energy intensity in energy per dollar GDP (MJ/$GDP), 
which is been converted to electrical units (kW/$GDP) based on an estimated fuel 
efficiency factor, electricity shares, and operational hours per year. The calculated 
electricity intensity per dollar GDP conversion can only show the required con-
nected load and the specific consumption of an industrial sector to a first approxima-
tion because there is a variety of uncertainty factors, such as:
 (a) significant regional differences;
 (b) significant demand differences within one industry sector, such as manufactur-
ing or chemical industry;
 (c) lack of standardized data on industry energy demands, especially for the elec-
tricity sector.
Despite the high degree of uncertainty, we decided to apply this methodology 
because after an initial calibration, the current statistically recorded industrial elec-
tricity consumption in some well-documented countries (e.g., USA) and regions 
(e.g., Europe) can be recalculated with a tolerance of ± 10%. However, this method-
ology requires further research.
S. Teske et al.
47
3.5.5  Load Distribution by Cluster
The spatial concept of the [R]E 24/7 is shown in Fig. 3.8. The model calculates the 
load distribution for one region, which can be broken down further to a maximum 
of eight sub-regions (or ‘clusters’). Therefore, the 10 world regions modelled in this 
analysis are calculated separately. OECD North America, for example, includes 
Canada, USA, and Mexico. These three countries can be subdivided into up to eight 
clusters. A cluster can be a country (e.g., Mexico), a province/state of a country 
(e.g., Alaska), or a selection of several provinces/states (e.g., West Canada = British 
Columbia, Alberta, Yukon Territory, and North-West Territories). A cluster is 
defined to capture the existing interconnected power supply areas of a region, a 
country, or across several provinces. In Europe, for example, one cluster is the 
Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal), a region within Europe that has only very 
limited interconnection with the central European grid system (UCT-E). However, 
data availability and the model limitations (maximum of eight clusters) force sim-
plifications, and countries or state/provinces must be bundled together in one cluster 
even though they may have significant differences. Therefore, further research is 
required to obtain more detailed results for selected countries or provinces.
The distribution of the regional load, calculated in Sects. 3.3 and 3.4, is con-
nected to the projected GDP, population, and power plant capacities for each cluster. 
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Fig. 3.8 Spatial concept of the [R]E 24/7 model
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The cluster-specific data for the base year (2015) are taken from the model’s data-
base interface to calculate the demand and supply for the base year. When data are 
not available for each sub-region, the input data from the entire region will be bro-
ken down (in percentages) by cluster, according to the population—as a result of the 
GIS analysis. For the global analysis, the spatial distribution of the population, 
GDP, and power plant capacities remain unchanged over the modelled years (2020–
2050) for all 10 regions and their respective sub-regions. In the next step, the result-
ing population and GDP values for each cluster are multiplied by the normalized 
load curves calculated as described in Sects. 3.3 and 3.4. Each cluster has an hourly 
load curve over one entire year (8760  h). Thus, one region (e.g., OCED North 
America) has eight different load curves.
3.5.6  The [R]E 24/7 Dispatch Module
Although the dispatch module for the [R]E 24/7 energy access model has been 
developed specifically for this study, integral parts have been taken from a model 
developed to analyse the generation and storage needs for a micro grid on Kangaroo 
Island (Dunstan and Fattal 2016), the Australian Storage Requirements (Rutovitz 
and James 2017), and a 100% Renewable Energy Analysis for Tanzania (Teske and 
Morris 2017). The key objective of this modelling is to calculate the theoretical 
generation and storage requirements for energy adequacy in each cluster and for the 
whole survey region (Tables 3.2 and 3.3).
Figure 3.9 provides an overview of the dispatch calculation process for one clus-
ter. The key inputs include the generation capacities by type, the demand projec-
tions and load curves for each cluster, the interconnection with other clusters, and 
the meteorological data from which to calculate the solar and wind power genera-
Table 3.2 Input parameters for the dispatch model
Input parameter
L Cluster Load Cluster [MW]
L Interconnection Load Interconnection (Im- or Export) [MW]
L Initial Initial Load (Cluster + Interconnection) [MW]
Cap Var.RE Installed capacity Variable Renewables [MW]
Meteo Norm Meteorological data for solar and wind [MW/MWINST]
L Post_Var.RE Load after Variable Renewable Supply [MW]
Cap Storage Capacity Storage [MW]
CapFact Max_Storage Max capacity factor storage technologies [h/year]
L Post_Storage Load after Storage Supply [MW]
Cap Dispatch Capacity Dispatch Power Plants [MW]
CapFact Max_Dispatch Max capacity factor Dispatch Power Plants [h/year]
L Post_Dispatch Load after Dispatch Power Plant Supply [MW]
Cap Interconnection Capacity Interconnection [MW]
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tion at hourly resolution. The calculation of one region with eight sub-regions will 
require eight calculation intervals. Table 3.4 shows the four different supply tech-
nology groups: variable renewables, dispatch power plants, storage technologies, 
and interconnections. The model allows the order in which the technology groups 
will be utilized to be changed to satisfy the demand. Storage and interconnection 
cannot be selected as the first supply technology. Within each technology group, the 
dispatch order can be changed. Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 provide an overview of all 
the available technologies and examples of different dispatch scenarios. While CSP 
plants with storage are dispatchable to some extent—depending on the storage size 
and the available solar radiation—they are part of the variable renewable group in 
the [R]E 24/7 model. Although the model allows the dispatch order to change, the 
100% renewable energy analysis always follows the same dispatch logic. The model 
identifies excess renewable production, which is defined as potential wind and solar 
PV generation greater than the actual hourly demand in MW during a specific hour. 
To avoid curtailment, the surplus renewable electricity should be stored with some 
form of electric storage technology or exported to a different cluster. Within the 
model, the excess renewable production accumulates through the dispatch order. If 
storage is present, it will charge the storage within the limits of the input capacity. 
If no storage is present, this potential excess renewable production is reported as 
‘potential curtailment’ (pre-storage).
Limitations: It is important to note that the calculation of possible interconnection 
capacities for transmission grids between sub-regions does not replace technical 
grid simulation. Grid services, such as inductive power supply, frequency control, 
and stability, should be analysed, although this is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
The results of [R]E 24/7 provide a first rough estimate of whether the increased use 
of storage or increased interconnection capacities or a mix of both will reduce sys-
tems costs.
Table 3.3 Output parameters for the dispatch model
Output parameter
L Initial Initial Load (Cluster + Interconnection) [MW]
L Post_Var.RE Load after Variable Renewable Supply [MW]
S EXECC_VAR.RE Access supply Renewables [MW]
L Post_Storage Load after Storage Supply [MW]
S Storage Storage Requirement/Curtailment [MW]
CapFact Actual_Storage Utilization Factor Storage [h/year]
L Post_Dispatch Load after Dispatch Power Plant Supply [MW]
S Dispatch Dispatch Requirement [MW]
CapFact Actual_Dispatch Utilization Factor Dispatch Power Plants [h/year]
L Post_Interconnection Load after Interconnection Supply [MW]
S Interconnection Interconnection Requirement [MW]
CapFact Actual_Interconnection: Utilization Factor Interconnection [h/year]
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Fig. 3.9 Dispatch order module of the [R]E 24/7 model
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3.5.7  Meteorological Data
Variable power-generation technologies are dependent on the local solar radiation 
and wind regimes. Therefore, all installed capacities of this technology group are 
connected to cluster-specific time series. The data were derived from the database 
Renewable Ninja (RE-N DB 2018), which allows the simulation of the hourly 
power output from wind and solar power plants at specific geographic positions 
throughout the world. Weather data, such as temperature, precipitation, and snow-
fall, for the year 2014 are also available.
Table 3.4 Technology 
groups for dispatch order 
selection
Technology options Input
Variable renewables Variable renewables
Storage Storage
Dispatch generation Dispatch generation
Interconnector Interconnector
Table 3.5 Technology 
options—variable renewable 
energy
Variable renewable power 
technology options Input
Photovoltaic—roof top - Photovoltaic—roof top
Photovoltaic—utility scale - Photovoltaic—utility scale
Wind—onshore - Wind—onshore
Wind—offshore - Wind—offshore
CSP (Dispatchable) CSP
Table 3.6 Technology 
options—dispatch generation
Dispatch generation
InputTechnology options
Bioenergy Hydropower
Geothermal Bioenergy
Hydropower CoGen Bio
Ocean Geothermal
Oil CoGen Geothermal
Gas Ocean
CoGen bio Gas
CoGen geothermal CoGen Gas
CoGen gas Coal
CoGen coal CoGen Coal
Coal Brown Coal
Brown coal Oil
Nuclear Nuclear
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To utilize climatization technologies for buildings (air-conditioning, electric 
heating), the demand curves for households and services are connected to the 
cluster- specific temperature time series. The demand for lighting is connected to the 
solar time series to accommodate the variability in lighting demand across the year, 
especially in northern and southern regions, which have significantly longer day-
light periods in summer and very short daylight periods in winter.
3.5.7.1  Solar and Wind Time Series
For every region included in the model, hourly output traces are utilized for onshore 
wind, offshore wind, utility solar, CSP, and roof-top solar energies. Given the num-
ber of clusters and the geographic extent of the study, and the uncertainty associated 
with the prediction of the spatial distribution of future generation systems, an repre-
sentative site was selected for each of the five generation types. For utility solar and 
CSP, the indicative sites were situated in areas of high solar output, close to the 
transmission network or regional centre or city, and in areas without competing land 
uses (as described in the mapping methodology). A roof-top solar indicative site 
was chosen in the demographic centre of the region, usually the capital city.
The onshore wind indicative site selected for each region was situated in an area 
of non-competing land use with the highest average wind speed and close to the 
transmission network or regional centre or city. The offshore wind indicative site 
was an area within 100 km of the shore with the highest average wind speed, and 
close to the transmission network or regional centre or city. In some cases, no 
acceptable wind area within a region was available, in which case the wind potential 
was set to zero.
Once the indicative sites were chosen, the hourly output values for typical solar 
arrays and wind farms were selected using the database of Stefan Pfenninger at 
ETH Zurich and Iain Stafell (Renewables.ninja; see above). The model methodol-
ogy used by the Renewables.ninja database is described by Pfenninger and Staffell 
(2016a, b), and is based on weather data from global reanalysis models and satellite 
observations (Rienecker and Suarez 2011; Müller and Pfeifroth, 2015; SARAH 
2018). It was assumed that the utility solar sites were optimized, and as such, a tilt 
angle was selected within a couple of degrees of the latitude of the indicative site. 
For roof-top solar, this was left at the default 35° because it is likely that the panels 
matched the roof tilt.
Table 3.7 Technology 
options—storage 
technologies
Storage
InputTechnology option
Battery Battery
Hydro pump STORAGE Hydro Pump storage
H2 H2
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The wind outputs for both onshore and offshore wind were calculated at an 80 m 
hub height because this reflects the wind data sets used in the mapping exercise. 
Although onshore wind and offshore wind are likely be higher than this, 80 m was 
considered a reasonable approximation and made our model consistent with the 
mapping-based predictions. A turbine model of Vestas V90 2000 was used.
Limitations: The solar and wind resources can differ within one cluster. In some 
cases, there are even different climate zones within one large cluster, e.g., in 
Australia and Russia. Therefore, the potential generation output can vary within a 
cluster and across the model period (2020–2050). Furthermore, some clusters 
extend significantly across several time zones, such as Russia. The model can only 
take into account the time variations in sunrise and sunset between different clus-
ters, but not within a single cluster. The effect of time differences within clusters 
with a large east–west spread requires high-resolution modelling, which is possible 
with the [R]E 24/7 model but beyond the scope of this research project.
3.5.8  Interconnection Capacities
The interconnection capacities are set as a function of the total generation capacity 
within a cluster and a manually set percentage. Defining the relevant percentage of 
a country’s overall (peak) capacity and/or total generation capacity is based on 
European energy policy. The European Union (EU) proposed in 2002 that all EU 
member states must establish a transmission capacity of at least 10% of the peak 
demand (in megawatts) by 2005 (EMP-BARCELONA 2002). The EU developed 
this regulation further, improved the calculation method, and increased the target to 
15% (EU-EG 2017), whereas the [R]E 24/7 model implements a simplified approach 
by taking a percentage of the overall installed capacity. Clusters that are not con-
nected at all to the real energy market (e.g., South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New 
Zealand in the OECD Pacific region) are assigned 0% interconnection capacity. 
Responsibly well-connected clusters (such as the south-western USA) are set to 
15%, and highly interconnected countries (such as Denmark) are assigned up to 
40%.
Several simplifications have been made to the [R]E 24/7 model for ease of com-
putation and to accommodate the paucity of data and uncertainty about the future 
when designing the interconnector algorithms:
 – Interconnections between the project-defined regions are the only ones consid-
ered, so all intra-regional interconnections or line constraints are excluded (‘cop-
per plate’);
 – Optimal load flow is neglected because policy and price signals are considered to 
be the factors dominating the international and inter-regional load flow;
 – Non-adjacent inter-regional interconnections are neglected for computational 
reasons, e.g., one region cannot buy power from a region with which it does not 
share a border.
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The algorithm devised for the function of the interconnectors is based on three 
key pieces of information for each region in a cluster:
 – Excess generation capacity;
 – Unmet load;
 – Interconnection capacity with each adjacent region, both in and out.
The excess generation capacity and unmet load were calculated by running the 
model without the interconnectors to determine the excess or shortfall in generation 
when the load within the region is met. These excesses and shortfalls were calcu-
lated at the point in the dispatch cascade at which the interconnectors provide or 
consume power, for example, after the variable renewables and dispatchable gen-
erators and before the storage elements.
The interconnection capacity between adjacent regions was defined based on a 
percentage of the maximum regional load. The capacity was defined in a matrix, 
both to and from every region to every other region. For non-adjacent regions, the 
capacities were set to zero. A priority order for each region to every other region was 
given, so that if the region had an unmet load, it would be served sequentially with 
the excess generation of the loads in their defined order.
For every hour and for every region in each cluster, the possible interconnection 
inflow or outflow for load balancing was calculated. Each region was considered in 
turn, and the algorithm attempted to meet the unmet load with excess generation by 
adjacent regions, keeping track of the residual excess load and interconnector 
capacities. Each region’s internal load was met first, before its generation resources 
were considered for other interconnected regions.
Once the total inflow and outflow of the interconnectors were calculated, the 
hourly values were fed into the model once more at the position in the cascade to 
which they were assigned, and the model was run again to give the total system 
behaviour. For regions sending generation capacity to other regions, the intercon-
nector element behaved as an increase in load, whereas for regions accepting power 
from neighbouring regions, the interconnector element behaved as an additional 
generator, from the model’s perspective.
3.6  Employment Modelling (UTS-ISF)
Two of the key dimensions influencing the social and economic impacts of the tran-
sition from fossil-fuel to clean energy are the quantity and type of jobs that are lost 
and created. Currently, there are limited data on the volumes of jobs that will be lost 
and created within particular occupations and locations during the transition to 
clean energy. National statistical agencies classify and collect data on occupations 
within the fossil fuel sectors but not within the renewable energy sectors (ABS 
2017). ISF has developed a model to estimate the volume of renewable energy jobs 
under different 100% global renewable energy scenarios (Rutovitz and Dominish 
2015), and an increasing body of research is estimating the jobs created by 
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renewable energy. The following section provides an overview of the basic method-
ology. Based on this, UTS/ISF has developed this methodology further, as presented 
in Sect. 3.2.
3.6.1  Quantitative Employment Calculation
In 2015, the Institute for Sustainable Futures (ISF) at the University of Technology 
Sydney (UTS) developed a quantitative employment model that calculates employ-
ment development in the electricity, heating, and fuel production sectors for the 
analysis of future energy pathways (Rutovitz and Dominish 2015). Figure 3.10 pro-
vides a simplified overview of how the calculations are performed, based on 
Rutovitz (2015b). The main inputs for the quantitative employment calculations 
are:
for each calculated scenario, e.g., the 5.0 °C (Sect. 5.1.1) and 2.0 °C Scenarios 
(Sect. 5.1.2),
• the electrical and heating capacity that will be installed each year for each 
technology;
• the primary energy demand for coal, gas, and biomass fuels in the electricity and 
heating sectors;
• the amount of electricity generated per year from nuclear power, oil, and diesel.
for each technology:
• ‘employment factors’, or the number of jobs per unit of capacity, separated into 
manufacturing, construction, operation, and maintenance, and per unit of pri-
mary energy for fuel supply;
• for the 2020, 2030, and 2050 calculations, a ‘decline factor’ for each technology, 
which reduces the employment factors by a certain percentage per year. This 
reflects the fact that employment per unit decreases as technology efficiencies 
improve.
for each region:
• the percentage of local manufacturing and domestic fuel production in each 
region, to calculate the proportions of jobs in manufacturing and fuel production 
that occur in the region;
• the percentage of world trade in coal and gas fuels, and traded renewable compo-
nents that originates in each region.
A ‘regional job multiplier’, which indicates how labour-intensive the economic 
activity is in that region compared with the OECD, is used to adjust the OECD 
employment factors when local data are not available. The figures for the increase 
in electrical capacity and energy use from each scenario are multiplied by the 
employment factors for each of the technologies, and then adjusted for regional 
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labour intensity and the proportion of fuel or manufacturing that occurs locally. The 
calculation is summarized in Fig. 3.10.
A range of data sources were used for the model inputs, including the International 
Energy Agency, US Energy Information Administration, BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, US National Renewable Energy Laboratory, International Labour 
Organization, World Bank, industry associations, national statistics, company 
reports, academic literature, and the ISF’s own research.
These calculations only take into account direct employment; for example, the 
construction team required to build a new wind farm. They do not include indirect 
employment; for example, the extra services provided in a town to accommodate 
the construction team. The calculations do not include jobs in energy efficiency 
because this is beyond the scope of this project. The large number of assumptions 
required to make these calculations means that employment numbers are only esti-
mates, especially for regions where few data exist. However, within the limits of 
data availability, the figures presented are representative of employment levels 
under the 5.0 °C and 2.0 °C Scenarios.
Manufacturing (for 
local use) =
MW installed per 
year in region x
Manufacturing 
employment factor x
Regional job multiplier 
for year x
% local 
manufacturing
Manufacturing 
(for export) =
MW exported per 
year x
Manufacturing 
employment factor x
Regional job multiplier 
for year
Construction = MW installed per year x
Construction 
employment factor x
Regional job multiplier 
for year
Operation and 
Maintenance = Cumulative capacity x
O&M employment 
factor x
Regional job multiplier 
for year
Fuel supply
(nuclear) =
Electricity 
generation x Fuel employment factor x
Regional job multiplier 
for year
Fuel supply (coal, 
gas and biomass) =
Primary energy 
demand plus 
exports
x
Fuel employment factor 
(always regional for 
coal)
x Regional job multiplier for year x
% of local 
production
Heat supply = MW installed per year x
Employment factor for 
heat x
Regional job multiplier 
for year
Jobs in region = Manufacturing + Construction + Operation and maintenance (O&M) + Fuel + Heat
Employment factors at 2020, 
2030 or 2050 = 2015 employment factor x Technology decline factor 
[number of years after 2015]
Fig. 3.10 Quantitative employment calculation: methodological overview
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3.6.2  Occupational Employment Modelling
The quantitative employment model documented in Sect. 3.6.1 were further devel-
oped to analyse the qualitative occupational composition of employment in the fos-
sil fuel and renewable energy industries. UTS-ISF has developed a framework for 
modelling disaggregated occupational change, and this framework is described in 
this section.
Quantitative employment studies at the level of technology and project phases 
(manufacturing, construction, and O&M) are useful when providing estimates of 
aggregate job creation. However, more disaggregated, granular data on the locations 
and types of occupations are required to plan a just transition to renewable energy. 
For example, it is necessary to know how many electricians are currently employed 
in fossil fuel industries and how many will be employed in the renewable energy 
sectors. Although our forecasts will almost inevitably be wrong, key trends can be 
established. For example, we can direct our focus to areas of the workforce in which 
an increase in the supply of labour will probably be required, and to areas where the 
effects of dislocation will be greatest.
Using a variety of data sources, ISF has developed a framework for classifying 
and measuring job changes at different levels of occupational disaggregation, to 
provide a richer picture of the composition of this employment change. The meth-
odology and key figures are detailed below.
Three primary studies that classify and measure the occupational compositions 
of renewable energy industries have been conducted by the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA). Using surveys of the participants in around 45 industries 
across a range of developed and developing nations, IRENA has estimated the per-
centages of person-days for the various occupations across the solar PV and onshore 
and offshore wind farm supply chains (IRENA 2017). Figure 3.11 is an example (in 
this case, for solar PV manufacturing).
IRENA’s studies are the most detailed estimates available of the occupational 
compositions of the solar PV and onshore wind sectors. ISF has extended the 
 application of IRENA’s work. Chapter 10 provides more details about the methodol-
ogy and the specific factors used in this analysis.
3.7  Material and Metal Resources Analysis (UTS-ISF)
3.7.1  Methodology—Material and Metal Resources Analysis
The future demands for metals have been modelled to better understand the resource 
requirements of the shift to renewable energy and transport systems. The future 
demands for metals have been modelled for the projection of 100% renewable 
energy and the full electrification of the transport system by 2050, as described in in 
Chap. 6.
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The predicted demand for the metals required to produce clean energy each year 
is estimated based on the increase in capacity plus an additional amount required to 
replace the capacity or vehicles that reach the ends of their lives in each year (based 
on a lifetime distribution curve for the average lifetime). From this, the GW of 
capacity or number of vehicles introduced in each year is estimated (also accounting 
for the replacement stock for end-of-life technologies).
When assuming that the introduced amount of specific technologies in year t is lt , 
the accumulated stock amount in year t (generation capacity or in-use stock) is St, and 
the discarded amount in year t is Ot , can be expressed by:
 S S I Ot t t t= + −−1  (3.1)
Where Ot depends on the number of use years of each product. This use year 
varies from product to product, and even within the same product group introduced 
into a society in the same year. The discarded year is not constant and has a lifetime 
distribution. Therefore, if the number of use years of the product is assumed as a, 
lifetime distribution can be defined as g(a). Hence, is given by following:
 
O I g at
a
a
t a= ( )
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−∑
0
max
 
(3.2)
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Fig. 3.11 Distribution of human resources required to manufacture the main components of a 
50 MW solar photovoltaic power plant. (IRENA 2017)
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Where amax is the maximum value of the product life. Therefore,It can be calcu-
lated with equation (3.3).
 
I S S I g at t t
a
a
t a= − + ( )−
=
−∑1
0
max
 
(3.3)
In this book, the Weibull distribution is used to consider the life characteristics of 
the products described above, with the key assumptions shown in Table 3.8.
Based on the annual introduced amount of clean energy technologies given by 
equation (3.3), the metal demand for technology p in year t is estimated as:
 
Demand I Metal intensityp t p t p t, , ,= ⋅   (3.4)
Where Metal intensity p,t is the amount of required metal in technology p in year 
t. Because this value can change over time with technological developments, we 
assume that the various scenarios incorporating the material efficiency 
improvement.
The demand estimated with equation (3.4) indicates the total metal requirements 
for the introduction of clean energy technologies. This demand arises from primary 
production (mined from natural deposits) and secondary production (recovered 
from end-of-life products). Secondary production could play an important role in 
the future by increasing metal availability and reducing the environmental impact. 
Therefore, we evaluated the effects of recycling by estimating the potential  reduction 
in primary production entailed. When the recycling of end-of-life products is con-
sidered, primary production is given by equation (3.5).
 
Primary production Demand Discard Recyclingratep t p t p t p , , ,= − ⋅  (3.5)
Where Discardp,t is end-of-life technology in year , and is estimated from the 
Weibull distribution, and the Recycling ratep indicates the proportion of metals 
recovered from end-of-life technology. Since this value can be increased by techno-
logical improvements, the metal price, and the amount of end-of-life product avail-
able, we assumed both the current recycling rate and an improved recycling rate.
This recycling rate is based on the rate of recycling of the metal within the tech-
nology (e.g., silver discarded from solar panels can be recycled into new solar pan-
els), rather than as an average across the use of the metal, as has been done in 
previous studies. This has been chosen as the most appropriate recycling rate to use 
because we assume that by using recycling rates specific to the technology, it is 
more likely to offset demand for new materials for that technology.
Table 3.8 Key assumptions
Technology Lifetime (years) Shape parameter
Solar PV 30 5.38
Battery 8 3.5
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Ultimately, the mineral requirements estimated with equations (3.4) and (3.5) 
under the various assumptions were compared with metal reserves and annual pro-
duction (in 2017). A ‘reserve’ is regarded as the amount economically extractable 
with the current technologies and at the current metal price, and can change signifi-
cantly over time. However, comparing reserves with estimated future requirements 
can provide insight into how the introduction of clean energy technologies will 
affect the physical availability of metals in the future. We also compared current 
production with the estimated future requirements to estimate the likelihood of a 
rapid increase in requirements. The key results are presented in Chap. 11.
3.8  Climate Model
3.8.1  Deriving Non-CO2 GHG Pathways
This section provides an overview of the methodology that has been used to com-
plement the energy-related CO2 emission pathways for non-energy-related CO2 
emissions, other GHG emissions, and aerosols.
The energy-related CO2 emissions were derived using energy-system modelling 
frameworks, but two different approaches have been used to derive the land-use CO2 
emissions and other GHG emissions. First, we will describe the approach that was 
used to determine other GHG emissions. This approach can be summarized as a 
statistical analysis of currently published scenarios. To derive non-CO2 pathways 
that are consistent with the relevant emission mitigation levels, the non-CO2 emis-
sions were regressed against the fossil fuel and industrial CO2 emissions. These 
regression characteristics were then used to derive the non-CO2 emissions. This 
method has been newly developed in the context of this study and can be regarded 
as a further development of the Equal Quantile Walk method introduced by 
Meinshausen et al. (2006).
One challenge in applying the collective knowledge that is enshrined in multi- 
gas- emission scenarios in the literature is that regional and sectoral definitions differ 
slightly between the various modelling groups. Because most IPCC scenarios work 
are based on the emission categories used by the IAM community, their emission 
categories and regions have been adopted in this analysis of non-CO2 emission path-
ways. The steps in the analysis are described in the following sub-sections.
3.8.1.1  Regional Definitions
First, the regional energy-related CO2 emissions developed in the previous sections 
must be transformed to match the five Renewable Communities Program (RCP) 
regions used by the IAM community, into the regions OECD90 (OECD countries, 
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membership status as of 1990), ASIA (Asian countries), REF (economies in transi-
tion), LAM (Latin America), and MAF (Middle East and Africa). Table 3.9 (above) 
indicates the overlap and differences between the RCP regions with the other 
regions described in this report. As an indicator of how different the regional defini-
tions are, we used the fossil fuel and industrial emissions for the year 2015 accord-
ing to the 2017 update of the PRIMAP database (Gütschow et al. 2016).
Table 3.9 provides an overview to the regional definitions used in this study. The 
top row indicates the regions for the CO2 fossil and industrial emissions, and the 
various rows refer to the five regions used in IAMs. To derive the non-CO2 emis-
sions, we used the IAM’s five RCP regions. The numbers indicate the fossil fuel and 
industrial emissions in the year 2015 in MtCO2, aggregated from country-level data. 
The colour shading of the cells indicates where most of the 2015 emissions occurred.
Table 3.9 Regional definitions according to the Integrated Assessment Modelling 
community (so-called ‘RCP5’ regions) compared with the other regions used in this 
study The overlap and differences between the two sets of regional definitions are 
shown with the 2015 fossil and industrial CO2 emissions. For example, the first row 
indicates that the largest sub-region in the RCP5_Asia group is China, with 8,826 
MtCO2 of emissions.
The transfer of the energy-related CO2 emission results to fit the IAM’s regional 
categorization (which is consistent with IEA WEO reports) was performed by first 
disaggregating all the results to country-level data. A simple proportional scale was 
applied to the 2015 energy-related country-level CO2 emissions from the PRIMAP 
database. The disaggregated country-level data were then re-aggregated at the RCP5 
regional level.
3.8.1.2  Harmonization: Emission Category Adjustments
Before proceeding with the application of CO2 versus non-CO2 statistical relation-
ships, a harmonization step is necessary. Various IAM use slightly different catego-
ries, emission factors, and activity data to estimate emissions. This can result in 
Regions
Developing
Asia Africa
Middle
East
Central & 
South 
Amer Eurasia China India
North 
America
OECD 
Asia 
Oceania Subtotal
RCP5_Asia 1,561 - - - 19 21 8,826 1,985 - 674 13,086 
RCP5_REF - 720 - - - 2,153 - - - - 2,873 
RCP5_MAF - - 1,174 2,021 - - - - - - 3,195 
RCP5_OECD9
0 2 3,031 - - - - - - 5,766 1,577 10,376 
RCP5_LAM - - - - 1,216 - - - 461 - 1,676 
Subtotal 1,563 3,751 1,174 2,021 1,235 2,174 8,826 1,985 6,226 2,251 31,206 
Europe
Table 3.9 Regional definitions according to the Integrated Assessment Modelling community
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some spread in the current emission estimates for the same regions and categories. 
To address this issue, the standard practice in the IAM community is to work with 
harmonized emissions scenarios, meaning that the original emissions scenarios 
have either been scaled or shifted towards a common reference point. A recent his-
torical emission level is normally chosen as this reference point. Here, we chose the 
2015 emissions across the five RCP regions.
Harmonization was performed in two steps. First, emissions were added that 
were related to the CO2 fossil and industrial emission categories (such as waste- 
related emissions) and that were outside the scope of emissions in the energy-related 
CO2 emission chapters. The scenarios from which these ‘other’ energy-related CO2 
emissions were taken were: the SSP2_Ref_SPA0_V25_upscaled_MESSAGE_
GLOBIOM (for the 5.0 °C reference scenario); SSP1_26_SPA1_V25_IMAGE (for 
the 2.0  °C Scenario), and SSP1_19_SPA1_V25_IMAGE scenario (for the 1.5°C 
Scenario). In the second harmonization step, the overall sum of the  complemented 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenario CO2 emissions were compared with the overall fossil and 
industrial sum of CO2 emissions in the year 2015, which were used for scenario 
harmonization under the CMIP6 ScenarioMIP process (Meinshausen et al., in prep-
aration). This comparison revealed that there were still differences between the 
complemented energy scenarios (see Chapter 8) and the harmonization emission 
levels for the various regions. These differences could again have resulted from dif-
ferent emission factors or activity assumptions, or they could simply reflect genuine 
uncertainty in the overall global and regional anthropogenic emissions. Consistent 
with the processing steps used in the CMIP6 process, we up- and down-scaled the 
raw and regionally disaggregated energy scenario emissions towards the harmoni-
zation emission levels. Figure 3.12 shows the differences between the raw emission 
scenario data, the data re-aggregated into the RCP regions, and the CMIP6 emission 
harmonization fossil and industrial CO2 emission levels for 2015 (in GtC). The dif-
ferences were bridged by applying a time-constant scaling factor.
3.57
2.83
0.87 0.78
0.46 0.35
4.16
3.03
0.91
0.63 0.51 0.48
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
Asia OECD90 MAF REF LAM BUNKERS
G
tC
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
in
 2
01
5
Harmonisation of Fossil & Industry CO2 Emissions
5.0C (Reference) Harmonised Fossil & Industrial
Fig. 3.12 Differences between the raw LDF emission scenario data
S. Teske et al.
63
3.8.1.3  A New Quantile Regression Method for Non-CO2 Gases
The completed fossil and industrial CO2 emission time series can now be compared 
with the set of scenarios in the literature. In this study, we used 811 scenarios from 
CMIP6 databases or the databases underlying the IPCC SR1.5 report. These 
literature- reported studies are either reference scenarios or mitigation scenarios 
with a specific forcing target or climate target. Some of the scenarios aim for 1.5 °C 
levels of change, others for 450 ppm CO2-equivalence concentrations, and yet oth-
ers assume fragmented worlds, with regional rivalries and no consistent policy 
approach. In summary, the input assumptions of all these literature-reported sce-
narios vary widely, yet all have some formal energy-system modelling framework 
behind them that provides first-level assurance that the envisaged CO2, methane, 
nitrous oxide, and other gas emission levels are not set below the limits considered 
technologically feasible under a certain set of boundary conditions, such as the 
requirement to continuing feeding the human population. The technological and 
economic feasibilities of emission pathways are fluid concepts, subject to change in 
response to technological advances and changes in policy settings.
This study and the approach it uses are not dependent on absolute levels of miti-
gation costs or precise definitions of technological feasibility. Instead, the method 
used assumes that that non-CO2 gases are reduced with a similar effort as that 
required to reduce CO2 emissions. Therefore, using the emission characteristics 
from a large set of scenarios reported in the literature, we assume similar levels of 
technological feasibility, economic mitigation costs, and implementation opportuni-
ties will be required to reduce emissions of CO2 and various other gases.
More specifically, we derived the non-CO2 emissions in a particular year by 
ranking all the scenarios against the indicator of fossil and industrial CO2 emissions 
in that year (see Fig.  3.11 below). By comparing them to the ‘crowd’ of other 
literature- reported scenarios, the LDF pathways could also be ranked. Specifically, 
the LDF reference scenario turned out to be around the 75th percentile of the 
 distribution of the fossil and industrial CO2 emissions across all 811 scenarios con-
sidered. By contrast, the lower 1.5 °C Scenario and 2.0 °C Scenario were not at the 
absolute lower boundary of the 811 scenario distribution, but were close to it. The 
1.5 °C Scenario ranked between the zero and first percentile—that is, among the 1% 
most stringent scenarios in the literature for the years 2025–2045. In the period until 
2050, the 2.0 °C Scenario was situated between the 5th and 10th percentiles of the 
scenario distribution (see Fig. 3.13).
Figure 3.13 shows the 1.5  °C and 2.0  °C Scenarios, their absolute fossil and 
industry CO2 emissions until 2050 (upper panel), and their respective locations in 
the set of 811 literature-reported scenarios considered (lower panel). The post-2050 
scenario extensions were extrapolated differently for fossil and industrial CO2 and 
the non-CO2 gases. To derive the non-CO2 gases, the 2050 percentile location was 
assumed constant for the remainder of the twenty-first century. For the fossil and 
industrial CO2 emissions in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, which do not assume 
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BECCS to achieve net negative emission levels, a continuation of the constant zero 
emission level was assumed (straight constant emission level in the upper panel cor-
responding to the increasing percentile level of the red–blue dashed line in the lower 
panel).
3.8.1.4  ‘Pseudo’ Fossil and Industrial CO2 Extensions Beyond 2050
By the end of the century, almost 40% of all of 811 scenarios will feature net nega-
tive fossil and industrial CO2 emissions, largely because there is some level of bio-
mass and CCS deployment. Given that the energy scenarios developed for this study 
do not assume, by design, any BECCS-related emission uptake, the extended post-
2050 energy scenarios are assumed to be consistent with other scenarios in which 
emissions will be around zero by the end of the century. However, those other 
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scenarios with zero emissions by the end of the century tend to reflect a much lower 
level of mitigation effort. Therefore, to derive non-CO2 emissions that involve a 
level of effort that is comparable to the mitigation effort involved in reducing 
energy-related CO2 emissions, we assumed that the energy scenarios developed for 
this study were comparable to other scenarios that share zero emissions around 
2050. This percentile ‘stringency’ level was then held constant for the remainder of 
the twenty-first century. Therefore, whereas the actual fossil and industrial CO2 
emissions in the LDF scenarios are assumed to remain constant at zero, the non-CO2 
gas emissions are derived from data in the existing literature, as if the scenarios 
remained at a stringency level of ~3% in the second half of the twenty-first century 
(see the lower panel in Fig. 3.13).
We now have the fossil and industrial CO2 emission levels throughout the twenty- 
first century for each of the three scenarios, and have complemented these with the 
‘pseudo’ CO2 emission levels for the second half of the twenty-first century. 
Therefore, we can derive the corresponding non-CO2 emissions.
In the first step, we derived the total non-CO2 emissions for a specific year and 
for the world as a whole. In the second step, we determined the shares of global fos-
sil and industrial emissions versus the land-use-related emissions—again regressed 
against the overall fossil CO2 emission level as an indicator of the ‘stringency’ of the 
scenario. In the third step, we disaggregated these fossil and land-use-specific emis-
sion time series into regional time series. Again, the shares of the regional emissions 
were derived with the same quantile regressions shown in Fig. 3.13 above. With 
these three quantile regression steps, we inferred either the lower (if lower quantile 
ranges are chosen), medium (for a median 50% quantile regression), or higher emis-
sion levels of the other gases. In this study, we do not intend to provide probabilistic 
emission scenarios and therefore limited our quantile regression choice to the 
median 50% setting for all regions, sectoral divisions, and other global total gases.
The major advantage of this newly developed method compared with the EQW 
method developed earlier (Meinshausen et al. 2006) is that the negative correlations 
between CO2 and other gases can also be taken into account. By performing all 
quantile regressions in the space defined by the global fossil and industrial CO2 
emissions in a particular year, any kind of non-linear, positive or negative relation-
ship with other non-CO2 gas emission levels, sectoral divisions, or regional divi-
sions are automatically incorporated into the final result—reflecting the overall 
characteristics of the chosen set of emission scenarios. Not all the 811 emission 
scenarios contained details of all the sectoral and regional divisions, but the step-
wise approach of this method can incorporate the characteristics from all the sce-
narios in whatever detail is available.
Figure 3.14 shows sample distributions of the emission scenario characteristics for 
the year 2040 and a subset of 21 GHGs. The x-axis of each plot shows the global fossil 
and industrial CO2 emissions, and the y-axis shows the global emission levels of 
another GHG, with one marker (blue dot) for each literature-reported scenario consid-
ered. The five red lines are quantile regressions at the levels of 20%, 33%, 50% 
(median), 66%, and 80% of the scenario distribution. It can be clearly seen that some 
total gas emissions correlate strongly with the fossil and industrial CO2 emissions 
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Fig. 3.14 Example distributions of emissions scenario characteristics
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(such as the SOX aerosols in the top-right panel), whereas others correlate less strongly. 
This method reflects the level of correlation in the finally derived multi-gas scenarios.
3.8.1.5  Land-Use Assumptions
In principle, the same methodological approach can be used for land-use emissions. 
In the IAM scenarios, the emission sequestration with the BECCS technology is 
reported as a negative emission in the fossil and industrial CO2 emission categories. 
Therefore, the quantile regression approach can also be applied to the land-use CO2 
sector. However, to more explicitly define the land-use choices that are implied by 
various land-use scenarios, we developed a new (probabilistic) scenario in conjunc-
tion with another land-use emission project (Dooley et al. 2018)
This method is based on various literature-reported studies and we provide an 
overall synthesis of four different land-use-based sequestration pathways: ‘forest 
ecosystem restoration’, ‘reforestation’, ‘sustainable use of forests’, and ‘agrofor-
estry’. These land-use sequestration pathways are based on the premise that the 
better management of terrestrial ecosystems should allow previously degraded car-
bon stocks to be restored, entailing the removal of significant atmospheric CO2 
(DeCicco and Schlesinger 2018; Law et  al. 2018; Mackey et  al. 2013; Mackey 
2014; Nabuurs et al. 2017). We derived the overall pathways separately for the tem-
perate and boreal regions on the one side and the subtropical and tropical regions on 
the other. This distinction is largely consistent with the dominant distinction of dif-
ferent climate domain characteristics in the literature (Grace et al. 2014; Houghton 
and Nassikas 2018; Pan et al. 2011), although the temperate and boreal biomes are 
as different in terms of land-use and forest ecosystem characteristics as the tropical 
biomes are from each of them. However, we derived only two climate domains 
because several of the RCP regions cross both temperate and boreal biomes. A nar-
rative for each of these pathways is available in Table 3.10 below.
Based on literature studies and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) statis-
tics, we then defined the available areas (and their uncertainties) for each of the four 
sequestration pathways. Similarly, we sourced average estimates of the maximal 
annual sequestration rates for the biomes (and their levels of uncertainty) for those 
four sequestration pathways—again distinguished in the large temperate/boreal and 
subtropical/tropical climate domains. We assume that after a certain ‘phase-in 
period’, this maximal annual sequestration rate can be reached and sustained for a 
number of years. We assume that after some decades to centuries, the capacities of 
these terrestrial ecosystems as carbon sinks will slowly decline until they reach 
equilibrium, termed the ‘saturation’ period. At the equilibrium point, these ecosys-
tems have a net zero effect on atmospheric CO2 over the time scales of interest here 
(Houghton and Nassikas 2018). The period over which the maximal sequestration 
rate is assumed, is reduced by the half-length of the corresponding phase-in and 
phase-out periods to account for the cumulative carbon uptake in those periods. As 
the last element in this framework, we assume a cap on the median carbon density 
change that is achieved over the full period. The difference between a degraded for-
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Table 3.10 Narrative for each sequestration pathway per climatic biome
Pathway
Climatic 
domain Narrative
Forest ecosystem 
restoration (set aside 
areas of degraded 
natural forest to restore 
to primary forest—25% 
of total)
Te,B Assume 25% of degraded natural forest put aside for full 
ecosystem and carbon stock recovery. Saturation times in 
temperate and boreal forests can be well over 100, or even 
200 years (Luyssaert et al. 2008; Roxburgh et al. 2006). 
25% set-aside is slightly higher than assumptions made in 
recent literature (Böttcher et al. 2018; Nabuurs et al. 2017), 
but in line with calls from conservation and indigenous 
movements.
S,Tr Assume 25% of degraded natural forests across the tropics 
set aside for full ecosystem and carbon stock recovery. 
Stopping all deforestation, wood harvest and temporary 
use, while traditional and customary uses continue. Net 
Primary Productivity (NPP) is higher across the tropics 
than in temperate and boreal biomes (Anav et al. 2015), 
hence sequestration rates are higher, but saturation times 
are shorter. We assume 60 years to ecosystem maturity 
(Arneth et al. 2017; Poorter et al. 2016). Sequestration rates 
across all biomes for forest ecosystem restoration are lower 
than post-logging recovery rates, as here we assume mixed 
age-class forests which have not been recently logged than 
(>20 years ago), which then saturates when forest reaches 
maturity.
Reforestation (forest 
expansion through 
natural regeneration)
Te Forest expansion on recently deforested land via natural 
regeneration of forests (passive regeneration) or 
reforestation of mixed native species (assisted 
regeneration). Extent of forest expansion is assumed to 
occur in line with current political targets: 350 Mha of 
reforestation by 2030 under the Bonn Challenge. Further, 
this 350 Mha is assumed to be reforestation for 
conservation purposes, which creates an ongoing sink from 
2030 to 2100, with saturation assumed at 100 years. Boreal 
areas excluded due to albedo effect (Houghton and 
Nassikas 2018).
S,Tr Natural forest expansion on recently deforested land as 
described above. We assume 80% of forest expansion 
occurs in the tropics, given 80% of Bonn Challenge pledges 
are in tropical regions (Wheeler et al. in press). All 
regeneration is assumed to be with natural forests rather 
than plantations, as this delivers the highest mitigation and 
biodiversity values (Grace et al., 2014; Wheeler et al. in 
press). Saturation of tropical regrowth forests is assumed at 
60 years, although large trees can take well over a century 
to mature (Poorter et al. 2016).
(continued)
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est ecosystem and its natural carbon-carrying capacity is the maximum potential for 
additional sequestration. Therefore, we used biome-averaged values for the per 
hectare carbon density of undisturbed forest ecosystems (Keith et al. 2009), rather 
than average global biome values (Liu et al. 2015), to define the maximum carbon 
density. Although the LDF scenarios only extend to 2050 or to 2100 for all the other 
GHGs, we modelled the land-use sequestration pathway assumptions until 2300 to 
be able to apply the overall ‘added carbon density’ cap.
Our climate-domain- and sequestration-specific assumptions regarding the 
median values, their uncertainty ranges, and confidence intervals are given in 
Table 3.10 (continued)
Pathway
Climatic 
domain Narrative
Sustainable use of 
forests (secondary 
forests under continued 
(but reduced) forest 
harvest )
Te,B Sustainable use of natural production forests (i.e. excluding 
plantations) under continued wood harvest. Multiple studies 
show the potential to double forest carbon stocks in 
production forests through reducing harvest intensity and 
extending rotation lengths (Law et al. 2018; Nabuurs et al. 
2017; Pingoud et al. 2018). Wood harvest is slightly 
reduced, requiring reduced demand for wood products, 
more efficient wood use and compensation to land-owners 
(Law et al. 2018; Pingoud et al. 2018). Including harvested 
wood products (HWP) in calculations could increase 
mitigation values (Houghton and Nassikas 2018; Nabuurs 
et al. 2017), but the life-time of HWP is generally too short 
to realise mitigation value compared to residence times in 
forest biomass (Law et al. 2018; Keith et al. 2015).
S,Tr Reduced harvest intensity and management practices such 
as reduced impact logging have not been shown to increase 
carbon stock in tropical forests (Martin et al. 2015). Carbon 
stocks are concentrated in commercially-valuable 
hardwood trees taking >100 years to reach maturity; hence 
selective logging as practiced across the tropics 
significantly decreases standing carbon stocks (Lutz et al. 
2018; Zimmerman and Kormos 2012). Our scenario 
assumes no commercial logging of tropical forests, and the 
extent of shifting cultivation is halved, allowing traditional 
practices to continue with lengthened fallow times and/or 
improved swidden practices (Mackey et al. 2018; Ziegler 
et al. 2012).
Agroforestry (Trees in 
croplands)
T,B We calculate biome-average sequestration rates from the 
literature for above-ground carbon uptake due to a broad 
range of agroforestry practices (Watson et al. 2000; 
Nabuurs et al. 2017; Ramachandran Nair et al. 2009), and 
subtract from this the baseline increase observed by Zomer 
et al. (2016). We apply this uptake to 20% of permanent 
cropland, and assume the resulting sequestration rate could 
be sustained for 50 years (Watson et al. 2000).
S,Tr
These domains are defined as temperate (Te), boreal (B), subtropical (S), or tropical (Tr). Note, this 
narrative overlaps with another land-use-related study (Dooley et al. 2018)
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Table 3.11. Our method of combining these input assumptions is a basic Monte Carlo 
ensemble. Given the symmetry or asymmetry and respective confidence intervals of 
the factors provided, we then created normal, lognormal, or skewed normal distribu-
tions (the latter is a linear combination of the normal and lognormal distributions to 
achieve the desired skewedness). We then made 500 independent draws from all four 
factors considered (area, maximum sequestration rate, phase-in time, and phase-out 
time). We repeated that process independently for each sequestration pathway and 
for each country within each climate domain. The areas for each country within the 
climate domains were assumed to be proportionally distributed by the relevant ‘FAO 
Scaling Area’ (see third column in Table 3.11), so that the climate domain aggregate 
areas matched our input assumptions for the respective sequestration pathway.
After combining all the country-specific and sequestration-pathway-specific 
time series for carbon uptake per sequestration pathway, we then checked whether 
the resulting cumulative sequestration over time (specifically its median) was at or 
below the specified maximum for the median carbon density change per hectare. If 
it was not, we scaled all the country-specific results proportionally, so that the 
median matched the cap on the carbon density gain.
3.8.2  Model for the Assessment of GHG-Induced Climate 
Change
To compute GHG concentrations and the implications for radiative forcing, global 
mean temperatures, and global mean sea-level rise, we used the reduced-complexity 
‘Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas-induced Climate Change’ 
(MAGICC), as described by Meinshausen et  al. (2011). The model has recently 
been extended by the addition of a newly designed sea-level rise module, as 
described in Nauels et al. (2016).
The MAGICC model has at its core an upwelling-diffusion ocean with 50 layers, 
in both the northern and southern hemispheres. Some simpler model approaches, 
with only a diffusive one-box ocean, for example, tend to overestimate the medium- 
term warming compared with the longer-term warming, (i.e., they tend to reach 
equilibrium too quickly). In the short term, the MAGICC modelling structure pro-
vides faster warming, but a lower approach to equilibrium, due to the effective cool-
ing cycle that mimics the sinking polar ocean waters.
Although simple in its general structure, the MAGICC model uses a broad cover-
age of GHGs and aerosols. This is much broader than for earth system models, 
because it would be too computationally expensive to carry around tracers for every 
minute GHG concentrations of, say, HFC227EA.  Because of the breadth of the 
GHGs that MAGICC can model, its calibrated carbon cycle, and its calibrated cli-
mate system with feedbacks and heat exchange parameterizations, it is frequently 
used as a climate model in IAMs. For example, the IMAGE and MESSAGE teams 
both have MAGICC inbuilt.
IPCC Assessment Reports also frequently use MAGICC as the modelling frame-
work to determine the exceedance probabilities of various emission pathways. For 
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example, see Chapter 6 of the Working Group 3 contribution to the Fifth Assessment 
Report and Chapter 2 of the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C. MAGICC has also been 
used in the preparation of the forthcoming IPCC Sixth Assessment Report to design 
the GHG concentration scenarios (Meinshausen et al., in preparation).
References
ABS (2017), Australian Bureau of Statistics (2017), Employment in Renewable Energy Activities—
Explanatory Notes, for a summary. http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4631.0E
xplanatory+Notes12015-16. Accessed September 16, 2018.
Anav, A., et al. (2015), Spatiotemporal patterns of terrestrial gross primary production: A review, 
Rev. Geophys., 53, 785–818, doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/2015RG000483
Arneth, A., Sitch, S., Pongratz, J., Stocker, B.D., Ciais, P., Poulter, B., Bayer, A.D., Bondeau, A., 
Calle, L., Chini, L.P., Gasser, T., Fader, M., Friedlingstein, P., Kato, E., Li, W., Lindeskog, M., 
Nabel, J.E.M.S., Pugh, T.A.M., Robertson, E., Viovy, N., Yue, C., Zaehle, S., 2017. Historical 
carbon dioxide emissions caused by land-use changes are possibly larger than assumed. Nature 
Geoscience 10, 79–84. https://doi.org/10.1038/ngeo2882
Asner, G.P., Brodrick, P.G., Philipson, C., Vaughn, N.R., Martin, R.E., Knapp, D.E., Heckler, 
J., Evans, L.J., Jucker, T., Goossens, B., Stark, D.J., Reynolds, G., Ong, R., Renneboog, N., 
Kugan, F., Coomes, D.A., 2018. Mapped aboveground carbon stocks to advance forest conser-
vation and recovery in Malaysian Borneo. Biological Conservation 217, 289–310. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.biocon.2017.10.020
Böttcher, H., Herrmann, L. M., Herold, M., Romijn, E., Román-Cuesta, R. M., Avitabile, V., ... 
& Schepaschenko, D. (2018). Independent Monitoring: Building trust and consensus around 
GHG data for increased accountability of mitigation in the land use sector.
Breyer (2016), Christian Breyer, Internet of Energy—A 100% renewable electricity sys-
tem, Neo Carbon Energy, Lappeenranta University of Technology, Finland, 2016, 
https://www.lut.fi/web/en/news/-/asset_publisher/lGh4SAywhcPu/content/simulation 
-brings-global-100-renewable-electricity-system-alive-for-the-first-time
Breyer, C, Bogdanov, D (2018), Breyer Ch., Bogdanov D., Aghahosseini A., Gulagi A., Child 
M., Oyewo A.S., Farfan J., Sadovskaia K., Vainikka P., 2018. Solar Photovoltaics Demand for 
the Global Energy Transition in the Power Sector, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and 
Applications, 26, 505-523, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/pip.2950
CIA (2018), Central Intelligence Agency, Library, World Factbook, Online database, viewed in 
July 2018 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html
DeCicco, J.M., Schlesinger, W.H., 2018. Reconsidering bioenergy given the urgency of climate 
protection. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, 9642–9645. https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.1814120115
Dooley, K., Stabinsky, D., Stone, K., Sharma, S., Anderson, T., Gurian-Sherman, D., Riggs, P., 
2018. Missing Pathways to 1.5 °C: The role of the land sector in ambitious climate action. 
Climate, Land, Ambition and Rights Alliance. https://www.climatelandambitionrightsalliance.
org/report/
Dunstan C, Fattal, A (2016), Dunstan C., Fattal A., James G., Teske S., 2016, Towards 100% 
Renewable Energy for Kangaroo Island. Prepared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures, 
University of Technology Sydney (with assistance from AECOM) for ARENA, Renewables 
SA and Kangaroo Island Council
Elliston, B, MacGill, Ian (2014), Ben Elliston, Iain MacGill, Mark Diesendorf, Comparing least 
cost scenarios for 100% renewable electricity with low emission fossil fuel scenarios in the 
Australian National Electricity, Market, Elsevier, Renewable Energy, Volume 66, June 2014, 
3 Methodology
74
Pages 196-204, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148113006745?via%
3Dihub,
EMP-BARCELONA (2002)—Barcelona European Council, 15 and 16 March 2002, Presidency 
Conclusions. “In the field of Energy the European Council: (…) agrees the target for Member 
States of a level of electricity interconnections equivalent to at least 10% of their installed pro-
duction capacity by 2005”; https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/805_en.html
EU-EG (2017), Towards a sustainable and integrated Europe, Report of the Commission Expert 
Group on electricity interconnection targets, November 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/
moving-10-15-final-report-commission-expert-group-2030-electricity-interconnection-tar-
gets-2017-nov-09_en
FAO, 2016. Global forest resources assessment 2015: how are the world’s forests changing? Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Fischedick, M., R.  Schaeffer, A (2011), Fischedick, M., R.  Schaeffer, A.  Adedoyin, M.  Akai, 
T. Bruckner, L. Clarke, V. Krey, I. Savolainen, S. Teske, D. Ürge-Vorsatz, R. Wright, 2011: 
Mitigation Potential and Costs. In IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy, Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation [O.  Edenhofer, R.  Pichs-Madruga, Y.  Sokona, K.  Seyboth, 
P. Matschoss, S. Kadner, T. Zwickel, P. Eickemeier, G. Hansen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow 
(eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 
Chapter 10, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srren/Chapter%2010%20Mitigation%20
Potential%20and%20Costs.pdf
Flato, G., J. Marotzke, B (2013), Flato, G., J. Marotzke, B. Abiodun, P. Braconnot, S.C. Chou, 
W.  Collins, P.  Cox, F.  Driouech, S.  Emori, V.  Eyring, C.  Forest, P.  Gleckler, E.  Guilyardi, 
C. Jakob, V. Kattsov, C. Reason and M. Rummukainen, 2013: Evaluation of Climate Models. 
In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, 
T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex 
and P.M.  Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom 
and New  York, NY, USA, Chapter 9, http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/
WG1AR5_Chapter09_FINAL.pdf
(Global Land Cover 2015); Global Land cover 2000; Joint Research Centre The European 
Commission’s science and knowledge service. 2015. Global Land Cover 2000—Products; 
Accessed 25 October 2018; ONLINE, http://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/glc2000/prod-
ucts.php
(Global Solar Atlas 2016), Global Solar Atlas. 2016; download for varies countries and regions, 
Accessed 25 October 2018 ONLINE; https://globalsolaratlas.info/downloads
Goodchild, M. F. (2005). GIS and modeling overview. GIS, spatial analysis, and modeling. ESRI 
Press, Redlands, 1-18. http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~good/papers/414.pdf
Grace, J., Mitchard, E., Gloor, E., 2014. Perturbations in the carbon budget of the tropics. Global 
Change Biology 20, 3238–3255. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.12600
Gütschow, J., M. L. Jeffery, R. Gieseke, R. Gebel, D. Stevens, M. Krapp and M. Rocha (2016). 
“The PRIMAP-hist national historical emissions time series.” Earth Syst. Sci. Data Discuss. 
2016: 1-44.
Hare, B, Roming, N (2016), Hare, B. , Roming, N. , Schaeffer, M. , Schleussner, C., (August 
2016), Implications of the 1.5 °C limit in the Paris Agreement for climate policy and decar-
bonisation, Climate Analytics, Berlin, Germany, Perth, Australia; http://climateanalytics.org/
files/1p5_australia_report_ci.pdf
Houghton, R.A., Nassikas, A.A., 2018. Negative emissions from stopping deforestation and forest 
degradation, globally. Global Change Biology 24, 350–359. https://doi.org/10.1111/gcb.13876
IEA (2016a) World Energy Balances (2016 edition). IEA energy statistics (Beyond 20/20). 
International Energy Agency, Paris
IEA (2016b) World Energy Outlook 2016. International Energy Agency, Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris
IEA (2017a) Energy Technology Perspectives. Modelling of the transport sector in the Mobility 
Model. https://www.iea.org/etp/etpmodel/transport/. Accessed 10 Oct 2018
IEA (2017b) World Energy Outlook 2017. OECD Publishing, Paris/IEA, Paris
S. Teske et al.
75
IPCC, 2006. Chapter 4: Forest Land, in: 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories.
IRENA (2017) Renewable Energy Benefits: Leveraging Local Capacity for Onshore Wind, 
IRENA, Abu Dhabi; http://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2017/
Jun/IRENA_Leveraging_for_Onshore_Wind_2017.pdf
(Jacobson, M, Choi, C, 2017), Mark Jacobson, Charles Q.  Choi, A Road Map to 
100 Percent Renewable Energy in 139 Countries by 2050, Stanford Engineering, 
Stanford University, USA, September 2017, https://cee.stanford.edu/news/
road-map-100-percent-renewable-energy-139-countries-2050
Keith, H., Mackey, B.G., Lindenmayer, D.B., 2009. Re-evaluation of forest biomass carbon stocks 
and lessons from the world’s most carbon-dense forests. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 106, 11635–11640. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0901970106
Keith, H., Lindenmayer, D., Macintosh, A., Mackey, B., 2015. Under What Circumstances Do 
Wood Products from Native Forests Benefit Climate Change Mitigation? PLOS ONE 10, 
e0139640. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0139640
Klaus, T, Vollmer, Clara, (2010), Thomas Klaus, Carla Vollmer, Kathrin Werner, Harry Lehmann, 
Klaus Müschen, Energy target 2050:100% renewable electricity supply, German Federal 
Environment Agency, Fraunhofer-Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik (IWES), 
Kassel, Contractor of the research project „Modellierung einer 100-Prozent erneuerbaren 
Stromerzeugung in 2050“,FKZ 363 01 277 Dessau-Roßlau, July 2010, https://www.umwelt-
bundesamt.de/sites/default/files/medien/378/publikationen/energieziel_2050_kurz.pdf
Law, B.E., Hudiburg, T.W., Berner, L.T., Kent, J.J., Buotte, P.C., Harmon, M.E., 2018. Land use 
strategies to mitigate climate change in carbon dense temperate forests. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 115, 3663–3668. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1720064115
Liu, Y.Y., van Dijk, A.I.J.M., de Jeu, R.A.M., Canadell, J.G., McCabe, M.F., Evans, J.P., Wang, G., 
2015. Recent reversal in loss of global terrestrial biomass. Nature Climate Change 5, 470–474. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate2581
Lutz, J.A., Furniss, T.J., Johnson, D.J., Davies, S.J., Allen, D., Alonso, A., Anderson-Teixeira, 
K.J., Andrade, A., Baltzer, J., Becker, K.M.L., Blomdahl, E.M., Bourg, N.A., Bunyavejchewin, 
S., Burslem, D.F.R.P., Cansler, C.A., Cao, K., Cao, M., Cárdenas, D., Chang, L.-W., Chao, 
K.-J., Chao, W.-C., Chiang, J.-M., Chu, C., Chuyong, G.B., Clay, K., Condit, R., Cordell, 
S., Dattaraja, H.S., Duque, A., Ewango, C.E.N., Fischer, G.A., Fletcher, C., Freund, J.A., 
Giardina, C., Germain, S.J., Gilbert, G.S., Hao, Z., Hart, T., Hau, B.C.H., He, F., Hector, A., 
Howe, R.W., Hsieh, C.-F., Hu, Y.-H., Hubbell, S.P., Inman-Narahari, F.M., Itoh, A., Janík, D., 
Kassim, A.R., Kenfack, D., Korte, L., Král, K., Larson, A.J., Li, Y., Lin, Y., Liu, S., Lum, 
S., Ma, K., Makana, J.-R., Malhi, Y., McMahon, S.M., McShea, W.J., Memiaghe, H.R., Mi, 
X., Morecroft, M., Musili, P.M., Myers, J.A., Novotny, V., de Oliveira, A., Ong, P., Orwig, 
D.A., Ostertag, R., Parker, G.G., Patankar, R., Phillips, R.P., Reynolds, G., Sack, L., Song, 
G.-Z.M., Su, S.-H., Sukumar, R., Sun, I.-F., Suresh, H.S., Swanson, M.E., Tan, S., Thomas, 
D.W., Thompson, J., Uriarte, M., Valencia, R., Vicentini, A., Vrška, T., Wang, X., Weiblen, 
G.D., Wolf, A., Wu, S.-H., Xu, H., Yamakura, T., Yap, S., Zimmerman, J.K., 2018. Global 
importance of large-diameter trees. Global Ecology and Biogeography 27, 849–864. https://
doi.org/10.1111/geb.12747
Luyssaert, S., Schulze, E.-D., Börner, A., Knohl, A., Hessenmöller, D., Law, B.E., Ciais, P., 
Grace, J., 2008. Old-growth forests as global carbon sinks. Nature 455, 213–215. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nature07276
Mackey, B., 2014. Counting trees, carbon and climate change. The Royal Statistical Society—
Significance 19–23.
Mackey, B., Prentice, I.C., Steffen, W., House, J.I., Lindenmayer, D., Keith, H., Berry, S., 2013. 
Untangling the confusion around land carbon science and climate change mitigation policy. 
Nature Climate Change 3, 552–557. https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1804
Mackey, B., Ware, D., Buckwell, A., Nalau, J., Sahin, O., Flemming, C. M., Smart, J.C., Connollet, 
R., Hallgren, W., 2018. Options and Implementation for Ecosystem-based Adaptation, Tanna 
3 Methodology
76
Island, Vanuatu (No. Report No. ESRAM-3), Griffith Climate Change Response Program. 
Griffith University, Gold Coast.
Martin, P.A., Newton, A.C., Pfeifer, M., Khoo, M., Bullock, J.M., 2015. Impacts of tropical selec-
tive logging on carbon storage and tree species richness: A meta-analysis. Forest Ecology and 
Management 356, 224–233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2015.07.010
Meinshausen, M., B. Hare, T. M. L. Wigley, D. van Vuuren, M. G. J. den Elzen and R. Swart (2006). 
“Multi-gas emission pathways to meet climate targets.” Climatic Change 75(1): 151–194.
Meinshausen, M., S. C. B. Raper and T. M. L. Wigley (2011). “Emulating coupled atmosphere- 
ocean and carbon cycle models with a simpler model, MAGICC6: Part I—Model Description 
and Calibration.” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 11: 1417-1456.
Müller, R., Pfeifroth, U (2015), Müller, R., Pfeifroth, U., Träger-Chatterjee, C., Trentmann, J., 
Cremer, R. (2015). Digging the METEOSAT Treasure—3 Decades of Solar Surface Radiation. 
Remote Sensing 7, 8067–8101. doi: https://doi.org/10.3390/rs70608067
Nabuurs, G.-J., Delacote, P., Ellison, D., Hanewinkel, M., Hetemäki, L., Lindner, M., 2017. 
By 2050 the Mitigation Effects of EU Forests Could Nearly Double through Climate Smart 
Forestry. Forests 8, 484. https://doi.org/10.3390/f8120484
Nauels, A., M. Meinshausen, M. Mengel, K. Lorbacher and T. M. L. Wigley (2016). “Synthesizing 
long-term sea level rise projections—the MAGICC sea level model.” Geosci. Model Dev. 
Discuss. 2016: 1–40.
Pan, Y., Birdsey, R.A., Fang, J., Houghton, R., Kauppi, P.E., Kurz, W.A., Phillips, O.L., 
Shvidenko, A., Lewis, S.L., Canadell, J.G., Ciais, P., Jackson, R.B., Pacala, S.W., McGuire, 
A.D., Piao, S., Rautiainen, A., Sitch, S., Hayes, D., 2011. A Large and Persistent Carbon Sink 
in the World’s Forests. Science 333, 988–993. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1201609
Pfenninger, S, Staffell, I. (2016a), Pfenninger, Stefan and Staffell, Iain (2016). Long-term patterns 
of European PV output using 30 years of validated hourly reanalysis and satellite data. Energy 
114, pp. 1251-1265. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.08.060
Pfenninger, S, Staffell, I. (2016b), Staffell, Iain and Pfenninger, Stefan (2016). Using Bias- 
Corrected Reanalysis to Simulate Current and Future Wind Power Output. Energy 114, 
pp. 1224-1239. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.08.068
Pingoud, K., Ekholm, T., Sievänen, R., Huuskonen, S., Hynynen, J., 2018. Trade-offs between 
forest carbon stocks and harvests in a steady state—A multi-criteria analysis. Journal of 
Environmental Management 210, 96–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2017.12.076
Poorter, L., Bongers, F., Aide, T.M., Almeyda Zambrano, A.M., Balvanera, P., Becknell, J.M., 
Boukili, V., Brancalion, P.H.S., Broadbent, E.N., Chazdon, R.L., Craven, D., de Almeida- 
Cortez, J.S., Cabral, G.A.L., de Jong, B.H.J., Denslow, J.S., Dent, D.H., DeWalt, S.J., Dupuy, 
J.M., Durán, S.M., Espírito-Santo, M.M., Fandino, M.C., César, R.G., Hall, J.S., Hernandez- 
Stefanoni, J.L., Jakovac, C.C., Junqueira, A.B., Kennard, D., Letcher, S.G., Licona, J.-C., 
Lohbeck, M., Marín-Spiotta, E., Martínez-Ramos, M., Massoca, P., Meave, J.A., Mesquita, 
R., Mora, F., Muñoz, R., Muscarella, R., Nunes, Y.R.F., Ochoa-Gaona, S., de Oliveira, 
A.A., Orihuela-Belmonte, E., Peña-Claros, M., Pérez-García, E.A., Piotto, D., Powers, J.S., 
Rodríguez-Velázquez, J., Romero-Pérez, I.E., Ruíz, J., Saldarriaga, J.G., Sanchez-Azofeifa, 
A., Schwartz, N.B., Steininger, M.K., Swenson, N.G., Toledo, M., Uriarte, M., van Breugel, 
M., van der Wal, H., Veloso, M.D.M., Vester, H.F.M., Vicentini, A., Vieira, I.C.G., Bentos, T.V., 
Williamson, G.B., Rozendaal, D.M.A., 2016. Biomass resilience of Neotropical secondary for-
ests. Nature 530, 211–214. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature16512
Ramachandran Nair, P.K., Mohan Kumar, B., Nair, V.D., 2009. Agroforestry as a strategy for 
carbon sequestration. Journal of Plant Nutrition and Soil Science 172, 10–23. https://doi.
org/10.1002/jpln.200800030
RE-N DB (2018) Renewables.ninja, onione database for hourly time series for solar and wind data 
for a specific geographical position, viewed and data down load took place between May and 
July 2018, https://www.renewables.ninja/
REN21-GSR (2018), 2018; Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, (Paris: REN21 Secretariat), 
ISBN 978-3-9818911-3-3
S. Teske et al.
77
Rienecker, M, Suarez MJ, (2011) Rienecker MM, Suarez MJ, Gelaro R, Todling R, et al. (2011). 
MERRA: NASA’s Modern-Era Retrospective Analysis for Research and Applications. Journal 
of Climate, 24(14): 3624-3648. doi: https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-11-00015.1
Rogelj, J, den Elzen, M (2016), Joeri Rogelj, Michel den Elzen, Niklas Höhne, Taryn Fransen, 
Hanna Fekete, Harald Winkler, Roberto Schaeffer, Fu Sha, Keywan Riahi & Malte Meinshausen, 
(30 June 2016), Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 
2  °C, Nature volume 534, pages 631–639 (30 June 2016), https://www.nature.com/articles/
nature18307
Roxburgh, S.H., Wood, S.W., Mackey, B.G., Woldendorp, G., Gibbons, P., 2006. Assessing the 
carbon sequestration potential of managed forests: a case study from temperate Australia: 
Carbon sequestration potential. Journal of Applied Ecology 43, 1149–1159. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1365-2664.2006.01221.x
Rutovitz (2015) chapter 7 of: Teske, S, Pregger, T., Naegler, T., Simon, S., Energy [R]evolution—
A sustainable
Rutovitz, J., Dominish, E (2015), Rutovitz, J., Dominish, E & Downes, J.  (2015) Calculating 
Global Energy Sector Jobs: 2015 Methodology. Prepared for Greenpeace International by the 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney.
Rutovitz, J, James, G (2017), Rutovitz, J., James, G., Teske S., Mpofu, S., Usher, J, Morris, T., and 
Alexander, D. 2017. Storage Requirements for Reliable Electricity in Australia. Report pre-
pared by the Institute for Sustainable Futures for the Australian Council of Learned Academies.
Sarah (2018) – Online database of “renewable.ninja,” https://dx.doi.org/10.5676/EUM_SAF_CM/
SARAH/V001
Schlenzig C (1998) Energy planning and environmental management with the information and 
decision support system MESAP. International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 12(1–6):81–91.
Seven2one (2012) Mesap/PlaNet software framework: Seven2one Modelling, Mesap4, Release 
4.14.1.9, Seven2one Informationssysteme GmbH, Karlsruhe, Germany
Simon S, Naegler T, Gils H (2018) Transformation towards a Renewable Energy System in Brazil 
and Mexico—Technological and Structural Options for Latin America. Energies 11 (4):907
ST 7 (2018), Statistic Times viewed July 2018, http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-
gdp-sector-composition.php
Teske, S (2015), Thesis, Bridging the Gap between Energy- and Grid Models, Developing an inte-
grated infrastructural planning model for 100% renewable energy systems in order to optimize 
the interaction of flexible power generation, smart grids and storage technologies, chapter 2, 
University Flensburg, Germany
Teske, S, Brown, T, (2012), Teske, S, Dr. Tom Brown, Dr. Eckehard Tröster, Peter-Philipp 
Schierhorn, Dr. Thomas
Teske, S, Dominish, E (2016), Teske, S., Dominish, E., Ison, N. and Maras, K. (2016) 100% 
Renewable Energy for Australia—Decarbonising Australia’s Energy Sector within one 
Generation; Report prepared by ISF for GetUp! and Solar Citizens, March 2016, https://www.
uts.edu.au/sites/default/files/article/downloads/ISF_100%25_Australian_Renewable_Energy_
Report.pdf
Teske, S, Morris, T (2017), Teske, S., Morris, T., Nagrath, Kriti (2017) 100% Renewable Energy 
for Tanzania—Access to renewable and affordable energy for all within one generation. Report 
prepared by ISF for Bread for the World, October 2017.
Teske, S, Pregger, T (2015), Teske, S, Pregger, T., Naegler, T., Simon, S., Energy [R]evolution—
A sustainable World Energy Outlook 2015, Greenpeace International with the German 
Aerospace Centre (DLR), Institute of Engineering Thermodynamics, System Analysis and 
Technology Assessment, Stuttgart, Germany. https://www.scribd.com/document/333565532/
Energy-Revolution-2015-Full
UN PD DB (2018) United Nations, Population Division, online database, viewed June 2018—
https://population.un.org/Household/index.html#/countries
UNFCCC (2015), The Paris Agreement builds upon the Convention and for the first time brings 
all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and 
adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, 
3 Methodology
78
it charts a new course in the global climate effort. https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/
the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement
(Vaisala 2017) Free Wind and Solar Resource Maps; Accessed 25 October 2018; ONLINE; https://
www.vaisala.com/en/lp/free-wind-and-solar-resource-maps.
Watson, B., Noble, L., Bolin, B., et. al., 2000. Summary for policymakers: land use, land-use 
change, and forestry: a special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
WEC (2018) World Energy Council—Energy Efficiency Indicators, Online database, viewed June 
2018), https://wec-indicators.enerdata.net/specific-electricity-use.html
Wheeler, C., Mitchard, E., Koch, A., Lewis, S.L., in press. The mitigation potential of large-scale 
tropical forest restoration: assessing the promise of the Bonn Challenge. in review.
WRI (2018), World Resources Institute, A Global Database of Power Plants, April 2018, viewed in 
July 2018, http://www.wri.org/publication/global-power-plant-database
Ziegler, A.D., Phelps, J., Yuen, J.Q., Webb, E.L., Lawrence, D., Fox, J.M., Bruun, T.B., Leisz, S.J., 
Ryan, C.M., Dressler, W., Mertz, O., Pascual, U., Padoch, C., Koh, L.P., 2012. Carbon outcomes 
of major land-cover transitions in SE Asia: great uncertainties and REDD+ policy implications. 
Global Change Biology 18, 3087–3099. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2486.2012.02747.x
Zimmerman, B., Kormos, C., 2012. Prospects for Sustainable Logging in Tropical Forests. 
BioScience 62, 479–487. https://doi.org/10.1525/bio.2012.62.5.9
Zomer, R.J., Neufeldt, H., Xu, J., Ahrends, A., Bossio, D., Trabucco, A., van Noordwijk, M., 
Wang, M., 2016. Global Tree Cover and Biomass Carbon on Agricultural Land: The contribu-
tion of agroforestry to global and national carbon budgets. Scientific Reports 6. https://doi.
org/10.1038/srep29987
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
S. Teske et al.
79© The Author(s) 2019 
S. Teske (ed.), Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05843-2_4
Chapter 4
Mitigation Scenarios for Non-energy GHG
Malte Meinshausen and Kate Dooley
Abstract Presentation of non-energy emission pathways in line with the new 
UNFCCC Shared Socio-Economic Pathways (SSP) scenario characteristics and the 
evaluation of the multi-gas pathways against various temperature thresholds and 
carbon budgets (1.5 °C and 2.0 °C) over time, and additionally against a 1.5 °C 
carbon budget in 2100, followed by a discussion of the results in the context of the 
most recent scientific literature in this field. Presentation of the non-energy GHG 
mitigation scenarios calculated to complement the energy-related CO2 emissions 
derived in Chap. 8.
In this section, we present the results for the land-use CO2 and non-CO2 emissions 
pathways that complement the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C energy-related CO2 scenarios.
4.1  Land-Use CO2 emissions
This section presents the aggregate results for the land-use sequestration pathways 
designed for this study. Figure  4.1 below shows the annual sequestration in the 
sequestration pathways over time, differentiated into climate domains. The path-
ways shown are the results of the Monte Carlo analysis described in Table 3.11 in 
Sect. 3.8.1.5 and the text. We focus on the median values (thick lines in Fig. 4.1). 
Note that the area under the curve for a given pathway is an indication of the cumu-
lative CO2 uptake. By far the most important sequestration may result from large- 
scale reforestation measures, particularly in the subtropics and tropics (see yellow 
pathways in Fig. 4.1 below). The second most important pathway in terms of the 
amount of CO2 sequestered is the sustainable use of existing forests, which basically 
means reducing logging within those forests. Although effective mitigation is not 
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achieved in the tropics (Martin et al. 2015), in the temperate and boreal regions, 
improved forest management could provide substantial additional carbon uptake 
over time. The time horizon for this sequestration option is assumed to be relatively 
long in temperate and boreal regions, consistent with the longer time it takes for 
these forest ecosystems to reach equilibrium (Roxburgh et al. 2006; Luyssaert et al. 
2008). The ‘forest ecosystem restoration’ pathway is also important, which basi-
cally assumes a reduction to zero in logging rates in a fraction of the forest, allowing 
these forests to be restored to full ecosystem function, including their carbon stocks 
and resilience due to biodiversity (Mackey 2014).
Overall, the median of all the assumed sequestration pathways, shown in Fig. 4.1, 
would result in the sequestration of 151.9 GtC by 2150. This is approximately equiv-
alent to all historical land-use-related CO2 emissions to date (Houghton and Nassikas 
2017; Mackey et al. 2013). The magnitude of these figures indicates the substantial 
challenges that go hand in hand with these sequestration pathways. Given the com-
peting forms of land use that exist today, the challenge of converting overall terres-
trial carbon stocks back to pre-industrial levels cannot be underestimated. There 
would be significant benefits, but also risks, if this sequestration option were to be 
used instead of mitigation. The benefits are clearly manifold, ranging from biodiver-
sity protection, reduced erosion, improved local climates, wind protection, and 
potentially a reduction in air pollution (Mackey 2014). Despite this, terrestrial car-
bon sequestration is inherently impermanent. However, a future warming climate 
with an increased fire risk also brings with it the risk of large reversals in sequestered 
carbon. Similarly, prolonged droughts in some areas could reverse the gains in ter-
restrial carbon stocks. Although the increased resilience of natural and biodiverse 
ecosystems compared with that of monoculture plantations can guard against this 
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risk (DellaSala, 2019; Lindenmayer and Sato 2018), a future mitigation pathway 
that relies on sequestration instead of mitigation action is ultimately always more 
susceptible to higher long-term climate change, given the risk of ‘non-permanence’. 
However, in this study, the land-use CO2 sequestration pathways complement some 
of the most ambitious mitigation pathways, and should therefore be regarded, not as 
‘offsetting’ mitigation action, but as complementary measures to help reduce the 
CO2 concentrations that have arisen from the overly high emissions in the past.
The thin lines in Fig. 4.1 indicate individual draws in the Monte Carlo analysis. 
The thick lines are the median values from the ensemble of draws for each seques-
tration pathway and domain.
We aggregated the four sequestration pathways from our country-level data to 
the five RCP regions (Fig. 4.2). The country-level data were subject to substantial 
uncertainties and simplifications because we used climate-domain average uptakes, 
carbon density caps, and saturation periods. The re-aggregated sequestration rates 
over the five RCP regions can be considered approximate illustrations of the biome- 
average sequestration rates if those sequestration pathways were pursued with a 
range of institutional and policy measures.
For the 1.5 °C Scenario, we assumed the full extent of sequestration shown in 
Fig.  4.1, whereas for the 2.0  °C pathway, we assumed that only a third of that 
sequestration will occur. The reference scenario is assumed to follow the SSP2 
‘middle of the road’ reference scenario created by the MESSAGE-GLOBIOM 
modelling team. As illustrated in Fig. 4.2, the reference scenario does not assume a 
complete phasing-out of global land-use-related net emissions over the next 20 or 
30 years. Instead, it assumes that they are not phased-out until approximately 2080.
The 2.0  °C pathway (brighter blue in Fig. 4.2) aligns relatively well with the 
SSP1 1.9 and SSP1 2.6 scenarios from the forthcoming CMIP6 model inter- 
comparison project. The 1.5 °C pathway, with three times the sequestration rates, is 
consistent with the lower land-use CO2 scenarios analysed here—with mitigation 
rates of up to −2 GtC per annum from 2040 to 2050.
Figure 4.2 shows the land-use-related CO2 emission and sequestration rates of 
the 2.0°C and 1.5 °C pathways in this study compared with those in the CMIP6 
CEDS scenarios (turquoise) and the scenarios from the IPCC SR1.5 database (thin 
green lines). The global total pathway is the sum of the five regional pathways 
shown in the lower row of the panels.
4.1.1  Other GHG and Aerosol Emissions
This section examines the other main GHGs (methane and N2O) and gives examples 
of some fluorinated gases. The full results, with the species-by-species time series, 
are provided in a data appendix.
Methane (CH4) emissions are the second-largest contributor to anthropogenically 
induced climate change. Our approach, described in the Methods section earlier, 
derives pathways for the 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C Scenarios that are close to the lower end 
of the overall scenario distribution. This is mainly because the methane distribution at 
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the lower end of the fossil fuel CO2 emissions is relatively narrow, and there is a 
strong correlation between the fossil CO2 and total CH4 emissions in the scenarios in 
any given year (see top-left methane panel in Fig. 3.14). As with almost all literature-
reported scenarios, a lower plateau of methane emissions is associated with agricul-
tural activities required to feed the world’s population. Our quantile regression method 
resulted in long-term methane emission levels that are quite similar to those in the two 
lower SSP scenarios, SSP1 1.9 and SSP1 2.6 (Fig. 4.3). The derived CH4 pathways for 
1.5 °C and 2.0 °C track towards the lower of the scenario distributions.
Nitrous oxide (N2O) is one of the longer-lived GHGs, although the overall 
amounts in the atmosphere are much smaller than those of methane or CO2. The 
relatively high plateau of global emissions, around 5 MtN2O-N for N2O, are reflected 
in the SSP1. 1.9 and SSP1 2.6 scenarios (dark green lines in Fig. 4.4) and in the 
quantile regression results for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios in this study. This 
plateau of emissions is related to agricultural activities, mainly the use of fertilizers, 
and combined with the long lifetime of N2O, it means that the N2O concentrations 
are projected to increase further over the course of the century, even for the lower 
1.5 °C and 2.0 °C pathways.
The derived methane pathways for 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C track towards the lower of 
the scenario distributions.
Halocarbons and fluorinated gases are another group of important GHGs. 
Recently, some of these gases, such as HFCs, were also subjected to control under 
the Montreal Protocol, with clear phase-out schedules. Some of the halocarbons and 
fluorinated gases (such as tetrafluoromethane, CF4) are only produced and emitted 
in relatively small quantities—largely for industrial purposes in the semi-conductor 
industry. Some also have applications in the agricultural sector, including methyl 
bromide, which is used for soil fumigation. SF6 is one of the strongest GHGs on a 
per mass basis. It is controlled under the Kyoto Protocol and included in the nation-
ally determined contributions (NDCs) by many countries under the Paris Agreement. 
Our applied quantile regression method practically phases-out many of the haloge-
nated species over the course of the next 10–20 years, although some small back-
ground emissions remain. The full results for 40 halocarbons, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6 
are provided in a data appendix (Figs. 4.5 and 4.6).
Aerosols have an important temporary masking effect on GHG-induced warm-
ing. The most important anthropogenically emitted aerosol coolant in the climate 
system is sulfur dioxide or SOX. With higher fuel standards and concerns about local 
air pollution, future SOX emissions are projected to be substantially lower than cur-
rent levels. In fact, most emission inventories assume that SOX emissions peaked in 
the 1990s. Therefore, even in the most high-fossil-fuel-emitting reference scenarios, 
SOX emissions are projected to decrease. Asia produces by far the most SOX emis-
sions of any continent because of the coal-fuelled power plants in China and India. 
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, our quantile regression method sets sulfate aerosol emissions 
at levels in between those in the SSP1 2.6 and SSP1 1.9 scenarios, whereas in the 
1.5 °C Scenario, the level is even lower.
Similarly, the projected emissions of NOX, which is largely a by-product of fossil 
fuel burning, are highest in Asia. In the derived 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C Scenarios, NOX 
4 Mitigation Scenarios for Non-energy GHG
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levels are between the levels in the SSP1 2.6 and SSP1 1.9 scenarios for most of the 
twenty-first century (Figs. 4.7 and 4.8).
Black and organic carbon emissions are also accruing substantially in the Middle 
East and Africa, largely from biomass burning (Figs. 4.9 and 4.10). Similar to other 
aerosol emissions, black and organic carbon emissions are projected to decrease. 
Although black carbon is a substantial warming agent, organic carbon is a net cool-
ant. Because both species are often co-emitted, the net effect of policies to reduce 
black carbon do not have as large a mitigation benefit as might be initially assumed. 
This is because a reduction in the processes and activities that produce black carbon 
emissions will also lead to lower organic carbon emissions, partially offsetting both 
the warming and cooling effects. The emissions projected as part of the IMAGE 
model SSP1 2.6 and SSP1 1.9 scenarios are very low compared with those in other 
studies. Furthermore, the correlation between fossil CO2 emissions and black or 
Fig. 4.5 Global SF6 emission levels from literature-reported scenarios and the LDF pathways 
derived in this study
Fig. 4.6 Global tetrafluoromethane (CF4) emissions from the collection of assessed literature- 
reported scenarios and the LDF pathways derived in this study
M. Meinshausen and K. Dooley
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organic carbon is less pronounced than the correlations of fossil CO2 with other 
aerosols, such as NOX and SOX, partly because it results from biomass burning, 
which is not related to the burning of fossil fuels. Therefore, with our quantile 
regression method, the black carbon and organic carbon emission pathways are not 
as low as those found in the lower SSP scenarios (see Figs. 4.9 and 4.10).
For Tabular overview of three scenarios see Annex
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Chapter 5
Main Assumptions for Energy Pathways
Thomas Pregger, Sonja Simon, Tobias Naegler, and Sven Teske
Abstract The aim of this chapter is to make the scenario calculations fully trans-
parent and comprehensible to the scientific community. It provides the scenario 
narratives for the reference case (5.0 °C) as well as for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C on a 
global and regional basis. Cost projections for all fossil fuels and renewable energy 
technologies until 2050 are provided. Explanations are given for all relevant base 
year data for the modelling and the main input parameters such as GDP, population, 
renewable energy potentials and technology parameters.
Scenario studies cannot predict the future, but they can describe what is needed for a 
successful pathway in terms of technology implementation and investments. Scenarios 
also help us to explore the possible effects of transition processes, such as supply 
costs and emissions. The energy demand and supply scenarios in this study are based 
on information about current energy structures and today’s knowledge of energy 
resources and the costs involved in deploying them. As far as possible, we also take 
into account potential constraints and preferences in each world region. However, this 
remains difficult due to large sub-regional variations. Our energy modelling primarily 
aims to achieve a transparent and consistent scenario, an ambitious but still plausible 
storyline from several possible techno-economic pathways. Knowledge integration 
is the core of this approach because we must consider different technical, 
economic, environmental, and societal factors. The scenario modelling follows a 
hybrid bottom- up/top-down approach, with no cost optimising objective functions. 
The analysis considers the key technologies required for a successful energy transi-
tion, and focuses on the roles and potential of renewable energies. Wind and solar 
energies have the highest economic potential and dominate the pathways on the 
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supply side. However, variable renewable power from wind and photovoltaics (PV) 
remains limited by the need for sufficient secured capacity in energy systems. 
Therefore, we also consider concentrated solar power (CSP) with high-temperature 
heat storage as a solar option that promises large-scale dispatchable and secured 
power generation.
5.1  Scenario Definition
Scenario modelling was performed for three main scenarios that can be related to dif-
ferent overall carbon budgets between 2015 and 2050 and derived mean global tem-
perature increases. The (around) 5.0 °C Scenario was calculated based on the Current 
Policies scenario published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in World 
Energy Outlook 2017 (IEA 2017), and the emission budget for this scenario simply 
uses and extrapolates from the corresponding narratives. The 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios were calculated in a normative way to achieve defined emission budgets.
5.1.1  The 5.0 °C Scenario (Reference Scenario)
The reference case only takes into account existing international energy and envi-
ronmental policies. Its assumptions include, for example, continuing progress in 
electricity and gas market reforms, the liberalization of cross-border energy trade, 
and recent policies designed to combat environmental pollution. The scenario does 
not include additional policies to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Because 
the IEA’s projections only extend to 2040, we have extrapolated their key macroeco-
nomic and energy indicators forward to 2050. This provides a baseline for compari-
son with the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
5.1.2  The 2.0 °C Scenario
The first alternative scenario aims to achieve an ambitious emissions reduction to 
zero by 2050 and a global energy-related CO2 emissions budget between 2015 and 
2050 of around 590 Gt. The scenario is close to the assumptions and results of the 
Advanced E[R] scenario published in 2015 by Greenpeace (Teske et  al. 2015). 
However, the scenario includes an updated base year, more coherent regional devel-
opments of energy intensities, and reconsidered trajectories and shares of renewable 
energy resource (RES) deployment. The 2.0  °C Scenario represents a far more 
likely pathway than the 1.5 °C Scenario, because the 2.0 °C case takes into account 
unavoidable delays due to political, economic, and societal processes and 
stakeholders.
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5.1.3  The 1.5 °C Scenario
The second alternative scenario aims to achieve a global energy-related CO2 emis-
sion budget of around 450 Gt, accumulated between 2015 and 2050. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario requires immediate action to realize all available options. It is a technical 
pathway, not a political prognosis. It refers to technically possible measures and 
options without taking into account societal risks or barriers. Efficiency and renew-
able potentials must be deployed even more quickly than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. 
Furthermore, avoiding inefficient technologies and behaviours are essential strate-
gies for developing regions in this time period.
5.2  Scenario World Regions and Clusters
The regional implementation of the long-term energy scenarios is defined according 
to the breakdown of the ten world regions of the IEA WEO 2016 (IEA 2016a, b). 
This approach has been chosen because the IEA also provides the most comprehen-
sive global energy statistics and, in contrast to the regional breakdown of the IEA 
WEO 2017, it is also consistent with the Energy [R]evolution study series. Table 5.1 
provides a country breakdown of the ten world regions considered in the scenarios.
Regional conditions play an important role in the layout of the scenario path-
ways. Therefore, scenario building tries to take into account important factors, such 
as current demand and supply structures, RES potentials, urbanization rates, and as 
far as possible, societal and behavioural factors. The following sections provide 
some regional information. Statistical data for the energy systems in the regions can 
be found in Sect. 5.3.
5.2.1  OECD North America
The energy system in OECD North America (USA, Canada, and Mexico) is domi-
nated by developments in the USA, where more than 80% of the region’s demand 
occurs. In the highly developed countries of the USA and Canada, reducing the 
demand for energy by increasing efficiency will play a crucial role in decarbonisa-
tion. However, the high energy intensity (i.e., the high demand per capita or per 
gross domestic product [GDP]) requires even more ambitious measures than in 
other regions to reduce the energy demand as quickly as possible. In Mexico, in 
contrast, increasing living standards and the increasing population will increase the 
difficulties associated with reducing the energy demand, despite ambitious increases 
in efficiency. Wind and solar power generation will be the backbone of the power 
supply in OECD North America. They will be supplemented by hydro power 
(mainly in Canada) and also concentrated solar power (CSP). The high potential for 
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CSP in Mexico and the southern parts of the USA will allow the large-scale use of 
CSP plants for grid balancing and grid stabilization. This will reduce the need for 
power storage, demand-side management, and other balancing strategies. In the 
large metropolitan areas in North America, electromobility and hydrogen cars will 
enter the market earlier and at a faster rate than in many other world regions. Large 
biomass potentials (residues) mean that biofuels could play important roles as 
climate- neutral fuels to bridge the gap until new powertrain technologies dominate 
Table 5.1 World regions used in the scenarios
World 
region Countries
OECD 
Europe
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
OECD 
North 
America
Canada, Mexico, United States of America
OECD 
Pacific
Australia, Japan, Korea (South), New Zealand
Eastern 
Europe/
Eurasia
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta
China People’s Republic of China, including Hong Kong
India India
Non-OECD 
Asia 
(without 
China and 
India)
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chinese Taipei, 
Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, Laos, Macao, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, Nepal, New Caledonia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, 
Vietnam,
Latin 
America
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, 
Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Falkland 
Islands, French Guyana, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Pierre et Miquelon, 
St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos 
Islands, Uruguay, Venezuela
Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, , Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe
Middle East Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
United Arab Emirates, Yemen
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the vehicle market. In the heating sector, particularly for process heat, solid biomass 
and biogas will be required as alternative fuels until the (direct or indirect) electrifi-
cation of the heat sector is accomplished.
5.2.2  Latin America
Latin America’s energy system is dominated by Brazil, which accounts for around 
half the region’s energy demand. In the reference (5.0 °C) scenario, this region has a 
particularly high demand for electrification and a strong increase in CO2 emissions 
per capita. Latin America has the highest urbanization rate of all non-OECD regions. 
This provides opportunities for efficiency measures and the large-scale electrification 
of the heat and transport sectors based on renewable resources. Latin America has a 
high overall potential for the use of renewable energies (Herreras Martínez et  al. 
2015) and the largest biomass potential of all regions. It already meets more than 
60% of its power demand from renewable sources, and higher shares are the focus of 
research (Nascimento et al. 2017; Barbosa et al. 2017; Gils et al. 2017). However, in 
many studies, heat and transport demands are not integrated into the assessments, 
even though the region has a large potential for renewable heat and decarbonised 
transport. Given the abundance of biomass, there is potential for generating more 
than 12 EJ from residues (Seidenberger et al. 2008). Biomass will also play a signifi-
cant role in the industry sector. Because the region has a long experience of biofuels, 
they will play a major role in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, especially in Brazil, 
where bioethanol for transport is already competitive (Lora and Andrade 2009; La 
Rovere et al. 2011; Nass et al. 2007). However, the high urbanization rate in Latin 
America means there is also an opportunity to develop electromobility early. In the 
power sector, the use of biomass from residues will help to balance the increasing 
share of variable renewable energy from the excellent solar and wind resources. Grid 
extensions will contribute to inter-regional stability (Nascimento et al. 2017).
5.2.3  OECD Europe
The OECD Europe region includes countries with quite different energy supply 
systems, different potentials for renewable energy sources, and different power and 
heat demand patterns. High solar potentials and low heat demand for buildings are 
characteristic of the south. The northern and western parts of Europe have high wind 
potentials, especially offshore wind. In northern and central Europe, there are high 
potentials for hydropower and a high energy demand for space heating (such as in 
Eastern Europe). Biomass potentials exist predominantly in the north and east, but 
are only limited in the southern regions. The industrial demands for electricity and 
process heat are quite different in highly industrialized countries, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, and France compared with some eastern and 
southern countries. Most European countries, particularly European Union (EU) 
member countries, already have policies and market mechanisms for the 
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implementation of renewable energy. The European Network of Transmission 
System Operators (ENTSO-E) can be used as a well-established basis for the further 
development of an interconnected European grid, which would be able to imple-
ment the large-scale and long-range transmission of renewable power to demand 
centres. This may also lead to important interconnections to the Middle East/North 
Africa (MENA) region and Eastern Europe/Eurasia. The possible large-scale impor-
tation of solar thermal electricity from MENA countries via high-voltage direct-
current lines has been described in many studies and still represents a promising 
option in the long term, despite the currently difficult political conditions.
5.2.4  Eastern Europe/Eurasia
The Eastern Europe/Eurasia region includes some eastern EU member countries that 
are not part of the OECD, some other countries of the former Yugoslav Republic, and 
several countries of the former Soviet Union. However, the region is dominated by 
the economy and energy system of Russia. The main energy carrier today is natural 
gas, followed by oil. The region has large energy resources in biomass and wind 
power, but also geothermal energy and PV. Eastern Europe/Eurasia is the only world 
region that may face a significant population decline with expected demographic 
developments, particularly in Russia. Today, the region has by far the highest final 
and primary energy demand per $GDP.  This indicates the existence of energy- 
intensive industries, but also large efficiency potentials in all sectors. The high heat 
demand, large rural areas, enormous oil and natural gas potentials, and the uneven 
distribution of economic wealth are some of the major challenges in this region. So 
far, only low expansion rates for renewable energies have been achieved in the region.
5.2.5  The Middle East
The Middle East consists of a series of oil-dependent countries, all of which have 
tremendous solar potential. The transport demand in the Middle East is very high, 
as is the electrification rate in urban areas, where currently almost 70% of the fast- 
growing population lives. Therefore, the electrification of transport systems is a 
major target in our scenarios. For many Middle East countries, water scarcity is a 
problem, and there are opportunities to combine large CSP plants with water 
desalination, to reduce the pressure on water supply systems. Biomass is very 
scarce, so its use must be limited to high-temperature process heat, especially in 
industry, where other renewable sources cannot be used. This will lead to a high 
demand for hydrogen or synthetic fuels. Naturally, this also limits the potential for 
combined heat and power generation (CHP), which is primarily seen as a transi-
tion technology to provide the most efficient use of the remaining fossil fuels and 
low- value biomass wastes. However, because the Middle East has extraordinary 
solar and wind potentials (Nematollahi et al. 2016; Hess 2018), the solar market is 
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taking off. Projects with a capacity of 11 GW are planned for 2018 (MESIA 2018). 
With the extraordinarily high number of full-load hours, there is also the potential 
to use high-temperature solar heat. These resources also provide excellent condi-
tions for hydrogen production, which are extensively exploited in the 2.0 °C and 
the 1.5 °C Scenarios. Therefore, the Middle East is a model solar and hydrogen 
region.
5.2.6  Africa
Africa is a very heterogeneous region, both economically and geographically. One 
of the few things African nations have in common is their very fast population 
growth. Africa includes the arid regions of North Africa, the undeveloped sub- 
Saharan region, and the emerging market of South Africa. North Africa features a 
high electrification rate and a strong dependence on oil. The water and biomass 
potentials for energy are very low, because water and biomass are prioritized for 
nutrition (or at least nutrition competes strongly with energy use). The region has 
outstanding solar irradiation, an excellent renewable energy source. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is characterized by low urbanization and a lack of access to electricity for 
two-thirds of its people (IEA 2014). Its energy supply is characterized by a high 
share of low-efficiency forms of generation, such as traditional biomass use. There 
is a general lack of energy services. Modernizing traditional biomass use could lead 
to significant reductions in energy demand, while maintaining or improving energy 
services (van der Zwaan et al. 2018). A broad variety of renewable energy sources, 
including biomass, hydro, geothermal, solar, and wind, have great potential. 
However, it will be a major challenge to find the investment required to tap these 
power sources under the present economic conditions (van der Zwaan et al. 2018). 
The picture is somewhat different in South Africa, which has a coal-based energy 
system and a comparatively stable and well-connected electricity grid, with access 
to electricity for more than 85% of its population (IEA 2014). The dependence on 
traditional biomass is extensive in the household and commerce sectors. Over 700 
million people rely on fuel wood or charcoal for cooking on inefficient cooking 
stoves or open fires, with an efficiency of 10–20%. Modern biomass technologies 
provide multiple advantages. The introduction of more-efficient technologies, even 
those as simple as improved cooking stoves (with an average efficiency of 25%) or 
biogas stoves (with an average efficiency of 65%) (IEA 2014), will reduce the bio-
mass input and thus the primary energy demand. This will also alleviate the heavy 
pressure on the ecosystem from the unsustainable exploitation of natural forests. 
The introduction of modern technologies will improve the supply of useful energy, 
lower indoor pollution, and improve living standards. Therefore, we assume in our 
scenarios that the overall biomass efficiency will improve from 35% in 2015 to 65% 
in 2050, while biomass’s share will decrease and be partially replaced by electric 
power and solar heat.
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5.2.7  Non-OECD Asia
The Non-OECD Asia region includes all the developing countries of Asia, except 
China and India. This group covers a large spectrum in terms of size, economy, 
stability, and developmental status. The region is spread over a large area from the 
Arabian Sea to the Pacific. Electricity access varies widely in these countries, 
according to WEO 2014. In Southeast Asia, the average access is 77%, with only 
30% access in Myanmar and Cambodia, and nearly 100% access in Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. In Indonesia, there is 76% access (92% in urban areas), in 
Bangladesh 60% (90%), and in Pakistan 69% (88%). In Southeast Asia, 46% of the 
population still relies on traditional biomass, with the highest use in Myanmar 
(93%) and Cambodia (89%). In Indonesia, 42% of the population used biomass for 
cooking in 2012; in Bangladesh the figure was 89%; and in Pakistan, it was 62%. 
The lowest values are in Singapore (0%), Malaysia (0%), and Thailand (24%). The 
scenarios thus cover the whole band-width of renewable resources and technologi-
cal development, even though the outlooks for individual countries deviate widely 
from the average.
5.2.8  India
India has a fast-growing population of over 1.2 billion people and is the world’s 
seventh largest country by area. However, the population density is already 2.7 
times higher than that in China. Due to its climate, India has a rather limited CSP 
potential but a large potential for PV power generation. Its wind power potential is 
expected to be limited by land-use constraints, but the technical potential estimated 
from available meteorological data is large. According to the WEO 2014 database, 
electricity access is on average 75%, with 94% in urban areas and 67% in rural 
areas. In India, about 815 million people still relied on the traditional use of biomass 
for cooking in 2012. Due to population and GDP growth, increasing living stan-
dards, and increasing mobility, it is expected that the energy demand in India will 
increase significantly, although large potentials for efficiency savings exist. 
Electrification is a core strategy for decarbonisation in India, which, combined with 
the rising demand for energy services, will lead to strong growth in the per capita 
and overall electricity demand. It is also expected that the need for mobility in India 
will increase rapidly and more strongly than in other regions of the world.
5.2.9  China
China has great potential renewable energy resources, especially for the generation 
of solar thermal power in the west, onshore wind in the north, and offshore wind in 
the east and southeast. Photovoltaic power generation could play an important role 
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throughout all parts of China. The expansion of hydropower generation is currently 
also seen as a major strategy, but the potential for small hydro systems is rather low. 
China will face further large increases in energy demand in all sectors of the energy 
system. Chinese economic prosperity has mainly been underpinned by coal, which 
provides over two-thirds of China’s primary energy supply today (IEA WEO 2014). 
The increase in electricity use due to higher electrification rates will be a major fac-
tor in the successful expansion of renewable energy in the industry, building, and 
transport sectors. In China, nearly all households are connected to the electricity 
grid. However, according to WEO 2014, about 450 million Chinese still relied on 
the traditional use of biomass for cooking in 2012. China has pledged to reduce CO2 
emissions before 2030, and already has some ambitious political targets for renew-
able energy deployment.
5.2.10  OECD Pacific
OECD Pacific consists of Japan, New Zealand, the peninsula of South Korea, and 
the continent of Australia. The region is dominated by the high energy demand in 
Japan, which has rather limited renewable energy resources. The lack of physical 
grid connections prevents power transmission between these countries. Therefore, it 
is a huge effort to supply the large Japanese nation with renewable energy and to 
stabilize the variable wind power without tapping the large solar potential in other 
countries, such as Australia. Here, hydrogen and synfuels will not only be used for 
the long-term storage of renewable power, but also as an option for balancing the 
renewable energy supply across borders. The early market introduction of fuel-cell 
cars in Japan may support such a strategy. Following the accident at Fukushima and 
the implementation of feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity, the expansion rates 
for renewable energies, in particular PV, have risen sharply.
5.3  Key Assumptions for Scenarios
5.3.1  Population Growth
Population growth is an important driver of energy demand, directly and through its 
impact on economic growth and development. The assumptions made in this study 
up to 2050 are based on United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projec-
tions for population growth (UNDP 2017 (medium variant)). Table 5.2 shows that 
according to the UNDP, the world’s population is expected to grow by 0.8% per 
year on average over the period 2015–2050. The global population will increase 
from 7.4 billion people in 2015 to nearly 9.8 billion by 2050. The rate of population 
growth will slow over this period, from 1.1% per year during 2015–2020 to 0.6% 
per year during 2040–2050. From a regional perspective, Africa’s population growth 
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will continue to be the most rapid (on average 2.2%/year), followed by the Middle 
East (1.3%/year). In contrast, in China and OECD Pacific, a population decline of 
about 0.1%/year. is expected. The populations in OECD Europe and OECD North 
America are expected to increase slowly through to 2050. The proportion of the 
population living in today’s non-OECD countries will increase from its current 81% 
to 85% in 2050. China’s contribution to the world population will drop from 19% 
today to 15% in 2050. Africa will remain the region with the highest population 
growth, leading to a share of 26% of world population in 2050. Satisfying the energy 
needs of a growing population in the developing regions of the world in an environ-
mentally friendly manner is the fundamental challenge in achieving a sustainable 
global energy supply.
5.3.2  GDP Development
Economic growth is a key driver of energy demand. Since 1971, each 1% increase 
in the global GDP has been accompanied by a 0.6% increase in primary energy 
consumption. Therefore, the decoupling of energy demand and GDP growth is a 
prerequisite for the rapid decarbonisation of the global energy industry. In this 
study, the economic growth in the model regions is measured in GDP, expressed in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. Purchasing power parities 
compare the costs in different currencies of fixed baskets of traded and non-traded 
goods and services. GDP PPP is a widely used measure of living standards and is 
independent of currency exchange rates, which might not reflect a currency’s true 
value (purchasing power) within a country. Therefore, GDP PPP is an important 
basis of comparison when analysing the main drivers of energy demand or when 
comparing the energy intensities of countries.
Table 5.2 Population growth projections (in millions)
Million capita 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change 
2015–2050
OECD North America 482 503 524 543 560 575 588 599 24%
OECD Pacific 207 208 208 208 206 204 201 198 −4%
OECD Europe 570 582 587 592 596 598 599 598 5%
Eastern Europe/
Eurasia
343 346 347 346 345 343 341 339 −1%
Middle East 234 254 276 295 314 331 348 363 56%
Latin America 506 531 552 571 587 599 609 616 22%
China 1405 1433 1447 1450 1442 1426 1403 1374 −2%
Africa 1194 1353 1522 1704 1897 2100 2312 2528 112%
India 1309 1383 1452 1513 1565 1605 1636 1659 27%
Non-OECD Asia 1132 1203 1269 1329 1382 1428 1467 1499 32%
Global 7383 7795 8185 8551 8893 9210 9504 9772 32%
Source: UN World Population Prospects—2017 revision, medium variant
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Although PPP assessments are still relatively imprecise compared with statistics 
based on national incomes, trade, and national price indices, it is argued that they 
provide a better basis for global scenario development. Therefore, all the data on 
economic development in the IEA World Energy Outlook 2016 (WEO 2016a, b) 
refer to purchasing-power-adjusted GDP in international US$ (2015).  However, 
because WEO 2016 only covers the time period up to 2040, projections for 2040–
2050 in the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios are based on German Aerospace 
Center (DLR) estimates, which are mainly used to extrapolate the GDP trends in the 
world regions used in our modelling.
GDP growth in all regions is expected to slow gradually over the coming decades 
(Table 5.3). It is assumed that world GDP will grow on average by 3.2% per year 
over the period 2015–2050. China, India, and Africa are expected to grow faster 
than other regions, followed by the Middle East, Africa, other non-OECD Asia, and 
Latin America. The growth of the Chinese economy will slow as it becomes more 
mature, but it will nonetheless become the economically strongest region in the 
world in PPP terms by 2020. The GDP in OECD Europe and OECD Pacific is 
assumed to grow by 1.3–1.5% per year over the projection period, while economic 
growth in OECD North America is expected to be slightly higher (2.1%). The 
OECD’s share of global PPP- adjusted GDP will decrease from 45% in 2015 to 28% 
in 2050.
Table 5.3 GDP development projections based on average annual growth rates for 2015–2040 
from IEA (WEO 2016a, b) and on our own extrapolations
Billion $ 
(2015) 
PPP
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 change 
2050/2015
OECD 
North 
America
22,123 24,787 27,650 30,513 34,038 37,562 41,675 45,788 107%
OECD 
Pacific
8284 8880 9644 10,407 11,125 11,842 12,462 13,081 58%
OECD 
Europe
21,632 23,883 26,076 28,269 30,538 32,807 34,885 36,963 71%
Eurasia 6397 6757 7919 9081 10,467 11,853 13,439 15,025 135%
Middle 
East
5380 6236 7646 9055 10,853 12,650 14,909 17,167 219%
Latin 
America
7181 7473 8807 10,141 11,951 13,761 16,218 18,675 160%
China 20,179 28,567 37,997 47,427 56,207 64,986 74,906 84,825 320%
Africa 5851 7118 9247 11,376 14,437 17,498 21,950 26,403 351%
India 8021 11,515 17,084 22,652 30,309 37,966 46,020 54,074 574%
Other 
Asia
10,061 11,361 14,577 17,794 21,835 25,876 30,055 34,234 240%
Global 115,108 136,578 166,646 196,715 231,758 266,801 306,519 346,236 201%
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5.3.3  Technology Cost Projections
The parameterization of the models requires many assumptions about the develop-
ment of the particular characteristics of technologies, such as specific investment 
and fuel costs. Therefore, because long-term projections are highly uncertain, we 
must define plausible and transparent assumptions based on background informa-
tion and up-to-date statistical and technical information.
The speed of an energy system transition also depends on overcoming economic 
barriers. These largely relate to the relationships between the costs of renewable 
technologies and their fossil and nuclear counterparts. For our scenarios, the projec-
tion of these costs is vital in making valid comparisons of energy systems. However, 
there have been significant limitations to these projections in the past in relation to 
investment and fuel costs.
In addition, efficiency measures also generate costs which are usually difficult to 
determine depending on technical, structural and economic boundary conditions. In 
the context of this study, we have therefore assumed uniform average costs of 3 ct 
per avoided kWh of electricity consumption in our cost accounting.
During the last decade, fossil fuel prices have seen huge fluctuations. Figure 5.1 
shows oil prices since 1997. After extremely high oil prices in 2012, we are cur-
rently in a low-price phase. Gas prices saw similar development (IEA 2017). 
Therefore, fossil fuel price projections have also seen considerable variations (IEA 
2013, 2017) and have had a considerable influence on scenario results ever since.
Although in the past, oil-exporting countries provided the best oil price projec-
tions, institutional price projections have become increasingly accurate, with the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) leading the way in 2018 (Roland Berger 2018). 
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Fig. 5.1 Historic development and projections of oil prices (bottom lines) and historical world oil 
production and projections (top lines) by the IEA according to Wachtmeister et al. (2018)
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An evaluation of the oil price projections of the IEA since 2000 by Wachtmeister 
et  al. (2018) showed that price projections have varied significantly over time. 
Whereas the IEA’s oil production projections seem comparatively accurate, oil price 
projections showed errors of 40–60%, even when made for only 10 years ahead. 
Between 2007 and 2017, the IEA price projections for 2030 varied from $70 to 
$140 per barrel, providing significant uncertainty regarding future costs in the sce-
narios. Despite this limitation, the IEA provides a comprehensive set of price 
 projections. Therefore, we based our scenario assumptions on these projections, as 
described below.
However, because most renewable energy technologies provide energy without 
fuel costs, the projections of investment costs become more important than fuel cost 
projections, and this limits the impact of errors in the fuel price projections. It is 
only for biomass that the cost of feedstock remains a crucial economic factor for 
renewables. Today, these costs range from negative costs for waste wood (based on 
credit for the waste disposal costs avoided), through inexpensive residual materials, 
to comparatively expensive energy crops. Because bioenergy holds significant mar-
ket shares in all sectors in many regions, a detailed assessment of future price pro-
jections is provided below.
Investment cost projections also pose challenges for scenario development. 
Available short-term projections of investment costs depend largely on the data 
available for existing and planned projects. Learning curves are most commonly 
used to assess the future development of investment costs as a function of their 
future installations and markets (McDonald and Schrattenholzer 2001; Rubin et al. 
2015). Therefore, the reliability of cost projections largely depends on the uncer-
tainty of future markets and the availability of historical data.
Fossil technologies provide a large cost data set featuring well-established mar-
kets and large annual installations. They are also mature technologies, where many 
cost reduction potentials have already been exploited.
For renewable technologies, the picture is more mixed. For example, hydro 
power is, like fossil fuels, well established and provides reliable data on investment 
costs. Other technologies, such as PV and wind, are currently experiencing tremen-
dous developments in installation and cost reduction. Solar PV and wind are the 
focus of cost monitoring, and considerable data are already available on existing 
projects. However, their future markets are not easily predicted, as can be seen from 
the evolution of IEA market projections over recent years in the World Energy 
Outlook series (compare for example IEA 2007, 2014, 2017). For PV and wind, 
small differences in cost assumptions will lead to large deviations in the overall 
costs, and cost assumptions must be made with special care. Furthermore, many 
technologies feature only comparably small markets, such as geothermal, modern 
bioenergy applications, and CSP, for which costs are still high and for which future 
markets are insecure. The cost reduction potential is correspondingly high for these 
technologies. This is also true for technologies that might become important in a 
transformed energy system but are not yet widely available. Hydrogen production, 
ocean power, and synthetic fuels might deliver important technology options in the 
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long term after 2040, but their cost reduction potential cannot be assessed with any 
certainty today.
Thus, cost assumptions are a crucial factor in evaluating scenarios. Because costs 
are an external input into the model and are not internally calculated, we assume the 
same progressive cost developments for all scenarios. In the next sections, we pres-
ent a detailed overview of our assumptions for power and renewable heat technolo-
gies, including the investment and fuel costs, and the potential CO2 costs in the 
scenarios.
5.3.3.1  Power and CHP Technologies
The focus of cost calculations in our scenario modelling is the power sector. We 
compared the specific investment costs estimated in previous studies (Teske et al. 
2012, 2015), which were based on a variety of studies, including the European 
Commission-funded NEEDS project (NEEDS 2009), projections from the European 
Renewable Energy Council (Zervos et al. 2010), investment cost projections by the 
IEA (2014), and current cost assumptions by IRENA and IEA (IEA 2016b). We 
found that investment costs generally converged, except for PV. Therefore, for con-
sistency reasons, the investment costs and operation and maintenance costs for the 
power sector are based primarily on the investment costs within WEO 2016 (IEA 
2016b) up to 2040, including their regional disaggregation. We extended the projec-
tions until 2050 based on the trends in the preceding decade.
For renewable power production, we used investment costs from the 450 ppm 
scenario from IEA 2016b. For technologies not distinguished in the IEA report 
(such as geothermal CHP), we used cost assumptions based on our own research, 
from the Energy [R]evolution Scenario 2015 (Teske et al. 2015). As the cost assump-
tions for PV systems by the IEA do not reflect recent cost degressions, we based our 
assumptions on a more recent analysis by Steurer et al. (2018), which projects lower 
investment costs for PV in 2050 than does the IEA. The costs for onshore and off-
shore wind in Europe were adapted from the same source, in order to reflect more 
recent data. The cost assumptions for hydrogen production come from our own 
analysis in the PlanDelyKaD project (Michalski et al. 2017). Table 5.4 summarizes 
the cost trends for power technologies derived from the assumptions discussed 
above for OECD Europe. It is important to note that the cost reductions are, in real-
ity, not a function of time, but of cumulative capacity (production of units), so 
dynamic market development is required to achieve a significant reduction in spe-
cific investment costs. Therefore, we might underestimate the costs of renewables in 
the reference (5.0  °C) scenario compared with the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios. 
However, our approach is conservative when we compare the reference scenario 
with the 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cost assumptions for the other nine regions 
are in the same range, but differ slightly for different renewable energy technolo-
gies. Fossil fuel power plants have a limited potential for cost reductions because 
they are at an advanced stage of technology and market development. Gas and oil 
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plants are relatively cheap, at around $670/kW and $822/kW, respectively. CHP 
applications and coal plants are more expensive, ranging between $2000/kW and 
$2500/kW. The IEA sees some cost reduction potential for expensive nuclear plants, 
tending towards $4500/kW by 2050, whereas gas might even increase in cost.
In contrast, several renewable technologies have seen considerable cost reduc-
tions over the last decade. This is expected to continue if renewables are deployed 
extensively. Fuel cells are expected to outpace other CHP technologies, with a cost 
reduction potential of more than 75% (from currently high costs). Hydro power and 
biomass remain stable in terms of costs. Tremendous cost reductions are still 
expected for solar energy and offshore wind, even though they have experienced 
significant reductions already. Although CSP might deliver dispatchable power at 
half its current cost in 2050, variable PV costs could drop to 35% of today’s costs. 
Offshore wind could see cost reductions of over 30%, whereas the cost reduction 
potential for onshore wind seems to have been exploited already to a large extent 
(Table 5.4).
Table 5.4 Investment cost assumptions for power generation plants (in $2015/kW) in the scenarios 
until 2050
Investment costs power generation plants in Europe
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
CHP Coal $/kW 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
CHP Gas $/kW 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
CHP Lignite $/kW 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500
CHP Oil $/kW 1310 1290 1240 1180 1130
Coal power plant $/kW 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Diesel generator $/kW 900 900 900 900 900
Gas power plant $/kW 670 500 500 500 670
Lignite power plant $/kW 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200
Nuclear power plant $/kW 6600 6000 5100 4500 4500
Oil power plant $/kW 950 930 890 860 820
CHP Biomass $/kW 2550 2500 2450 2350 2250
CHP Fuel cell $/kW 5000 5000 2500 2500 1120
CHP Geothermal $/kW 13,200 11,190 8890 7460 6460
Biomass power plant $/kW 2400 2350 2300 2200 2110
Geothermal power plant $/kW 12,340 2800 2650 2500 2400
Hydro power planta $/kW 2650 2650 2650 2650 2650
Ocean energy power plant $/kW 6950 6650 4400 3100 2110
PV power plant $/kW 1300 980 730 560 470
CSP power plantb $/kW 5700 5000 3700 3050 2740
Wind turbine offshore $/kW 4000 3690 3190 2830 2610
Wind turbine onshore $/kW 1640 1580 1510 1450 1400
Hydrogen production $/kW 1380 1220 920 700 570
aCosts for a system with solar multiple of two and thermal storage for 8 h of turbine operation
bValues apply to both run-of-the-river and reservoir hydro power
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In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, hydrogen is introduced as a substitute for natu-
ral gas, with a significant share after 2030. Hydrogen is assumed to be produced by 
electrolysis. With electrolysers just emerging on larger scale on the markets, they have 
considerable cost reduction potential. Based on the Plan-DelyKaD studies (Michalski 
et al. 2017), we assume that costs could decrease to $570/kW in the long term.
5.3.3.2  Heating Technologies
Assessing the costs in the heating sector is even more ambitious than in the power 
sector. Costs for new installations differ significantly between regions and are inter-
linked with construction costs and industry processes, which are not addressed in 
this study. Moreover, no data are available to allow the comprehensive calculation 
of the costs for existing heating appliances in all regions. Therefore, we concentrate 
on the additional costs resulting from new renewable applications in the heating 
sector.
Our cost assumptions are based on a previous survey of renewable heating tech-
nologies in Europe, which focused on solar collectors, geothermal, heat pumps, and 
biomass applications. Biomass and simple heating systems in the residential sector 
are already mature. However, more-sophisticated technologies, which can provide 
higher shares of heat demand from renewable sources, are still under development 
and rather expensive. Market barriers will slow the further implementation and cost 
reduction of renewable heating systems, especially for heating networks. 
Nevertheless, significant learning rates can be expected if renewable heating is 
increasingly implemented, as projected the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
Table 5.5 presents the investment cost assumptions for heating technologies for 
OECD Europe, disaggregated by sector. Geothermal heating displays the same high 
costs in all sectors. In Europe, deep geothermal applications are being developed for 
Table 5.5 Specific investment cost assumptions (in $2015) for heating technologies in the 
scenarios until 2050
Investment costs heat generation plants in OECD Europe
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Geothermal $/kW 2390 2270 2030 1800 1590
Heat pumps $/kW 1790 1740 1640 1540 1450
Biomass heat plants $/kW 600 580 550 510 480
Residential biomass stoves Industrialized countries $/kW 840 810 760 720 680
Residential biomass stoves Developing countries $/kW 110 110 110 110 110
Solar collectors Industry $/kW 850 820 730 650 550
In heat grids $/kW 970 970 970 970 970
Residential $/kW 1060 1010 910 800 680
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heating purposes at investment costs ranging from €500/kWth (shallow) to €3000/
kWth (deep), with the costs strongly dependent on the drilling depth. The cost reduc-
tion potential is assumed to be around 30% by 2050.
Heat pumps typically provide hot water or space heat for heating systems with 
relatively low supply temperatures, or they supplement other heating technologies. 
Therefore, they are currently mainly used for small-scale residential applications. 
Costs currently cover a large band-width and are expected to decrease by only 20% 
to $1450/kW by 2050.
For biomass and solar collectors, we assume significant differences between the 
sectors. There is a broad portfolio of modern technologies for heat production from 
biomass, ranging from small-scale single-room stoves to heating or CHP plants on 
an MW scale. Investment costs show similar variations: simple log-wood stoves can 
be obtained from $100/kW, but more sophisticated automated heating systems that 
cover the whole heat demand of a building are significantly more expensive. Log-
wood or pellet boilers range from $500 to 1300/kW. Large biomass heating systems 
are assumed to reach their cheapest costs in 2050 at around $480/kW for industry. 
For all sectors, we assume a cost reduction of 20% by 2050. In contrast, solar col-
lectors for households are comparatively simple and will become cheap at $680/kW 
by 2050. The costs of simple solar collectors for swimming pools might have been 
optimized already, whereas their integration in large systems is neither technologi-
cally nor economically mature. For larger applications, especially in heat grid sys-
tems, the collectors are large and more sophisticated. Because there is not yet a mass 
market for such grid-connected solar systems, we assume there will be a cost reduc-
tion potential until 2050.
5.3.4  Fuel Cost Projections
5.3.4.1  Fossil Fuels
Although fossil fuel price projections have seen considerable variations, as described 
above, we based our fuel price assumptions up to 2040 on the WEO 2017 (IEA 
2017). Beyond 2040, we extrapolated from the price developments between 2035 
and 2040. Even though these price projections are highly speculative, they provide 
a set of prices consistent to our investment assumptions. Fuel prices for nuclear 
energy are based on the values in the Energy [R]evolution report 2015 (Teske et al. 
2015), corrected by the cumulative inflation rate for the Eurozone of 1.82% between 
2012 and 2015 (Table 5.6).
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5.3.4.2  Biomass Prices
Biomass prices depend on the quality of the biomass (residues or energy crops) and 
the regional supply and demand. The variability is large. Lamers et al. (2015) found 
a price range of €4–4.8/GJ for forest residues in Europe in 2020, whereas agricul-
tural products might cost €8.5–12/GJ.  Lamers et  al. modelled a range for wood 
pellets from €6/GJ in Malaysia to 8.8€/GJ in Brazil. IRENA modelled a cost supply 
curve on a global level for 2030 (see Fig. 5.2), ranging from $3/GJ for a potential of 
35 EJ/year. up to $8–10/GJ for a potential up to 90–100 EJ/year (IRENA 2014) (and 
up to $17/GJ for an potential extending to 147 EJ).
Table 5.6 Development projections for fossil fuel prices in $2015 (IEA 2017)
Development projections for fossil fuel prices
Reference scenario 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Oil All $/GJ 8.5 12.3 21.5 24.2 35.1
Gas OECD North America $/GJ 2.5 3.3 5.5 6.2 8.9
OECD Europe $/GJ 6.6 7.2 9.2 10.0 12.9
China $/GJ 9.2 9.5 10.3 10.5 11.4
OECD Pacific $/GJ 9.8 10.0 10.7 10.9 11.8
Others $/GJ 2.5 3.3 5.5 6.2 8.9
Coal OECD North America $/GJ 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.0 5.3
OECD Europe $/GJ 2.6 3.1 4.1 4.3 5.3
China $/GJ 3.2 3.5 4.3 4.5 5.3
OECD Pacific $/GJ 2.6 3.3 4.4 4.5 5.3
Others $/GJ 2.9 3.3 4.2 4.4 5.3
Nuclear All $/GJ 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios
Oil all $/GJ 8.5 10.2 12.6 13.0 14.3
Gas OECD North America $/GJ 2.5 2.8 4.5 5.1 7.6
OECD Europe $/GJ 6.6 6.6 8.5 9.4 13.0
China $/GJ 9.2 8.5 9.2 10.0 12.9
OECD Pacific $/GJ 9.8 9.0 9.6 10.3 13.2
Others $/GJ 2.5 2.8 4.5 5.1 7.6
Coal OECD Europe $/GJ 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4
OECD North America $/GJ 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.9 2.7
China $/GJ 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.9
OECD Pacific $/GJ 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.4
Others $/GJ 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8
Nuclear All $/GJ 1.1 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.1
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IRENA projected regional supply costs for liquid and other biomass sources in 
2030 based on a global biomass use of around 108 EJ, using current primary bio-
mass prices as a proxy (see Table 5.7). Liquid biofuels demand higher prices because 
of their production and transformation processes; ‘other biomass’ includes primary 
biomass, such as fuel wood, energy crops, and residues.
The prices cited above hold true for modern biomass applications. Traditional 
biomass use is still often based on firewood or other biomass, which is acquired 
without a price (and with the labour cost not considered). No price data are yet 
available for a considerable range of residues. Therefore, the average primary bio-
mass costs across the complete energy system in many regions are lower than the 
available market prices for biomass commodities. Consequently, today’s market 
prices represent the upper limit of today’s biomass costs.
Therefore, for our scenarios, we assumed a lower average biomass price in all 
regions, starting from the lower end of the cost supply curve at around $7.50/GJ for 
OECD regions, with predominantly modern applications. For Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia, including Russia, which have abundant biomass residue potential, current 
prices were assumed to be $3/GJ. For the remaining regions (the Middle East, and 
Eastern Europe), we assumed $5/GJ.
The prices for primary biomass will increase proportionately to the IRENA ref-
erence price for ‘other biomass’ by 2030, following the increasing uptake of modern 
Fig. 5.2 Global supply curve for primary biomass in 2030 (IRENA 2014)
5 Main Assumptions for Energy Pathways
112
biomass technologies and increasing trade, representing a further biomass potential 
uptake along the supply curve. For the period until 2050, we consider that biomass 
prices will be stable. The prices calculated by IRENA are valid for a demand of 
108 EJ/year. The biomass demand considered in this study never exceeds a total of 
100 EJ/year. However, the international trade in biomass may heavily influence bio-
mass prices in the future, representing a significant source of uncertainty in our 
assumptions.
5.3.5  CO2 Costs
The WEO 2017 (IEA 2017) considers the future price of CO2 in the power and 
industry sectors. There is considerable variation between the current policy sce-
nario, the new policy scenario, and the 450 ppm scenario, not only in value, but also 
in regional range. Various studies have indicated a close relationship between decar-
bonisation and the implicit or explicit CO2 price (regardless of the most efficient 
implementation measure). On the one hand, the carbon price is a precondition for a 
decarbonisation of the energy sector (Lucena et al. 2016), but on the other hand, 
decarbonisation may limit the costs of CO2 emissions if an efficient pricing measure 
is in place (Jacobson et al. 2017). Because the scenarios in this study rely heavily on 
effective reductions in CO2 emissions, we used the CO2 prices of the 450 ppm sce-
nario in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the reference case, we deviated from the 
WEO 2017, which applies rather low CO2 emission costs. Instead, we applied CO2 
costs equivalent to the cost of the resulting climate damage. Based on existing stud-
ies of fossil-energy-induced damage (Anthoff and Tol 2013; Stern et al. 2006), we 
assumed that $78/t of CO2 is a plausible cost estimate in the wide range of estimates 
of the social costs of CO2 emissions (Table 5.8).
Table 5.7 Biomass price projections for 2030 at 108 EJ of the biomass demand (IRENA 2014)
Liquid biofuel reference price Other biomass reference price
US $/GJ US $/GJ
Africa 36 10
Asia 40 7
Europe 58 18
North America 34 15
OECD Pacific 61 15
Latin America 59 12
World 42 11
T. Pregger et al.
113
5.4  Energy Scenario Narratives and Assumptions for World 
Regions
The scenario-building process involves many assumptions and explicit, but also 
implicit, narratives about how future economies and societies, and ultimately energy 
systems, may develop under the overall objective of ‘deep and rapid decarbonisa-
tion’ by 2050. These narratives depend on three main strategic pillars:
• Efficiency improvement and demand reduction: stringent implementation of 
technical and structural efficiency improvements in energy demand and supply. 
These will lead to a continuous reduction in both final and primary energy con-
sumption. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, these measures must be supplemented with 
responsible energy consumption behaviour by the consumer.
• Deployment of renewable energies: massive implementation of new technolo-
gies for the generation of power and heat in all sectors. These will include vari-
able renewable energies from solar and wind, which have experienced 
considerable cost reductions in recent years, but also more expensive technolo-
gies, such as large-scale geothermal and ocean energy, small hydro power, and 
CSP.
• Sector coupling: stringent direct electrification of heating and transport technolo-
gies in order to integrate renewable energy in the most efficient way. Because 
this strategy has its limitations, it will be complemented by the massive use of 
hydrogen (generated by electrolysis) or other synthetic energy carriers.
Some alternative or probably complementary future technical options are explic-
itly excluded from the scenarios. In particular, those options with large uncertainties 
with respect to technical, economic, societal, and environmental risks, such as large 
hydro and nuclear power plants, unsustainable biomass use, carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), and geoengineering, are not considered on the supply side as mitiga-
tion measures or—in the case of hydro—not expanded in the future. The sustainable 
use of biomass will partly substitute for fossil fuels in all energy sectors. However, 
this use will be limited to an annual global energy potential of less than 100 EJ per 
year for sustainability reasons, according to the calculations of Seidenberger et al. 
(2008), Thrän et al. (2011), and Schueler et al. (2013).
The transformations described in the two alternative scenarios are constrained, to 
a certain degree, by current short- to medium-term investment planning, as described 
in the reference case, because most technical and structural options to change the 
demand or supply side require years of planning and construction. This means that 
Table 5.8 CO2 cost assumptions in the scenarios
CO2 costs
2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Reference All regions $/t CO2 0 42 69 78 78
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C OECD Economies $/t CO2 0 62 87.6 138 189.0
Other regions $/t CO2 0 42 69.5 124 177.5
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both alternative scenarios start deviating significantly from the reference case only 
after 2025. However, some short-term developments shown in the IEA WEO 
Current Policies scenario have been corrected and are not adopted in the alternative 
scenarios because there is newer statistical information (that renders the reference 
development implausible). This is the case for the IEA estimates of demand devel-
opment in some regions and sectors, and it is partly true for investments in fossil- 
fuel- based heat and power generation.
5.4.1  Efficiency and Energy Intensities
It is obvious that a major increase in energy efficiency is the backbone of each ambi-
tious transition scenario, because energy efficiency significantly reduces the need 
for energy conversion and infrastructure investment. The development of the future 
global energy demand is determined by three key factors:
• Population growth, which affects the number of people consuming energy or 
using energy services. Associated with this, increasing access to energy services 
in developing countries and emerging economies is an additional influencing 
factor, bearing in mind that this could mean power grid access or the implemen-
tation of isolated, usually small-scale, local power systems.
• Economic development, which is commonly measured as GDP. In general, GDP 
growth triggers an increase in energy demand, directly via additional industrial 
activities and indirectly via an increase in private consumption arising from the 
higher incomes associated with a prospering economy.
• Energy intensity, which is a measure of how much final energy is required in the 
industrial sector to produce a unit of GDP. Efficiency measures help to reduce 
energy intensity and can result in a decoupling of economic growth and final 
energy consumption. In the ‘Residential and other’ sector, energy intensity refers 
to the per capita demand for final energy (for electrical appliances and heat gen-
eration). Efficiency improvement is also a result of reduced conversion losses, in 
particular those achieved by replacing thermal power generation with renewable 
technologies, which leads to a further reduction in the primary energy intensity.
The reference scenario and both target scenarios are based on the same projec-
tions of population and economic growth. Therefore, the scenarios represent the 
specific, although widely accepted, development of future societies. However, the 
future development of energy intensities differs between the reference and alterna-
tive scenarios, taking into account the different efficiency pathways and therefore 
the successful implementation of measures to intensify required investments in effi-
cient technologies or to change consumer behaviour.
The assumptions made about the potential to further increase the economic and 
technical efficiency in all sectors are based on various external studies. However, 
the lower benchmarks for the assumptions on efficiency potentials are derived from 
the Current Policies scenario of the IEA WEO 2017 (IEA 2017). The upper bench-
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marks for efficiency potentials per world region are taken from Graus et al. (2011), 
Kermeli et al. (2014), and recently published low-energy-demand scenarios devel-
oped by Grubler et al. (2018).
5.4.1.1  Industrial Electricity Demand
‘Industrial electricity demand’ refers to many appliances of different sizes and pur-
poses. Large potentials for saving electricity have been identified in various studies 
in most branches of industry. This particularly applies to electric drives for com-
pressed air, pumps, and fans. The scenario model approach distinguishes between 
electric appliances and power-to-heat devices for space and process heating. The 
consumption of electricity per GDP varies widely between regions, depending on 
their industrial structures and efficiency standards. The trajectories for industrial 
electricity demands are constrained by the abovementioned lower and upper bench-
marks and aim for similar electricity uses per $GDP in the industrial sectors in all 
regions by 2050. The resulting trajectories for OECD and non-OECD countries are 
shown in Table 5.9. The average global electricity demand for electric appliances in 
‘industry’ (without power-to-heat) will decrease from 55 kWh/$1000 GDP in 2015 
to 36 kWh/$1000 in 2050 in the reference case, but to 24 kWh/$1000 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario and 23 kWh/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. However, the increased electri-
fication of industrial heat in both alternative scenarios almost cancels out the greater 
efficiency increases in those two scenarios when compared with the reference case. 
The average power-to-heat share in industry will increase in this period from 6% to 
34% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C 
Scenario, the annual electricity demand for industrial electrical appliances will be 
around 5% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario between 2020 and 2025, and up to 
10% lower between 2025 and 2035. However, between 2035 and 2050, the electric-
ity demand for electric appliances in the industry sector converges under the two 
scenarios.
Table 5.9 Assumed average development of specific (per $GDP) electricity use for electrical 
appliances in the ‘Industry’ sector
kWh/$1000 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change  
2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 42.8 40.8 38.2 35.8 33.5 31.5 29.7 28.2 −34%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 62.5 55.7 52.9 48.7 45.7 41.9 39.1 −41%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 42.8 40.4 35.6 32.2 28.7 25.7 23.5 21.7 −49%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 60.9 49.2 42.9 37.2 32.9 28.3 24.8 −62%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 42.8 40.1 33.4 27.4 24.3 22.4 20.7 20.0 −53%
Non-OECD regions 65.8 58.6 46.4 39.8 34.4 30.8 27.4 24.7 −62%
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5.4.1.2  Demand for Fuel to Produce Heat in the Industry Sector
Industrial heat is required for different purposes and at different temperatures. 
Currently, industrial (process) heat is mainly produced by burning fossil fuels. 
Biomass plays a minor role, except in heat use from the combustion of residues and 
biogenic waste. Some low- and medium-temperature heat is produced by co- 
generation plants with combined heat and power provisions. Power-to-heat makes 
up only a small percentage of the industrial energy demand for heat. Regional dif-
ferences in the nature of industry, especially in terms of the presence of energy- 
intensive heavy or manufacturing industries, strongly influence the amounts of 
low-, medium-, and high-temperature heat that must be produced today and in the 
future (because we assume that the regional industry structure will remain the 
same). Various technological improvements, process substitutions, and innovations 
are technically possible and have been implemented to some extent already. An 
important example is highly efficient waste heat recovery. Shorter investment cycles 
and incentives to replace old technologies will help to reduce energy consumption 
as quickly as possible. It is obvious that incentives are essential to trigger rapid 
innovation and the implementation of new technologies. Any political strategy for 
introducing such a pathway requires strong support from various industry stake-
holders and regional or even global governance to overcome the economic and tech-
nical obstacles and conflicting interests. Therefore, both alternative scenarios 
assume that the conditions exist to allow rapid technological change. Table 5.10 
provides the resulting final energy demands for heating per $GDP for OECD and 
non-OECD countries. The average global values will decrease from 680 MJ/$1000 
GDP in 2015 to 366 MJ/$1000 in 2050 in the reference case, and to 185 MJ/$1000 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 172 MJ/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Compared with the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the 1.5 °C Scenario assumes a significantly more rapid reduction 
in the industrial heat demand. Between 2020 and 2025, the annual energy demand 
for heat will be up to 8% lower under the 1.5 °C Scenario than under the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, and up to 17% lower between 2025 and 2035. After 2035, the difference 
will decrease again, and by 2050, it will be around 7%.
Table 5.10 Assumed average development in final energy use for heating in the industry sector 
(including power-to-heat) (per $GDP)
MJ/$1000 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Change 2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 406 417 384 352 320 293 270 249 −39%
Non-OECD regions 911 823 687 620 553 506 453 410 −55%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 406 383 330 284 242 207 177 157 −61%
Non-OECD regions 911 791 608 491 381 302 238 196 −79%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 406 377 306 239 199 177 158 143 −65%
Non-OECD regions 911 762 558 428 318 259 212 182 −80%
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5.4.1.3  Electricity Demand in the ‘Residential and Other’ Sector
The electricity demand in the ‘Residential and other’ sector includes electricity use 
in households, for commercial purposes, and in the service and trade sectors, fish-
ery, and agriculture. Besides lighting, information, and communication, a large 
amount of electricity is used for cooking, cooling, and hot water. It has been esti-
mated that in 2015, electricity use for heating had a global average share of 5% of 
the final energy use for heating. It is assumed that this share will increase signifi-
cantly to 30% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
These increases are attributed to sector coupling, the provision of storage for vari-
able renewable energy in the heat sector, and the provision of high-temperature heat 
without fuel combustion. The average global electricity use for appliances in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will decrease in the reference case from 78 kWh/$1000 
GDP in 2015 to 60 kWh/$1000 in 2050, whereas it will decrease to 38 kWh/$1000 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 37 kWh/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario, a reduction of 
more than 50% relative to today’s energy consumption. The average global electric-
ity use for appliances in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, which is related to per 
capita consumption, will increase in the reference scenario from 1350 kWh/capita 
in 2015 to 2370 kWh/capita in 2050, whereas it will increase to only 1490 kWh/
capita in the 2.0  °C Scenario and to 1460  kWh/capita in the 1.5  °C Scenario. 
Table 5.11 shows the changes in electricity use for appliances in OECD and non- 
OECD countries (without electricity for heating). Significant reduction potentials 
are assumed for all world regions. Similar to the development in the industry sector, 
between 2020 and 2025, the annual power demand for electrical appliances in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will be around 5% lower in the 1.5 °C Scenario than 
in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and more than 10% lower between 2025 and 2035. After 
2035, the two scenarios will converge again, so that in 2050, the global demand will 
be only 2% higher in the 2.0 °C Scenario than in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Table 5.11 Assumed average developments of per capita electricity use in the ‘Residential and 
other’ sector for electrical appliances (without power-to-heat)
kWh/capita 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Change 2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 4457 4585 4753 4972 5189 5419 5626 5837 31%
Non-OECD regions 712 851 977 1191 1366 1532 1661 1788 151%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 4457 4526 4366 4137 3837 3590 3304 3023 −32%
Non-OECD regions 712 834 894 1004 1083 1143 1193 1238 74%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 4457 4502 4078 3346 2987 2896 2889 2872 −36%
Non-OECD regions 712 806 842 928 1001 1086 1164 1224 72%
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5.4.1.4  Fuel Demand for Heat in the ‘Residential and Other’ Sector
The fuel demand for heat in households has quite different characteristics depend-
ing on the consumption structures in each world region and their climatic condi-
tions. In regions with harsh winters, the heat demand is dominated by the building 
sector (space heat and hot water in private and commercial buildings), but in regions 
with a comparatively warm climate, the demand for space heat is generally low and 
heat is predominantly used for cooking and as low-temperature heat for hot water. 
In the commercial sector, the energy mix for heat is more diverse. The medium- to 
high-temperature process heat demand arises in this sector. Reducing the final 
energy use for heating will involve reducing the demand (e.g., by improving the 
thermal insulation of building envelopes) and replacing inefficient procedures and 
technologies, such as the traditional use of biomass, which is still widely used for 
cooking and heating in some regions. In contrast to traditional biomass, the effi-
ciency of electrical appliances can improve significantly, and they produce zero 
direct emissions and no air pollution. Table 5.12 shows the assumed average final 
energy demand for heating in OECD and non-OECD countries. The average global 
consumption will decrease from 560 MJ/$1000 GDP in 2015 to 280 MJ/$1000 in 
2050 in the reference scenario, but to 173 MJ/$1000 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 
160 MJ/$1000 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The average global per capita energy demand 
for fuels in ‘Residential and other sectors’ will decrease from around 12,600 MJ/
capita per year in 2015 to 11,700 MJ/capita in the reference case. This will mainly 
be due to a shift in the global population shares towards the developing regions. 
Compared with the reference scenario, the energy intensity will decrease to 
7300 MJ/capita in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 6700 MJ/capita in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
Table 5.12 Assumed average development of specific final energy use for heating in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector (including power-to-heat)
MJ/capita 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change 
2050/2015
Reference case
OECD 
regions
24,932 24,421 24,163 23,980 23,794 23,696 23,821 24,121 −3%
Non-OECD 
regions
10,047 9933 9786 9749 9678 9628 9623 9666 −4%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD 
regions
24,932 24,282 22,300 20,578 19,064 17,677 16,599 15,800 −37%
Non-OECD 
regions
10,047 9650 8961 8209 7498 6807 6217 5868 −42%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD 
regions
24,932 24,047 20,413 16,222 15,143 14,538 14,172 13,901 −44%
Non-OECD 
regions
10,047 9549 8593 7515 6737 6234 5808 5510 −45%
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The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes a significantly stronger reduction in demand than the 
2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, additional efficiency measures will reduce 
the final energy demand until 2025 by around 5%, and by up to 13% between 2025 
and 2035 (compared with the 2.0  °C Scenario). Thereafter, the differences will 
become smaller, finally reaching around 8% by 2050.
5.4.1.5  Resulting Energy Intensities by Region
Figure 5.3 shows the final energy intensities related to $GDP for each of the ten 
world regions between 2015 and 2050 and for both alternative scenarios. The final 
energy use per GDP will decrease significantly in all regions, but the decreases will 
be larger (and faster) in OECD countries. This will result in smaller regional differ-
ences in the final energy demand compared with the current situation. Compared 
with the very ambitious assumptions of Grubler et al. (2018) for the specific final 
energy demands in northern and southern world regions, the assumptions made in 
this study are conservative. In Grubler et al. (2018), the annual global final energy 
use, including non-energy consumption, will decrease from 363 EJ in 2015 to 245 
EJ by 2050, whereas in our study, the annual global value will decrease to 310 EJ in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 284 EJ in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with 586 EJ in 
the reference case (see Chap. 8). Because the 1.5 °C target requires a significant 
reduction in emissions before 2030, the 1.5  °C Scenario necessarily reduces the 
energy demand more rapidly than the 2.0 °C Scenario, but only a slightly lower 
annual consumption is assumed in 2050.
5.4.2  RES Deployment for Electricity Generation
The power demand will increase significantly in all scenarios. In the 2.0 °C and 
1.5 °C Scenarios, this will result from the continuous electrification of the heating 
and transport sectors, and the increasing production of synthetic fuels for indirect 
electrification and sector coupling. The available energy sources for renewable 
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5 Main Assumptions for Energy Pathways
120
power generation and their costs vary from region to region. Therefore, the scenar-
ios follow regionally different strategies and storylines, taking the different regional 
conditions into account on the supply side. The core strategy is the replacement of 
conventional thermal power and heat generators with solar, wind, geothermal, and 
other renewable options for the highly efficient generation of electricity for final 
energy consumption and the generation of synthetic fuels.
Our estimates of the potential for renewable power generation are based on the 
results of the REMix EnDat tool developed (Scholz 2012; Stetter 2014; Pietzcker 
et al. 2014). The technical potentials for solar and wind power in each world region 
were estimated while taking into account the different exclusion criteria and con-
straints documented by Stetter (2014). The analysis was used to estimate the ‘eco-
nomic’ potential for each world region, which is the upper limit of the technological 
expansion under the different scenarios. ‘Economic’ potentials were derived by 
assuming the minimum annual full-load hours for each technology. In the case of 
PV, the assumed global economic potential was estimated to be in the order of 5.4 
million TWh per year. The potential of CSP was even larger, at around 5.6 million 
TWh per year. The annual wind power potentials were estimated to be in the order 
of 500,000 TWh for onshore wind and around 100,000 TWh for offshore wind.
The harvesting of global solar radiation by PVs has enormous economic poten-
tial worldwide. In the last few years, economies of scale have led to a significant 
cost degression for PV modules, and large PV production capacities have been cre-
ated. The PV technology also plays a major role in our scenarios because of its 
decentralized characteristics, which make it easy to build cost-efficient renewable 
power supplies in rural and isolated areas. However, its restriction to sunny hours 
causes high daily and seasonal variability. This results in rather low annual full-load 
hours. Therefore, large quantities of storage capacity must also be installed for 
short-term storage to support the major expansion of PV. The storage options con-
sidered are pumped hydro storage (e.g., by the enhancement of existing hydro sites) 
and a massive expansion of battery storage. This leads to uncertainties in the total 
infrastructure costs for the integration of high shares of PV into the power system 
and the mineral resources required for this. For this reason, the share of PV globally 
remains in the range of about 30% of total power generation, with the highest shares 
in the Middle East (40%), followed by OECD North America and Other Asia (35% 
each). The lowest shares, in the range of 20–25%, are in Eurasia, OECD Europe, 
Latin America, and China.
Wind power on land will achieve an average global generation share of 25% in 
2050 in both alternative scenarios (compared with 8% in the reference case). The 
highest generation shares for onshore wind are assumed in India and Eastern 
Europe/Eurasia, at about 30% each. The lowest shares will be in China, the Middle 
East, and Non-OECD Asia, at 18–23%. For offshore wind, the global generation 
share will rise to 8% by 2050 under both alternative scenarios, compared with only 
1% in the reference scenario. The highest offshore wind shares of 10–15% will be 
achieved under the 2.0  °C Scenario in the OECD regions and Eastern Europe/
Eurasia. The lowest shares are predicted in the Middle East (2%), India (6%), and 
China (6.5%), where the potential is rather limited. The offshore shares under the 
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1.5 °C Scenario will tend to be slightly lower because of the stronger focus on PV 
and onshore wind as the best options for a very rapid expansion of RES.
Compared with PV and wind power, CSP plants promise highly flexible power 
and heat generation, with high capacity factors due to high-temperature heat stor-
age. The use of heat for desalination can also contribute to secure water supplies in 
the sunbelt of the world. We assume that its multi-purpose uses and dispatchable 
generation capability can lead to a significant role for CSP in the medium- to long- 
term future, although levelized costs of CSP are today still much higher than they 
are for PV or wind, and investment costs for batteries for short-term electricity stor-
age might also decrease in the future. Therefore, it is assumed that CSP will achieve 
an average global electricity generation share of 15% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and 13% in the 1.5 °C Scenario, compared with 0.5% in the reference case. A high 
share, close to 30%, will be achieved, especially in the Middle East. This will 
include electricity generation for export to OECD Europe of up to 120 TWh per 
year by 2050. High CSP potentials are also assumed for Africa (16%), which will 
also export up to 280 TWh/year in 2050 from North Africa to OECD Europe—and 
for China (18–20%) and Non-OECD Asia (15–17%).
Hydro power generation will increase only moderately under the alternative sce-
narios compared with the reference case. This source has already been tapped and 
large hydro plants usually have significant ecological and societal consequences. 
Therefore, the average global power generation share will decrease in the alterna-
tive scenarios from today’s 16% to around 8%, whereas the reference scenario 
assumes a generation share of 14% in 2050. Nevertheless, a 30% increase in the 
global hydro power generation is assumed between 2015 and 2050. The highest 
power generation shares in 2050 are assumed to be in Latin America (24%), fol-
lowed by OECD Europe (11%) and China (10%). The generation of hydro power 
plays only a minor role in the long term in the Middle East (1%), Africa, and India 
(each 4%).
Even smaller contributions are assumed for geothermal energy, ocean energy, 
and biomass. All three options have comparably high power-generation costs, but 
offer complementary characteristics and availabilities that may stabilize future elec-
tricity supply systems. The global average share of geothermal power generation is 
assumed to be about 5% in 2050, ocean energy use will contribute another 2%, and 
biomass, including co-generation, will achieve a maximum of 6–7% around 2030 
and 5% in 2050. The highest share for geothermal power generation is assumed to 
occur in Eastern Europe/Eurasia (11%), for ocean energy in OECD Pacific (4%), 
and for biomass use in Latin America, Eastern Europe/Eurasia, and OECD Europe 
(8–9%). It is predicted that hydrogen will take an increasing share of the remaining 
thermal power generation, as a substitute for natural gas in gas turbines and com-
bined cycle gas turbine plants and with increasing contributions from hydrogen fuel 
cells to co-generation. Figure 5.4 shows the basic storyline in global power genera-
tion under the 2.0 °C Scenario.
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5.4.3  RES Deployment for Heat Generation
Heat generation covers a broad range of processes, including district heat (either 
from co-generation or public heating plants), direct heating in buildings, and pro-
cess heat in industry, commerce, and other sectors. Different technologies are con-
sidered for each sector, and strong RES expansion is assumed. The increasing heat 
extraction from co-generation will trigger increasing district heat use, which will 
stabilizes in the long term or decrease by 2050 with the declining heat demand 
attributable to ambitious efficiency measures. However, CHP will only contribute 
significantly in regions with a tradition of district heating and/or a high heat demand 
in the building sector. No strong expansion of heat grids is assumed in regions with-
out existing heat grids and a low demand for space heat.
Electricity for heating is assumed to play a significant role in future energy sys-
tems. In contrast to today’s technology, flexible use is assumed, adjusted to variable 
feed-ins from variable renewable generation. This implies the availability of heat 
storages, smart operation controls, and flexible electricity tariffs. Electricity can be 
used with relatively low investment for space heating and is therefore easily com-
bined with other heating technologies. For example, simple electric heaters can eas-
ily be integrated into heat storage or heating grids. However, more-efficient electric 
heat pumps generally require higher investment in both the heat pump itself and in 
the heat distribution within the building. Electricity can also be used to provide 
process heat in industry at high-temperature levels. The alternative scenarios glob-
ally assume a significant increase in the average electricity share of the final energy 
for heating in ‘Industry’ from 6% in 2015 to around 34% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario by 2050. All regions achieve shares of between 23% and 
43%. Electricity shares in the ‘Residential and other’ sector are assumed to grow 
from 5% in 2015 to 30% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 35% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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However, the need for process heat at high temperature levels, problems associ-
ated with process integration, and specific process requirements call for additional 
process-specific strategies for replacing fossil fuels in the industry sector. As men-
tioned above, electrification is a comparatively efficient strategy. Other strategies 
are the use of biomass and hydrogen or—with some limitations—concentrated solar 
energy. While hydrogen is used to provide high temperature process heat in this 
study, it could—at least partially—be replaced by other synthetic energy carriers, 
such as synthetic methane, which can be generated from hydrogen and a (renew-
able) carbon source. This power-to-gas option has the advantage that it can be fed in 
into the gas grid, and act in storage and transport. However, energy losses are around 
20% higher (compared with hydrogen). As a consequence, synthetic methane is not 
taken into account in the scenarios.
Overall, biomass use for heating in the ‘Residential and other’ sector is decreas-
ing as the traditional and currently inefficient use of biomass is replaced by advanced 
efficient technologies, and biomass is used in a more efficient way in the energy 
system. Thus, the average global share of biomass as a final energy source for heat-
ing will decrease from today’s 34% to 22% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 
17% in the 1.5 °C Scenario, when direct electrification and indirect electrification 
(via synthetic gases and fuels) play a stronger role. In contrast, biomass use in the 
‘Industry’ sector will increase continuously as the combustion of biomass can be 
used to generate high-temperature heat for many industrial processes for which 
renewable low-temperature heat sources are unsuitable. The average global share of 
biomass for the final energy for heating in the ‘Industry’ sector will increase from 
9% in 2015 to 19% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 14% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
The largest shares are assumed for Latin America (47%) and Africa (35%) in the 
2.0 °C Scenario, where biomass residues are still rather abundant, with much lower 
values for the 1.5 °C Scenario (18–21%). In that scenario, biomass as a transition 
technology will be avoided due to the earlier development of alternative renewable 
technologies and electrification. The lowest shares are assumed for the Middle East 
(4%) and China (7%) in both alternative scenarios because of their limited sustain-
able potentials.
Solar collectors are suitable for hot water preparation and for supporting heating 
systems using heat storage. In heat grids, large heat storage systems can also be used 
to balance the seasonal heat demand and solar generation, and the integration of 
solar heat at low costs in the long term. The contributions of solar collectors to the 
heat supply are limited by the temperatures that collectors can provide (below 
120 °C for traditional collectors and up to 300 °C for concentrated collectors) and 
the seasonal variations in regions with significant space heat demand. In the alterna-
tive scenarios, the global average share of solar thermal final energy for heating will 
rise to 19% in the ‘Residential and other’ sector. The largest shares are assumed to 
be in the Middle East (30–25%), where the abundance of solar radiation can be 
exploited by concentrated solar heat applications. All other regions have shares 
between 15% and 22%, considering the limited applicability of concentrated sys-
tems. The global average solar share in the ‘Industry’ sector will increase to 16% by 
2050. The largest shares are achieved in the Middle East (25%) and Africa (20%) 
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and the lowest shares are assumed in Eastern Europe/Eurasia (9%), followed by the 
OECD regions (10–13%).
Heat pumps allow very efficient heat supply. System-wide CO2 emissions depend 
on the CO2 emissions in the power mix. Because of their generation of low- 
temperature heat, heat pumps play a role in space heating in regions with moderate 
or cold climates, but large industrial heat pumps can also generate low-temperature 
heat for industrial processes and tap the enormous potential of waste heat. A con-
tinuous improvement in the coefficient of performance of heat pumps, which 
describes the ratio of useful energy in the form of heat to the required compressor 
energy in the form of electricity, in all existing plants from an average of 3 today to 
a value of 4 in 2050 is assumed. The application potential of heat pumps (in terms 
of MWth) is assumed to be limited by the low temperature of the heat provided, the 
increasing share of the grid-connected heat supply, the assumed increase in exten-
sive building insulation, and the low space heating demand in some world regions. 
In addition to heat pumps, an increase in deep geothermal energy use is assumed for 
the ‘Industry’ sector, with an increase of up to 11% in the global average share of 
final energy by 2050 under both alternative scenarios.
Hydrogen use for direct heating is linked to the increasing substitution of natural 
gas with hydrogen in all sectors, except transport. This will lead to a hydrogen share 
of 12–14% in final energy for heating in the ‘Industry’ sector under the two alterna-
tive scenarios and 3% in the ‘Residential and other’ sector under the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and 4% under the 1.5 °C Scenario. The highest hydrogen shares in ‘Industry’ are 
assumed for OECD North America (22–23%), followed by other OECD regions, 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia, China, and the Middle East with shares of 13%–18%. The 
lowest shares, below 5%, are assumed for Latin America and Africa, where biomass 
from residues provides a flexible alternative. The highest hydrogen shares in the 
‘Residential and other’ sector will be in the Middle East (7–10%), followed by 
OECD Pacific (6–8%) and OECD Europe (up to 9%) (Figs. 5.5 and 5.6).
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5.4.4  Co-generation of Heat and Power and District Heating
Compared with condensing power plants with high efficiency losses due to waste 
heat, the co-generation of heat and power (combined heat and power, CHP) allows 
the highly efficient use of fossil and renewable fuels. If this approach is made more 
flexible with the help of heat storage, and if it is powered by renewable fuels, such 
as biomass or hydrogen from renewable electricity, CHP promises to generate not 
only renewable power in a flexible way but also to integrate efficiently large shares 
of renewable heat into energy systems via large and small district heating systems. 
Therefore, co-generation is a particularly good option in regions with high low- to 
medium-temperature heat demands (e.g., industrial consumers and space heating). 
Our modelling distinguishes between public generation in large CHP plants and 
CHP autoproduction. The latter comprises industrial CHP generators but also 
smaller plants in the ‘Residential and other’ sector. Power-to-heat ratios, efficien-
cies, and assumed costs reflect these different structural options. The IEA Energy 
Balances provides statistical values with which to calibrate the co-generation for 
each world region. The scenarios then assume the similar development of these 
parameters according to a defined advanced state of technology, with overall effi-
ciencies of 85–90%.
Although absolute electricity generation from CHP will increase in all regions, 
all scenarios assume a decreasing power generation share for CHP in the long term 
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due to the decommissioning of fossil-fuel generators, the limited availability of bio-
mass, and the assumption that heat losses in CHP technologies will be reduced, 
leading to higher overall efficiency. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 show the resulting devel-
opments for power and heat as intensities summed across the ‘Industry’ and 
‘Residential and other’ sectors. Whereas the absolute power supply from CHP will 
increase in all regions, the power-related intensities will decrease. Under the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, higher CHP power production is assumed to be higher than in the refer-
ence case, as a balancing option for variable renewable sources. CHP plants will 
play a smaller role in the future, particularly in non-OECD countries.
For heat, the situations are more diverse between the scenarios and regions. 
While the intensity of heat use from CHP will increase in the OECD regions, it will 
decrease in the non-OECD regions. Even though the intensity converges between 
OECD and non-OECD regions under all scenarios, the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios 
will achieve higher levels of intensity. However, the early reduction in demand in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario will preclude any additional demand for CHP.
Table 5.13 Development of power from co-generation per $GDP
kWh/$1000 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change  
2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 18.8 17.4 15.9 14.3 13.0 12.1 11.3 10.7 −43%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 28.7 23.1 19.3 16.3 14.1 12.1 10.7 −69%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 18.8 18.0 18.8 18.8 18.1 16.7 15.1 13.6 −28%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 29.4 25.9 23.5 20.9 18.6 16.3 14.3 −58%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 18.8 18.0 18.1 17.7 16.6 15.3 13.8 12.4 −34%
Non-OECD regions 34.0 29.4 25.9 23.5 20.8 18.7 16.3 14.2 −58%
Table 5.14 Development of heat from co-generation per $GDP
MJ/$1000 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Change  
2050/2015
Reference case
OECD regions 39.5 39.7 38.8 39.4 40.2 41.8 43.6 47.2 19%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 94.8 78.3 67.9 60.0 54.8 50.1 47.9 −56%
2.0 °C Scenario
OECD regions 39.5 40.5 49.3 58.1 65.2 70.1 75.2 78.4 98%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 101.2 92.6 89.8 86.3 83.4 77.6 70.4 −35%
1.5 °C Scenario
OECD regions 39.5 41.0 51.9 58.4 60.4 61.6 63.8 66.0 67%
Non-OECD regions 108.8 101.1 93.8 93.3 89.8 84.5 77.9 69.9 −36%
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5.4.5  Other Assumptions for Stationary Processes
Although the energy losses in the production of synthetic fuels are significant, these 
fuels are expected to be mandatory in the deep decarbonisation scenarios for sectors 
and processes in which the direct use of other renewable sources, including renew-
able power, is not technically feasible. We assume an optimistic increase in the 
efficiency1 of electrolytic hydrogen generation, from 66% today to 77% by 2050 
(ratio of energy output [H2] to energy input [electricity]). The generation of syn-
thetic fuels (such as Fischer-Tropsch fuels) from hydrogen, using CO2 as the carbon 
source, is assumed to be a complementary option that will allow the decarbonisation 
of long-range transport, particularly aviation and international bunkers, without 
exceeding the defined maximum sustainable biomass use. Therefore, the assumed 
shares of power-to-liquid synfuels in the aggregated biofuel/synfuel fraction of all 
transport modes (according to Sect. 6.3.3.) is a result of the sectoral allocation of the 
limited biomass potentials in each world region. The assumed efficiency2 of synfuel 
generation will increase from 35% in 2020 to 42% in 2050. As well as in fuel-cell 
vehicles, hydrogen can be used to replace natural gas in stationary processes by 
2030  in both scenarios, mostly for use in industry and co-generation plants. The 
scenarios do not assume a hydrogen economy in the long term. The development of 
hydrogen infrastructure is expected to be inefficient, especially for residential use. 
However, because hydrogen is assumed to be fed into the gas grid with a share of up 
to 100% by 2050, it will also be partly used in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, 
which includes various commercial applications.
The allocation of the limited biomass to the power, heat, and transport sectors 
differs significantly between the available scenarios. In this study, the biomass in the 
alternative scenarios is mainly for use in transport, co-generation, and industry. 
Traditional biomass use is strongly reduced, but biomass remains an important pil-
lar of heat supply in the ‘Residential and other’ sector under the assumption that the 
most-efficient technologies are implemented. Biofuel production for transportation 
remains limited. An increase in overall efficiency of up to 75% is assumed, implying 
the use of residues for heat and power generation.
The efficiency of fossil technologies will also increase, especially for gas power 
plants. This goes along with the decreasing utilization rates that result from the vari-
able feed-in from renewable energies. Therefore, the scenarios implicitly assume 
that the future innovations in all combustion technologies will focus on maximum 
efficiency at lower utilization rates. Gas power plants will be used for backup, 
requiring low investment but providing high flexibility to the power system. 
Therefore, a part of the energy transition is the rapid replacement of inflexible 
medium- to base-load power plant capacities with flexible gas power plants.
1 Ratio energy output (H2) to energy input (electricity)
2 Ratio of energy output (synfuels) to energy input (electricity).
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Chapter 6
Transport Transition Concepts
Johannes Pagenkopf, Bent van den Adel, Özcan Deniz, and Stephan Schmid
Abstract Detailed background for all transport scenarios and development path-
ways including all key parameters, and story-lines for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
transport scenario pathways. Mode specific efficiency improvement over time for 
road-, rail- and aviation transport technologies. Explanations of all vehicle tech-
nologies are included in the scenarios, along with the rationale for their selection. 
Description of key technology parameters for all relevant transport modes such as 
energy demand per passenger, and per freight tonne. Detailed regional breakdown 
for developments in regard to transport energy demand for ten world regions and all 
transport modes are provided.
6.1  Introduction
Global transport accounted for 23% of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2010 
and those emissions have increased at a rapid rate in recent decades, reaching 7 Gt 
in 2010 according to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (Sims et  al. 2014). The 
reason for this steady increase in emissions is that passenger and freight transport 
activities are increasing in all world regions, and there is currently no sign that this 
growth will slow down in the near future. The increasing energy demand in the 
transport sector has mainly been met by greenhouse gas (GHG)-emitting fossil 
fuels. Although (battery) electric mobility has recently surged considerably, it has 
done so from a very low base, which is why, in terms of total numbers, electricity 
still plays a relatively minor role as an energy carrier in the transport sector.
Apart from their impacts on climate, increasing transport levels, especially of 
cars, trucks, and aeroplanes, also have unwanted side-effects, including accidents, 
traffic jams, the emission of noise and other pollutants, visual pollution, and the 
disruption of landscapes by the large-scale build-up of the transport infrastructure. 
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However, road, rail, sea, and air transport are also an integral part of our globalized 
and interconnected world, and guarantee prosperity and inter-cultural exchange. 
Therefore, if we are to cater to people’s desire for mobility while keeping the econ-
omy running and meeting the Paris climate goals, fundamental technical, opera-
tional, and behavioural measures are required immediately.
In this transport chapter, we discuss potential transport activity pathways and 
technological developments by which the requirement that warming does not exceed 
pre-industrial levels by more than 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C can be met—while at the same 
time maintaining a reasonable standard of mobility.
For our transport scenario modelling, the global warming limits of 2.0 °C and 
1.5  °C were translated into transport CO2 budgets. We structured our scenario 
designs around the following key CO2-reducing measures1:
• Powertrain electrification;
• Enhancement of energy efficiency through technological development;
• Use of bio-based and synthetically produced fuels;
• Modal shifts (from high- to low-energy intensity modes) and overall reductions 
in transport activity in energy-intensive transport modes.
These measures are outlined in more detail in the subsequent chapters.
6.2  Global Transport Picture in 2015
The world final energy demand in the transport sector totalled 94,812 PJ2 in 2015, 
according to the IEA Energy Balances (IEA 2017a, b, c). Based on this estimate, we 
used TRAEM (Sect. 3.3 to model the freight and passenger transport performance 
in our transport model with statistical data and energy efficiency figures.
The following paragraphs outline the 2015 transport structure modelled in 
TRAEM, which is the starting point for the subsequent scenario building until 2050.
As can be seen from Fig. 6.1, road passenger transport had the biggest transport 
final energy share of 51% in 2015. Most of this comprised individual road passenger 
modes (mostly cars, but also two- and three-wheel vehicles), which accounted for 
45% of all end energy in the transport sector. In total, road transport (passenger and 
freight) accounted for around 90% of total final energy demand for transport.
The majority of total passenger–km (pkm) in passenger transport (around 85% 
of total pkm) is contributed by road transport modes. Freight is much more rail- 
oriented, and has a 42% share of total tonne–km (tkm), as shown in Fig. 6.2. The 
tkm share is much larger than the energy share arising from the much higher energy 
efficiency of railways compared with trucks.
Figure 6.3 shows the powertrain split of all transport modes in 2015 (by pkm or 
tkm respectively). With a few exceptions, the majority of modes were still heavily 
dependent on conventional internal combustion engines (ICE). A small number of 
buses had electric powertrains, which were mainly trolleybuses and increasingly 
1 See also Teske et al. (2015).
2 International aviation and navigation bunkers are not included in this figure.
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also battery- powered electric buses, predominantly in China. China also has a par-
ticularly large number of electric two- and three-wheel vehicles. Almost all battery 
electric scooters worldwide were in China. Passenger rail was electrified to a large 
extent (e.g., metro and high-speed trains), whereas freight trains were predomi-
nantly not electrified.
OECD America and OECD Europe together make up nearly half the total energy 
demand (Fig. 6.4), and China is almost on the same level as OECD Europe, although 
it has about twice as many inhabitants as OECD Europe.
6.3  Measures to Reduce and Decarbonise Transport Energy 
Consumption
This section describes the measures required to reduce the final energy demand and 
decarbonise the transport sector. A variety of actions will be required so that the 
transport sector can conform to the <2.0 °C or 1.5 °C global warming pathways. The 
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set of actions described can be clustered into technical and operational measures 
(e.g., energy efficiency increases, drivetrain electrification); behavioural measures 
(e.g., shifts to less-carbon-intensive transport carriers and an overall reduction in 
transport activity); and accompanying policy measures (e.g., taxation, regulations, 
urban planning, and the promotion of less-harmful transport modes). This study 
focuses on the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios and sets out the differences between 
these scenarios and the business-as-usual 5.0 °C Scenario.
We found that urgent and profound measures must be taken because the emis-
sions reduction window will soon close. Therefore, temporary reductions in fossil- 
fuel- related transport activities (in terms of pkm and tkm of passenger cars, trucks, 
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and aviation) in OECD countries seem nearly unavoidable until the electrification 
(based on renewable energy production) of the transport sector undergoes a 
breakthrough.
6.3.1  Powertrain Electrification
Increasing the market penetration of highly efficient (battery and fuel-cell) electric 
vehicles, coupled with clean electricity generation, is a powerful lever and probably 
also the most effective means of moving toward a decarbonised transport system. 
All electric vehicles have the highest efficiency levels of all the drivetrain options. 
Today, only a few countries have significant proportions of electric vehicles in their 
fleets. The total numbers of electric vehicles, particularly in road transport, are 
insignificant, but because road transport is by far the largest CO2 emitter in overall 
transport, it offers a very powerful lever for decarbonisation. In terms of drivetrain 
electrification, we cluster the world regions into three groups, according to the dif-
fusion theory (Rogers 2003):
• Innovators: OECD North America (excluding Mexico), OECD Europe, OECD 
Pacific, and China
• Moderate: Mexico, Non-OECD Asia, India, Eurasia, and Latin America
• Late adopters: Africa and the Middle East.
Although this clustering is rough, it sufficiently mirrors the basic tendencies we 
modelled. The regions differ in the speed with which novel technologies, especially 
electric drivetrains, will penetrate the market.
6.3.1.1  The 5.0 °C Scenario
The 5.0 °C Scenario follows the IEA Current Policies Scenario (IEA 2017a) until 
2040, with extrapolation to 2050. We model only minor electrification over all 
transport modes (see Fig. 6.5), with passenger cars and buses making relevant gains 
in electric vehicle (EV) shares. For example, we project a share of 30% for battery 
electric vehicles (BEV) in China by 2050 due to foreseeable legislation and techno-
logical advancements in that country (Cui and Xiao 2018), whereas for the world 
car fleet, the share is projected to increase to only around 10%. The growth in the 
share of the commercial road vehicle fleet and of the fleet of two- and three-wheel 
vehicles held of electric powertrains will be small, as will be the increase in further 
rail electrification. Aviation and navigation (shipping) will remain fully dependent 
on conventional kerosene and diesel, respectively.
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6.3.1.2  The 2.0 °C Scenario
Based on the low market share of BEV observed today (2018), minimal progress in 
electrification until 2020 is assumed in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Moving towards 2030, 
the innovator regions will experience strong electrification, encouraged by purchase 
incentives, EV credit systems, and tightened CO2 fleet emission targets. Passenger 
cars and light commercial vehicles are projected to achieve shares of BEVs in the 
regional stocks between 21% and 30%, whereas heavy commercial vehicles and 
buses will attain even higher EV fleet shares of between 28% and 52% by 2030. 
This will require a massive build-up of battery production capacity in the coming 
years. Electric city buses and some trolley trucks will make a significant contribu-
tion to this development. Two- and three-wheel vehicles will be nearly completely 
electrified (batteries and fuel cells) in a couple of regions. OECD Pacific will head 
the fuel-cell-electric vehicle (FCEV) market introduction, which will account for up 
to 6% of passenger cars and light commercial vehicles by 2030, with Japan and 
South Korea the main market drivers. Higher shares of FCEV in innovator regions 
are more likely in the bus and heavy truck sector, which reach up to 10% in 2030. 
In 2050 in the innovative regions, only a minor proportion of vehicles will have ICE 
(up to 9%). Passenger cars and light commercial vehicles will predominantly be 
electrified, with a BEV share of around 80%. FCEV will also gain a significant 
share of 17% in OECD Pacific and OECD North America.
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Looking ahead to 2050, 60–70% of buses and heavy trucks will probably be (bat-
tery) electric, whereas FCEV will increase their market share to around 37%. The 
proportion of buses and heavy trucks that will be BEV in 2050 will be around 
60–70%. Two- and three-wheel vehicles will be nearly fully electrified in all regions 
(80–100%).
In the moderate regions, the BEV share of road transport vehicles is set in a 
range of 1–15%. Except for Latin America, the moderate regions will have an ICE 
share of 83% or less for passenger cars. For example, India is progressing with its 
current electrification strategy and up to 14% of its passenger cars will be battery- 
powered by 2030. It is likely that ICE will dominate buses and trucks in the moder-
ate regions in 2030. Fuel-cell cars now have small shares of 1–2%. Non-OECD Asia 
is positively influenced by its innovator neighbour region, OECD Pacific. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, moderate regions will reach BEV shares of up to 67% for passen-
ger cars and light commercial vehicles and between 54% and 65% for buses and 
heavy trucks by 2050. Compared with the innovator regions, the moderate regions 
will not experience a significant uptake of FCEVs. Africa and the Middle East will 
remain mostly dependent on ICE in 2050, with shares of around 90%. Only slow 
electrification will occur in Africa, with small and cheap BEVs (Fig. 6.6).
As an example of how different the electrification speeds will be across the world 
regions, Fig. 6.7 shows the uptake of electric and fuel-cell drivetrains in buses and 
two- and three-wheel vehicles, region by region, in terms of pkm. In 2015, a sub-
stantial proportion (15%) of China’s buses were already electrified. OECD Pacific 
and OECD Europe will follow, with substantial electrification after 2020, as will 
India, Non-OECD Asia, and Eurasia after 2030. The remaining regions will elec-
trify their fleets predominantly after 2035. Fuel-cell drivetrains will not begin to 
penetrate the market to a significant extent until 2025. We project a fleet that is 
40–70% electric (battery and trolley) and 10–30% fuel-cell electric by 2050 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario.
Figure 6.8 plots the projected electrification of passenger and freight rail in terms 
of final energy demand. Substantial electric passenger rail was present in OECD 
Europe, OECD Pacific, and China in 2015, and substantial electric freight transport 
in OECD Europe and Eurasia. In most other world regions, freight transport by rail 
predominantly relied on diesel locomotives.
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In most world regions, nearly all rail traffic is projected to be electric after 
2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Total diesel consumption in rail operations is projected 
to increase slowly until 2030, mainly because railway vehicles have long lifespans, 
and once diesel cars are put into operation, they are not replaced overnight. 
Furthermore, line electrification usually requires several years of planning and 
construction.
Aviation will probably remain predominantly powered by liquid fossil fuels (ker-
osene and bio- and synfuel derivatives) in the medium to long term because of limi-
tations in electrical energy storage. We project a moderate increase in domestic pkm 
flown in electric aircrafts starting in 2030, with larger shares in OECD Europe 
because the flight distances are shorter than, for example, in the USA (Fig. 6.9). 
Norway has announced plans to perform all short-haul flights electrically by 2040 
(Agence France-Presse 2018).
However, no real electrification breakthrough in aviation is foreseeable unless 
the attainable energy densities of batteries increase to 800–1000  Wh/kg, which 
would require fast-charging capable post-lithium battery chemistries.
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6.3.1.3  The 1.5 °C Scenario
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, an earlier and more rapid ramp-up of electric powertrain 
penetration is required than in the 2.0 °C Scenario and the innovative regions will 
be at the forefront. The moderate regions will also need to electrify more rapidly 
than in the 2.0 °C Scenario, but will end up with only a minimally higher share by 
2050. In the passenger car sector in particular, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles 
(PHEVs) will ensure a sharp reduction in conventional combustion engine vehicles 
between 2030 and 2050. In the late adopter regions, there is no difference between 
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The phasing out of internal combustion engine 
(ICE) vehicles will occur more quickly under the 1.5 °C Scenario than under the 
2.0 °C Scenario (Fig. 6.10).
6.3.2  Mode-Specific Efficiency and Improvements Over Time
In passenger transport, trains and buses are much more energy efficient per pkm 
than passenger cars or aeroplanes. This situation does not change fundamentally if 
only electric drivetrains are compared (Fig. 6.11). It is apparent that railways and 
especially ships are clearly more energy efficient than trucks in transporting freight 
(Fig. 6.12). The 2015 figures are the starting point for a more detailed discussion, 
mode by mode, later in this chapter, and these figures are the basis for the rationale 
of our discussion in terms of modal shift (Chap. 6, Sect. 4 ). The efficiency data are 
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based on literature-reported and transport operator information. The efficiency lev-
els in terms of pkm or tkm depend to a large extent on the underlying capacity uti-
lization of the vehicles, which differs between world regions. The numbers are 
average values and differences are evaluated at the regional level.
In addition to powertrain electrification, there are other potential improvements 
in energy efficiency, and their implementation will steadily improve energy  intensity 
over time. Regardless of the types of powertrains and fuels used, efficiency improve-
ments on the MJ/pkm or MJ/tkm level will result from (for example):
• Reductions in powertrain losses through more-efficient motors, gears, power 
electronics, etc.;
• Reductions in aerodynamic drag;
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• Reductions in vehicle mass through light-weighting;
• The use of smaller vehicles;
• Operational improvements (e.g., through automatic train operation, load factor 
improvements).
The measures are discussed in the following mode-specific sub-chapters.
6.3.3  Road Transport
6.3.3.1  Passenger Cars
As of 2017, 99% of the passenger cars produced worldwide were estimated to be 
equipped with an ICE: the majority of them gasoline or diesel (95%), 3.4% hybrid 
electric vehicles (HEV), and 0.7% PHEV (BCG 2017). Only about 0.9% of the cars 
sold were pure battery electric vehicles (BEV). There are several options for energy 
efficiency improvements. The fuel consumption reduction potential of petrol 
engines as a result of engine improvements and hybridization is around 25–30%, 
and it is around 15–20% for diesel engines (van Basshuysen and Schäfer 2015). 
Maximum efficiencies of 38–40% can be reached by ICE (Schäfer 2016), whereas 
electric drivetrains have efficiencies of 80–85% (including [re]charging losses). 
Besides the reduction in engine losses, both lightweight construction and reductions 
in rolling resistance will result in additional fuel savings.
Hybrid systems increase the complexity of powertrains, resulting in higher 
masses and higher costs, but they offer additional fuel-saving potentials. Energy can 
thus be recovered by recuperation during braking in hybridized and all-electric 
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vehicles. In BEV and FCEV, advanced battery technologies can reduce the overall 
vehicle mass. However, post-lithium technologies, such as lithium–sulfur and solid- 
state batteries with increased energy densities and lower systems masses compared 
with today’s Li-ion battery technologies, will probably not enter the transport sector 
before 2030 (Schmuch et al. 2018).
In total, we project a 1% increase in annual efficiency on a per passenger/km 
basis (the same for all drivetrains) for the 5.0 °C and 2.0 °C Scenarios. The effi-
ciency improvements for 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario will be achieved in 2040 under 
the 1.5 °C Scenario (Fig. 6.13).
6.3.3.2  Light and Heavy Freight Vehicles
Like passenger cars, trucks are currently driven almost exclusively by conventional 
ICE. With a market share of 84% of diesel-fuelled vehicles in 2015 (IEA 2017c), 
the global fleet of trucks was predominantly operating on diesel (IEA 2017b). In 
some regions, such as the Middle East, trucks are also powered by gasoline to a 
considerable degree. Electric drivetrains will enter the truck sector gradually in 
coming years because of changes in exhaust emissions legislation and because the 
higher efficiency of electric drivetrains compared with ICE will offer economic 
advantages to road carriers (Fig. 6.14). Compared with diesel-powered trucks, fuel- 
cell electric drivetrains in trucks can substantially reduce the energy intensity per 
tkm, and allow higher operating ranges than battery-powered trucks. To achieve 
rapid improvements in energy efficiency in the truck sector, the hybridization of 
diesel powertrains, especially those operating in stop-and-go intensive urban envi-
ronments, is promising (Burke and Hengbing 2017; Lischke 2017). However, after 
2030, the hybrid diesel powertrain will be seen merely as a transitional technology 
before the advent of fully electric powertrains (overhead catenary, battery electric, 
and fuel-cell electric). Therefore, the development of battery recharging and hydro-
gen refuelling infrastructures will require massive investments in coming years. In 
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the commercial sector, it is likely that many electrical charging stations will be set 
up on the private grounds of logistics operators. The market growth of BEV in the 
truck sector will require considerable public spending on the installation of over-
head catenary lines along major highways for trolley trucks (hybridized with diesel, 
fuel cells, or batteries). The first pilot lanes are being developed in Germany, 
Sweden, and California (USA) (Siemens 2017).
6.3.3.3  Buses
State-of-the-art city buses operate on ICE (diesel or gas) or are trolley buses (all- 
electric or hybridized with an additional battery or diesel motor). Diesel hybrids 
have entered the city bus market and constitute a large proportion of the bus fleets 
in a range of cities today. The short distances between stations, small operating 
radii, and moderate daily mileages make the use of batteries in city buses a viable 
option, complemented by fuel cells for routes with higher ranges or difficult ter-
rains. Battery electric buses are between the prototype/experimental stage and a 
mature technology. In China, battery electric buses are already an integral part of 
public bus transport systems, and the city of Shenzen has had a 100% electric bus 
fleet since 2016 (over 16,000 battery electric buses) (Sisson 2018). Fuel-cell electric 
buses still lag behind battery electric buses in terms of numbers, but are increasing. 
In 2017, about 80 fuel-cell electric buses were in operation in Europe (Element 
Energy Ltd. 2018) and 26 in the USA (Eudy and Post 2017). Full battery operation 
is more difficult to achieve in regional and long-distance buses and coaches, so the 
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uptake of full battery electric and also fuel-cell powertrains will be slower than in 
city buses. Diesel-powered buses will remain in the market longer, complemented 
by diesel hybrid powertrains. Ultimately, fuel-cell-powered inter-urban coaches 
will probably be more common than fuel-cell-powered city buses. In our model, we 
divided the regions into innovators (i.e., China and OECD countries) and all the 
other regions lagging behind the innovators. We also identified a clear trend towards 
electrification.
We project a 0.5% (diesel, diesel-hybrid and natural gas) to 0.8% (electric and 
fuel cell hydrogen electric) increase in efficiency on a per passenger per km basis in 
all three scenarios (Fig. 6.15).
6.3.3.4  Two- and Three-Wheel Vehicles
Two-wheel vehicles are probably the most important component of everyday traffic 
in large parts of Asia and Africa. The drivetrain efficiencies of e-scooters are 
reported to be 1.2–3 kWh/100 vehicle–km. China is by far the biggest market for 
electric scooters in the world, with more than 200 million electric scooters on the 
road by 2015, that translates to an electric share of about 70%.
Three-wheel vehicles (also country-specifically called ‘rickshaws’ or ‘tuk-tuks’) 
have at least two, and usually three or more seats, and are often overloaded in daily 
traffic. India alone is reported to have 2.5 million rickshaws on the road, each travel-
ling 70–150  km/day (Abu Mallouh et  al. 2010). Most three-wheel vehicles are 
fuelled by gasoline and some by liquid petroleum gas (LPG), although some com-
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munities incentivize the conversion of two-stroke engines to battery electric three- 
wheel vehicles. Electric tuk-tuks are increasingly emerging in South-East Asia, 
together with battery swap stations and solar-powered rickshaws (Moran 2018; 
Reddy et al. 2017). Thailand has announced that it plans to convert all existing two- 
stroke- powered tuk-tuks to battery electric powertrains within 5 years (Coconuts 
Bangkok 2017). In India, too, plans are repeatedly announced to electrify all new 
two- and three-wheel vehicles within the next two decades (Ghoshal 2017).
The efficiency of battery electric drivetrains is much better than that of conven-
tional two-stroke engines in two- and three-wheel vehicles (Fig. 6.16). We project a 
0.5% annual increase in efficiency on a per pkm basis (the same for all drivetrains) 
in all three scenarios.
6.3.3.5  Rail Transport
No other transport mode is more suited to operate electrically than railways. Urban 
rail systems, for instance, are invariably electric. Electric trains consume about 
60–70% less energy than diesel trains when their final energy use is compared (on 
catenary and tank levels, respectively). According to the International Railway 
Association, about 32% of the worldwide rail network was electrified in 2015 (UIC 
2017). However, in terms of transport performance (pkm or tkm), the ratio of elec-
tric to diesel is higher because electrified rail lines usually experience more traffic 
than non-electrified lines. The electrification of rail lines with overhead catenaries 
has been the state-of-the-art technology for decades and new lines are almost exclu-
sively equipped with overhead power lines right from the start.
However, line electrification, especially of existing lines, is often difficult to 
achieve due to unsettled and complex right-of-way issues, narrow tunnel diameters, 
or simply because line electrification is not economically viable due to low line 
utilization. The use of on-board batteries for mixed electrified/non-electrified lines 
and shunting operations and the use of fuel-cell hybrid powertrains for longer lines 
with little or no electrification whatsoever could be feasible fully electric alterna-
tives to diesel power or full-line electrification. (Fuel-cell electric trains have not 
been modelled in this research).
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We project a 0.5% annual increase in efficiency on a per passenger per km basis 
and a 0.8% annual increase in efficiency on a per tonne per km basis (the same for 
all drivetrains) in all three scenarios (Fig. 6.17).
The actual efficiency depends on the type of train and the world region. These 
differences are considered in every transport sub-model and are exemplified in 
Fig. 6.18 for freight and passenger trains.
6.3.3.6  Water and Air Transport
Inland navigation will probably remain predominantly powered by ICE in the next 
few decades. Therefore, we did not model the electrification of inland navigation 
vessels. However, pilot projects using diesel hybrids, batteries, and fuel cells are in 
preparation (DNV GL 2015). We assumed the same increase in the share of bio- and 
synthetic fuels over time as in the road and rail sectors.
In aviation, energy efficiency can be improved by measures such as winglets, 
advanced composite-based lightweight structures, powertrain hybridization, and 
enhanced air traffic management systems (Madavan 2016; Vyas et al. 2013). We 
project a 1% annual increase in efficiency on a per pkm basis.
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6.3.4  Replacement of Fossil Fuels by Biofuels and Synfuels
The use of biofuels in the transport sector offers a potential lever to reduce the CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels. Biofuels can be used either as a direct drop-in or as 
admixtures to fossil fuels. Biofuels are widely used, especially in Latin America 
(e.g., E85 in Brazil, a blend of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline). Biofuels will be 
replaced by synthetic fuels (synfuels) within the next few decades.
In the three scenarios, we use region-specific shares of bio- and synfuels to 
replace fossil fuels such as diesel, gasoline, and kerosene. Figure 6.19 shows the 
scenario-specific band-widths. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, Latin America will increase 
its proportion of bio- and synfuels to around 15%, whereas in the Middle East, 
Mexico, and Eurasia will even not reach a 0.5% share by 2050. Bio-fuel and 
 especially synfuel shares will remain constant in the 5.0 °C Scenario, whereas they 
will increase in the 2.0  °C Scenario between 2030 and 2050 and in the 1.5  °C 
Scenario from 2020 onwards.
6.3.5  Operational Improvements and Novel Service Concepts
In addition to technical improvements, such as the energy efficiency savings 
described in previous chapters, behavioural changes can potentially reduce energy 
demand and help decarbonise the transport sector as a whole. These measures 
include, among other things, the efficient operation of vehicles, for example by 
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increasing the occupancy rates of moving vehicles, reductions in mileages, and 
reductions in vehicle stocks.
6.3.5.1  Passenger Transport
The classic fixed boundary between private and public transport will blur in the 
future as novel platforms and sharing concepts emerge. This trend will potentially 
reduce the number and usage of privately owned vehicles. Private car ownership is 
generally becoming less a ‘must’ for many people in the car-oriented OECD regions. 
Driven by digitization, app-based cars and ride-sharing concepts are emerging. 
They include traditional car sharing (e.g., Zipcar), free-floating car sharing busi-
nesses (e.g., car2go), and ride-hailing mobility concepts (e.g., Uber, lyft). In Europe, 
private ride-sharing mobility platforms, such as BlaBlaCar, are seen as alternative 
passenger car usership schemes. All shared-use mobility concepts have in common 
that they reduce the vehicle stock and increase occupation rates on trips. To own a 
car is no longer considered a status symbol, but has become simply a mode of trans-
port in the Western world.
Flexibility and passenger-friendly usability is becoming increasingly important 
to users of public transport. Various app-based on-demand mobility services are 
currently being tested in pilot projects—for example, in the German city of 
Schorndorf (Brost et  al. 2018). Under these business models, innovative vehicle 
concepts are tested for suitability. Automated battery electric (mini) buses can make 
public transit more flexible. Their modularity also allows them to connect to other 
modes of transport, such as rail and air transport, and thus opens up fundamentally 
new transport chains that are more energy efficient than traditional passenger car 
usage. However, decision-makers and transport planners must consider the poten-
tially detrimental rebound effects of highly personalized automated mobility 
(Pakusch et al. 2018). For example, an increase in total energy consumption may 
occur as a result of the higher transport demand arising from transport options that 
are seen as more attractive than more-energy-efficient mass transit systems or 
cycling. Therefore, novel transport concepts could cancel out the gains in energy 
efficiency on a per vehicle level.
6.3.5.2  Freight Transport
The automatization of road freight traffic can reduce fuel consumption. The tech-
nology for partially automated trucks is already available and being tested to make 
it widely available. In the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) automation level 
3 (SAE 2018), (multi-brand) truck platooning has become possible, which is a 
driver-assistance technology (Janssen et  al. 2015). With communication between 
the first truck and the following trucks, the control of the following vehicles is 
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handed over to the leading vehicle. Thus, the following vehicles are driving in the 
slipstream and lower air drag is achieved, which can reduce energy consumption by 
up to 5% (Daimler 2018).
In urban freight transport, last-mile delivery concepts based on light commercial 
vehicles can help reduce fuel consumption. By fragmenting the transport routes into 
the main leg and urban traffic (last mile), different vehicle types and modes can be 
used more efficiently for specialized transport tasks. Like light commercial vehicles 
(electric), cargo bikes could shape the urban freight traffic of the future as they do 
already today in many countries in Asia.
Further novel logistic concepts, such as the use of drones for delivery and decen-
tralized production using 3D printers, will help to reduce the overall transport 
demand and thus energy consumption through more-efficient operational 
solutions.
6.4  Transport Performance
We outline achievable 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenario paths that will allow us to achieve 
very ambitious emission reduction targets. The levels of pkm and tkm for every 
world region in 2015 were calibrated against statistical data, the literature, and our 
own estimates when concrete data were not available.
To complement the anticipated technologically driven mode-inherent improve-
ments in efficiency that we took as the input for our modelling in the previous sec-
tions of this chapter, we now describe the scenario assumptions in terms of the 
transport mode choices and transport demand. The main idea is to model low- 
emission pathways that shift from fossil-dependent, low-energy-efficiency modes 
toward more-energy-efficient and electrified modes. We also look at the general 
level of performance of transport modes and suggest region-specific development 
pathways. We first outline the scenario-specific pkm and tkm pathways to 2050 and 
then discuss the rationales for the mode choices that will result in the transport per-
formance projections.
For the 5.0 °C Scenario, we extrapolate current trends in transport performance 
until 2050. In relative terms, the transport performance of all transport carriers will 
increase from current levels. Aviation, passenger car, and commercial road transport 
are particularly projected to grow strongly (Fig. 6.20). These modes consume more 
energy than trains, ships, and buses, as discussed in Sect. 6.3.2. Even if the full 
efficiency potential of these transport modes is realized, energy intensity per pkm or 
tkm will remain higher than that of trains, ships, or buses.
In the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario, we project a strong increase in rail 
traffic (starting from a relatively low level) and a slower growth or even a reduction 
in the use of the other modes in all world regions (Fig. 6.21). The next two sections 
describe the specific changes and developments for each type of passenger and 
freight transport.
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6.4.1  Passenger Transport Modes
To reduce transport-related CO2 emissions, a shift towards low-energy-intensity 
modes of transport is required for both ambitious climate-protection scenarios. 
Travelling by rail is the most energy-efficient form of transport, and therefore we 
suggest a strong shift from domestic aviation to trains, especially high-speed trains 
and magnetic levitation trains. The assumed shifts from domestic aviation to trains 
are shown in Table 6.1. The mode shift potential differs, depending predominantly 
on the country-specific distance between origin–destination pairs. The shifts from 
international aviation to trains were not analysed because the potential is lower 
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(although not zero). The maximum global shift from domestic aviation to trains will 
be stronger in the 1.5 °C Scenario than in the 2.0 °C Scenario.
In the urban context, investments in public transit systems and limitations on the 
use of private cars are cornerstones of a more-energy-efficient transport system. The 
increased use and integration of homes and offices, and video conferencing can 
reduce traffic. With further urbanization, two- and three-wheel vehicles are suitable 
for travelling small distances quickly. A shift to small and medium cars and away 
from larger cars and SUVs will also allow lower energy intensity. Whereas occu-
pancy rates remain steady for the passenger car sector in the 2.0 °C Scenario, in the 
1.5 °C Scenario, we assume a significant increase in occupancy rates. Ultimately, 
pkm will stabilize, whereas vehicle–km (vkm) will decline in response to incentives 
such as high-occupancy vehicle lanes and novel ride-sharing services.
Figure 6.22 shows the development of pkm in all scenarios for sample world 
regions. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, pkm in the OECD countries will predominantly 
remain on the same level in 2050 as in 2015 due to saturation and sufficiency effects. 
In all the other world regions, we project a growth in pkm, reflecting economic 
catch-up processes in the developing world induced by increases in population and 
Table 6.1 Pkm “per km” shift from domestic aviation to trains (in %)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
2.0 °C scenario 0 0 0.5–0.75 0.7–1.1 1–1.7 1.4–2.5 1.9–3.8 2.7–5.7
1.5 °C scenario 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
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GDP. As can be seen for the 1.5 °C Scenario, India, which represents a strongly 
growing economy, will double its pkm by 2050, whereas OECD areas, such as the 
USA and Europe, will experience a decline. Although China is expected to experi-
ence continuous economic growth over the next few decades, pkm will rise slowly 
compared with that in the 5.0 °C Scenario.
Pkm in absolute numbers in 2050 will be highest in the 5.0 °C Scenario. It will 
also increase in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, but at a slower rate (Figs. 6.23 and 
6.24).
Looking more closely at the 2.0 °C Scenario, the transport modes will evolve 
differently in the world regions, both quantitatively and in relative terms (Fig. 6.25) 
due to the diverse mobility patterns. For example, Africa has a high bus share in 
total pkm today, whereas OECD Europe has a high passenger car share (LDV), but 
pkm must decrease by 2020 and in subsequent years to meet the CO2 reduction 
targets because fleet electrification will not be able to keep up. In parallel, rail pkm 
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will increase strongly until 2050 and this will compensate, in part, the decline in 
passenger car pkm. Population and GDP are very likely to catch up in Africa and 
will result in a sharp rise in mobility demand. We project that most of this rise to be 
covered by informal and formal public transport systems, with buses and mini- 
buses. In China, the pkm split among modes is more balanced. All modes are pro-
jected to rise in pkm in the future.
6.4.2  Freight Transport Modes
Total freight activity is modelled to increase strongly in the 5.0 °C Scenario and 
more slowly in the 2.0 °C Scenario (Fig. 6.26). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, freight trans-
port activity in 2050 is projected to remain at the 2015 level. Freight intensity will 
stagnate or decrease in the 1.5 °C Scenario in the OECD countries and increase in 
other regions, such as China and India (Figs. 6.26 and 6.27).
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We modelled the shift from high-energy-intensity modes to low-energy-intensity 
modes, especially from road to rail freight. This will require substantial investments 
in additional rail infrastructure. Table 6.2 shows the assumed global tkm shift from 
truck to train in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Heavy freight trucks (HFT) are 
more likely to operate over long-haul distances, and are therefore more suitable for 
the shift to rail freight than light freight trucks (LFT) or medium freight trucks 
(MFT). In the 2.0 °C Scenario, we assume an average shift of 18% for HFT, whereas 
in the 1.5 °C Scenario, the shift is projected to reach up to 27%. The ramp- up of 
shift potential is slow, because the provision of rail and terminal infrastructures and 
rolling stock will require considerable time.
We modelled tkm for truck (road) and rail freight transport. In the 5.0  °C 
Scenario, transport activity is projected to increase clearly until 2050. In the 2.0 °C 
and 1.5 °C Scenarios, this increase will be slower and the tkm on rail will exceed the 
road tkm in numbers by 2050 (Fig. 6.28).
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, road tkm will decrease in the OECD countries and stag-
nate or increase slightly in China (Fig. 6.29). Rail tkm is projected to increase in all 
other world regions (Fig. 6.29). Rail tkm in China will temporarily decrease slightly 
because of an anticipated medium-term decline in coal transport (Fig. 6.30).
In 2015, rail’s share of total tkm differed between regions, but will increase in the 
2.0 °C Scenario in all regions except India, where road tkm will increase more than 
rail tkm (Fig. 6.31).
Energy Scenario Results
Our scenario modelling involves merging the transport performance for all modes 
and powertrains with specific energy demands, and yields the accumulated demands 
for electricity, hydrogen, gas, and liquid fuels across all world regions between 2015 
and 2050. The transport energy scenario results are outlined in Chap. 8.
Table 6.2 Global tkm shifts from truck to train in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios (in %)
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
LFT (2.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LFT (1.5) 0 1 4 6 7–8 9–10 11–12 13–14
MFT (2.0) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MFT (1.5) 0 2–3 5–10 9–14 13–18 13–19 13–19 13–18
HFT (2.0) 0 3 5 8 10 13 15 18
HFT (1.5) 0 2–3 8–18 12–22 16–27 16–27 16–27 18–27
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Chapter 7
Renewable Energy Resource Assessment
Sven Teske, Kriti Nagrath, Tom Morris, and Kate Dooley
Abstract Literature overview of published global and regional renewable energy 
potential estimates. This section provides definitions for different types of RE 
potentials and introduces a new category, the economic renewable energy potential 
in space constrained environments. The potential for utility scale solar and onshore 
wind in square kilometre and maximum possible installed capacity (in GW) are 
provided for 75 different regions. The results set the upper limits for the deployment 
of solar- and wind technologies for the development of the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C energy 
pathways.
There is a wide range of estimates of global and regional renewable energy poten-
tials in the literature, and all conclude that the total global technical renewable 
energy potential is substantially higher than the current global energy demand 
(IPCC/SRREN 2011). Furthermore, the IPCC has concluded that the global techni-
cal renewable energy potential will not limit continued renewable energy growth 
(IPCC/SRREN 2011). However, the technical potential is also much higher than the 
sustainable potential, which is limited by factors such as land availability and other 
resource constraints.
This chapter provides an overview of various estimates of global renewable 
energy (RE) potential. It also provides definitions of different types of RE potential 
and presents mapping results for the spatial RE resource analysis (see Sect. 1.3 in 
Chap. 3)—[R]E-SPACE. The [R]E-SPACE results provide the upper limit for the 
deployment of all solar and wind technologies used in the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios.
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7.1  Global Renewable Energy Potentials
The International Panel on Climate Change—Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation (IPCC-SRRN 2011) defines renewable 
energy (RE) as:
“ (…) any form of energy from solar, geophysical or biological sources that is replenished 
by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. Renewable energy is 
obtained from the continuing or repetitive flows of energy occurring in the natural environ-
ment and includes low-carbon technologies such as solar energy, hydropower, wind, tide 
and waves and ocean thermal energy, as well as renewable fuels such as biomass.”
For the development of the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, an additional renewable 
energy potential—the economic renewable energy potential in a space-constrained 
environment (Sect. 3.2 in Chap. 3)—has been analysed and utilized in this study.
The theoretical and technical potentials of renewable energy are significantly 
larger than the current global primary energy demand. The minimum technical 
potential of solar energy, shown in Table 7.1 (Turkenburg et al. 2012), could supply 
the global primary energy of 2015 112 times over.
However, the technical potential is only a first indication of the extent to 
which the resource is available. There are many other limitations, which must be 
considered. One of the main constraints on deploying renewable energy tech-
Different types of renewable energy potentials have been identified by the 
German Advisory Council on Climate Change (WBGU)—World in Transition: 
Towards Sustainable Energy Systems, Chap. 3, page 44, published in 2003: 
(WBGU 2003) (Quote):
“Theoretical potential: The theoretical potential identifies the physical upper limit of 
the energy available from a certain source. For solar energy, for example, this would 
be the total solar radiation falling on a particular surface. This potential does there-
fore not take account of any restrictions on utilization, nor is the efficiency of the 
conversion technologies considered.
Conversion potential: The conversion potential is defined specifically for 
each technology and is derived from the theoretical potential and the annual effi-
ciency of the respective conversion technology. The conversion potential is 
therefore not a strictly defined value, since the efficiency of a particular technol-
ogy depends on technological progress.
Technological potential: The technological potential is derived from the conver-
sion potential, taking account of additional restrictions regarding the area that is real-
istically available for energy generation. […] like the conversion potential, the 
technological potential of the different energy sources is therefore not a strictly 
defined value but depends on numerous boundary conditions and assumptions.
Economic potential: This potential identifies the proportion of the technological 
potential that can be utilized economically, based on economic boundary conditions 
at a certain time […].
Sustainable potential: This potential of an energy source covers all aspects of 
sustainability, which usually requires careful consideration and evaluation of differ-
ent ecological and socio-economic aspects […].” (END Quote)
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nologies is the available space, especially in densely populated areas where there 
are competing claims on land use, such as agriculture and nature conservation, to 
name just two.
It is neither necessary nor desirable to exploit the entire technical potential. The 
implementation of renewable energy must respect sustainability criteria to achieve 
a sound future energy supply. Public acceptance is crucial, especially because the 
decentralised character of many renewable energy technologies will move systems 
closer to consumers. Without public acceptance, market expansion will be difficult 
or even impossible (Teske and Pregger 2015). The energy policy framework in a 
particular country or region will have a profound impact on the expansion of renew-
ables, in terms of both the economic situation and the social acceptance of renew-
able energy projects.
7.1.1  Bioenergy
The discrepancy between the technical potential for bioenergy and the likely sus-
tainable potential raises some issues that warrant further discussion. Recent analy-
ses put the technical potential for primary bioenergy supply at 100–300 EJ/year. 
(GEA 2012; Smith et al. 2014). However, the dedicated use of land for bioenergy—
whether through energy crops or the harvest of forest biomass—raises concerns 
over competition for land and the carbon neutrality of bioenergy (Field and Mach 
2017; Searchinger et  al. 2017). Research that focused on the trade-offs between 
bioenergy production, food security, and biodiversity found that less than 100 EJ /
year. could be produced sustainably (Boysen et al. 2017; Heck et al. 2018), although 
such production levels would be dependent on strong global land governance sys-
tems (Creutzig 2017).
The carbon neutrality of bioenergy is based on the assumption that the CO2 
released when bioenergy is combusted is then recaptured when the biomass stock 
Table 7.1 Theoretical and technical renewable energy potentials versus utilization in 2015
Renewable 
energy resource
Theoretical potential 
(Annual energy flux) [EJ/
year] IPCC 2011
Technical potential [EJ/
year] Global energy 
assessment 2012, Chap. 11, 
p. 774
Utilization in 2015 
[EJ/year] IEA-WEO 
2017
Solar energy 3,900,000 62,000–280,000 1.3
Wind energy 6000 1250–2250 1.9
Bioenergy 1548 160–270 51.5
Geothermal 
energy
1400 810–1545 2.4
Hydropower 147 50–60 13.2
Ocean energy 7400 3240–10,500 0.0018
Total 76,000–294,500 (Total primary 
energy demand 
2015) 555 EJ/year
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regrows (EASAC 2017). Most land is part of the terrestrial carbon sink or is used 
for food production, so that harvesting for bioenergy will either deplete the exist-
ing carbon stock or displace food production (Searchinger et al. 2015, 2017). The 
use of harvested forest products (e.g., wood pellets) for bioenergy is not carbon 
neutral in the majority of circumstances because an increased harvesting in forests 
leads to a permanent increase in the atmospheric CO2 concentration (Sterman et al. 
2018; Smyth et  al. 2014; Ter Mikaelian et  al. 2015). Leaving carbon stored in 
intact forests can represent a better climate mitigation strategy (DeCicco and 
Schlesinger 2018), because increased atmospheric concentrations of CO2 from the 
burning of bioenergy may worsen the irreversible impacts of climate change before 
the forests can grow back to compensate the increase (EASAC 2017; Booth 2018; 
Schlesinger 2018).
Bioenergy sourced from wastes and residues rather than harvested from dedi-
cated land can be considered carbon neutral, because of the ‘carbon opportunity 
cost’ per hectare of land (i.e., bioenergy production reduces the carbon-carrying 
capacity of land) (Searchinger et al. 2017). The supply of waste and residues as 
a bioenergy source is always inherently limited (Miyake et al. 2012). Although 
in some cases, burning residues can still release more emissions into the atmo-
sphere in the mid-term (20–40 years) than allowing them to decay (Booth 2018), 
there is general agreement that specific and limited waste materials from the for-
est industry (for example, black liquor or sawdust) can be used with beneficial 
climate effects (EASAC 2017). The use of secondary residues (cascade utiliza-
tion) may reduce the logistical costs and trade-offs associated with waste use 
(Smith et al. 2014).
7.2  Economic Renewable Energy Potential in Space- 
Constrained Environments
Land is a scarce resource. The use of land for nature conservation, agricultural pro-
duction, residential areas, and industry, as well as for infrastructure, such as roads 
and all aspects of human settlements, limits the amount of land available land for 
utility-scale solar and wind projects. Furthermore, solar and wind generation require 
favourable climatic conditions, so not all available areas are suitable for renewable 
power generation. To assess the renewable energy potential of the available area, all 
ten world regions defined in Table 8 in Sect. 1 of Chap. 5 were analysed with the [R]
E-SPACE methodology described in Sect. 3 of Chap. 3.
Given the issues involved in dedicated land-use for bioenergy outlined above, we 
assume that bioenergy is sourced primarily from cascading residue use and wastes, 
and do not analyse the availability of land for dedicated bioenergy crops.
This analysis quantifies the available land area (in square kilometres) in all 
regions and sub-regions with a defined set of constraints.
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7.2.1  Constrains for Utility-Scale Solar and Wind Power 
Plants
The following land-use areas were excluded from the deployment of utility-scale 
solar photovoltaic (PV) and concentrated solar power plants:
• Residential and urban settlements;
• Infrastructure for transport (e.g., rail, roads);
• Industrial areas;
• Intensive agricultural production land;
• Nature conservation areas and national parks;
• Wetlands and swamps;
• Closed grasslands (a land-use type) (GLC 2000).
7.2.2  Mapping Solar and Wind Potential
After the spatial analysis, the remaining available land areas were analysed for their 
solar and wind resources. For concentrated solar power, a minimum solar radiation 
of 2000 kilowatt hours per square meter and year (kWh/m2 year) is assumed as the 
minimum deployment criterion, and onshore wind potentials under an average 
annual wind speed of 5 m/s have been omitted.
In the next step, the existing electricity infrastructure of power lines and power 
plants was mapped for all regions with WRI (2018) data. Figure 7.1 provides an 
example of the electricity infrastructure in Africa. These maps provide important 
insights into the current situation in the power sector, especially the availability of 
transmission grids. This is of particular interest for developing countries because it 
allows a comparison of the available land areas that have favourable solar and wind 
conditions with the infrastructure available to transport electricity to the demand 
centres. This assessment is less important for OECD regions because the energy 
infrastructure is usually already fairly evenly distributed across the country—except 
in some parts of Canada, the United States, and Australia. For some countries, cov-
erage is not 100% complete due to a lack of public data sources. This is particularly 
true for renewable energy generation assets such as solar, wind, biomass, geother-
mal energy, and hydropower resources.
Figure 7.2 shows the solar potential for utility-scale solar power plants—both 
solar PV and concentrated solar power—in Africa. The scale from light yellow to 
dark red shows the solar radiation intensity: the darker the area, the better the solar 
resource. The green lines show existing transmission lines. All areas that are not 
yellow or red are unsuitable for utility-scale solar because there is conflicting land 
use and/or there are no suitable solar resources. Africa provides a very extreme 
example of very good solar resources far from existing infrastructure. While  roof- top 
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Fig. 7.2 Solar potential in Africa
Fig. 7.1 Electricity infrastructure in Africa—power plants (over 1 MW) and high-voltage trans-
mission lines
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solar PV can be deployed virtually anywhere and only needs roof space on any sort 
of building, bulk power supply via solar—to produce synthetic and hydrogen 
fuels—requires a certain minimum of utility-scale solar applications. The vast solar 
potential in the north of Africa—as well as in the Middle East—has been earmarked 
for the production of synthetic and hydrogen fuels and for the export of renewable 
electricity (via sub-sea cable) to Europe in the long-term energy scenarios in the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios.
Europe, in contrast, is densely populated and has fewer favourable utility-scale 
solar sites because of both its lower solar radiation and conflicting land-use patterns. 
Figure 7.3 shows Europe’s potential for utility-scale solar power plants. Only the 
yellow and red dots across Europe, most visible in the south of Spain, south of the 
Alps, south-west Italy, and the Asian part of Turkey, mark regions suitable for 
utility- scale solar, whereas roof-top solar can be deployed economically across 
Europe, including Scandinavia.
However, Africa and Europe are in a good position, from a technical point of 
view, to form an economic partnership for solar energy exchange.
The situation for onshore wind power differs from that for solar energy. The best 
potential is in areas that are more than 30° north and south of the equator, whereas 
the actual equatorial zone is less suitable for wind installation. North America has 
significant wind resources and the resource is still largely untapped, even though 
there is already a mature wind industry in Canada and the USA. Figure 7.4 shows 
the existing and potential wind power sites. While significant wind power 
Fig. 7.3 Europe’s potential for utility-scale solar power plants
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 installations are already in operation, mainly in the USA, there are still very large 
untapped resources across the entire north American continent, in Canada and the 
mid-west of the USA.
Unlike the situation in the USA, wind power in Latin America is still in its initial 
stages and the industry, which has great potential, is still in its infancy. Figure 7.5 
shows the existing wind farm locations—marked with blue dots—and the potential 
wind farm sites, especially in coastal regions and the entire southern parts of 
Argentina and Chile.
The available solar and wind potentials are distributed differently across all 
world regions. Whereas some regions have significantly more resources than others, 
all regions have enough potential to supply their demand with local solar and wind 
resources—together with other renewable energy resources, such as hydro-, bio-, 
and geothermal energies.
Table 7.2 provides an overview of the key results of the [R]E-SPACE analysis. 
The available areas (in square kilometres) are based on the space-constrained 
assumptions (see Sect. 2.1 in Chap. 7). The installed capacities are calculated based 
on the following space requirements (Table 7.2):
• Solar photovoltaic: 1 MW = 0.04 km2
• Concentrated solar power: 1 MW = 0.04 km2
• Onshore wind: 1 MW = 0.2 km2
Note: Mapping Eurasia was not possible because the data files were 
incomplete.
Fig. 7.4 OECD North America: existing and potential wind power sites
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Fig. 7.5 Latin America: potential and existing wind power sites
Table 7.2 [R]E-SPACE: key results part 1
Region Subregion
Solar Onshore wind
Potential availability 
for utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
Potential availability 
for utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
[km2] [GW] [km2] [GW]
OECD 
North 
America
Canada East 2,742,668 68,567 2,530,232 12,651
Canada West 2,242,715 56,068 2,180,271 10,901
Mexico 3,365,974 84,149 3,341,940 16,710
USA – South 
East
269,650 6741 254,976 1275
USA – North 
East
1,043,033 26,076 1,043,026 5215
USA – South 
West
1,847,162 46,179 1,840,980 9205
USA – North 
West
431,277 10,782 427,709 2139
USA – 
Alaska
1,152,288 28,807 1,091,698 5458
(continued)
7 Renewable Energy Resource Assessment
170
Table 7.2 (continued)
Region Subregion
Solar Onshore wind
Potential availability 
for utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
Potential availability 
for utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
[km2] [GW] [km2] [GW]
Latin 
America
Caribbean 34,238 856 34,238 171
Central 
America
17,529 438 17,603 88
North Latin 
America
869,811 21,745 869,811 4349
Brazil 1,623,625 40,591 1,623,625 8118
Central South 
America
1,023,848 25,596 1,024,340 5122
Chile 693,990 17,350 693,990 3470
Argentina 1,651,168 41,279 1,651,168 8256
CSA – 
Uruguay
32,360 809 32,360 162
Europe EU – Central 146,797 3670 146,797 734
EU – UK and 
Islands
22,406 560 22,406 112
EU – Iberian 
Peninsula
15,608 390 15,608 78
EU – Balkans 
+ Greece
4825 121 4825 24
EU – Baltic 32,090 802 32,090 160
EU – Nordic 218,496 5462 218,496 1092
Turkey 134,354 3359 134,354 672
Middle 
East
East – 
Middle East
165,302 4133 5738 29
North – 
Middle East
91,970 2299 7123 36
Iraq 119,967 2999 9104 46
Iran 586,595 14,665 57,965 290
United Arab 
Emirates
530 13 530 3
Israel 386 10 217 1
Saudi Arabia 13,284 332 13,284 66
Africa North – 
Africa
9,726,388 243,160 9,784,694 48,923
East – Africa 6,378,561 159,464 6,980,497 34,902
West – Africa 8,336,960 208,424 8,669,628 43,348
Central – 
Africa
7,229,129 180,728 7,509,351 37,547
Southern – 
Africa
3,269,644 81,741 3,547,591 17,738
Rep. South 
Africa
1,626,528 40,663 1,650,471 8252
S. Teske et al.
171
Table 7.3 [R]E-SPACE: key results part 2
Region Subregion
Solar Onshore wind
Potential 
availability for 
utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
Potential 
availability for 
utility-scale 
installations
Space 
potential
[km2] [GW] [km2] [GW]
Non- 
OECD 
Asia
Asia-West 
(Himalaya)
1,315,395 32,885 801,044 4005
South and South 
East Asia
9062 227 8184 41
Asia North West 184,503 4613 43,710 219
Asia Central 
North
138,861 3472 81,228 406
Philippines 2634 66 941 5
Indonesia 106,581 2665 12,162 61
Pacific Island 
States
5510 138 673 3
India North – India 229,314 5733 163,118 816
East – India 32,511 813 5195 26
West – West 224,355 5609 121,441 607
South – Incl. 
Islands
129,346 3234 103,177 516
Northeast – 
India
77,379 1934 1821 9
China East – China 47,621 1191 39,648 198
North – China 425,350 10,634 825,272 4126
Northeast – 
China
193,006 4825 192,110 961
Northwest – 
China
5,642,854 141,071 1,603,909 8020
Central – China 256,272 6407 211,229 1056
South – China 500,211 12,505 317,046 1585
Taiwan 5862 147 2791 14
Tibet 5460 137 377,610 1888
OECD 
Pacific
North Japan 8697 217 8213 41
South Japan 3567 89 3036 15
North Korea 10,724 268 9854 49
South Korea 2411 60 1892 9
North New 
Zealand
22,699 567 22,163 111
South New 
Zealand
25,106 628 46,266 231
Australia – 
South and East 
(NEM)
2,080,117 52,003 2,035,523 10,178
Australia – West 
and North (NT)
2,813,791 70,345 2,762,499 13,812
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Chapter 8
Energy Scenario Results
Sven Teske, Thomas Pregger, Tobias Naegler, Sonja Simon, 
Johannes Pagenkopf, Bent van den Adel, and Özcan Deniz
Abstract Results for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios for ten world regions 
in regard to energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions, final-, primary-, transport- 
and heating demand and the deployment of various supply technologies to meet the 
demand. Furthermore, the electricity demand and generation scenarios are pro-
vided. The key results of a power sector analysis which simulates further electricity 
supply with high shares of solar- and wind power in one hour steps is provided. The 
ten world regions are divided into eight sub-regions and the expected development 
of loads, capacity-factors for various power plant types and storage demands are 
provided. This chapter contains more than 100 figures and tables.
This chapter provides a condensed description of the energy scenario results on a 
global scale, for each of the ten world regions. The descriptions include a presenta-
tion of the calculated energy demands for all sectors (power and heat/fuels for the 
following sectors: industry, residential and other, and transport) and of supply strat-
egies for all the technologies considered, from 2015 to 2050. The results of the 
model-based analyses of hourly supply curves and required storage capacities are 
also discussed based on key indicators. Graphs, tables, and descriptions are pro-
vided in a standardized way to facilitate comparisons between scenarios and 
between regions.
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The following global summary of the regional results is presented in the same 
structure as that used for individual regions. Consistent with the regional results, 
these tables do not include the demand and supply details for the bunker fuels used 
in international aviation and navigation. Section 8.2 outlines a global demand and 
supply scenario for renewable bunker fuels in the long term, including estimates of 
additional CO2 emissions from fossil bunker fuels between 2015 and 2050.
8.1  Global: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.1.1  Global: Projection of Overall Energy Intensity
Combining the assumptions for the power, heat, and fuel demands for all sectors 
produced the overall final energy intensity (per $ GDP) development shown in 
Fig. 8.1. Compared with the 5.0 °C case based on the Current Policies Scenario of 
the IEA, the alternative scenarios follow more stringent efficiency levels. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario represents an even faster implementation of efficiency measures than the 
2.0  °C Scenario. The 1.5  °C Scenario involves the decelerated growth of energy 
services in all regions, to avoid any further strong increase in fossil fuel use after 
2020. The global average intensity drops from 2.4  MJ/$GDP in 2015 to 
1.25 MJ/$GDP in 2050  in the 5.0  °C case compared with 0.65 MJ/$GDP in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 0.59 MJ/$GDP in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The average final energy 
consumption decreases from 46.3 GJ/capita in 2015 to 28.4 GJ/capita in 2050 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and to below 26 GJ/capita in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In the 5.0 °C case, 
it increases to 55 GJ/capita.
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8.1.2  Global: Final Energy Demand by Sector 
(Excluding Bunkers)
Combining the assumptions for population growth, GDP growth, and energy inten-
sity produced the future development pathways for the global final energy demand 
shown in Fig. 8.2 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
the total final energy demand will increase by 57% from 342 EJ/year in 2015 to 537 
EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy demand will decrease by 
19% compared with the current consumption and reach 278  EJ/year by 2050, 
whereas the final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will reach 253 EJ, 26% 
below the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final energy demand in 2050 is 
9% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The electricity demand for ‘classical’ electri-
cal devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will increase from around 
15,900  TWh/year in 2015 to 23,800 TWh/year (2.0  °C) or to 23,300  TWh/year 
(1.5 °C) by 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (37,000 TWh/year in 2050), the 
efficiency measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save 13,200 TWh/year 
and 13,700 TWh/year, respectively, by 2050.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be about 
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12,600 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector 
there will be an increase of about 23,400 TWh/year due to increased electric mobil-
ity. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process heat) 
and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an additional 
power demand of 18,800 TWh/year The gross power demand will thus rise from 
24,300 TWh/year in 2015 to 65,900 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 34% 
higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity demand 
will increase to a maximum of 65,300 TWh/year in 2050.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the 
electricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption 
equivalent to about 85.7 EJ/year and 95.4 EJ/year, respectively, is avoided 
through efficiency gains by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario (Figs. 8.3, 
8.4, 8.5, and 8.6).
8.1.3  Global: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power coming from 
renewable sources. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 100% of the electricity produced glob-
ally will come from renewable energy sources by 2050. ‘New’ renewables—mainly 
wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 83% of the total electricity 
generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 62% by 
2030 and 88% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 9500 
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GW by 2030 and 25,600 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation 
in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 73%. The 1.5 °C Scenario indicates 
a generation capacity from renewable energy of about 25,700 GW in 2050.
Table 8.1 shows the development of different renewable technologies in the 
world over time. Figure 8.7 provides an overview of the global power-generation 
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Table 8.1 Global: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the scenarios
in GW (°C) 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 1202 1420 1558 1757 1951
2.0 1202 1386 1416 1473 1525
1.5 1202 1385 1415 1471 1523
Biomass 5.0 112 165 195 235 290
2.0 112 301 436 617 770
1.5 112 350 498 656 798
Wind 5.0 413 880 1069 1395 1790
2.0 413 1582 2901 5809 7851
1.5 413 1912 3673 6645 7753
Geothermal 5.0 14 20 26 41 62
2.0 14 49 125 348 557
1.5 14 53 147 356 525
PV 5.0 225 785 1031 1422 2017
2.0 225 2194 4158 8343 12,306
1.5 225 2829 5133 10,017 12,684
CSP 5.0 4 13 20 39 64
2.0 4 69 361 1346 2062
1.5 4 92 474 1540 1990
Ocean 5.0 0 1 3 9 22
2.0 0 22 82 307 512
1.5 0 22 80 295 450
Total 5.0 1971 3285 3902 4899 6195
2.0 1971 5604 9478 18,243 25,584
1.5 1971 6644 11,420 20,980 25,723
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structure. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and photovoltaic 
(PV), up to 7850 GW and 12,300 GW, respectively, will be complemented by up to 
2060 GW of solar thermal generation, and limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean 
energy in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario will 
lead to a high proportion of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 
38% and 46%, respectively, by 2030 and 64% and 65%, respectively, by 2050.
8.1.4  Global: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.8 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated average 
electricity generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 6 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when they reach 
10.6 ct/kWh. The generation costs will also increase in the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios until 2030, when they will reach 9 ct/kWh, and then drop to 7 ct/kWh by 
2050. In both alternative scenarios, the generation costs will be around 3.5 ct/kWh 
lower than in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 2050. Note that these estimates of generation 
costs do not take into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, stor-
age, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to increase from today’s $1560 billion/year to 
around $5500 billion/year in 2050. In both alternative scenarios, the total supply 
costs will be $5050 billion/year in 2050. Therefore, the long-term costs for electric-
ity supply in both alternative scenarios are about 8% lower than in the 5.0  °C 
Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and the electrification of 
 heating and mobility.
 0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
TW
h/
yr
Ocean Energy
CSP
Geothermal
Biomass
PV
Wind
Hydro
Hydrogen
Nuclear
Diesel
Oil
Gas
Lignite
Coal
Fig. 8.7 Global: development of electricity-generation structure in the scenarios
8 Energy Scenario Results
182
Compared with these results, the generation costs (without including CO2 emis-
sion costs) will increase in the 5.0 °C case to only 7.9 ct/kWh. The generation costs 
will increase in the 2.0 °C Scenario until 2030 to 7.7 ct/kWh and to a maximum of 
8.1 ct/kWh in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Between 2030 and 2050, the costs will decrease 
to 7 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the generation costs will be, at maximum, 
0.1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C Scenario and this will occur in 2040. In the 
1.5 °C Scenario, the generation costs will be, at maximum, 0.5 ct/kWh higher than 
in the 5.0 °C Scenario, again by around 2040. In 2050, the generation costs in the 
alternative scenarios will be 0.8–0.9 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. If the 
CO2 costs are not considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will 
rise to about $4150 billion/year in 2050.
8.1.5  Global: Future Investments in the Power Sector
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, around $49,000 billion in investment will be required for 
power generation between 2015 and 2050—including for additional power plants to 
produce hydrogen and synthetic fuels and for the plant replacement costs at the end 
of their economic lifetimes. This value will be equivalent to approximately $1360 
billion per year on average, and is $28,600 billion more than in the 5.0  °C case 
($20,400 billion). An investment of around $51,000 billion for power generation 
will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, this 
will be an investment of $1420 billion per year. In the 5.0  °C Scenario, the 
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investment in conventional power plants will comprises around 40% of total cumu-
lative investments, whereas approximately 60% will be invested in renewable power 
generation and co-generation (Fig. 8.9).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, the world will shift almost 94% (95%) 
of its total energy investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil 
fuel share of the power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas power 
plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $26,300 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $730 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings in the 
2.0  °C Scenario will be equivalent to 90% of the additional energy investments 
compared to the 5.0 °C Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will 
add up to $28,800 billion, or $800 billion per year.
8.1.6  Global: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 59%, from 
151 EJ/year in 2015 to around 240 EJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, energy 
efficiency measures will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 36% in 
2050, relative to that in the 5.0 °C Scenario, and by 40% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply around 20% of the global final energy demand for heating. The 
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main contribution is from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 42% of the world’s 
total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 56% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In 
both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.10 shows the development of different technologies for heating world-
wide over time, and Table 8.2 provides the resulting renewable heat supply for all 
scenarios. Until 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. In the long-term, 
the growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead to a biomass 
share in total heating of 33% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 30% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 15,900 PJ/year in 
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Table 8.2 Global: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the direct 
use of electricity)
in PJ/year (°C) 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 25,470 27,643 28,878 31,568 34,564
2.0 25,470 32,078 35,134 38,187 37,536
1.5 25,470 33,493 36,927 36,385 30,151
Solar heating 5.0 1246 2091 2754 4353 6220
2.0 1246 6485 12,720 23,329 27,312
1.5 1246 7656 14,153 21,665 24,725
Geothermal heat 
and heat pumps
5.0 563 804 925 1293 1823
2.0 563 4212 8956 21,115 33,123
1.5 563 4615 10,288 20,031 29,123
Hydrogen 5.0 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 0 193 508 5670 15,877
1.5 0 180 1769 10,461 17,173
Total 5.0 27,278 30,538 32,557 37,214 42,608
2.0 27,278 42,967 57,318 88,301 113,848
1.5 27,278 45,944 63,137 88,542 101,172
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the 2.0 °C Scenario and 17,200 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of 
electricity for heating will also increase by a factor of 4.2–4.5 between 2015 and 
2050 and will have a final share of 26% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 30% in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario (Table 8.2).
8.1.7  Global: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $13,230 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
for plant replacement after their economic lifetimes)—approximately $368 billion 
per year. The largest share of this investment is assumed to be for heat pumps (around 
$5700 billion), followed by solar collectors and geothermal heat use. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies. However, the 
lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will result in a lower aver-
age annual investment of around $344 billion per year (Table 8.3, Fig. 8.11).
8.1.8  Global: Transport
The energy demand in the transport sector will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 
50% by 2050, from around 97,200 PJ/year in 2015 to 145,700 PJ/year in 2050. In 
the 2.0  °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes will 
reduce the energy demand by 66% (96,000 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 
5.0 °C Scenario. Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in 
Table 8.3 Global: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW (°C) 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 10,215 10,180 9938 9423 8997
2.0 10,215 10,202 9456 7875 5949
1.5 10,215 10,418 9568 7073 4141
Geothermal 5.0 5 7 7 8 4
2.0 5 85 181 492 656
1.5 5 101 200 433 551
Solar heating 5.0 378 615 781 1175 1652
2.0 378 1685 3198 5722 6575
1.5 378 1993 3555 5286 5964
Heat pumps 5.0 89 126 144 199 270
2.0 89 497 906 1821 2857
1.5 89 514 967 1726 2430
Totala 5.0 10,688 10,928 10,871 10,805 10,923
2.0 10,688 12,469 13,741 15,910 16,036
1.5 10,688 13,026 14,290 14,517 13,086
a Excluding direct electric heating
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the transport demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
of 74% (or 108,000 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.4, 
Fig. 8.12).
By 2030, electricity will provide 12% (2700 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 47% 
(6500 TWh/year). In 2050, around 8430 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the 
transport sector, as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
annual electricity demand will be about 5200 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario 
also assumes a hydrogen demand of 6850 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0 °C Scenario to a maximum of around 12,000 PJ/
year Therefore, by around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be 
introduced, with a maximum amount of 5820 PJ/year in 2050. Because of the lower 
overall energy demand by transport, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5  °C 
Scenario to a maximum of 10,000 PJ/year The maximum synthetic fuel demand 
will amount to 6300 PJ/year.
biomass 
technologies
61%
geothermal
heat use
0%
solar 
collectors
22%
heat 
pumps
17%
5.0°C: 2015-2050
total 3,025 billion $
biomass 
technologies
9%
geothermal 
heat use
10%
solar 
collectors
38%
heat pumps
43%
2.0°C: 2015-2050
total 13,200 billion $
biomass 
technologies
9%
geothermal 
heat use
9%
solar 
collectors
40%
heat pumps
42%
1.5°C: 2015-2050
total 12,400 billion $
Fig. 8.11 Global: development of investment in renewable heat-generation technologies in the 
scenarios
S. Teske et al.
187
8.1.9  Global: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the annual global energy-related CO2 emissions will increase 
by 40%, from 31,180 Mt. in 2015 to more than 43,500 Mt. in 2050. The stringent 
mitigation measures in both alternative scenarios will cause annual emissions to fall 
to 7070 Mt. in 2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 2650 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
with further reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the cumula-
tive CO2 emissions from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 1388 Gt. In contrast, in the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period 2015–2050 
will be 587 Gt and 450 Gt, respectively.
Table 8.4 Global: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year (°C) 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 2705 2708 2814 3024 3199
2.0 2705 2875 3149 3520 3960
1.5 2705 2932 3119 3559 4087
Road 5.0 85,169 94,755 102,556 116,449 127,758
2.0 85,169 79,975 68,660 48,650 40,089
1.5 85,169 67,579 48,949 34,055 28,859
Domestic aviation 5.0 4719 6544 7745 9080 9176
2.0 4719 4732 4239 3291 2640
1.5 4719 4461 3612 2361 1845
Domestic navigation 5.0 2130 2304 2392 2537 2663
2.0 2130 2303 2388 2512 2601
1.5 2130 2301 2383 2506 2601
Total 5.0 94,723 106,310 115,506 131,091 142,796
2.0 94,723 89,886 78,436 57,973 49,290
1.5 94,723 77,274 58,063 42,482 37,392
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Thus, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 58% in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and by 68% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid reduction 
in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
the reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by the ‘Residential 
and other’ and ‘Transport’ sectors (Fig. 8.13).
8.1.10  Global: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption based on the assumptions discussed 
above in the three scenarios are shown in Fig. 8.14. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the pri-
mary energy demand will decrease by 21%, from around 556 EJ/year in 2015 to 439 
EJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the overall primary energy 
demand will decrease by 48% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario (5.0 °C: 837 EJ in 
2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will be even lower (412 
EJ in 2050) due to the lower final energy demand and lower conversion losses.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 35% in 2030 and 
92% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 92% in 2050 (this will includes non-energy con-
sumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out in 
both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy consumption 
of natural gas in the 5.0 °C Scenario will be 5580 EJ, the cumulative coal consump-
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tion will be about 6360 EJ, and the crude oil consumption will be 6380 EJ. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 3140 EJ, the cumulative 
coal demand to 2340 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 2960 EJ. Even lower fos-
sil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 2710 EJ for natural gas, 1570 EJ 
for coal, and 2230 EJ for oil.
8.2  Global: Bunker Fuels
Bunker fuels for international aviation and navigation are separate categories in the 
energy statistics. Their use and related emissions are not usually directly allocated 
to the regional energy balances. However, they contribute significantly to global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and pose great challenges regarding their substi-
tution with low-carbon alternatives. In 2015, the annual bunker fuels consumption 
was in the order of 16,000 PJ, of which 7400 PJ was for aviation and 8600 PJ for 
navigation. Between 2009 and 2015, bunker fuel consumption increased by 13%. 
The annual CO2 emissions from bunker fuels accounted for 1.3 Gt in 2015, approxi-
mately 4% of global energy-related CO2 emissions. In the 5.0  °C Scenario, the 
development of the final energy demand for bunker fuels is assumed to be that of the 
IEA World Energy Outlook 2017 Current Policies scenario. This will lead to a fur-
ther increase of 120% in the demand for bunker fuels until 2050 compared with that 
in the base year, 2015. Because no substitution with ‘green’ fuels is assumed, CO2 
emissions will rise by the same order of magnitude.
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Although the use of hydrogen and electricity in aviation is technically feasible (at 
least for regional transport) and synthetic gas use in navigation is an additional option 
under discussion, this analysis uses a conservative approach and assumes that bunker 
fuels are only replaced by biofuels or synthetic liquid fuels. Figure 8.15 shows the 
5.0 °C and two alternative bunker scenarios, which are defined in consistency to the 
scenarios for each world region. For the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, we assume the 
limited use of sustainable biomass potentials and the complementary central produc-
tion of power-to-liquid synfuels. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, this production is assumed 
to take place in three world regions: Africa, the Middle East, and OECD Pacific 
(especially Australia), where synfuel generation for export is expected to be the most 
economic. The 1.5 °C Scenario requires even faster decarbonisation, and therefore 
follows a more ambitious low-energy pathway. This will lead to a faster build-up of 
the power-to-liquid infrastructure in all regions, which in the long term, will also be 
used for limited ‘regional’ bunker fuel production to maintain the utilization of the 
existing infrastructure. Therefore, the production of bunker fuels is assumed to occur 
in more regions, with lower exports from the supply regions mentioned above, in the 
2.0  °C Scenario. Another assumption is that, consistent with the regional 1.5  °C 
Scenarios, the biomass consumption for energy supply will decrease in the long term, 
whereas power-to-liquid will continue to increase as the main option for international 
aviation and navigation. Finally, the expansion of the power- to- liquid infrastructure 
for the generation of bunker fuel will be closely associated with the assumed devel-
opment of regional synthetic fuel demand and generation for transportation in each 
world region. Figure 8.15 also shows the resulting cumulative CO2 emissions from 
bunker fuel consumption between 2015 and 2050, which amount to around 70 Gt in 
the 5.0 °C case, 30 Gt in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and 21 Gt in the 1.5 °C Scenario. 
Table 8.5 provides more-detailed data for the three bunker fuel scenarios.
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The production of synthetic fuels will cause significant additional electricity 
demand and a corresponding expansion of the renewable power generation 
 capacities. In the case of liquid bunker fuels, these additional renewable power 
generation capacities will amount to 1100 GW in the 2.0 °C Scenario and more 
than 1200 GW in the 1.5 °C Scenario if a flexible utilization rate of 4000 full-load 
hours per year can be achieved. However, such a situation will require high amounts 
of electrolyser capacity and hydrogen storage to allow not only flexibility in the 
power system, but also high utilization rates of the downstream synthesis processes 
(e.g., via Fischer- Tropsch plants). Other options for renewable synthetic fuel pro-
duction are solar thermal chemical processes, which directly use high-temperature 
solar heat.
8.3  Global: Utilization of Solar and Wind Potential
The economic potential, under space constraints, of utility solar PV, concentrated 
solar power (CSP), and onshore wind was analysed with the methodology described 
in Sect. 3.3 of Chap. 3.
The 2.0 °C Scenario utilizes only a fraction of the available economic potential 
of the assumed suitable land for utility-scale solar PV and concentrated solar power 
plants. This estimate does not include solar PV roof-top systems, which have sig-
nificant additional potential. India (2.0 °C) will have the highest solar utilization 
rate of 8.5%, followed by Europe (2.0 °C) and the Middle East (2.0 °C), with 5.9% 
and 4.6%, respectively.
Onshore wind potential has been utilized to a larger extent than solar potential. 
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, space-constrained India will utilize more than half of onshore 
wind, followed by Europe with 20%. This wind potential excludes offshore wind, 
which has significant potential but the mapping for the offshore wind potential was 
beyond the scope of this analysis (Table 8.6).
The 1.5 °C Scenario is based on the accelerated deployment of all renewables 
and the more ambitious implementation of efficiency measures. Therefore, the total 
installed capacity of solar and wind generators by 2050 is not necessarily larger than 
it is in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and the utilization rate is in the same order of magnitude. 
The increased deployment of renewable capacity in OECD Pacific (Australia), the 
Middle East, and OECD North America (USA) will be due to the production of 
synthetic bunker fuels from hydrogen to supply global transport energy for interna-
tional shipping and aviation.
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8.4  Global: Power Sector Analysis
The long-term global and regional energy results were used to conduct a detailed 
power sector analysis with the methodology described in Sect. 3.5 of Chap. 3. Both 
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios rely on high shares of variable solar and wind genera-
tion. The aim of the power sector analysis was to gain insight into the power system 
stability for each region (subdivided into up to eight sub-regions) and to gauge the 
extent to which power grid interconnections, dispatch generation services, and storage 
technologies are required. The results presented in this chapter are projections calcu-
lated from publicly available data. Detailed load curves for some of the sub-regions 
and countries discussed in this chapter were not available and, in some cases, the rel-
evant information is classified. Therefore, the outcomes of the [R]E 24/7 model are 
estimates and require further research with more detailed localized data, especially 
regarding the available power grid infrastructure. Furthermore, power sector projec-
tions for developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia, assume unilateral access 
to energy services for the residential sector by 2050, and they require transmission and 
distribution grids in regions where there are none at the time of writing. Further 
research—in cooperation with local utilities and government representatives—is 
required to develop a more detailed understanding of power infrastructure needs.
8.4.1  Global: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The size of the global market for renewable power plants will increase significantly 
under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The annual market for solar PV power must increase 
from close to 100 GW in 2017 (REN21-GSR 2018) by a factor of 4.5 to an average 
of 454 GW by 2030. The onshore wind market must expand to 172 GW by 2025, 
about three times higher than in 2017 (REN21-GSR 2018). The offshore wind mar-
ket will continue to increase in importance within the renewable power sector. By 
2050, offshore wind installations will increase to 32 GW annually—11 times higher 
than in 2017 (GWEC 2018). Concentrated solar power plants will play an important 
role in dispatchable solar electricity generation for the supply of bulk power, espe-
cially for industry, and will provide secured capacity to power systems. By 2030, 
the annual CSP market must increase to 78 GW, compared with 3 GW in 2020 and 
only 0.1 GW in 2017 (REN21-GSR2018) (Table 8.7).
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the phase-out of coal and lignite power plants is acceler-
ated and a total capacity of 618 GW—equivalent to approximately 515 power sta-
tions1—must end operation by 2025. The replacement power must come from a 
variety of renewable power generators, both variable and dispatchable. The annual 
market for solar PV must be around 30% higher in 2050 than it was in 2025, as in the 
2.0 °C Scenario. While the onshore wind market also has an accelerated trajectory 
1 Assumption: average size of one coal power plant side contains multiple generation blocks, with 
a total of 1200 MW on average for each location.
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under the 1.5 °C Scenario as well, the offshore wind market is assumed to be almost 
identical to that in the 2.0 °C pathway because of the longer lead times for these 
projects. The same is assumed for CSP plants, which are utility-scale projects and 
significantly higher deployment seems unlikely in the time remaining until 2025.
8.4.2  Global: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
On a global scale, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the shares of variable renew-
able power generation will increase from 4% in 2015 to 39% and 47%, respectively, 
by 2030, and to 64% and 60%, respectively, by 2050. The reason for the variations 
in the two cases is their different assumptions regarding efficiency measures, which 
may lead to lower overall demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. 
During the same period, dispatchable renewables—CSP plants, biofuel generation, 
geothermal energy, and hydropower—will remain around 32% until 2030 on a 
global average and decrease slightly to 29% in the 2.0 °C Scenario (and to 27% in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario) by 2050. The shares of dispatchable conventional generation—
mainly coal, oil, gas, and nuclear—will decline from a global average of 60% in 
2015 to only 14% in 2040. By 2050, the remaining dispatchable conventional gas 
power plants will have been converted to operate with hydrogen and synthetic fuels, 
to avoid stranded investments and to achieve higher quantities of dispatch power 
capacity. Table  8.8 shows the increasing shares of variable renewable power 
Table 8.7 World: average annual change in the installed power plant capacity
Global power generation: average 
annual change of installed 
capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 2 −107 −96 −119 −68 −12
Lignite −25 −34 −16 −9 −3 −1
Gas 41 70 44 72 −199 −28
Hydrogen-gas 1 17 12 57 240 246
Oil/diesel −18 −32 −29 −28 −6 −2
Nuclear −15 −27 −23 −24 −7 −10
Biomass 24 40 26 29 25 21
Hydro 19 10 7 7 7 8
Wind (onshore) 121 307 273 333 242 158
Wind (offshore) 16 64 75 91 64 45
PV (roof top) 170 413 368 437 399 324
PV (utility scale) 57 138 123 146 133 108
Geothermal 5 16 22 24 28 23
Solar thermal power plants 9 57 93 109 102 85
Ocean energy 4 10 20 20 28 23
Renewable fuel based 
co-generation
13 31 27 31 25 20
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Table 8.8 Global: power system shares by technology group
Power 
generation 
structure in 10 
world regions 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
World
Variable 
renewables
Dispatch 
renewables
Dispatch 
fossil
Variable 
renewables
Dispatch 
renewables
Dispatch 
fossil
OECD North 
America
2015 7% 35% 58% 7% 41% 52%
2030 48% 30% 23% 59% 27% 15%
2050 68% 19% 13% 68% 21% 11%
Latin America 2015 3% 63% 34% 3% 62% 35%
2030 24% 51% 25% 36% 61% 3%
2050 39% 45% 16% 40% 46% 13%
Europe 2015 15% 47% 38% 15% 47% 38%
2030 44% 44% 12% 51% 39% 10%
2050 67% 28% 4% 69% 27% 4%
Middle East 2015 0% 12% 88% 0% 13% 87%
2030 51% 19% 31% 56% 18% 27%
2050 81% 19% 0% 70% 16% 13%
Africa 2015 2% 26% 73% 2% 17% 81%
2030 47% 21% 32% 52% 13% 35%
2050 73% 27% 0% 64% 15% 21%
Eurasia 2015 1% 35% 63% 1% 35% 63%
2030 36% 43% 21% 40% 46% 14%
2050 69% 23% 7% 65% 25% 10%
Non-OECD 
Asia
2015 1% 35% 64% 1% 35% 64%
2030 26% 35% 39% 36% 34% 30%
2050 52% 28% 19% 55% 28% 17%
India 2015 4% 32% 64% 4% 32% 64%
2030 45% 26% 29% 60% 21% 19%
2050 72% 27% 1% 58% 26% 16%
China 2015 6% 35% 59% 6% 21% 73%
2030 30% 24% 46% 39% 30% 31%
2050 49% 47% 5% 49% 42% 9%
OECD Pacific 2015 4% 34% 61% 4% 34% 61%
2030 40% 31% 30% 45% 29% 27%
2050 71% 26% 2% 64% 22% 14%
Global 
average
2015 4% 35% 60% 4% 34% 62%
2030 39% 32% 29% 47% 32% 21%
2050 64% 29% 7% 60% 27% 13%
Note: Variable renewable generation shares in long term energy pathways and power sector analy-
sis differ due to different calculation methods. The power sector analysis results are based on the 
sum of up to eight sub-regional simulations, while the long term energy pathway is based on the 
regional average generation excluding variations in solar and wind resources within that region
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Table 8.9 Global: capacity factors for variable and dispatchable power generation
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable  
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
World 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 49.5% 37% 37% 33% 31% 34% 30% 33% 31%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 58.7% 34% 34% 24% 16% 25% 10% 17% 9%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 36.9% 45% 45% 42% 36% 58% 31% 39% 34%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 42.9% 28% 28% 19% 15% 33% 15% 19% 19%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 43.1% 56% 56% 54% 47% 42% 39% 51% 43%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 14.6% 14% 14% 28% 26% 28% 26% 29% 27%
generation—solar PV and wind power—under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios over 
the entire modelling period. The main difference between the two scenarios is the 
time horizon until variable renewable power generation is implemented, with more 
rapid implementation in the 1.5  °C Scenario. Again, increased variable shares—
mainly in the USA, the Middle East region, and Australia—will produce synthetic 
fuels for the export market, as fuel for both renewable power plants and the trans-
port sector.
Table 8.9 provides an overview of the capacity factor developments by technol-
ogy group for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The operational hours shown are 
the result of [R]E 24/7 modelling under the ‘Dispatch case’, which assumes that 
the highest priority is given to the dispatch of power from variable sources, fol-
lowed by dispatchable renewables. Conventional power generation will only pro-
vide power for electricity demand that cannot be met by renewables and storage 
technologies. Only imports via interconnections will be assigned a lower priority 
than conventional power. The reason that interconnections are placed last in the 
supply cascade is the high level of uncertainty about whether these interconnec-
tions can actually be implemented in time. Experience with power grid projects—
especially transmission lines—indicates that planning and construction can take 
many years or fail entirely, leaving large-scale utility-based renewable power 
projects unbuilt.
S. Teske et al.
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On the global level, the average capacity factor across all power-generation tech-
nologies is around 45%. For this analysis, we created five different power plant 
categories based on their current usual operation times and areas of use:
• Limited dispatchable fossil and nuclear power plants: coal, lignite, and 
nuclear power plants with limited ability to respond to changes in demand. These 
power plants are historically categorized as ‘baseload power plants’. Power sys-
tems dominated by renewable energy usually contain high proportions of vari-
able generation, and therefore quick reaction times (to ramp up and down) are 
required. Limited dispatchable power plants cannot deliver these services and are 
therefore being phased-out.
• Limited dispatchable renewable systems are CSP plants with integrated stor-
age and co-generation systems with renewable fuels (including geothermal heat). 
They cannot respond quickly enough to adapt to minute-by-minute changes in 
demand, but can still be used as dispatch power plants for ‘day ahead’ 
planning.
• Dispatchable fossil fuel power plants are gas power plants that have very quick 
reaction times and therefore provide valid power system services.
• Dispatchable renewable power plants are hydropower plants (although they 
are dependent on the climatic conditions in the region where the plant is used), 
biogas power plants, and former gas power plants converted to hydrogen and/or 
synthetic fuel. This technology group is responsible for most of the required 
load-balancing services and is vital for the stability of the power system, as stor-
age systems, interconnections, and, if possible, demand-side management.
• Variable renewables are solar PV plants, onshore and offshore wind farms, and 
ocean energy generators. A sub-category of ocean energy plants—tidal energy 
plants—is very predictable.
Table 8.9 shows the development of the utilization of limited and fully dispatch-
able power generators—both fossil and renewable fuels—and variable power gen-
eration. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, conventional power generation in the baseload 
mode—currently with an annual operation time of around 6000  h per year or 
more—will decline sharply after 2030 and the annual operation time will be halved, 
whereas medium-load and dispatch power plants will predominate. The system 
share of dispatchable renewables will remain around 45%–50% throughout the 
entire modelling period.
8.4.3  Global: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
Table 8.10 shows the development of the maximum and average loads for the 10 
world regions, the average and maximum power generation in each region in mega-
watts, and the residual loads under both alternative scenarios. The residual load in 
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Fig. 8.16 Development of maximum load in 10 world regions in 2020, 2030, and 2050  in the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios
this analysis is the load remaining after variable renewable power generation. 
Negative values indicate that the power generation from solar and wind exceeds the 
actual load and must be exported to other regions, stored, or curtailed. In each 
region, the average generation should be on the same level as the average load. The 
maximum loads and maximum generations shown do not usually occur at the same 
time, so surplus production of electricity can appear and this should be exported or 
stored as much as possible. In rare individual cases, solar or wind generation plants 
can also temporarily reduce their output to a lower load, or some plants can be shut 
down. Any reduced generation from solar and wind in response to low demand is 
defined as curtailment.
Figure 8.16 illustrates the development of the maximum loads across all 10 
world regions under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The most significant increase 
appears in Africa, where the maximum load surges over the entire modelling period 
by 534% in response to favourable economic development and increased access to 
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energy services by households. In OECD Pacific, efficiency measures will lead to a 
reduction in the maximum load to 87% of the base year value by 2030 and will 
increase to 116% by 2050 with the expansion of electric mobility and the increased 
electrification of the process heat supply in the industry sector. The 1.5 °C Scenario 
has slightly higher loads in response to the accelerated electrification of the indus-
try, heating, and business sectors, except in three regions (the Middle East, India, 
and Non OECD Asia), where early action on efficiency measures will lead to an 
overall lower demand at the end of the modelling period, with the same GDP and 
population growth rates.
8.4.4  Global System-Relevant Technologies—Storage 
and Dispatch
The global results of introducing system-relevant technologies are shown in 
Table 8.8. The first part of this section documents the required power plant markets, 
the changes and configurations of power-generation systems, and the development 
of loads in response to high electrification rates in the industry, heating, and trans-
port sectors. The next step in the analysis documents the storage and dispatch 
demands and possible technology utilization. It is important to note that the results 
presented here are not cost-optimized. The mixture of battery storage and pumped 
hydropower plants with hydrogen- and synthetic-fuel-based dispatch power plants 
presented here represents only one option of many.
Significant simplification is required for the computer simulations of large 
regions, to reduce the data volumes (and calculation times) or simply because there 
is not yet any data, because several regions still have no electricity infrastructure in 
place. Detailed modelling requires access to detailed data. Although the modelling 
tools used for this analysis could be used to develop significantly more-detailed 
regional analyses, this is beyond the scope of this research.
The basic concept for the management of power system generation is based on 
four principles:
 1. Diversity;
 2. Flexibility;
 3. Inter-sectorial connectivity;
 4. Resource efficiency.
Diversity in the locally deployed renewable power-generation structure. For exam-
ple, a combination of onshore and offshore wind with solar PV and CSP plants will 
reduce storage and dispatch demands.
Flexibility involves a significant number of fast-reacting dispatch power plants 
operated with fuels produced from renewable electricity (hydrogen and synthetic 
fuels). The existing gas infrastructure can be further utilized to avoid stranded 
8 Energy Scenario Results
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investments, and the actual fuel production can also be used—with some technical 
limitations—for load management, which again will reduce the need for storage 
technologies.
Inter-sectorial connectivity involves the connection of the heating (including pro-
cess heat) and transport sectors. Neither the transport sector nor the heating sector 
will undergo complete electrification. To supply industrial process heat, the capacity 
of co-generation plants—operated with bio-, geothermal, or hydrogen fuels—will 
be increased by a factor of 2.5 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Co-generation heating sys-
tems with heat storage capacities and heat pumps operated with renewable electric-
ity will lead to more flexibility in the management of both load and demand. 
However, an analysis of the full potential for these heating systems was not within 
the scope of this project, so they have not been included in the modelling. Further 
research with localized data is required.
Resource efficiency In addition to energy and GHG modelling, a resource assess-
ment of selected metals has been undertaken (see Chap. 11). A variety of technolo-
gies—especially storage technologies—can be used to reduce the pressure on 
resource requirements, namely for cobalt and lithium for batteries and electric 
mobility and the silver required for solar technologies. Therefore, the choice of stor-
age technologies has taken the specific requirements for metals into account.
Table 8.11 shows the storage volumes (in GWh per year) required to avoid the 
curtailment of variable renewable power generation and the utilization of storage 
capacities for batteries and pumped hydro for charging with variable renewable 
electricity in the calculated scenarios. The total storage throughput, including the 
hydrogen production and the amount of hydrogen-based dispatch power plants, is 
also shown.
Pumped hydropower will remain the backbone of the storage concept until 2030, 
when batteries start to overtake pumped hydropower by volume. The model does 
not distinguish between different battery or pumped hydro technologies. Hydrogen- 
based dispatch will remain the largest contributor to systems services after 2030 
until the end of the modelling period.
8.4.5  Global: Required Storage Capacities for the Stationary 
Power Sector
The world market for storage and dispatch technologies and services will increase 
significantly in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The annual market for new hydro pump storage 
plants will grow on average by 6 GW per year to a total capacity of 244 GW in 
2030. During the same period, the total installed capacity for batteries will grow to 
12 GW, requiring an annual market of 1 GW. Between 2030 and 2050, the energy 
service sector for storage and storage technologies must accelerate further. The 
S. Teske et al.
205
Ta
bl
e 
8.
11
 
G
lo
ba
l: 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
W
or
ld
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-c
ha
rg
e-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-c
ha
rg
e-
To
ta
l 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
H
2
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-c
ha
rg
e-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-c
ha
rg
e-
To
ta
l 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h
H
2
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
O
E
C
D
 
N
or
th
 
A
m
er
ic
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
62
,3
69
34
1
19
2
10
65
11
,1
81
24
3,
23
5
24
3,
23
5
47
5
24
05
11
,1
81
20
50
85
3,
40
1
21
,8
05
86
8
45
,3
31
23
8,
73
0
99
9,
70
4
99
9,
70
4
92
4
46
,7
66
23
8,
73
0
L
at
in
 
A
m
er
ic
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
0
0
0
0
34
12
07
12
07
99
31
8
34
20
50
13
14
64
0
34
13
47
12
7,
22
6
30
,5
26
30
,5
26
62
1
12
,8
75
12
7,
22
6
O
E
C
D
 
E
ur
op
e
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
62
38
31
5
52
65
11
,1
61
60
,2
23
38
,5
04
38
,5
04
20
,5
66
42
,8
27
60
,2
23
20
50
21
2,
06
0
30
,5
46
58
,3
68
17
7,
63
2
81
4,
58
5
30
1,
23
4
30
1,
23
4
72
,8
12
21
5,
64
1
81
4,
58
5
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
18
,0
88
2
94
3
18
90
0
44
,9
45
44
,9
45
14
69
29
43
0
20
50
75
2,
88
2
10
9
46
36
91
80
0
55
4,
22
2
55
4,
22
2
43
71
86
18
0
A
fr
ic
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
48
77
11
8
22
44
47
26
0
11
,2
64
11
,2
64
26
72
55
91
0
20
50
36
7,
20
1
65
14
89
77
30
,9
74
21
2,
90
2
58
5,
42
3
58
5,
42
3
92
82
31
,2
10
21
2,
90
2
E
ur
as
ia
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
73
6
1
16
9
34
1
14
,1
06
60
31
60
31
64
4
12
95
14
,1
06
20
50
29
6,
49
0
94
8
83
96
18
,6
61
40
1,
04
4
24
9,
98
4
24
9,
98
4
72
58
16
,3
03
40
1,
04
4
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
8 Energy Scenario Results
206
Ta
bl
e 
8.
11
 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
W
or
ld
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-c
ha
rg
e-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-c
ha
rg
e-
To
ta
l 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
H
2
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-c
ha
rg
e-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-c
ha
rg
e-
To
ta
l 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h
H
2
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
N
on
-O
E
C
D
 
A
si
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
13
7
2
15
34
0
68
48
68
48
31
1
64
6
0
20
50
17
1,
97
3
24
78
22
61
94
65
38
6,
45
4
22
8,
16
0
22
8,
16
0
29
43
87
89
38
6,
45
4
In
di
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
59
,3
99
52
29
83
60
69
17
59
18
2,
56
1
18
2,
56
1
85
77
17
,4
87
17
59
20
50
37
2,
80
9
21
25
67
15
17
,6
78
28
,1
13
43
7,
88
4
43
7,
88
4
65
95
17
,1
99
28
,1
13
C
hi
na
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
11
02
19
39
4
82
7
25
82
45
,2
17
45
,2
17
72
66
14
,9
57
25
82
20
50
10
2,
04
2
57
,4
83
29
66
12
0,
89
9
62
3,
25
4
26
4,
72
9
26
4,
72
9
20
,8
85
60
,0
22
62
3,
25
4
O
E
C
D
 
Pa
ci
fic
20
20
16
0
0
0
0
16
16
0
0
0
20
30
84
,0
79
62
3
46
01
10
,4
03
83
1
14
6,
44
0
14
6,
44
0
66
88
14
,8
55
83
1
20
50
65
4,
28
7
70
,4
04
14
,8
15
17
0,
43
1
81
,2
15
76
0,
96
2
76
0,
96
2
14
,8
65
16
9,
09
3
81
,2
15
To
ta
l g
lo
ba
l
20
20
16
0
0
0
0
16
0
0
0
0
20
30
23
7,
02
6
14
74
16
,8
08
36
,5
17
90
,7
16
72
6,
25
2
29
45
48
,7
67
10
3,
32
3
90
,7
16
20
50
3,
78
4,
45
9
19
3,
05
1
10
8,
03
7
60
1,
59
8
2,
91
3,
52
2
4,
41
2,
82
7
15
3,
52
8
14
0,
55
5
58
6,
51
6
2,
91
3,
52
2
S. Teske et al.
207
battery market must grow by an annual installation rate of 22 GW, and as a result, it 
will overtake the global capacity of pumped hydro between 2040 and 2050. The 
conversion of the gas infrastructure from natural gas to hydrogen and synthetic fuels 
will start slowly between 2020 and 2030, with the conversion of power plants with 
an annual capacity of around 2 GW. However, after 2030, the transformation of the 
global gas industry to hydrogen will accelerate significantly, with a total of 197 GW 
of gas power plants and gas co-generation capacity converted each year. In parallel, 
the average capacity factor for gas and hydrogen plants will decrease from 29% 
(2578 h/year) in 2030 to 11% (975 h/year) by 2050, turning the gas sector from a 
supply-driven to a service-driven industry.
At around 2030, the 1.5 °C Scenario requires more storage throughput than does 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, but storage demands for the two scenarios will be equal at the 
end of the modelling period. It is assumed that this higher throughput can be man-
aged with equally high installed capacities, leading to annual capacity factors for 
battery and hydro pump storage of around 5–6% by 2050 (Table 8.12).
Table 8.13 shows the average global investment costs for the battery and hydro 
pump storage capacities in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Both pathways have 
equal storage capacities and cost projections, especially for batteries, but are highly 
uncertain in the years beyond 2025. Therefore, the costs are only estimates and 
require research.
8.5  OECD North America
8.5.1  OECD North America: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.5.1.1  OECD North America: Final Energy Demand by Sector
Combining the assumptions for population growth, GDP growth, and energy inten-
sity will result in the development pathways for OECD North America’s final energy 
demand shown in Fig. 8.17 under the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Under 
the 5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 10% from the 
current 70,500 PJ/year to 77,800 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand will decrease by 47% compared with current consumption and will 
reach 37,300 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will 
reach 33,700 PJ, 52% below the 2015 demand level. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand in 2050 will be 10% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The electric-
ity demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) 
will decrease from 4230 TWh/year in 2015 to 3340 TWh/year (2.0  °C) or 2950 
TWh/year (1.5 °C) by 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (6050 TWh/year in 
2050), the efficiency measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save a maxi-
mum of 2710 TWh/year and 3100 TWh/year, respectively.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. The 2.0 °C Scenario will require approximately 1400 TWh/year of electricity 
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for electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector, it will require 
approximately 3300 TWh/year for electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen 
(for transport and high-temperature process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic 
fuels (mainly for transport) will add an additional power demand of 3000 TWh/year. 
Therefore, the gross power demand will rise from 5300 TWh/year in 2015 to 9500 
TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 30% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 
1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity demand will increase to a maximum of 9400 
TWh/year in 2050 for similar reasons.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector will be similar in magnitude to those in 
the electricity sector. Under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy con-
sumption equivalent to about 7000 PJ/year and 9400 PJ/year, respectively, will be 
avoided by 2050 through efficiency gains compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.5.1.2  OECD North America: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 100% of the electricity produced in OECD 
North America will come from renewable energy sources by 2050. ‘New’ renew-
ables—mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 85% of the total 
electricity generated. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 
68% by 2030 and 89% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach 
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about 1880 GW by 2030 and 3810 GW by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the share 
of renewable electricity generation in 2030 is assumed to be 84%. The 1.5  °C 
Scenario projects a generation capacity from renewable energy of about 3920 GW 
in 2050.
Table 8.14 shows the development of the installed capacities of different renew-
able technologies in OECD North America over time. Figure 8.18 provides an over-
view of the overall power-generation structure in OECD North America. From 2020 
onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV—to 1090 GW and 2130 GW, 
respectively—is complemented by up to 210 GW of solar thermal generation, as 
well as limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both 
the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to a high proportion of variable power 
generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 49% and 59%, respectively, by 2030, and 73% 
and 74%, respectively, by 2050.
Table 8.14 OECD North America: development of renewable electricity generation capacity in 
the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 194 202 207 216 217
2.0 °C 194 199 202 206 206
1.5 °C 194 199 202 203 203
Biomass 5.0 °C 22 25 27 30 35
2.0 °C 22 27 32 42 52
1.5 °C 22 35 39 43 45
Wind 5.0 °C 87 157 172 197 253
2.0 °C 87 323 540 812 1092
1.5 °C 87 358 656 924 1059
Geothermal 5.0 °C 5 5 6 9 12
2.0 °C 5 6 9 23 37
1.5 °C 5 5 8 25 37
PV 5.0 °C 29 133 162 220 358
2.0 °C 29 534 991 1419 2129
1.5 °C 29 659 1097 1783 2269
CSP 5.0 °C 2 2 3 4 12
2.0 °C 2 22 87 168 209
1.5 °C 2 39 148 257 236
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 1 2 4
2.0 °C 0 3 15 59 85
1.5 °C 0 2 13 52 66
Total 5.0 °C 338 523 577 678 891
2.0 °C 338 1115 1878 2729 3810
1.5 °C 338 1298 2163 3288 3916
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8.5.1.3  OECD North America: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.19 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated electricity- 
generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 4.9 ct/kWh. In the 
5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when they reach 10.1 ct/
kWh. The generation costs in the 2.0 °C Scenario will increase in a similar way until 
2030, when they reach 8.3 ct/kWh, and then drop to 6.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 
1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 8.8 ct/kWh and then drop to 7.1 ct/kWh by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs in 2050 are 3.3 ct/kWh lower than 
in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the generation costs in 2050 are 3.1 ct/
kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that these estimates of generation costs do 
not take into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, storage, or 
other load-balancing measures.
Under the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices 
will result in an increase in total electricity supply costs from today’s $270 billion/
year to more than $760 billion/year in 2050. In both alternative scenarios, the total 
supply costs in 2050 will be around $690 billion/year The long-term costs for elec-
tricity supply in 2050 will be 8%–9% lower than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result 
of the estimated generation costs and the electrification of heating and mobility.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0  °C case to 7.5 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, they will increase until 2030, when they reach 7.3 ct/kWh, and then drop 
to 6.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 8.4 ct/kWh in 
2030, and then drop to 7.1 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation 
costs will be, at maximum, 1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case, and this will 
S. Teske et al.
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occur in 2030. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the maxi-
mum difference in generation costs will be 2 ct/kWh in 2030. If the CO2 costs are 
not considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will increase to 
$570 billion/year in 2050.
8.5.1.4  OECD North America: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $7600 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replace-
ment after the end of their economic lifetimes. This value is equivalent to approxi-
mately $211 billion per year on average, which is $4400 billion more than in the 
5.0 °C case ($3200 billion). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, an investment of around $8180 
billion for power generation will be required between 2015 and 2050. On average, 
this is an investment of $227 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment 
in conventional power plants will be around 48% of the total cumulative invest-
ments, whereas approximately 52% will be invested in renewable power generation 
and co-generation (Fig. 8.20). However, under the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, OECD 
North America will shift almost 93% (93%) of its entire investment to renewables 
and co- generation. By 2030, the fossil fuel share of the power sector investment will 
mainly focus on gas power plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $3240 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $90 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
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equivalent to 70% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $3910 billion, 
or $109 billion per year.
8.5.1.5  OECD North America: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increases in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 32%, 
from 19,700 PJ/year in 2015 to 26,000 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 27% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario relative to the 5.0  °C case, and by 36% in the 1.5  °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply around 11% of OECD North America’s final energy demand for 
heating, with the main contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 
38% of OECD North America’s total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
and 61% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of 
the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.21 shows the development of different technologies for heating in 
OECD North America over time, and Table 8.15 provides the resulting renewable 
heat supply for all scenarios. Until 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. 
The growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead, in the long 
term, to a biomass share of 25% under the 2.0  °C Scenario and 19% under the 
1.5 °C Scenario. Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence 
on fossil fuels under both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 
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3000 PJ/year in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 2700 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The 
direct use of electricity for heating will also increase by a factor of 4.6–4.9 between 
2015 and 2050 and will have a final energy share of 21% in 2050  in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario and 26% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
8.5.1.6  OECD North America: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $2580 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
for plant replacement after their economic lifetimes) or approximately $72 billion 
Table 8.15 OECD North America: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios 
(excluding the direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 1868 2142 2334 2787 3279
2.0 °C 1868 2758 3019 3493 3686
1.5 °C 1868 2707 3149 3191 2378
Solar heating 5.0 °C 107 210 277 451 695
2.0 °C 107 887 1772 2639 2962
1.5 °C 107 1290 2169 2839 3128
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 17 17 18 18 19
2.0 °C 17 875 1378 3031 5257
1.5 °C 17 1076 2185 3463 4152
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 144 276 1014 3045
1.5 °C 0 22 677 2100 2666
Total 5.0 °C 1991 2369 2629 3256 3994
2.0 °C 1991 4664 6445 10,176 14,949
1.5 °C 1991 5095 8180 11,592 12,324
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Table 8.16 OECD North America: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 292 315 330 366 411
2.0 °C 292 381 387 355 272
1.5 °C 292 360 384 334 179
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 17 30 44 52
1.5 °C 0 34 57 82 109
Solar heating 5.0 °C 29 58 76 124 191
2.0 °C 29 232 466 697 780
1.5 °C 29 331 557 728 793
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 3 3 3 3 3
2.0 °C 3 123 188 393 677
1.5 °C 3 143 292 479 568
Totala 5.0 °C 324 375 410 494 605
2.0 °C 324 752 1071 1489 1781
1.5 °C 324 868 1290 1622 1649
a Excluding direct electric heating
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per year. The largest share of investment in OECD North America is assumed to be 
for heat pumps (around $1300 billion), followed by solar collectors and biomass 
technologies. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable 
technologies, resulting in a lower average annual investment of around $78 billion 
per year (Table 8.16, Fig. 8.22).
8.5.1.7  OECD North America: Transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in OECD North America is expected to 
decrease by 8% in the 5.0  °C Scenario, from around 31,000 PJ/year in 2015 to 
28,600 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and 
behavioural changes will save 73% (20,970 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 
5.0 °C case. Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in trans-
port demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario, of 74% 
(or 21,100 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.17, Fig. 8.23).
By 2030, electricity will provide 11% (620 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and in 2050, the share will be 44% (930 
TWh/year). In 2050, up to 2090 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the transport 
sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5  °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 1030 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 2020 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 2540 PJ/year 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
duced, with a maximum amount of 270 PJ/year in 2050. Because the reduction in 
Table 8.17 OECD North America: projection of the transport energy demand by mode in the 
scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 674 628 609 570 529
2.0 °C 674 660 655 523 516
1.5 °C 674 743 730 773 806
Road 5.0 °C 26,686 25,691 24,838 24,222 23,414
2.0 °C 26,686 21,257 15,933 7731 5124
1.5 °C 26,686 18,612 11,973 6717 5251
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 2421 2978 3274 3398 3186
2.0 °C 2421 2309 2026 1530 1242
1.5 °C 2421 2167 1689 1063 840
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 461 482 493 514 535
2.0 °C 461 481 489 489 473
1.5 °C 461 479 484 483 473
Total 5.0 °C 30,241 29,779 29,214 28,704 27,664
2.0 °C 30,241 24,707 19,104 10,273 7354
1.5 °C 30,241 22,000 14,875 9036 7370
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fossil fuel for transport will be faster, biofuel use will increase in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
to a maximum of 5900 PJ/year. The demand for synthetic fuels will decrease to zero 
by 2050  in the 1.5  °C Scenario because of the lower overall energy demand by 
transport.
8.5.1.8  OECD North America: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, OECD North America’s annual CO2 emissions will decrease 
by 9% from 6170 Mt. in 2015 to 5612 Mt. in 2050. Stringent mitigation measures 
in both the alternative scenarios will lead to reductions in annual emissions to 930 
Mt. in 2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 120 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with fur-
ther reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emis-
sions from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 216 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 
1.5 °C Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will 
be 99 Gt and 72 Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 54% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 67% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
decrease in the annual emissions will occur under both alternative scenarios. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by 
the ‘Transport’ and ‘Residential and other’ sectors (Fig. 8.24).
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8.5.1.9  OECD North America: Primary Energy Consumption
Taking into account the assumptions discussed above, the levels of primary energy 
consumption under the three scenarios are shown in Fig. 8.25. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
the primary energy demand will decrease by 46%, from around 111,600 PJ/year in 
2015 to 60,600 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the overall 
primary energy demand will decrease by 50% by 2050  in the 2.0  °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 121,000 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand 
will be even lower (56,600 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conver-
sion losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. As a 
result, renewable energy will have a primary energy share of 34% in 2030 and 91% 
in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a pri-
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mary share of more than 91% in 2050 (including non-energy consumption, which 
will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out by 2040 under both 
the 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy consumption 
of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 1290 EJ, the cumulative coal con-
sumption to about 470 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 1300 EJ. In contrast, in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 730 EJ, the cumula-
tive coal demand to 120 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 640 EJ. Even lower 
cumulative fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 480 EJ for natural 
gas, 80 EJ for coal, and 440 EJ for oil.
8.5.2  Regional Results: Power Sector Analysis
The key results for all 10 world regions and their sub-regions are presented in this 
section, with standardized tables to make them comparable for the reader. Regional 
differences and particularities are summarized. It is important to note that the elec-
tricity loads for the sub-regions—which are in several cases also countries—are 
calculated (see Chap. 3) and are not real measured values. When information was 
available, the model results are compared with published peak loads and adapted as 
far as possible. However, deviations of 10% or more for the base year are in the 
range of the probability. The interconnection capacities between sub-regions are 
simplified assumptions based on current practices in liberalized power markets, and 
include cross-border trade (e.g., between Canada and the USA) (C2ES 2017) or 
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within the European Union (EU). The EU set a target of 10% interconnection capac-
ity between their member states in 2002 (EU-EG 2017). The interconnection capac-
ities for sub-regions that are not geographically connected are set to zero for the 
entire modelling period, even when there is current discussion about the implemen-
tation of new interconnections, such as for the ASEAN Power Grid (ASEAN-CE 
2018).
8.5.3  OECD North America: Power Sector Analysis
The OECD North America region includes Canada, the USA, and Mexico, and 
therefore contains more than one large electricity market. Although the power sec-
tor is liberalized in all three countries, the state of implementation and the market 
rules in place vary significantly. Even within the USA, each state has different mar-
ket rules and grid regulations. Therefore, the calculated scenarios assume the prior-
ity dispatch of all renewables and priority grid connections for new renewable 
power plants, and a streamlined process for required construction permits. The 
power sector analysis for all regions is based on technical, not political, 
considerations.
8.5.3.1  OECD North America: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The size of the renewable power market in OECD North America will increase 
significantly in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The annual market for solar PV must increase 
from 22.76 GW in 2020 by a factor of 5 to an average of 95 GW by 2030. The 
onshore wind market must expand to 35 GW by 2025, an increase from around 13 
GW 5 years earlier. By 2050, offshore wind generation will increase to 9.7 GW 
annually, by a factor of 7 compared with the base year (2015). Concentrated solar 
power plants will play an important role in dispatchable solar electricity generation 
to supply bulk power, especially for industry and industrial process heat. The annual 
market in 2030 will increase to 16 GW, compared with 1.7 GW in 2020. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario accelerates both the phase-out of fossil-fuel-based power generation and 
the deployment of renewables—mainly solar PV and wind in the first decade—
about 5–7 years faster than the 2.0 °C Scenario (Table 8.18).
8.5.3.2  OECD North America: Utilization of Power-Generation 
Capacities
Table 8.19 shows the increasing shares of variable renewable power generation 
across all North American regions. Whereas Alaska and Canada are dominated by 
variable wind power generation, Mexico and the sunny mid-west of the USA have 
significant contributions from CSP. Solar PV is distributed evenly across the entire 
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region. Onshore and offshore wind penetration is highest in rural areas, whereas 
solar roof-top power generation is highest in suburban regions where roof space and 
electricity demand from residential buildings correlate best. The south-west of the 
USA will have the highest share of variable renewables—mainly solar PV for resid-
ual homes and office buildings, connected to battery systems. There are no struc-
tural differences between the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios, except faster 
implementation in the latter. It is assumed that all regions will have an interconnec-
tion capacity of 20% of the regional average load, with which to exchange renew-
able and dispatch electricity to neighbouring regions.
Capacity factors for the five generation types and the resulting average utiliza-
tion are shown in Table 8.20. Compared with the global average, North America 
will start with a capacity factor for limited dispatchable generation of about 10% 
over the global average. By 2050, the average capacity factor across all power- 
generation types will be 29% for both scenarios. A low average capacity factor 
requires flexible power plants and a power market framework that incentivizes 
them.
8.5.3.3  OECD North America: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
Table 8.21 shows the development of the maximum load, generation, and resulting 
residual load (the load remaining after variable renewable generation). With 
increased shares of variable solar PV and wind power, the minimum residual load 
Table 8.18 OECD North America: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Power generation: average annual change 
of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal −7 −16 −6 −8 −4 0
Lignite −14 −18 −7 0 0 0
Gas 6 9 12 1 −55 −4
Hydrogen-gas 1 10 4 24 55 39
Oil/diesel −5 −7 −3 −4 −1 0
Nuclear −4 −9 −10 −10 0 −1
Biomass 1 2 1 1 1 0
Hydro −5 −3 0 0 0 2
Wind (onshore) 24 48 36 36 24 19
Wind (offshore) 2 19 11 19 10 3
PV (roof top) 39 94 64 68 61 55
PV (utility scale) 13 31 21 23 20 18
Geothermal 0 0 1 1 2 2
Solar thermal power plants 3 18 15 18 6 4
Ocean energy 1 2 4 4 4 3
Renewable fuel based co-generation 1 2 2 2 2 0
S. Teske et al.
223
Ta
bl
e 
8.
19
 
O
E
C
D
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d 
su
b-
re
gi
on
s:
 p
ow
er
 s
ys
te
m
 s
ha
re
s 
by
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 g
ro
up
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
O
E
C
D
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
U
SA
 A
la
sk
a
20
15
4%
35
%
61
%
10
%
20
30
29
%
31
%
40
%
15
%
36
%
30
%
34
%
15
%
20
50
42
%
23
%
35
%
20
%
42
%
26
%
32
%
20
%
C
an
ad
a 
W
es
t
20
15
6%
35
%
59
%
10
%
20
30
43
%
30
%
27
%
15
%
53
%
28
%
19
%
15
%
20
50
63
%
21
%
16
%
20
%
63
%
23
%
14
%
20
%
C
an
ad
a 
E
as
t
20
15
7%
35
%
59
%
10
%
20
30
45
%
30
%
25
%
15
%
56
%
27
%
16
%
15
%
20
50
66
%
21
%
13
%
20
%
66
%
23
%
11
%
20
%
U
SA
 N
or
th
 E
as
t
20
15
7%
35
%
58
%
10
%
20
30
47
%
31
%
22
%
15
%
58
%
28
%
14
%
15
%
20
50
69
%
20
%
11
%
20
%
69
%
22
%
9%
20
%
U
SA
 N
or
th
 W
es
t
20
15
4%
35
%
61
%
10
%
20
30
36
%
32
%
32
%
15
%
47
%
30
%
23
%
15
%
20
50
59
%
23
%
18
%
20
%
59
%
25
%
16
%
20
%
U
SA
 S
ou
th
 W
es
t
20
15
7%
35
%
58
%
10
%
20
30
53
%
28
%
19
%
15
%
64
%
25
%
11
%
15
%
20
50
73
%
17
%
10
%
20
%
73
%
18
%
8%
20
%
U
SA
 S
ou
th
 E
as
t
20
15
8%
35
%
58
%
10
%
20
30
53
%
28
%
19
%
15
%
63
%
25
%
12
%
15
%
20
50
71
%
18
%
11
%
20
%
71
%
20
%
9%
20
% (
co
nt
in
ue
d)
8 Energy Scenario Results
224
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
O
E
C
D
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
M
ex
ic
o
20
15
5%
35
%
61
%
10
%
20
30
37
%
30
%
32
%
15
%
46
%
28
%
26
%
15
%
20
50
56
%
23
%
22
%
20
%
55
%
25
%
19
%
20
%
O
E
C
D
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a
20
15
7%
35
%
58
%
20
30
48
%
30
%
23
%
59
%
27
%
15
%
20
50
68
%
19
%
13
%
68
%
21
%
11
%
Ta
bl
e 
8.
19
 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
S. Teske et al.
225
can become negative. If this happens, the surplus generation can either be exported 
to other regions, stored, or curtailed. The export of load to other regions requires 
transmission lines. If the theoretical utilization rate of transmission cables (= inter-
connection) exceeds 100%, the transport capacity must be increased. We assume 
that the entire load need not be exported, and that surplus generation capacities can 
be curtailed because interconnections are costly and require a certain level of utili-
zation to make them economically viable. An analysis of the economic viability of 
new interconnections and their optimal transmission capacities is beyond the scope 
of this research project.
In Alaska in the 2.0 °C Scenario, for example, generation and demand are bal-
anced in 2020 and 2030, but peak generation is substantially higher than demand in 
2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, a significant level of overproduction is achieved by 
2030. In the two scenarios, the surplus peak generation is equally high. These results 
have been calculated under the assumption that surplus generation will be stored in 
a cascade of batteries and pumped-storage hydroelectricity (PSH) or used to pro-
duce hydrogen and/or synthetic fuels. Therefore, the maximal interconnection 
requirements shown in this chapter represent the maximum surplus generation 
capacity. To avoid curtailment, these overcapacities have mainly been used for 
hydrogen production. Therefore, Alaska could remain an energy exporter but switch 
from oil to wind-generated synthetic gas and/or hydrogen.
Table 8.22 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch power 
requirements by sub-region. To store or export the entire electricity output during 
Table 8.20 OECD North America: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
OECD North 
America 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
Factor – average
[%/yr] 53.1% 35% 33% 29% 28% 34% 28% 29% 29%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 68.6% 40% 10% 28% 2% 20% 6% 10% 10%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 45.9% 46% 57% 37% 39% 59% 36% 36% 35%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 39.7% 23% 21% 11% 5% 30% 8% 12% 11%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 44.0% 52% 68% 49% 52% 47% 44% 49% 45%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 18.9% 12% 12% 25% 26% 34% 27% 28% 28%
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each production peak would require significant additional investment. Therefore, it 
is assumed that not all surplus solar and wind generation must be stored, and that up 
to 5% (in 2030) and 10% (in 2050) of the annual production can be curtailed with-
out significant economic disadvantage. We assume that regions with favourable 
wind and solar potentials, and advantages regarding available space, will use their 
overcapacities to export electricity via transmission lines and/or to produce syn-
thetic and/or hydrogen fuels. 
The southern part of the USA will achieve a significant solar PV share by 2050 
and storage demand will be highest in this region. Storage and dispatch demand will 
increase in all sub-regions between 2025 and 2035. Before 2025, storage demand 
will be zero in all regions.
8.6  Latin America
8.6.1  Latin America: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.6.1.1  Latin America: Final Energy Demand by Sector
Combining the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy inten-
sity will produce the future development pathways for Latin America’s final energy 
demand shown in Fig. 8.26 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Under the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 70% from the cur-
rent 19,200 PJ/year to 32,600 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand will decrease by 11% compared with current consumption and will 
reach 17,000 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will 
fall to 15,800 PJ in 2050, 18% below the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
final energy demand in 2050 will be 7% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The 
electricity demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or 
e-mobility) will increase from 740 TWh/year in 2015 to around 1560 TWh/year in 
2050 in both alternative scenarios, around 300 TWh/year lower than in the 5.0 °C 
Scenario (1860 TWh/year in 2050).
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be about 600 
TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector an 
increase of approximately 1700 TWh/year will be caused by electric mobility. The 
generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process heat) and the 
manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an additional power 
demand of 600 TWh/year. The gross power demand will thus increase from 1300 
TWh/year in 2015 to 3500 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 25% higher 
than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity demand will 
increase to a maximum of 3800 TWh/year in 2050.
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Fig. 8.26 Latin America: development of final energy demand by sector in the scenarios
Efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the electricity 
sector. Under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 4300 PJ/year will be avoided through efficiency gains in both scenarios 
by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.6.1.2  Latin America: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power coming from 
renewable sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in Latin America will 
come from renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—
mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 63% of the total elec-
tricity generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 87% 
by 2030 and 96% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 
530 GW by 2030 and 1030 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity genera-
tion in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario will be 91%. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the genera-
tion capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 1210 GW in 2050.
Table 8.23 shows the development of different renewable technologies in Latin 
America over time. Figure  8.27 provides an overview of the overall power- 
generation structure in Latin America. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth 
of wind and PV, up to 230 GW and 410 GW, respectively, will be complemented by 
up to 60 GW solar thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, geothermal, and 
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Table 8.23 Latin America: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 161 200 222 269 302
2.0 °C 161 180 180 183 184
1.5 °C 161 180 180 183 184
Biomass 5.0 °C 18 23 25 29 34
2.0 °C 18 43 57 75 89
1.5 °C 18 43 61 75 81
Wind 5.0 °C 11 31 38 50 66
2.0 °C 11 56 95 199 234
1.5 °C 11 67 134 272 285
Geothermal 5.0 °C 1 1 2 3 4
2.0 °C 1 3 5 12 18
1.5 °C 1 3 5 12 15
PV 5.0 °C 2 14 19 29 42
2.0 °C 2 108 175 295 409
1.5 °C 2 133 237 529 537
CSP 5.0 °C 0 1 1 2 3
2.0 °C 0 4 20 51 63
1.5 °C 0 4 20 76 78
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 4
2.0 °C 0 1 2 20 37
1.5 °C 0 1 2 20 30
Total 5.0 °C 193 270 306 382 456
2.0 °C 193 395 534 834 1034
1.5 °C 193 432 640 1167 1209
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ocean energy, in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead 
to a high proportion of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 31% and 
39%, respectively, by 2030, and 52% and 57%, respectively, by 2050.
8.6.1.3  Latin America: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.28 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including CO2 emission costs, under all scenarios. The calculated 
electricity- generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 4.5 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when they reach 8.3 
ct/kWh. The generation costs in the 2.0 °C Scenario will increase until 2030, when 
they reach 7 ct/kWh, and will then drop to 5.9 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5  °C 
Scenario, they will increase to 6.7 ct/kWh, and then drop to 5.6 ct/kWh by 2050. In 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs in 2050 will be 2.4 ct/kWh lower than in 
the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the maximum difference in generation costs 
will be 2.6 ct/kWh in 2050. Note that these estimates of generation costs do not take 
into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, storage, or other load- 
balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
result in an increase in total electricity supply costs from today’s $70 billion/year to 
more than $240 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs 
will be $230 billion/year and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $240 billion/year 
in 2050. The long-term costs for electricity supply will be more than 5% lower in 
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the 2.0 °C Scenario than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated genera-
tion costs and the electrification of heating and mobility. Further electrification and 
synthetic fuel generation in the 1.5 °C Scenario will result in total power generation 
costs that are similar to the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0  °C case to 7.1 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, they will increase until 2030, when they will reach 6.6 ct/kWh, and then 
drop to 5.9 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 6.5 ct/kWh 
and then drop to 5.6 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs 
will be maximum, at 0.25 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case, in 2030 (0.1 ct/
kWh in the 1.5 °C Scenario). The generation costs in 2050 will again be lower in the 
alternative scenarios than in the 5.0 °C case: 1.2 ct/kWh in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
1.5 ct/kWh in the 1.5 °C Scenario. If CO2 costs are not considered, the total electric-
ity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will increase to about $210 billion/year in 2050.
8.6.1.4  Latin America: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of about $1920 billion will be required for power generation between 
2015 and 2050  in the 2.0 °C Scenario, including additional power plants for the 
production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replacement 
after the ends of their economic lives. This value is equivalent to approximately $53 
billion per year, on average, which is $880 billion more than in the 5.0  °C case 
($1040 billion). An investment of around $2190 billion for power generation will be 
required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, this will be an 
investment of $61 billion per year. Under the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment in 
conventional power plants will be around 25% of the total cumulative investments, 
whereas approximately 75% will be invested in renewable power generation and 
co-generation (Fig. 8.29).
However, under the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, Latin America will shift almost 
94% (95%) of its entire investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the 
fossil fuel share of the power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas 
power plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $820 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $23 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 90% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $900 billion, 
or $25 billion per year.
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8.6.1.5  Latin America: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 72%, 
from 7800 PJ/year in 2015 to 13,300 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios, energy efficiency measures will help to reduce the energy demand for heat-
ing by 32% in 2050, relative to that in the 5.0 °C Scenario. Today, renewables supply 
around 42% of Latin America’s final energy demand for heating, with the main con-
tribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 68% of Latin America’s total 
heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 75% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both 
scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.30 shows the development of different technologies for heating in Latin 
America over time, and Table 8.24 provides the resulting renewable heat supply for 
all scenarios. Biomass will remain the main contributor. The growing use of solar, 
geothermal, and environmental heat will supplement mainly fossil fuels. This will 
lead in the long term to a biomass share of 65% under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 50% 
under the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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Table 8.24 Latin America: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the 
direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 2684 2760 2888 3335 3622
2.0 °C 2684 3550 3895 4412 4654
1.5 °C 2684 3632 4007 4023 2767
Solar heating 5.0 °C 32 64 88 146 227
2.0 °C 32 394 712 1217 1418
1.5 °C 32 394 783 1265 1445
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 133 206 458 910
1.5 °C 0 133 204 452 930
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 4 169 220
1.5 °C 0 0 88 473 404
Total 5.0 °C 2715 2824 2976 3480 3849
2.0 °C 2715 4077 4817 6255 7202
1.5 °C 2715 4159 5082 6213 5546
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Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 200 PJ/year in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 400 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of electricity 
for heating will also increase by a factor of 2–4 between 2015 and 2050 and will 
attain a final energy share of 20% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 39% in the 
1.5 °C Scenario.
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8.6.1.6  Latin America: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $580 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments in 
plant replacement after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $16 billion per 
year. The largest share of investment in Latin America is assumed to be for solar 
collectors (more than $200 billion), followed by biomass technologies and heat 
pumps. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable tech-
nologies, but due to the lower heat demand, the average annual investment will 
again be around $16 billion per year (Fig. 8.31, Table 8.25).
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8.6.1.7  Latin America: Transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in Latin America is expected to increase by 
63% under the 5.0 °C Scenario, from around 7100 PJ/year in 2015 to 11,700 PJ/year 
in 2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural 
changes will save 69% (8090 PJ/year) by 2050 relative to the 5.0  °C Scenario. 
Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in transport demand 
will lead to even greater energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 77% (or 9040 PJ/
year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.26, Fig. 8.32).
By 2030, electricity will provide 6% (110 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand under the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 
47% (470 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 480 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the 
transport sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
annual electricity demand will be 390 TWh in 2050. The 1.5  °C Scenario also 
assumes a hydrogen demand of 430 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 1340 PJ/year 
Around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be introduced, with a 
maximum of 190 PJ/year by 2050. Due to the lower overall energy demand in trans-
port, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a maximum of 1030 PJ/
year The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 350 PJ/year.
8.6.1.8  Latin America: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, Latin America’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 48%, 
from 1220 Mt. in 2015 to 1806 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures in 
both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 240 Mt. in 
Table 8.25 Latin America: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 549 531 536 552 542
2.0 °C 549 730 742 657 603
1.5 °C 549 770 752 513 179
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 2 4 12 16
1.5 °C 0 2 4 12 17
Solar heating 5.0 °C 7 15 20 34 52
2.0 °C 7 91 164 281 327
1.5 °C 7 91 181 292 333
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 13 18 36 88
1.5 °C 0 13 18 36 89
Totala 5.0 °C 556 546 556 585 594
2.0 °C 556 835 929 986 1034
1.5 °C 556 876 955 853 619
a Excluding direct electric heating
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2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 50 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further reduc-
tions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions from 
2015 until 2050 will add up to 56 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, 
the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 21 Gt and 17 
Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 63% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 70% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by the 
‘Residential and other’ and ‘Industry’ sectors (Fig. 8.33).
Table 8.26 Latin America: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 90 110 122 145 163
2.0 °C 90 113 133 157 192
1.5 °C 90 130 145 163 224
Road 5.0 °C 6662 7486 8102 9754 10,610
2.0 °C 6662 6424 5799 4107 3112
1.5 °C 6662 5196 3971 2744 2161
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 211 348 453 593 638
2.0 °C 211 228 213 175 139
1.5 °C 211 218 196 137 104
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 101 104 107 113 117
2.0 °C 101 104 107 113 117
1.5 °C 101 104 107 113 117
Total 5.0 °C 7064 8047 8783 10,605 11,529
2.0 °C 7064 6868 6251 4551 3559
1.5 °C 7064 5648 4419 3157 2605
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8.6.1.9  Latin America: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption under the three scenarios when the 
assumptions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.34. In the 
2.0  °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 2%, from around 
28,400 PJ/year in 2015 to 27,900 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0  °C 
Scenario, the overall primary energy demand will decrease by 38% in 2050 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario (5.0 °C: 45000 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary 
energy demand will be even lower (25,700 PJ in 2050) because the final energy 
demand and conversion losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 55% in 2030 and 
94% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will also 
have a primary energy share of more than 94% in 2050 (including non-energy con-
sumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out 
by 2035 under both the 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary 
energy consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 290 EJ, the 
cumulative coal consumption to about 60 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 460 
EJ. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 
130 EJ, the cumulative coal demand to 20 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 200 
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Fig. 8.34 Latin America: projection of total primary energy demand (PED) by energy carrier in 
the scenarios (including electricity import balance)
EJ. Even lower fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 110 EJ for 
natural gas, 10 EJ for coal, and 150 EJ for oil.
8.6.2  Latin America: Power Sector Analysis
The Latin American region is extremely diverse. It borders Mexico in the north and 
its southern tip is in the South Pacific. It also includes all the Caribbean islands and 
Central America. The power-generation situation is equally diverse, and the sub- 
regional breakdown tries to reflect this diversity to some extent. In the Caribbean, 
which contains 28 island nations and more than 7000 islands, the calculated storage 
demand will almost certainly be higher than the region’s average, because a regional 
power exchange grid between the islands seems impractical. To calculate the 
detailed storage demand, island-specific analyses would be required, as has recently 
been done for Barbados (Hohmeyer 2015). The mainland of South America has 
been subdivided into the large economic centres of Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, and 
Central America and the northern part of South America have been clustered into 
two parts.
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8.6.2.1  Latin America: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The most important future renewable technologies for Latin America are solar PV 
and onshore wind, followed by CSP (which will be especially suited to the Atacama 
Desert in Chile) and offshore wind, mainly in the coastal areas of Brazil and 
Argentina. The annual market for solar PV must increase from 6.5 GW in 2020 by 
a factor of three to an average of 15.5 GW by 2030 under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
to around 23 GW under the 1.5 °C Scenario. The onshore wind market in the 1.5 °C 
Scenario must increase to 15 GW by 2025, compared with the average annual 
onshore wind market of around 3 GW between 2014 and 2017 (GWEC 2018). By 
2050, offshore wind will have increased to a moderate annual new installation 
capacity of around 2–3 GW from 2025 to 2050  in both scenarios. Concentrated 
solar power plants will be limited to the desert regions of South America, especially 
Chile. The market for biofuels for electricity generation will play an important role 
in all agricultural areas, including the Caribbean and Central America, where most 
geothermal resources are located (Table 8.27).
8.6.2.2  Latin America: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
Table 8.28 shows that our modelling assumes that for the entire modelling period, 
there will be no interconnection capacity between the Caribbean, Central America, 
and South America, whereas the interconnection capacity in the rest of South 
America will increase to 15% by 2030 and to 20% by 2050. The shares of variable 
Table 8.27 Latin America: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Latin Power Generation: average annual change 
of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 0 −1 0 −1 −1 0
Lignite 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 4 2 1 6 −9 5
Hydrogen-gas 0 1 1 4 11 14
Oil/diesel −1 −4 −4 −3 0 0
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass 3 5 3 4 4 3
Hydro 2 0 0 0 0 0
Wind (onshore) 5 11 11 17 6 3
Wind (offshore) 0 1 2 2 3 2
PV (roof top) 9 18 14 25 9 8
PV (utility scale) 3 6 5 8 3 3
Geothermal 0 1 1 1 1 1
Solar thermal power plants 0 2 4 5 2 3
Ocean energy 0 0 1 1 2 2
Renewable fuel based co-generation 1 2 2 2 2 1
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renewables are almost identical in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The lowest rates 
of variable renewables are in central South America and Central America because 
the onshore wind potential is limited by average wind speeds that are lower than 
elsewhere. Compared with all the other world regions, Latin America has the high-
est share of dispatchable renewables, mainly attributable to existing hydropower 
plants.
Compared with other regions of the world, Latin America currently has a small 
fleet of coal and nuclear power plants, but they are operated with a high capacity 
factor (Table 8.29). The dispatch order for all world regions in all cases is assumed 
to be the same, to make the results comparable. Therefore, the capacity factors of 
these dispatch power plants (mainly gas) will increase at the expense of those for 
coal and nuclear power plants, which explains the rapid reduction in the capacity 
factor in 2020. Therefore, this effect is the result of the assumed dispatch order, 
rather than of an increase in variable power generation.
8.6.2.3  Latin America: Development of Load, Generation 
and Residual Load
The sub-regions of Latin America are highly diverse in their geographic features 
and population densities, so the maximum loads in the different sub-regions vary 
widely. Table 8.30 shows that the sub-region with the smallest calculated maximum 
load is Uruguay, with only 2.3 GW, which seems realistic because the maximum 
Table 8.29 Latin America: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
Latin America 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 48.9% 31% 25% 36% 21% 41% 18% 34% 24%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 73.4% 14% 3% 17% 0% 45% 0% 13% 4%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 26.0% 53% 48% 46% 19% 56% 23% 47% 33%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 53.2% 24% 11% 31% 2% 37% 6% 31% 11%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 45.6% 37% 28% 46% 26% 43% 25% 46% 35%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 12.2% 12% 12% 21% 14% 31% 15% 22% 15%
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load was 1.7 GW in 2012 according to IDB (2013). Brazil, Uruguay’s direct neigh-
bour, has the largest load of close to 100 GW, which will increase by a factor of 2.5 
to around 250 GW by 2050 under both scenarios. Brazil’s maximum generation will 
increase accordingly, without significant overproduction peaks. The calculated 
maximum increase in interconnection required is only 10 GW. In Argentina, peak 
generation matches peak demand because Argentina has one of the best wind 
resources in the world in Patagonia. Surplus wind power can either be exported after 
a significant increase in transmission capacity or, as assumed in our scenario, it can 
be used to produce synthetic and hydrogen fuels.
Table 8.31 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch power 
requirements by sub-region. As indicated in the introduction to the Latin America 
results, the storage requirements for the Caribbean might be high because the region 
cannot exchange solar or wind electricity with other sub-regions. However, all other 
sub-regions contain either several countries or larger provinces, so they are more 
suited to the integration of variable electricity. Compared with other world regions, 
Latin America has one of the lowest storage capacities and one of the lowest needs 
for additional dispatch. This is because the region’s installed capacity of hydro-
power is high. However, this research does not include a water resource assessment 
for hydropower plants. Droughts may increase the demand for storage and/or hydro-
gen dispatch.
8.7  OECD Europe
8.7.1  OECD Europe: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.7.1.1  OECD Europe: Final Energy Demand by Sector
Combining the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy inten-
sity produces the future development pathways for OECD Europe’s final energy 
demand shown in Fig. 8.35 for the 5.0  °C, 2.0  °C, and 1.5  °C Scenarios. In the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 9%, from the current 
46,000 PJ/year to 50,000 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand will decrease by 39% compared with current consumption and will reach 
28,000 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will reach 
25,200 PJ, 45% below the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand in 2050 will be 10% lower than in the 2.0  °C Scenario. The electricity 
demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will 
decrease from 2300 TWh/year in 2015 to 2040 TWh/year by 2050 in both alterna-
tive scenarios. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (3200 TWh/year in 2050), the effi-
ciency measures implemented in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save 1160 
TWh/year in 2050.
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Fig. 8.35 OECD Europe: development in three scenarios
Electrification will cause a significant increase in the electricity demand by 2050. 
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will increase to approxi-
mately 1300 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport 
sector, the demand will increase to approximately 2600 TWh/year in response to 
increased electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high- 
temperature process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for trans-
port) will add an additional power demand of 1600 TWh/year The gross power 
demand will thus rise from 3600 TWh/year in 2015 to 6000 TWh/year by 2050 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, 28% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
gross electricity demand will increase to a maximum of 6400 TWh/year by 2050.
Efficiency gains could be even larger in the heating sector than in the electricity 
sector. Under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 6200 PJ/year and 8200 PJ/year, respectively, are avoided by efficiency 
gains by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.7.1.2  OECD Europe: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in OECD Europe will come 
from renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—mainly 
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wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 75% of the total electricity 
generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 68% by 
2030 and 89% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 1200 
GW by 2030 and 2270 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation 
in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 74%. The 1.5 °C Scenario will have 
a generation capacity from renewable energy of approximately 2480 GW in 2050.
Table 8.32 shows the development of different renewable technologies in OECD 
Europe over time. Figure 8.36 provides an overview of the overall power-generation 
structure in OECD Europe. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and 
PV, up to 790 GW and 1000 GW, respectively, will be complemented by generation 
from biomass (ca. 110 GW) CSP and ocean energy (more than 50 GW each), in the 
2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to high proportions 
of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 38% and 45%, respectively, 
by 2030 and 67% and 68%, respectively, by 2050.
Table 8.32 OECD Europe: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 207 224 231 238 248
2.0 °C 207 218 219 221 225
1.5 °C 207 218 219 221 225
Biomass 5.0 °C 40 51 56 60 65
2.0 °C 40 78 105 115 113
1.5 °C 40 84 111 113 113
Wind 5.0 °C 138 216 254 296 347
2.0 °C 138 279 409 655 787
1.5 °C 138 299 468 778 847
Geothermal 5.0 °C 2 3 3 3 4
2.0 °C 2 6 11 27 39
1.5 °C 2 6 11 27 39
PV 5.0 °C 95 137 157 172 191
2.0 °C 95 264 422 745 996
1.5 °C 95 364 598 1028 1151
CSP 5.0 °C 2 3 4 7 11
2.0 °C 2 7 17 38 54
1.5 °C 2 7 22 48 57
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 1 1 4 8
2.0 °C 0 7 16 42 53
1.5 °C 0 7 16 42 53
Total 5.0 °C 484 635 706 780 873
2.0 °C 484 859 1198 1842 2267
1.5 °C 484 985 1444 2256 2485
S. Teske et al.
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8.7.1.3  OECD Europe: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.37 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated elec-
tricity generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 7 ct/kWh. In the 
5.0 °C case, generation costs will increase until 2050, when they will reach 10.4 ct/
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kWh. The generation costs in both alternative scenarios will increase until 2030, 
when they will reach 10.3 ct/kWh, and they will drop by 2050 to 8.9 ct/kWh and 8.8 
ct/kWh, respectively, 1.5–1.6 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that these 
estimates of generation costs do not take into account integration costs such as 
power grid expansion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
result in an increase in total electricity supply costs from today’s $270 billion/year 
to more than $550 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs 
will be $560 billion/year and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $590 billion/year 
The long-term costs for electricity supply will be more than 2% higher in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and 
the electrification of heating and mobility. Further electrification and synthetic fuel 
generation in the 1.5 °C Scenario will result in total power generation costs that are 
8% higher than in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario to 8.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, they will increase until 2030 when they reach 9.5 ct/kWh, and then 
drop to 8.9 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 9.7 ct/kWh, 
and then drop to 8.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs 
will reach a maximum of 1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case in 2030. In the 
1.5 °C Scenario, the maximum difference in generation costs compared with the 
5.0 °C Scenario will be 1.2 ct/kWh, which will occur in 2040. If the CO2 costs are 
not considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will rise to about 
$470 billion/year in 2050.
8.7.1.4  OECD Europe: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $4900 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments to replace plants 
at the ends of their economic lives. This value is equivalent to approximately $136 
billion per year on average, which is $2150 billion more than in the 5.0 °C case 
($2750 billion). An investment of around $5340 billion for power generation will be 
required between 2015 and 2050 under the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, this will be 
an investment of $148 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, investment in conven-
tional power plants will be around 26% of the total cumulative investments, whereas 
approximately 74% will be invested in renewable power generation and co- 
generation (Fig. 8.38).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, OECD Europe will shift almost 96% 
(97%) of its entire investments to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil 
fuel share of the power sector investments will predominantly focus on gas power 
plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $2340 billion in 2050, 
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equivalent to $65 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 110% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $2600 billion, 
or $72 billion per year.
8.7.1.5  OECD Europe: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 16%, 
from 20,600 PJ/year in 2015 to 24,000 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 26% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario relative to that in the 5.0  °C case, and by 34% in the 1.5  °C Scenario. 
Today, renewables supply around 19% of OECD Europe’s final energy demand for 
heating, with the main contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 
44% of OECD Europe’s total heat demand in 2030 under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
53% under the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of 
the total heat demand in 2050.
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Fig. 8.38 OECD Europe: investment shares for power generation in the scenarios
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Figure 8.39 shows the development of different technologies for heating in 
OECD Europe over time, and Table 8.33 provides the resulting renewable heat sup-
ply for all scenarios. Up to 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. The 
growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead in the long term 
to a biomass share of 27% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 28% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 1900 PJ/year in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 2200 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of elec-
tricity for heating will also increase by a factor of 1.5–1.6 between 2015 and 2050, 
and will have a final energy share of 22% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 23% 
in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Table 8.33 OECD Europe: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the 
direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 2681 3115 3343 3713 4153
2.0 °C 2681 3109 3295 3483 3772
1.5 °C 2681 3046 3096 3220 3433
Solar heating 5.0 °C 119 216 251 345 454
2.0 °C 119 1043 1788 2904 3243
1.5 °C 119 1013 1464 2182 2327
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 203 291 336 479 717
2.0 °C 203 968 1731 3572 5080
1.5 °C 203 878 1430 2933 4147
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 1 788 1895
1.5 °C 0 0 162 1595 2227
Total 5.0 °C 3003 3623 3931 4537 5325
2.0 °C 3003 5121 6815 10,748 13,989
1.5 °C 3003 4937 6152 9930 12,134
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8.7.1.6  OECD Europe: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $2410 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
for plant replacement at the ends of their economic lifetimes), or approximately $67 
billion per year. The largest share of investments in OECD Europe is assumed to be 
for heat pumps (around $1200 billion), followed by solar collectors ($1080 billion). 
The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies. 
However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will results 
in a lower average annual investment of around $51 billion per year (Fig.  8.40, 
Table 8.34).
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8.7.1.7  OECD Europe: Transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in OECD Europe is expected to decrease by 
3% in the 5.0 °C Scenario, from around 14,000 PJ/year in 2015 to 13,600 PJ/year in 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes 
will save 69% (9460 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. Additional 
modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the transport demand will lead 
to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 76% (or 10,300 PJ/year) in 
2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.35, Fig. 8.41).
By 2030, electricity will provide 18% (430 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 64% 
(740 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 840 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 580 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 730 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 600  PJ/year 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
duced, with a maximum amount of 130 PJ/year in 2050. Biofuel use will be reduced 
in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a maximum of 590 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel 
demand will reach 170 PJ/year.
8.7.1.8  OECD Europe: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, OECD Europe’s annual CO2 emissions will decrease by 15% 
from 3400 Mt. in 2015 to 2876 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures in 
both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 570 Mt. in 
Table 8.34 OECD Europe: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 434 467 486 507 519
2.0 °C 434 407 339 293 289
1.5 °C 434 381 276 256 242
Geothermal 5.0 °C 5 7 7 7 3
2.0 °C 5 15 24 49 48
1.5 °C 5 14 16 21 11
Solar heating 5.0 °C 36 65 76 104 137
2.0 °C 36 298 510 790 885
1.5 °C 36 291 423 624 685
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 29 40 46 62 84
2.0 °C 29 134 228 417 566
1.5 °C 29 121 183 336 444
Totala 5.0 °C 504 579 615 681 744
2.0 °C 504 855 1101 1548 1789
1.5 °C 504 807 897 1237 1383
a Excluding direct electric heating
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Table 8.35 OECD Europe: projection of the transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 323 334 335 337 344
2.0 °C 323 362 409 509 643
1.5 °C 323 383 458 453 400
Road 5.0 °C 13,087 12,699 12,633 12,529 12,464
2.0 °C 13,087 10,163 7540 4196 3097
1.5 °C 13,087 8197 4404 3215 2556
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 300 397 448 485 474
2.0 °C 300 294 254 182 142
1.5 °C 300 273 198 105 82
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 227 236 240 248 259
2.0 °C 227 236 240 247 258
1.5 °C 227 236 240 247 258
Total 5.0 °C 13,938 13,665 13,656 13,598 13,541
2.0 °C 13,938 11,055 8443 5134 4140
1.5 °C 13,938 9090 5300 4020 3296
2040  in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 270 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further 
reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 116 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 55 
Gt and 44 Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 53% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 62% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in the annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by 
the ‘Transport’ and the ‘Residential and other’ sectors (Fig. 8.42).
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8.7.1.9  OECD Europe: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.43. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 44%, from around 71,200 
PJ/year in 2015 to 40,100 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
overall primary energy demand will decrease by 43% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 70,700 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will 
be even lower (39,000 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conversion 
losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have primary energy shares of 39% in 2030 and 92% 
in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a pri-
mary energy share of more than 92% in 2050 (including non-energy consumption, 
which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out by 2040 
under both the 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy 
consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 670 EJ, the cumulative 
coal consumption to about 300 EJm, and the crude oil consumption to 660 EJ. In 
contrast, in the 2.0 °C case, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 420 EJ, the 
cumulative coal demand to 100 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 320 EJ. Even 
lower fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 340 EJ for natural gas, 
70 EJ for coal, and 240 EJ for oil.
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8.7.2  OECD Europe: Power Sector Analysis
The European power sector is liberalized across the EU and cross-border trade in 
electricity has a long tradition and is very well documented. The European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) publishes detailed 
data about the annual cross-border trade (ENTSO-E 2018) and produces the Ten- 
Year- Network Development Plan (TYNDP), which aims to integrate 60% renewable 
electricity by 2040 (TYNDP 2016). While the extent to which the power sector is 
liberalised and open for competition for generation and supply varies significantly 
across the EU, at the time of the writing of this book all 28-member states had 
renewable electricity and energy efficiency targets and policies to implement them. 
However, the OECD Europe region covers not only the EU but also neighbouring 
countries such as Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, which are not members of the 
EU, but are connected to the EU grid and are also involved in the cross-border elec-
tricity trade. The region also includes Iceland, Malta, and a significant number of 
islands in the coastal waters of the European continent and the Mediterranean Sea. 
The storage demand for all the islands and island nations cannot be calculated with 
a regional approach, and doing so was beyond the scope of this research. Israel is 
also part of OECD Europe in the IEA world regions used for this analysis. However, 
because of its geographic position, and to reflect current and possible future inter-
connections with its neighbours, Israel has been taken out of the energy balance of 
OECD Europe and integrated into the Middle East region.
8 Energy Scenario Results
262
8.7.2.1  OECD Europe: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The annual market for solar PV must increase from 11 GW in 2020 by a factor of 2 
to an average of 40 GW by 2030. The onshore wind market must expand to 18 GW 
by 2025 under the 2.0 °C Scenario. This is only a minor increase on the average 
European wind market of 10–14 GW between 2009 and 2016 and 16.8 GW in 2017. 
However, the 1.5  °C Scenario requires that the size of the onshore wind market 
double between 2020 and 2025. The offshore wind market for both scenarios is 
similar and must increase from 3 GW (GWEC 2018) in 2017 to around 10 GW per 
year throughout the entire modelling period until 2050. All European lignite power 
plants will have stopped operations by 2035, and the last hard coal power plant will 
have gone offline by 2040 under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The 1.5 °C pathway requires 
the phase-out 5 years earlier (Table 8.36).
8.7.2.2  OECD Europe: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
The UK, Ireland, and the Iberian Peninsula are the least interconnected sub-regions 
of OECD Europe, and they already have relatively high shares of variable renew-
ables, as shown in Table 8.37.
Table 8.37 shows that the Nordic countries, especially Norway and Sweden, have 
very high shares of hydropower, including pumped hydropower. Therefore, an 
increased interconnection capacity with other sub-regions by 2030 will contribute 
to the integration of larger shares of wind and solar in other European regions. 
Table 8.36 OECD Europe: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
OECD Europe power generation: average 
annual change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal −5 −9 −8 −4 0 0
Lignite −5 −6 −3 −2 0 0
Gas 2 1 0 −5 −22 −19
Hydrogen-gas 0 1 2 6 14 14
Oil/diesel −7 −5 −1 −2 0 0
Nuclear −6 −9 −6 −6 −2 −2
Biomass 5 7 4 3 1 1
Hydro 1 0 0 0 0 0
Wind (onshore) 13 28 22 32 13 10
Wind (offshore) 4 9 10 11 8 8
PV (roof top) 16 43 30 42 25 21
PV (utility scale) 5 14 10 14 8 7
Geothermal 0 1 2 2 2 2
Solar thermal power plants 1 2 2 4 2 2
Ocean energy 1 2 3 3 2 2
Renewable fuel based co-generation 3 6 4 4 1 1
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Across the EU, it is assumed that the average interconnection capacities will increase 
to 20% of the regional peak load.
Both alternative scenarios assume that limited dispatchable power generation—
namely coal, lignite, and nuclear—will not have priority dispatch and will be last in 
the dispatch queue. Therefore, the average calculated capacity factor will decrease 
from 57.5% in 2015 to only 14% in 2020, as shown in Table 8.38.
Table 8.38 shows that by 2020, most of the installed coal and nuclear capacity 
will not be required to secure power supply. Instead, dispatchable renewable power 
plants will fill the gap and their capacity factors will increase.
8.7.2.3  OECD Europe: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
The loads of the European sub-regions will not increase until 2030 in the two alter-
native scenarios, as shown in Table 8.39. The only exception is Turkey, which will 
have a constantly increasing load. This is attributed to Turkey’s assumed economic 
development and increasing per capita electricity demand, which is currently lower 
than in most EU countries (WB-DB 2018). The calculated load will increase in all 
sub-regions between 2030 and 2050 due to the increased deployment of electric 
mobility. Central Europe has a very high requirement for increased transmission 
interconnection—or storage, see Table 8.40—because of increases in variable gen-
eration, including offshore wind in the North Sea and Baltic Sea. Central Europe, 
Table 8.38 OECD Europe: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
World 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 45.2% 37% 37% 48% 44% 35% 36% 39% 38%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 57.5% 14% 14% 3% 2% 19% 1% 20% 9%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 54.0% 60% 60% 52% 48% 60% 39% 41% 40%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 32.0% 20% 20% 7% 7% 30% 10% 15% 16%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 43.7% 67% 67% 67% 61% 39% 49% 52% 50%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 22.5% 22% 22% 40% 38% 29% 35% 36% 35%
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the Iberian Peninsula, and the UK have the highest storage demands, as shown in 
Table  8.40. This corresponds to the calculated results for increased interconnec-
tions. To avoid curtailment, renewably produced hydrogen will be used to store 
surplus generation for dispatch when required. Finding the optimal mix of battery 
capacity, pumped hydro capacity, hydrogen production, and expansion of transmis-
sion capacity was beyond the scope of this analysis, and further research is required 
on this issue.
8.8  Africa
8.8.1  Africa: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.8.1.1  Africa: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The development pathways for Africa’s final energy demand when the assumptions 
on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are combined are shown in 
Fig. 8.44 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the total 
final energy demand will increase by 103% from the current 23,200 PJ/year to 47,100 
PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy demand will increase at a 
much slower rate, by 39% compared with current consumption, and will reach 
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32,300 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand under the 1.5 °C Scenario will 
reach 30,100 PJ, 30% above the 2015 demand level. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand in 2050 will be 7% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The electricity 
demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will 
increase from 540 TWh/year in 2015 to around 2590 TWh/year in 2050 in both alter-
native scenarios, which will be 590 TWh/year higher than in the 5.0 °C case. Although 
efficiency measures will reduce the specific energy consumption by appliances, the 
scenarios consider higher consumption to achieve higher living standards.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will increase to 
approximately 1200 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the 
transport sector, the demand will increase to approximately 1300 TWh/year in 
response to increased electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport 
and high-temperature process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly 
for transport) will add an additional power demand of 1100 TWh/year The gross 
power demand will thus increase from 800 TWh/year in 2015 to 5700 TWh/year in 
2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 119% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C 
Scenario, the gross electricity demand will increase to a maximum of 6300 TWh/
year in 2050.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the elec-
tricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 3600 PJ/year is avoided through efficiency gains by 2050 compared 
with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.8.1.2  Africa: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in Africa will come from 
renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—mainly wind, 
solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 92% of the total electricity genera-
tion. Renewable electricity’s share of total production will be 61% by 2030 and 96% 
by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 360 GW by 2030 and 
2040 GW by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the share of renewable electricity genera-
tion in 2030 is assumed to be 73%. The 1.5  °C Scenario will have a generation 
capacity from renewable energy of approximately 2280 GW in 2050.
Table 8.41 shows the development of different renewable technologies in Africa 
over time. Figure 8.45 provides an overview of the overall power-generation struc-
ture in Africa. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV, up to 610 
GW and 980 GW, respectively, will be complemented by up to 230 GW of solar 
thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, in the 
2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to high proportions 
of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 40% and 49%, respectively, 
by 2030, and 71% by 2050.
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Table 8.41 Africa: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 28 47 58 84 117
2.0 °C 28 46 49 51 54
1.5 °C 28 46 48 51 54
Biomass 5.0 °C 1 2 4 8 13
2.0 °C 1 8 17 33 48
1.5 °C 1 8 25 42 72
Wind 5.0 °C 3 11 14 20 29
2.0 °C 3 42 132 415 609
1.5 °C 3 87 197 453 633
Geothermal 5.0 °C 1 2 3 7 14
2.0 °C 1 7 16 33 64
1.5 °C 1 7 16 33 64
PV 5.0 °C 2 17 27 52 89
2.0 °C 2 38 134 611 983
1.5 °C 2 70 166 757 1162
CSP 5.0 °C 0 2 3 10 17
2.0 °C 0 0 1 80 235
1.5 °C 0 2 19 108 257
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 2 10 20 43
1.5 °C 0 2 10 20 43
Total 5.0 °C 35 81 110 180 279
2.0 °C 35 144 359 1243 2036
1.5 °C 35 223 481 1464 2284
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8.8.1.3  Africa: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.46 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated 
electricity- generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 5.4 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, generation costs will increase until 2030, when they reach 11 ct/
kWh, and will then stabilize at 10.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios, the generation costs will increase until 2030, when they reach 8.4 ct/kWh 
and 8.2 ct/kWh, respectively. They will then drop to 5.6 ct/kWh by 2050 in both 
scenarios, 5.2 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that these estimates of 
generation costs do not take into account integration costs such as power grid expan-
sion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to increase from today’s $40 billion/year to 
more than $290 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs 
will be $350 billion/year, and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $380 billion/year 
The long-term costs of electricity supply will be more than 23% higher under the 
2.0 °C Scenario than under the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated genera-
tion costs and the electrification of heating and mobility. Further electrification and 
synthetic fuel generation in the 1.5 °C Scenario will result in total power generation 
costs that are 34% higher than in the 5.0 °C case.
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Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0  °C case to 8.1 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, they will increase until 2030, when they reach 6.8 ct/kWh, and then drop 
to 5.6 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 7.2 ct/kWh and 
then drop to 5.6 ct/kWh by 2050. Therefore, the generation costs in both alternative 
scenarios are, at maximum, 2.5 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. If the CO2 
costs are not considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will 
increase to about $220 billion/year in 2050.
8.8.1.4  Africa: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $3500 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replace-
ment at the ends of their economic lives. This value is equivalent to approximately 
$97 billion per year, on average, and is $2590 billion more than in the 5.0 ° C case 
($910 billion). An investment of around $3910 billion for power generation will be 
required between 2015 and 2050  in the 1.5  °C Scenario. On average, this is an 
investment of $109 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment in con-
ventional power plants will be around 45% of the total cumulative investments, and 
approximately 55% will be invested in renewable power generation and co-genera-
tion (Fig. 8.47).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, Africa will shift almost 93% (94%) of 
its entire investments to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil fuel 
share of power sector investments will focus predominantly on gas power plants 
that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $1510 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $42 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 60% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $1610 billion, 
or $45 billion per year.
8.8.1.5  Africa: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 166%, 
from 7600 PJ/year in 2015 to 20,200 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 18% in 2050 in both alterna-
tive scenarios, relative to the 5.0 °C case. Today, renewables supply around 61% of 
Africa’s final energy demand for heating, with the main contribution from biomass. 
Renewable energy will provide 71% of Africa’s total heat demand in 2030 under the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 79% under the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables 
will provide 100% of the total heat demand from renewable energy in 2050.
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Figure 8.48 shows the development of different technologies for heating in 
Africa over time, and Table 8.42 provides the resulting renewable heat supply for all 
scenarios. Biomass will remain the main contributor. The growing use of solar, geo-
thermal, and environmental heat will lead, in the long term, to a reduced biomass 
share of 51% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 40% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 720 PJ/year in 
both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of electricity for heat-
ing will also increase by a factor of 21–34 between 2015 and 2050, and will attain a 
final energy share of 23% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 37% in the 1.5 °C 
Scenario.
8.8.1.6  Africa: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $790 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments in 
plant replacement after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $22 billion per 
year. The largest share of investment in Africa is assumed to be for heat pumps 
(around $370 billion), followed by solar collectors and biomass technologies. The 
1.5  °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies. 
However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will result in 
a lower average annual investment of around $21 billion per year (Table  8.43, 
Fig. 8.49).
Table 8.42 Africa: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the direct 
use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 4586 5761 6317 7211 8203
2.0 °C 4586 5308 6047 7039 6551
1.5 °C 4586 5748 6448 6938 4222
Solar heating 5.0 °C 7 37 86 228 481
2.0 °C 7 204 786 2066 3416
1.5 °C 7 203 783 2109 3416
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 86 215 559 2106
1.5 °C 0 86 213 591 2106
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 0 397 720
1.5 °C 0 0 0 429 720
Total 5.0 °C 4593 5797 6404 7440 8684
2.0 °C 4593 5598 7047 10,061 12,793
1.5 °C 4593 6037 7444 10,067 10,464
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Table 8.43 Africa: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5 0 °C 3655 4036 4100 3973 3870
2 0 °C 3655 3276 3063 2792 2251
1 5 °C 3655 3562 3069 2440 1307
Geothermal 5 0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 °C 0 5 9 15 37
1 5 °C 0 5 8 15 37
Solar heating 5 0 °C 1 7 16 44 92
2 0 °C 1 39 150 396 654
1 5 °C 1 39 150 404 654
Heat pumps 5 0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 °C 0 3 16 51 227
1 5 °C 0 3 16 54 227
Totala 5 0 °C 3656 4043 4116 4017 3962
2 0 °C 3656 3324 3239 3253 3169
1 5 °C 3656 3610 3244 2912 2225
a Excluding direct electric heating
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8.8.1.7  Africa: Transport
The energy demand in the transport sector in Africa is expected to increase by 131% 
in the 5.0 °C Scenario, from around 4400 PJ/year in 2015 to 10,100 PJ/year in 2050. 
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes will 
save 53% (5410 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. Additional 
modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the transport demand will lead 
to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 63% (or 6360 PJ/year) in 
2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.44, Fig. 8.50).
By 2030, electricity will provide 4% (50 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s total 
energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas by 2050, the share will be 28% (370 
TWh/year). In 2050, up to 410 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the transport 
sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5  °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 360 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 340 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 2300 PJ/year. 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be  introduced, 
with a maximum amount of 700 PJ/year in 2050. With the lower overall energy 
demand by transport, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a maxi-
mum of 1700 PJ/year The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 470 PJ/
year.
8.8.1.8  Africa: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, Africa’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 126%, from 
1140 Mt. in 2015 to 2585 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures in both 
alternative scenarios will cause annual emissions to fall to 400 Mt. in 2040 in the 
Table 8.44 Africa: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 46 52 58 67 74
2.0 °C 46 58 71 96 110
1.5 °C 46 69 88 125 186
Road 5.0 °C 4182 5000 5812 7522 9635
2.0 °C 4182 4688 4828 4651 4488
1.5 °C 4182 4493 4422 3925 3482
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 105 159 198 256 272
2.0 °C 105 114 110 90 71
1.5 °C 105 110 102 74 54
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 32 35 37 40 44
2.0 °C 32 35 37 40 44
1.5 °C 32 35 37 40 44
Total 5.0 °C 4366 5246 6105 7885 10,027
2.0 °C 4366 4895 5045 4877 4714
1.5 °C 4366 4707 4648 4164 3765
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2.0 °C Scenario and to 200 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further reductions to 
almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions from 2015 
until 2050 will add up to 66 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the 
cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 27 Gt and 22 Gt, 
respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 59% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 67% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by the 
‘Industry’ and ‘Residential and other’ sectors (Fig. 8.51).
8.8.1.9  Africa: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.52. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will increase by 50% from around 33,200 PJ/
year in 2015 to around 50,000 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
the overall primary energy demand will decrease by 26% by 2050  in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario (5.0 °C: 67700 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy 
demand will be even lower (48,000 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand 
and conversion losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 56% in 2030 and 
98% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 98% in 2050 (including non-energy consump-
tion, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out by 
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2035 under both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario. The cumulative primary 
energy consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 290 EJ, the 
cumulative coal consumption to about 210 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 390 
EJ. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 
130 EJ, the cumulative coal demand to 70 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 180 
EJ. Even lower fossil fuel use will achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 110 EJ for natu-
ral gas, 50 EJ for coal, and 150 EJ for oil.
8.8.2  Africa: Power Sector Analysis
The African continent has 54 countries and its geographic, economic, and climatic 
diversity are significant. Its regional breakdown into sub-regions tries to reflect this 
diversity, but still requires a level of simplification. There is no pan-African power 
grid yet, although it is currently under discussion. The African Clean Energy 
Corridor (ACEC) is the most prominent regional initiative and aims to connect the 
Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP) with the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP). It 
was politically endorsed in January 2014 at the Assembly of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA 2014).
8.8.2.1  Africa: Development of Power Plant Capacities
In 2050, Africa’s most important renewable power-generation technology in both 
scenarios will be solar PV. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, solar PV will provide just over 
40% of the total generation capacity, followed by onshore wind (with 24%), hydro-
gen power (15%), and CSP plants (located in the desert regions), with 10% of the 
total capacity. All other renewable power plant technologies will have only 2%–3% 
shares. The 2.0 °C Scenario will arrive at similar capacities by 2050, although the 
transition times in the two scenarios differ. Africa must build up solar PV and 
onshore wind markets equal to the market sizes in China in 2017: 50 GW of solar 
PV installation (REN21-GSR2018) and 23 GW of onshore wind (GWEC 2018). 
The market for CSP plants must reach about 1 GW per year by 2025, increasing 
rapidly to 3 GW per year in 2029 and 15 GW per year in 2035 (Table 8.45).
8.8.2.2  Africa: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
Africa’s sub-regions are assumed to have an interconnection capacity of 5% at the 
beginning of the calculation period (2015). This capacity is not required for any 
exchange of variable electricity production, because currently, shares are only at or 
below 2% of the total generation capacity (Table 8.46). However, the variable gen-
eration capacity will increase rapidly towards 2030. We assume that the intercon-
nection capacity between sub-regions will increase and that initiatives such as the 
African Clean Energy Corridor (ACEC) will be implemented successfully.
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The development of average capacity factors for each generation type will follow 
the same trend as in most world regions. Table 8.47 shows the significant drop in the 
capacity factors of limited dispatchable power plants under the 1.5 °C Scenario.
8.8.2.3  Africa: Development of Load, Generation, and Residual Load
Table 8.48 shows that under the 2.0 °C Scenario, the transmission capacities need 
not exceed the assumed 25% interconnection capacity. If the exchange capacity 
between Africa’s sub-regions is 20%—as calculated under the 1.5 °C Scenario—
additional capacity will be required. Therefore, a 25% interconnection capacity 
seems a good target for high renewable penetration scenarios in Africa. The load in 
all sub-regions—from North Africa to South Africa—will increase significantly. 
The greatest increase is calculated for Southern Africa, with the load increasing by 
a factor of 7, followed by Central Africa (a factor of 6.5), East Africa (6), West 
Africa (5.5), and North Africa (4). The load increase in the Republic of South Africa 
will follow the patterns of other industrialized countries, more than doubling, due 
mainly to increases in electric mobility. The load increases in other parts of Africa 
will be first and foremost due to universal access to energy services for all house-
holds and favourable economic development.
Table 8.49 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch power 
requirements by African sub-region. East and West Africa will require the highest 
battery capacity, due to the very high share of solar PV battery systems in rural and 
residential areas with low power grid availability. Like the Middle East, Africa is 
Table 8.45 Africa: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Africa power generation: average annual 
change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 2 0 −2 −7 −4 0
Lignite 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 6 3 10 16 13 14
Hydrogen-gas 0 0 1 3 15 32
Oil/diesel −1 −2 −2 −2 −1 −1
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass 1 3 2 3 2 3
Hydro 2 1 1 1 0 0
Wind (onshore) 5 20 21 21 23 21
Wind (offshore) 0 2 5 10 7 4
PV (roof top) 3 12 29 31 41 48
PV (utility scale) 1 4 10 10 14 16
Geothermal 1 2 2 2 3 3
Solar thermal power plants 0 2 4 9 18 16
Ocean energy 0 1 1 1 3 3
Renewable fuel based co-generation 1 2 2 2 1 1
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one of the global renewable fuel production regions and it is assumed that all sub- 
regions of Africa have equal amounts of energy export potential. However, a more 
detailed examination of export energy is required, which is beyond the scope of this 
project.
8.9  The Middle East
8.9.1  The Middle East: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.9.1.1  The Middle East: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The future development pathways for the Middle East’s final energy demand when 
the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are com-
bined are shown in Fig. 8.53 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 133% from the cur-
rent 17,100 PJ/year to around 40,000 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the 
final energy demand will decrease by 8% compared with current consumption and 
will reach 15,800 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
will reach 13,600 PJ, 20% below the 2015 demand level. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
final energy demand in 2050 will be 14% lower than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. The 
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electricity demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or 
e-mobility) will increase from 650 TWh/year in 2015 to 1230 TWh/year (2.0 °C) 
and 1160 TWh/year (1.5 °C) by 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (2330 TWh/
year in 2050), the efficiency measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save 
a maximum of 1100 TWh/year and 1170 TWh/year, respectively.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will rise to approximately 800 
TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector, the 
demand will rise to approximately 1700 TWh/year due to the increase in electric 
mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process 
heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an addi-
tional power demand of 1900 TWh/year. The gross power demand will thus rise 
from 1100 TWh/year in 2015 to 4700 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
57% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity 
demand will increase to a maximum of 4100 TWh/year by 2045.
The efficiency gains could be even larger in the heating sector than in the elec-
tricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 10,100 PJ/year and 10,500 PJ/year, respectively, will be avoided 
through efficiency gains by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.9.1.2  The Middle East: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in the Middle East will 
come from renewable energy sources under the 2.0  °C Scenario. ‘New’ renew-
ables—mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 96% of the total 
electricity generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 
49% by 2030 and 91% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach 
about 430 GW by 2030 and 1910 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity 
generation in 2030  in the 1.5  °C Scenario is assumed to be 58%. In the 1.5  °C 
Scenario, the generation capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 
1700 GW in 2050.
Table 8.50 shows the development of different renewable technologies in the 
Middle East over time. Figure  8.54 provides an overview of the overall power- 
generation structure in the Middle East. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth 
of wind and PV, up to 480 GW and 1070 GW, respectively, will be complemented 
by up to 250 GW of solar thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, geother-
mal, and ocean energy, in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C 
Scenario will lead to high proportions of variable power generation (PV, wind, and 
ocean) of 39% and 46%, respectively, by 2030, and 64% and 66%, respectively, by 
2050.
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Table 8.50 Middle East: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 16 20 22 25 29
2.0 °C 16 22 22 25 29
1.5 °C 16 22 22 25 29
Biomass 5.0 °C 0 0 1 3 7
2.0 °C 0 2 3 4 4
1.5 °C 0 3 3 4 4
Wind 5.0 °C 0 4 9 23 49
2.0 °C 0 54 156 371 481
1.5 °C 0 60 175 432 456
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 5 7 20 25
1.5 °C 0 5 7 20 21
PV 5.0 °C 0 7 10 21 40
2.0 °C 0 76 187 560 1069
1.5 °C 0 92 236 587 928
CSP 5.0 °C 0 2 3 6 7
2.0 °C 0 10 43 270 252
1.5 °C 0 10 47 342 216
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 5 10 40 50
1.5 °C 0 5 10 40 45
Total 5.0 °C 16 32 45 79 132
2.0 °C 16 174 427 1290 1911
1.5 °C 16 197 500 1449 1699
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8.9.1.3  The Middle East: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.55 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated 
electricity- generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 7.1 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2030, when they reach 
14.8 ct/kWh, and then drop to 13.7 ct/kWh by 2050. The generation costs in the 
2.0 °C Scenario will increase until 2030, when they reach 11.1 ct/kWh, and then 
drop to 6.1 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 10.7 ct/
kWh, and then drop to 7.3 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation 
costs in 2050 will be 7.6 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
the generation costs in 2050 will be 6.4 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note 
that these estimates of generation costs do not take into account integration costs 
such as power grid expansion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will cause 
the total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $70 billion/year to more than 
$410 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs will be $300 
billion/year and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $310 billion/year. The long- 
term cost of electricity supply will be more than 27% lower in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and the 
electrification of heating and mobility. Further demand reductions in the 1.5  °C 
Scenario will result in total power-generation costs that are 24% lower than in the 
5.0 °C case.
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The generation costs without the CO2 emission costs will increase in the 5.0 °C 
case to 11.1 ct/kWh by 2030, and then stabilize at 10.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario and the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to a maximum of 9 ct/
kWh in 2030, before they drop to 6.1 ct/kWh and 7.3 ct/kWh by 2050, respectively. 
In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs will be 4.7 ct/kWh lower than in the 
5.0 °C case and this maximum difference will occur in 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
the maximum difference in generation costs compared with the 5.0 °C case will be 
3.5 ct/kWh in 2050. If the CO2 costs are not considered, the total electricity supply 
costs in the 5.0 °C case will rise to about $320 billion/year by 2050.
8.9.1.4  The Middle East: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $3450 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replace-
ment at the ends of their economic lives. This value will be equivalent to approxi-
mately $96 billion per year on average, and this is $2720 billion more than in the 
5.0 °C case ($730 billion). An investment of around $3470 billion for power genera-
tion will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario, or on average, 
$96 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment in conventional power 
plants will be around 68% of the total cumulative investments, whereas approxi-
mately 32% will be invested in renewable power generation and co-generation 
(Fig. 8.56). However, in both alternative scenarios, the Middle East will shift almost 
94% of its entire investments to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil 
fuel share of power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas power plants 
that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $2900 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $81 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 110% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $3100 billion, 
or $86 billion per year.
8.9.1.5  The Middle East: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase by 139% in the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
from 7100 PJ/year in 2015 to 17,100 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 59% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, relative to the 5.0 °C case, and by 62% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply almost none of the Middle East’s final energy demand for heat-
ing. Renewable energy will provide 23% of the Middle East’s total heat demand in 
2030  in the 2.0  °C Scenario and 25% in the 1.5  °C Scenario. In both scenarios, 
renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
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Figure 8.57 shows the development of different technologies for heating in the 
Middle East over time, and Table 8.51 provides the resulting renewable heat supply 
for all scenarios. The growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will 
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Table 8.51 Middle East: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the 
direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 20 56 86 169 291
2.0 °C 20 101 132 200 196
1.5 °C 20 92 124 183 155
Solar heating 5.0 °C 8 92 284 778 1113
2.0 °C 8 404 932 1535 1961
1.5 °C 8 393 909 1475 1619
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 118 232 565 1387
1.5 °C 0 115 226 540 1057
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 51 488 946
1.5 °C 0 0 48 828 915
Total 5.0 °C 28 149 370 947 1404
2.0 °C 28 624 1346 2788 4489
1.5 °C 28 601 1307 3025 3746
supplement electrification, with solar heat becoming the main direct renewable heat 
source in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 950 PJ/year in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 920 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of electricity 
for heating will also increase by a factor of 9–10 between 2015 and 2050, and its 
final energy share will be 36% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 43% in the 1.5 °C 
Scenario (Fig. 8.57).
8.9.1.6  The Middle East: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies to 2050 will 
amount to less than $440 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments for 
plant replacement after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $12 billion per 
year. The largest share of investments in the Middle East is assumed to be for heat 
pumps (more than $200 billion), followed by solar collectors and geothermal heat 
use. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technolo-
gies. However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will 
result in a lower average annual investment of around $10 billion per year 
(Table 8.52, Fig. 8.58).
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Table 8.52 Middle East: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 4 10 14 25 38
2.0 °C 4 13 15 18 14
1.5 °C 4 12 15 17 13
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 2 8 19 30
1.5 °C 0 2 8 18 35
Solar heating 5.0 °C 1 17 51 139 198
2.0 °C 1 72 142 217 252
1.5 °C 1 71 139 209 206
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 12 17 43 122
1.5 °C 0 12 17 42 76
Totala 5.0 °C 6 26 65 164 237
2.0 °C 6 99 183 297 418
1.5 °C 6 96 178 286 330
a Excluding direct electric heating
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8.9.1.7  The Middle East: transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in the Middle East is expected to increase in 
the 5.0 °C Scenario by 133%, from around 5700 PJ/year in 2015 to 13,300 PJ/year 
in 2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural 
changes will save 67% (8860 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. 
Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the transport 
demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 79% (or 
10,400 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.53, Fig. 8.59).
By 2030, electricity will provide 4% (70 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s total 
energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 39% (480 
TWh/year). In 2050, up to 620 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the transport 
sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5  °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 350 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 450 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 370 PJ/year. 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
duced, with a maximum consumption of 1670 PJ/year in 2050. Biofuel use in the 
1.5 °C Scenario with have a maximum of 430 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel 
demand will amount to 920 PJ/year.
Table 8.53 Middle East: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 184 38 48 65 75
2.0 °C 184 64 103 169 157
1.5 °C 184 89 117 161 194
Road 5.0 °C 5425 6613 7802 10,999 12,992
2.0 °C 5425 5928 5732 4510 4194
1.5 °C 5425 5246 4528 2899 2618
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 57 83 103 136 146
2.0 °C 57 60 57 47 37
1.5 °C 57 57 52 36 28
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 °C 0 0 0 0 0
Total 5.0 °C 5666 6734 7954 11,200 13,213
2.0 °C 5666 6051 5893 4726 4388
1.5 °C 5666 5392 4697 3096 2840
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8.9.1.8  The Middle East: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the Middle East’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 
76% from 1760 Mt. in 2015 to 3094 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures 
in both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 510 Mt. in 
2040  in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 220 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further 
reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 90 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 38 
Gt and 31 Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 58% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 66% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Industry’ followed by the ‘Power gen-
eration’ and ‘Transport’ sectors (Fig. 8.60).
8.9.1.9  The Middle East: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.61. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 16%, from around 30,300 
PJ/year in 2015 to 25,400 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
overall primary energy demand will decrease by 59% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 61,700 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will 
be even lower (22,300 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conversion 
losses will be lower.
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Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 18% in 2030 and 
88% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 86% in 2050 (including non-energy consump-
tion, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out in 
2035 in both the 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy 
consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 830 EJ, the cumulative 
coal consumption to about 10 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 630 EJ. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 330 EJ, the cumulative 
coal demand to 1 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 310 EJ. Even lower fossil 
fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 280 EJ for natural gas, 0.9 EJ for 
coal, and 270 EJ for oil.
8.9.2  The Middle East: Power Sector Analysis
The Middle East has significant renewable energy potential. The region’s solar radi-
ation is among the highest in the world and it has good wind conditions in coastal 
areas and in its mountain ranges. The electricity market is fragmented, and policies 
differ significantly. However, most countries are connected to their neighbours by 
transmission lines. Saudi Arabia, the geographic centre of the region, has connec-
tions to most neighbouring countries. Both the 2.0  °C Scenario and the 1.5  °C 
Scenario assume that the Middle East will remain a significant player in the energy 
market, moving from oil and gas to solar, and that it will play an important role in 
producing synthetic fuels and hydrogen for export.
8.9.2.1  The Middle East: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The overwhelming majority of fossil-fuel-based power generation in the Middle 
East is from gas-fired power plants. Both scenarios assume that this gas capacity (in 
GW) will remain on the same level until 2050, but will be converted to hydrogen. 
The annual market for solar PV must increase to 2.5 GW in 2020 and to 28.5 GW 
by 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and to 35 GW in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The onshore 
wind market must expand to 10 GW by 2025 in both scenarios. This represents a 
very ambitious target because the market for wind power plants in the Middle East 
has never been higher than 117 MW (GWEC 2018) (in 2015). Parts of the offshore 
oil and gas industry can be transitioned into an offshore wind industry. The total 
capacity assumed for the Middle East by 2050 is 20–25 GW under both scenarios. 
For comparison, the UK had an installed capacity for offshore wind of 6.8 GW and 
Germany of 5.4 GW in 2017 (GWEC 2018). The vast solar resources in the Middle 
S. Teske et al.
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Table 8.54 Middle East: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Middle East – power generation: average 
annual change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lignite 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gas 1.5 7.0 1.9 6.2 −19.1 3.0
Hydrogen-gas 0.0 0.3 1.5 1.7 20.3 24.2
Oil/Diesel −0.1 −4.0 −8.9 −8.1 −0.8 −0.5
Nuclear −0.1 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.0 0.0
Biomass 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Hydro 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5
Wind (onshore) 6.5 19.3 28.3 35.5 14.7 7.6
Wind (offshore) 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.2
PV (roof top) 7.3 19.0 26.2 29.9 46.4 32.3
PV (utility scale) 2.4 6.3 8.7 10.0 15.5 10.8
Geothermal 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.6
Solar thermal power plants 1.3 5.4 13.1 20.3 11.4 3.7
Ocean energy 0.3 1.3 1.3 2.5 1.0 1.7
Renewable fuel based co-generation 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
East make it suitable for CSP plants—the total capacity by 2050 is calculated to be 
252 GW (2.0 °C Scenario), equal to the gas power plant capacity in the Middle East 
in 2017 (Table 8.54).
8.9.2.2  Middle East: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
In 2015, the base year of the scenario calculations, the Middle East had less than 
0.5% variable power generation. Table 8.55 shows the rapidly increasing shares of 
variable renewable power generation across the Middle East. Israel is included in 
the Middle East region (as opposed to the IEA region used for the long-term sce-
nario) to reflect its current and possible future interconnection with the regional 
power system. The current interconnection capacity between all sub-regions is 
assumed to be 5%, increasing to 20% in 2030 and 25% in 2050. Dispatchable 
renewables will have a stable market share of around 15%–20% over the entire 
modelling period in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 15%–20% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Average capacity factors correspond to the results for the other world regions. 
Table 8.56 shows that the limited dispatchable fossil and nuclear generation will 
drop quickly, whereas the significant gas power plant capacity within the region can 
increase capacity factors to take over their load and reduce carbon emissions at an 
early stage. The calculation results are attributed to the assumed dispatch order, 
which prioritizes gas over coal and nuclear.
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8.9.2.3  The Middle East: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
The Middle East is assumed to be one of the exporters of solar electricity into the 
EU, so the calculated solar installation capacities throughout the region will be sig-
nificantly higher than required for self-supply.
Table 8.57 shows a negative residual load in almost all sub-regions for every year 
and in both scenarios. This is attributable to substantial oversupply, so the produc-
tion of renewables is almost constantly higher than the demand. This electricity has 
been calculated as exports from the Middle East and imports to Europe.
The Middle East will be one of three dedicated renewable energy export regions. 
These exports are in the form of renewable fuels and electricity. The [R]E 24/7 
model does not calculate electricity exchange in 1 h steps between the world regions, 
and therefore the amount of electricity exported accumulates from year to year. The 
load curves for the Middle East and European regions are not calculated 
separately.
Table 8.58 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch power 
requirements by sub-region in the Middle East. Iran and Saudi Arabia West Africa 
will require the highest storage capacity, due to the very high share of solar PV 
systems in residential areas. Like the Africa, the Middle East is one of the global 
renewable fuel production regions and it is assumed that all sub-regions of the 
Middle East have equal amounts of energy export potential. However, a more 
detailed examination of export energy is required, which is beyond the scope of this 
project.
Table 8.56 Middle East: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
Middle East 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 52.6% 45% 43% 27% 24% 34% 21% 29% 25%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 31.1% 13% 13% 5% 2% 19% 3% 10% 5%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 26.3% 34% 34% 47% 42% 50% 21% 28% 30%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 52.9% 41% 40% 15% 10% 45% 8% 17% 16%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 38.9% 83% 83% 66% 57% 43% 20% 36% 38%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 6.6% 12% 12% 24% 23% 27% 23% 29% 25%
S. Teske et al.
303
Ta
bl
e 
8.
57
 
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t: 
lo
ad
, g
en
er
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 r
es
id
ua
l l
oa
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
M
ax
 
de
m
an
d
M
ax
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
M
ax
 
re
si
du
al
 
lo
ad
M
ax
 in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
M
ax
 
de
m
an
d
M
ax
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
M
ax
 
re
si
du
al
 
lo
ad
M
ax
 in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
Is
ra
el
20
20
11
.5
11
.0
−2
.9
11
.5
11
.9
−2
.9
20
30
14
.0
17
.3
−1
.8
5
14
.3
19
.9
−1
.4
7
20
50
29
.7
62
.7
−3
.7
37
29
.3
55
.2
−1
0.
3
36
N
or
th
-M
E
20
20
33
.7
25
.7
−1
2.
1
33
.8
29
.4
−1
1.
6
20
30
39
.7
44
.6
−1
2.
1
17
40
.6
52
.6
−1
1.
2
23
20
50
83
.6
19
6.
5
−1
1.
5
12
4
77
.5
17
2.
8
−1
9.
9
11
5
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a-
M
E
20
20
59
.5
45
.9
−3
.4
59
.6
45
.4
−2
.4
20
30
72
.4
85
.9
2.
3
11
75
.1
99
.8
5.
6
19
20
50
17
3.
6
38
0.
9
−2
1.
7
22
9
16
8.
6
33
4.
0
−5
9.
4
22
5
U
A
E
-M
E
20
20
21
.2
29
.8
−0
.4
21
.2
29
.6
1.
3
20
30
26
.0
44
.1
2.
2
16
27
.0
50
.7
3.
4
20
20
50
62
.2
12
0.
2
−7
.4
65
61
.3
10
5.
4
−2
3.
4
67
E
as
t-
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
20
20
12
.0
23
.3
−2
.5
12
.0
22
.6
−2
.6
20
30
14
.8
31
.3
−1
.2
18
15
.1
35
.9
−0
.8
22
20
50
32
.5
63
.4
−3
.9
35
31
.2
55
.6
−7
.2
32
Ir
aq
-M
E
20
20
20
.1
13
.8
−7
.6
20
.2
13
.8
−7
.3
20
30
26
.0
30
.4
−7
.4
12
26
.8
35
.8
−8
.1
17
20
50
64
.3
13
7.
5
−7
.8
81
57
.7
11
9.
9
−2
0.
0
82
Ir
an
-M
E
20
20
49
.4
56
.9
−1
2.
2
49
.4
56
.4
−1
2.
2
20
30
76
.1
88
.1
−1
4.
3
26
78
.3
10
3.
9
−1
1.
4
37
20
50
18
8.
5
39
9.
1
−2
2.
7
23
3
17
4.
3
34
8.
0
−4
0.
5
21
4
8 Energy Scenario Results
304
Ta
bl
e 
8.
58
 
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t: 
st
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
 s
er
vi
ce
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
Is
ra
el
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
29
0
10
10
0
22
6
0
36
36
8
20
50
24
,7
25
11
37
9
39
0
0
14
,2
44
11
32
0
33
1
52
9
N
or
th
-M
E
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
11
64
0
19
3
19
4
0
35
96
1
35
5
35
6
20
20
50
10
9,
49
8
32
14
09
14
41
0
84
,9
74
31
14
34
14
65
11
93
Sa
ud
i 
A
ra
bi
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
33
66
1
51
3
51
4
0
11
,4
57
2
90
0
90
2
39
20
50
23
1,
14
0
73
26
85
27
57
0
15
9,
94
9
74
24
29
25
03
26
24
U
A
E
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
9
0
5
5
0
23
3
0
45
45
17
20
50
35
,4
63
24
67
9
70
3
0
17
,0
93
23
50
7
53
1
10
75
S. Teske et al.
305
E
as
t-
M
E
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
2
0
3
3
0
11
7
0
29
29
9
20
50
21
,9
16
12
41
0
42
1
0
12
,9
20
12
35
0
36
2
49
0
Ir
aq
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
39
41
0
33
0
33
0
0
81
85
0
44
6
44
7
10
20
50
87
,3
43
18
89
2
91
0
0
74
,2
52
17
92
0
93
7
68
4
Ir
an
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
95
76
1
83
1
83
3
0
21
,1
30
1
11
27
11
28
30
20
50
24
2,
79
9
50
25
08
25
58
0
19
0,
79
0
47
24
43
24
90
20
36
M
id
dl
e 
E
as
t
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
18
,0
88
4
18
86
18
90
0
44
,9
45
4
29
39
29
43
13
2
20
50
75
2,
88
2
21
8
89
62
91
80
0
55
4,
22
2
21
5
84
04
86
18
86
30
8 Energy Scenario Results
306
8.10  Eastern Europe/Eurasia
8.10.1  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.10.1.1  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The future development pathways for Eastern Europe/Eurasia’s final energy demand 
when the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are 
combined are shown in Fig. 8.62 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 45%, from the cur-
rent 25,500 PJ/year to 37,000 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand will decrease by 25% compared with current consumption and will 
reach 19,100 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will 
reach 17,800 PJ, 30% below the 2015 level. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand in 2050 will be 7% lower than in the 2.0  °C Scenario. The electricity 
demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will 
increase from 910 TWh/year in 2015 to 1000 TWh/year (2.0 °C) or 940 TWh/year 
(1.5 °C) by 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (1600 TWh/year in 2050), the 
efficiency measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save a maximum of 600 
TWh/year and 660 TWh/year, respectively.
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Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be approxi-
mately 700 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport 
sector, the electricity demand will be approximately 2300 TWh/year due to increased 
electric mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature 
process heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add 
an additional power demand of 2300 TWh/year. Therefore, the gross power demand 
will rise from 1700 TWh/year in 2015 to 4900 TWh/year in 2050  in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, 88% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross elec-
tricity demand will increase to a maximum of 4800 TWh/year in 2050.
Efficiency gains could be even larger in the heating sector than in the electricity 
sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equivalent to 
more than 10,700 PJ/year is avoided by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario 
through efficiency gains.
8.10.1.2  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in Eastern Europe/Eurasia 
will come from renewable energy sources in the 2.0  °C Scenario. ‘New’ renew-
ables—mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 75% of the total 
electricity generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 
55% by 2030 and 84% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach 
about 560 GW by 2030 and 1900 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity 
generation in 2030  in the 1.5  °C Scenario is assumed to be 66%. In the 1.5  °C 
Scenario, the generation capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 
1870 GW in 2050.
Table 8.59 shows the development of different renewable technologies in Eastern 
Europe/Eurasia over time. Figure 8.63 provides an overview of the overall power- 
generation structure in Eastern Europe/Eurasia. From 2020 onwards, the continuing 
growth of wind and PV, up to 740 GW and 820 GW, respectively, will be comple-
mented by up to 30 GW of solar thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, 
geothermal, and ocean energy, in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
1.5 °C Scenario will lead to a high proportion of variable power generation (PV, 
wind, and ocean) of 28% and 32%, respectively, by 2030, and 62% and 61%, 
respectively, by 2050.
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8.10.1.3  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.64 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated 
electricity- generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 4.5 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when they reach 10 
ct/kWh. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when 
they will reach 8.6 ct/kWh. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 9.3 ct/kWh, 
and then drop to 8.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs in 
2050 will be 1.4 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
generation costs in 2050 will be 1.1 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that 
these estimates of generation costs do not take into account integration costs such as 
power grid expansion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
Table 8.59 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in 
the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 98 107 112 123 136
2.0 °C 98 107 112 115 116
1.5 °C 98 107 112 115 116
Biomass 5.0 °C 1 4 6 9 14
2.0 °C 1 21 45 64 96
1.5 °C 1 40 74 86 109
Wind 5.0 °C 6 9 10 17 23
2.0 °C 6 70 176 469 744
1.5 °C 6 74 196 531 697
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 1 1 2 4
2.0 °C 0 5 12 38 71
1.5 °C 0 7 21 46 71
PV 5.0 °C 4 5 6 8 10
2.0 °C 4 108 209 502 817
1.5 °C 4 132 294 678 821
CSP 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 1 16 33
1.5 °C 0 0 1 22 34
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 1 13 19
1.5 °C 0 0 1 13 19
Total 5.0 °C 108 126 136 159 186
2.0 °C 108 310 555 1216 1896
1.5 °C 108 360 698 1492 1869
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In the 5.0 °C case, the growth of demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $120 billion/year to more 
than $320 billion/year in 2050. In both alternative scenarios, the total supply costs 
will be $490 billion/year in 2050. The long-term costs of electricity supply will be 
more than 54% higher in the 2.0 °C Scenario than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result 
of the estimated generation costs and the electrification of heating and mobility. 
Further electrification and synthetic fuel generation in the 1.5  °C Scenario will 
result in total power generation costs that are 55% higher than in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0  °C case to 6.9 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, the generation costs will increase continuously until 2050, when they 
reach 8.6 ct/kWh. They will increase to 8.8 ct/kWh in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs will reach a maximum, at 1.7 ct/kWh higher 
than in the 5.0 °C case, and this will occur in 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the maxi-
mum difference in generation costs compared with the 5.0 °C case will be 2.6 ct/
kWh in 2040. The generation costs in 2050 will still be 2 ct/kWh higher than in the 
5.0 °C case. If the CO2 costs are not considered, the total electricity supply costs in 
the 5.0 °C case will rise to about $240 billion in 2050.
8.10.1.4  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Future Investments in the Power 
Sector
An investment of around $3600 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replace-
ment at the end of their economic lives. This value is equivalent to approximately 
$100 billion per year on average, and is $2660 billion more than in the 5.0 °C case 
($940 billion). An investment of around $3770 billion for power generation will be 
required between 2015 and 2050  in the 1.5  °C Scenario. On average, this is an 
investment of $105 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment in con-
ventional power plants will be around 40% of the total cumulative investments, 
whereas approximately 60% will be invested in renewable power generation and 
co-generation (Fig. 8.65).
However, in the 2.0  °C (1.5  °C) scenario, Eastern Europe/Eurasia will shift 
almost 97% (98%) of its entire investments to renewables and co-generation. By 
2030, the fossil fuel share of the power sector investments will predominantly focus 
on gas power plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $1730 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $48 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 70% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $1900 billion, 
or $53 billion per year.
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Fig. 8.65 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: investment shares for power generation in the scenarios
8.10.1.5  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 46%, 
from 15,700 PJ/year in 2015 to 22,900 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 47% in 2050 in both alterna-
tive scenarios. Today, renewables supply around 4% of Eastern Europe/Eurasia’s 
final energy demand for heating, with the main contribution from biomass. 
Renewable energy will provide 29% of Eastern Europe/Eurasia’s total heat demand 
in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 42% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, 
renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.66 shows the development of different technologies for heating in 
Eastern Europe/Eurasia over time, and Table 8.60 provides the resulting renewable 
heat supply for all scenarios. Until 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. 
In the long term, the growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will 
lead to a biomass share of 28% in both alternative scenarios.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 1900 PJ/year in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 2000 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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The direct use of electricity for heating will also increases by a factor of 2.7 
between 2015 and 2050, and its final energy share will be 18% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario and 19% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
8.10.1.6  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Future Investments in the Heating 
Sector
The roughly estimated investment in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $1070 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
in plant replacement after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $30 billion 
Table 8.60 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios 
(excluding the direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 537 810 873 1005 1164
2.0 °C 537 1604 2199 2971 2819
1.5 °C 537 1869 2684 2734 2722
Solar heating 5.0 °C 5 10 13 24 41
2.0 °C 5 277 706 1560 1662
1.5 °C 5 351 768 1395 1620
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 6 9 11 15 21
2.0 °C 6 265 780 2314 3493
1.5 °C 6 410 1163 2434 3393
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 42 152 795 1934
1.5 °C 0 155 494 1344 2032
Total 5.0 °C 548 829 897 1044 1226
2.0 °C 548 2187 3837 7640 9908
1.5 °C 548 2786 5110 7906 9767
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Table 8.61 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 107 150 157 169 183
2.0 °C 107 230 249 263 172
1.5 °C 107 241 252 230 162
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 1 1
2.0 °C 0 14 26 64 61
1.5 °C 0 12 30 52 54
Solar heating 5.0 °C 1 2 3 5 9
2.0 °C 1 56 145 330 359
1.5 °C 1 74 163 300 352
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 1 1 2 2 3
2.0 °C 1 25 64 184 248
1.5 °C 1 33 76 175 236
Totala 5.0 °C 109 154 162 177 196
2.0 °C 109 325 483 841 839
1.5 °C 109 361 522 758 805
a Excluding direct electric heating
per year. The largest share of the investments in Eastern Europe/Eurasia is assumed 
to be for heat pumps (around $490 billion), followed by solar collectors and bio-
mass technologies. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renew-
able technologies. However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0  °C 
Scenario) will result in a lower average annual investment of around $29 billion per 
year (Table 8.61, Fig. 8.67).
8.10.1.7  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in Eastern Europe/Eurasia is expected to 
increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 34%, from around 6000 PJ/year in 2015 to 8000 
PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behav-
ioural changes will save 48% (3840 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C 
Scenario. Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the 
transport demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 
62% (or 4970 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.62, Fig. 8.68).
By 2030, electricity will provide 14% (240 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 54% 
(630 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 410 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 510 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 330 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 720 PJ/year 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
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duced, with a maximum amount of 880 PJ/year in 2050. With the lower overall 
energy demand in transport, biofuel use will also be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
to a maximum of 700 PJ/year The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 
540 PJ/year.
8.10.1.8  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, Eastern Europe/Eurasia’s annual CO2 emissions will increase 
by 14%, from 2420 Mt. in 2015 to 2768 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation mea-
sures in both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 590 Mt. 
in 2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 340 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further 
reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 95 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 45 
Gt and 36 Gt, respectively.
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Table 8.62 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the 
scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 434 498 528 599 674
2.0 °C 434 509 544 646 712
1.5 °C 434 449 470 620 796
Road 5.0 °C 3873 4321 4680 5181 5319
2.0 °C 3873 4336 4403 3923 3195
1.5 °C 3873 3593 2963 2346 2016
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 232 336 403 482 471
2.0 °C 232 247 228 188 150
1.5 °C 232 237 207 146 114
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 34 35 36 38 40
2.0 °C 34 35 36 38 40
1.5 °C 34 35 36 38 40
Total 5.0 °C 4573 5191 5647 6301 6504
2.0 °C 4573 5127 5210 4795 4097
1.5 °C 4573 4313 3677 3150 2966
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Fig. 8.68 Eastern Europe/Eurasia: final energy consumption by transport in the scenarios
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 53% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 62% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by the 
‘Residential and other’ and ‘Industry’ sectors (Fig. 8.69).
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8.10.1.9  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.70. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 25%, from around 46,000 
PJ/year in 2015 to 34,600 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
overall primary energy demand will decrease by 40% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 57,700 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will 
be even lower (33,600 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conversion 
losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 26% in 2030 and 
91% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 90% in 2050 (including non-energy consump-
tion, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out by 
2040  in both the 2.0  °C Scenario and 1.5  °C Scenario. The cumulative primary 
energy consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 840 EJ, the 
cumulative coal consumption to about 290 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 340 
EJ. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 
510 EJ, the cumulative coal demand to 100 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 
160 EJ. Even lower fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 450 EJ 
for natural gas, 70 EJ for coal, and 120 EJ for oil.
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8.10.2  Eastern Europe/Eurasia: Power Sector Analysis
This region sits between the strong economic hubs of the EU, China, and India. 
Russia, by far the largest country within this region, is an important producer of oil 
and gas, and supplies all surrounding countries. Therefore, Eurasia will be key in 
future energy developments. Its renewable energy industry is among the smallest in 
the world, but recent developments indicate growth in both the wind (WPM 3-2018) 
and solar industries (PVM 3-2018).
8.10.2.1  Eurasia: Development of Power Plant Capacities—2.0 °C 
Scenario
The northern part of Eurasia and Mongolia have significant wind potential, whereas 
the southern part, especially in Central Asia, has substantial possibilities for utility- 
scale solar power plants—both for solar PV and concentrated solar. The annual 
market for solar PV and onshore wind—as for all other renewable power generation 
technologies—must develop from a very low MW range in 2017 to a GW market by 
2025. Besides solar PV and onshore wind, bioenergy has significant potential in 
Eurasia, especially in the European part, Russia, and the agricultural regions around 
the Caspian Sea (Table 8.63).
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8.10.2.2  Eurasia: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
Variable power generation starts at almost zero, but increases rapidly to over 30% in 
most sub-regions of Eurasia, as shown in Table 8.64.
Table 8.64 shows that dispatchable renewables will experience stable market 
conditions throughout the entire modelling period across the whole region. Both 
scenarios assume that the interconnections between Eastern Europe and Russia will 
increase significantly, whereas the power transmission capacities for Kazakhstan, 
Central Asia, the area around the Caspian Sea, and Mongolia will remain low due to 
geographic distances.
Compared with other world regions, it will take longer for the capacity factor of 
the limited dispatchable power plants to drop below economic viability, as shown in 
Table 8.65.
Table 8.65. The capacity factor of variable renewables will rise by 2030, mainly 
due to increased deployment of wind and concentrated solar power with storage. 
The average capacity factor of the power-generation fleet will be around 35% by 
2050 and will therefore be on the same level as it was 2015 in both scenarios.
8.10.2.3  Eurasia: Development of Load, Generation, and Residual Load
The modelling of both scenarios predicts small increases in interconnection beyond 
those assumed to occur by 2030 (see Table 8.64).
Table 8.63 Eurasia: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Eurasia power generation: average annual 
change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal −1 −6 −6 −4 0 0
Lignite −3 −4 −2 −1 0 0
Gas 4 1 0 −2 −17 −5
Hydrogen-gas 0 2 2 4 20 17
Oil/Diesel −2 −2 −1 −1 0 0
Nuclear −2 −3 −2 −4 −1 0
Biomass 3 8 3 5 4 2
Hydro 2 1 1 1 0 0
Wind (onshore) 7 20 26 28 24 21
Wind (offshore) 1 3 6 6 11 8
PV (roof top) 9 25 21 32 31 22
PV (utility scale) 3 8 7 11 10 7
Geothermal 1 3 2 4 4 3
Solar thermal power plants 0 0 1 1 1 2
Ocean energy 0 0 1 1 1 1
Renewable fuel based co-generation 2 7 4 7 5 3
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Table 8.65 Eurasia: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
Eurasia 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – 
average
[%/yr] 36.8% 31% 40% 48% 47% 34% 34% 34% 34%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 43.8% 31% 30% 22% 18% 19% 0% 7% 4%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 39.3% 42% 42% 57% 54% 60% 39% 39% 40%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 27.6% 18% 17% 7% 6% 31% 8% 12% 15%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 38.7% 48% 73% 73% 68% 41% 49% 50% 51%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 10.5% 11% 11% 40% 39% 25% 32% 32% 33%
Table 8.64. However, after 2030, significant increases will be required by 2050, 
especially in Russia. The export of renewable electricity can also take place via 
existing gas pipelines with power-to-gas technologies. Between 2030 and 2050, the 
loads for all regions will double, due to the increased electrification of the heating, 
industry, and transport sectors (Table 8.66).
In Eurasia, the main storage technology for both scenarios is pumped hydro, 
whereas hydrogen plays a major role for the grid integration of variable generation 
(Table 8.67). Hydrogen production can also be used for load management, although 
not for short peak loads. Due to the technical and economic limitations associated 
with the increased interconnection via transmission lines and pumped hydro storage 
systems, curtailment will be higher than the scenario target (a maximum of 10% by 
2050). For Eastern Europe, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and the East Caspian Sea, the 
calculated curtailment will be between 10% and 14%, whereas the West Caspian 
Region will have the highest curtailment of 19% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 17% in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario. Further research and optimization are required.
8 Energy Scenario Results
322
Ta
bl
e 
8.
66
 
E
ur
as
ia
: l
oa
d,
 g
en
er
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 r
es
id
ua
l l
oa
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
E
ur
as
ia
M
ax
 
de
m
an
d
M
ax
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
M
ax
 
re
si
du
al
 
lo
ad
M
ax
 in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
M
ax
 
de
m
an
d
M
ax
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
M
ax
 
re
si
du
al
 
lo
ad
M
ax
 in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
[G
W
]
E
as
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e
20
20
32
.9
30
.8
3.
9
32
.9
33
.0
4.
6
20
30
38
.1
45
.0
12
.4
0
40
.8
56
.2
14
.2
1
20
50
77
.2
17
9.
6
30
.9
71
77
.5
17
4.
3
31
.6
65
R
us
si
a
20
20
17
2.
7
95
.8
83
.6
17
2.
7
10
0.
6
81
.8
20
30
21
4.
2
21
8.
6
10
3.
5
0
22
1.
4
27
5.
2
94
.9
0
20
50
42
8.
3
88
7.
6
19
1.
7
26
8
42
9.
2
85
9.
0
19
4.
4
23
5
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
20
20
14
.7
18
.8
0.
9
14
.7
17
.9
0.
9
20
30
17
.9
18
.6
8.
3
0
18
.9
23
.1
7.
7
0
20
50
34
.3
74
.5
14
.1
26
34
.4
72
.2
14
.4
23
M
on
go
lia
20
20
1.
7
2.
0
0.
1
1.
7
2.
0
0.
1
20
30
2.
0
2.
3
0.
9
0
2.
1
2.
9
0.
9
0
20
50
3.
7
8.
5
1.
2
4
3.
7
8.
4
1.
2
3
W
es
t C
as
pi
an
 S
ea
20
20
10
.7
6.
2
4.
6
10
.7
6.
9
4.
2
20
30
12
.5
13
.9
6.
4
0
13
.4
17
.3
5.
9
0
20
50
24
.3
55
.8
9.
8
22
24
.4
54
.1
10
.0
20
E
as
t C
as
pi
an
 S
ea
20
20
21
.6
7.
5
14
.2
21
.6
7.
8
13
.8
20
30
25
.2
28
.2
12
.7
0
26
.9
35
.0
12
.5
0
20
50
50
.0
11
3.
4
18
.6
45
50
.2
10
9.
7
19
.1
40
C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
20
20
2.
5
2.
3
0.
2
2.
5
2.
3
0.
2
20
30
6.
0
5.
8
2.
8
0
6.
7
6.
5
3.
0
0
20
50
12
.0
18
.2
4.
2
2
12
.1
18
.2
4.
4
2
S. Teske et al.
323
Ta
bl
e 
8.
67
 
E
ur
as
ia
: s
to
ra
ge
 a
nd
 d
is
pa
tc
h 
se
rv
ic
e 
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
E
ur
as
ia
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
E
as
te
rn
 
E
ur
op
e
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
37
3
1
13
7
13
8
17
20
16
74
2
31
7
31
9
59
20
20
50
52
,5
16
27
4
26
26
29
00
49
,0
57
43
,9
33
26
7
23
03
25
70
49
,8
58
R
us
si
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
36
0
41
41
97
11
22
90
3
51
7
52
0
33
,7
07
20
50
14
7,
85
4
11
32
93
42
10
,4
74
28
2,
10
0
12
3,
49
0
10
49
78
95
89
44
28
7,
18
8
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
7
0
7
7
69
0
28
1
1
84
85
22
23
20
50
28
,0
94
13
3
14
44
15
77
13
,1
92
23
,9
26
12
7
12
71
13
98
13
,5
44
M
on
go
lia
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
24
0
11
11
78
13
1
0
25
25
25
8
20
50
31
77
17
15
2
16
9
19
97
29
38
16
13
9
15
5
19
71
W
es
t 
C
as
pi
an
 S
ea
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
16
3
0
78
79
47
2
88
2
1
17
3
17
4
15
58
20
50
30
,2
81
96
12
07
13
03
12
,0
25
26
,0
53
94
11
20
12
14
12
,0
88
E
as
t C
as
pi
an
 
Se
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
13
4
0
65
65
11
25
77
3
1
17
0
17
0
37
59
20
50
32
,0
74
20
2
17
85
19
88
30
,4
93
27
,2
53
19
5
15
80
17
75
30
,8
52
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
8 Energy Scenario Results
324
Ta
bl
e 
8.
67
 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
di
sp
at
ch
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
E
ur
as
ia
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
R
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 
av
oi
d 
cu
rt
ai
lm
en
t
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
ba
tte
ry
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
PS
H
-th
ro
ug
h-
pu
t-
To
ta
l 
st
or
ag
e 
de
m
an
d 
(i
nc
l. 
H
2)
D
is
pa
tc
h 
hy
dr
og
en
- 
ba
se
d
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
[G
W
h/
ye
ar
]
C
en
tr
al
 A
si
a
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
0
0
0
0
30
9
0
0
1
1
10
90
20
50
24
95
39
21
1
25
0
12
,1
81
23
91
39
20
7
24
5
12
,0
37
E
ur
as
ia
 
E
as
te
rn
 
E
ur
op
e
20
20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
30
73
6
2
33
9
34
1
14
,1
06
60
31
7
12
87
12
95
48
,5
16
20
50
29
6,
49
0
18
94
16
,7
67
18
,6
61
40
1,
04
4
24
9,
98
4
17
88
14
,5
15
16
,3
03
40
7,
53
7
S. Teske et al.
325
 0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
 0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
TW
h/yrP
J/
yr
Transport fuels Transport electricity
Industry fuels Industry electricity
Residential & other sectors fuels Residential & other sectors electricity
total power demand (incl. synfuels & H2)
Fig. 8.71 Non-OECD Asia: development of the final energy demand by sector in the scenarios
8.11  Non-OECD Asia
8.11.1  Non-OECD Asia: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.11.1.1  Non-OECD Asia: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The future development pathways for Non-OECD Asia’s final energy demand when 
the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are com-
bined are shown in Fig. 8.71 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 111% from the cur-
rent 24,500 PJ/year to 51,800 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0  °C Scenario, the final 
energy demand will increase at a much lower rate by 16% compared with current 
consumption, and will reach 28,300 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario will reach 25,700 PJ, 5% above the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C 
Scenario, the final energy demand in 2050 will be 9% lower than in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario. The electricity demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power- 
to- heat or e-mobility) will increase from 830 TWh/year in 2015 to 2480 TWh/year 
in 2050 in both alternative scenarios. Compared with the reference case (3880 TWh/
year in 2050), the efficiency measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios will save 
1400 TWh/year in 2050.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be approxi-
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mately 1500 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport 
sector, the electricity demand will be approximately 1700 TWh/year due to electric 
mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process 
heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an addi-
tional power demand of 1700 TWh/year. Therefore, the gross power demand will 
rise from 1400 TWh/year in 2015 to 6400 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
33% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity 
demand will increase to a maximum of 6000 TWh/year in 2050.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than those in the 
electricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption 
equivalent to about 6900 PJ/year and 8100 PJ/year, respectively, will be avoided by 
2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, through efficiency gains.
8.11.1.2  Non-OECD Asia: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in Non-OECD Asia will 
come from renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—
mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 87% of the total electric-
ity generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 59% by 
2030 and 87% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 610 
GW by 2030 and 2430 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation 
in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 74%. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the 
generation capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 2320 GW in 2050.
Table 8.68 shows the development of different renewable technologies in Non- 
OECD Asia over time. Figure  8.72 provides an overview of the overall power- 
generation structure in Non-OECD Asia. From 2020 onwards, the continuing 
growth of wind and PV up to 635 GW and 1280 GW, respectively, will be comple-
mented by up to 275 GW solar thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, 
geothermal, and ocean energy in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 
1.5 °C Scenario will lead to a high proportion of variable power generation (PV, 
wind, and ocean) of 34% and 48%, respectively, by 2030, and 64% and 66%, 
respectively, by 2050.
8.11.1.3  Non-OECD Asia: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.73 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated elec-
tricity generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 5.2 ct/kWh. In 
the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2050, when they reach 11.7 
ct/kWh. The generation costs will increase in the 2.0 °C Scenario until 2030, when 
they will reach 8.1 ct/kWh, and will drop to 6.3 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5  °C 
S. Teske et al.
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Table 8.68 Non-OECD Asia: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 63 85 124 151 183
2.0 °C 63 86 86 90 91
1.5 °C 63 86 86 90 91
Biomass 5.0 °C 7 10 17 22 31
2.0 °C 7 19 19 30 36
1.5 °C 7 19 20 31 39
Wind 5.0 °C 2 5 17 32 54
2.0 °C 2 53 148 389 635
1.5 °C 2 98 229 458 631
Geothermal 5.0 °C 3 4 6 8 10
2.0 °C 3 6 23 50 63
1.5 °C 3 7 26 47 54
PV 5.0 °C 3 9 26 44 70
2.0 °C 3 107 287 806 1282
1.5 °C 3 157 396 907 1256
CSP 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 5 45 134 275
1.5 °C 0 5 45 110 224
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 2 20 50
1.5 °C 0 0 2 15 30
Total 5.0 °C 78 113 191 257 348
2.0 °C 78 276 610 1518 2432
1.5 °C 78 373 804 1658 2325
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Scenario, they will increase to 7.9 ct/kWh, and drop to 6.1 ct/kWh by 2050. In both 
alternative scenarios, the generation costs in 2050 will be around 5.5 ct/kWh lower 
than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that these estimates of generation costs do not take into 
account integration costs such as power grid expansion, storage, or other load- 
balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $70 billion/year to more 
than $560 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs will be 
$430 billion/year and in the 1.5  °C Scenario they will be $390 billion/year. The 
long-term costs for electricity supply will be more than 24% lower in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and 
the electrification of heating and mobility. Further reductions in demand in the 
1.5 °C Scenario will result in total power generation costs that are 30% lower than 
in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0  °C case to 7.4 ct/kWh. In the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, they still increase until 2030, when they reach 6.5 ct/kWh, and then drop 
to 6.3 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 6.9 ct/kWh and 
then drop to 6.1 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C case, the generation costs will be 
maximum in 2050, and 1.1 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C, whereas they will be 
1.3 ct/kWh in the 1.5 °C Scenario. If the CO2 costs are not considered, the total 
electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will increase to about $360 billion/year in 
2050.
S. Teske et al.
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8.11.1.4  Non-OECD Asia: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of $4030 billion will be required for power generation between 2015 
and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including investment in additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in plant replace-
ment at the end of their economic lifetimes. This value is equivalent to approxi-
mately $112 billion per year on average, and is $2660 billion more than in the 
5.0 °C case ($1370 billion). An investment of around $3950 billion for power gen-
eration will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, 
this is an investment of $110 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment 
in conventional power plants will be around 55% of the total cumulative invest-
ments, whereas approximately 45% will be invested in renewable power generation 
and co-generation (Fig. 8.74). 
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, Non-OECD Asia will shift almost 93% 
(95%) of its entire investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil 
fuel share of power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas power plants 
that can also be operated with hydrogen.
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Fig. 8.74 Non-OECD Asia: investment shares for power generation in the scenarios
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Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative fuel 
cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $2610 billion in 2050, equiva-
lent to $73 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be equivalent to 
98% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0 °C Scenario. The fuel cost 
savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $2770 billion, or $77 billion per year.
8.11.1.5  Non-OECD Asia: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase by 103% in the 5.0 °C scenario, 
from 10,800 PJ/year in 2015 to 21,900 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 32% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, relative to the 5.0 °C case, and by 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply around 43% of Non-OECD Asia’s final energy demand for heat-
ing, with the main contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 57% 
of Non-OECD Asia’s total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 70% in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario. In both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total 
heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.75 shows the development of different technologies for heating in Non- 
OECD Asia over time, and Table 8.69 provides the resulting renewable heat supply 
for all scenarios. Up to 2030, biomass remains the main contributor. In the long 
term, the growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead to a 
biomass share of 40% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 38% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The 
heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels in 
both scenarios. The hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 900 PJ/year in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1300 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of elec-
tricity for heating will also increase by a factor of 5-5.7 between 2015 and 2050. 
Energy for heating will have a final energy share of 34% in 2050  in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and 32% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
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8.11.1.6  Non-OECD Asia: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $1120 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
for the replacement of plants after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $31 
billion per year. The largest share of investment in Non-OECD Asia is assumed to 
be for solar collectors (around $480 billion), followed by heat pumps and geother-
mal heat use. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable 
technologies. However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) 
will results in a lower average annual investment of around $28 billion per year 
(Table 8.70, Fig. 8.76).
8.11.1.7  Non-OECD Asia: Transport
The energy demand in the transport sector in Non-OECD Asia is expected to 
increase in 2015  in the 5.0  °C Scenario from around 6500 PJ/year by 102% to 
13,200 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and 
behavioural changes will save 63% (8320 PJ/year) by 2050 compared to the 5.0 °C 
Scenario. Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the 
transport demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 
73% (or 9660 PJ/year) by 2050 compared to the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.71, Fig. 8.77).
By 2030, electricity will provide 6% (120 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 36% 
(480 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 650 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
Table 8.69 Non-OECD Asia: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding 
the direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 4459 4800 4787 4878 4919
2.0 °C 4459 4680 4529 4232 3948
1.5 °C 4459 4772 4890 4054 3549
Solar heating 5.0 °C 4 12 33 70 128
2.0 °C 4 401 1129 2252 2723
1.5 °C 4 509 1221 2141 2389
Geothermal heat and  heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 141 740 1563 2410
1.5 °C 0 262 839 1587 2198
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 0 454 862
1.5 °C 0 0 133 735 1274
Total 5.0 °C 4464 4811 4821 4948 5047
2.0 °C 4464 5222 6398 8501 9942
1.5 °C 4464 5542 7083 8516 9411
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Table 8.70 Non-OECD Asia: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 1886 1925 1767 1610 1459
2.0 °C 1886 1850 1557 1150 821
1.5 °C 1886 1829 1693 1084 713
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 4 18 51 73
1.5 °C 0 4 15 44 64
Solar heating 5.0 °C 1 3 10 20 37
2.0 °C 1 114 321 639 772
1.5 °C 1 145 349 609 678
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 13 58 103 159
1.5 °C 0 27 70 110 144
Totala 5.0 °C 1888 1928 1777 1631 1496
2.0 °C 1888 1981 1954 1944 1825
1.5 °C 1888 2004 2127 1847 1598
a Excluding direct electric heating
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port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 350 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 500 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 1940 PJ/year 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
duced, with a maximum amount of 530 PJ/year in 2050. Due to the lower overall 
energy demand in transport, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a 
Table 8.71 Non-OECD Asia: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 76 81 81 83 83
2.0 °C 76 96 116 158 183
1.5 °C 76 115 124 148 212
Road 5.0 °C 6023 7139 9256 11,061 12,181
2.0 °C 6023 6694 6489 5251 4245
1.5 °C 6023 5493 4217 3258 2903
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 225 353 447 581 621
2.0 °C 225 240 220 180 143
1.5 °C 225 230 200 139 108
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 196 216 227 246 267
2.0 °C 196 216 227 246 267
1.5 °C 196 216 227 246 267
Total 5.0 °C 6521 7789 10,010 11,970 13,153
2.0 °C 6521 7246 7051 5834 4838
1.5 °C 6521 6053 4769 3791 3489
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maximum of 1540 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 
280 PJ/year.
8.11.1.8  Non-OECD Asia: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, Non-OECD Asia’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 
160%, from 1880 Mt. in 2015 to 4880 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation mea-
sures in both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 630 Mt. 
in 2040 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 330 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further 
reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 121 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 42 
Gt and 32 Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 65% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 74% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by the 
‘Residential and other’ and ‘Industry’ sectors (Fig. 8.78).
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8.11.1.9  Non-OECD Asia: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.79. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will increase by 13%, from around 38,100 PJ/
year in 2015 to 43,200 PJ/year. Compared with the 5.0  °C Scenario, the overall 
primary energy demand will decrease by 47% by 2050  in the 2.0  °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 81600 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will 
be even lower (39,300 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conversion 
losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario aim to rapidly phase-out coal and 
oil. This will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 40% in 2030 
and 93% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will 
have a primary energy share of more than 92% in 2050 (including non-energy con-
sumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased out by 
2045  in both the 2.0  °C Scenario and 1.5  °C Scenario. The cumulative primary 
energy consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 430 EJ, the 
cumulative coal consumption to about 530 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 580 
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EJ. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 
260 EJ, the cumulative coal demand to 120 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 
270 EJ. Even lower fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 230 EJ 
for natural gas, 70 EJ for coal, and 190 EJ for oil.
8.11.2  Non-OECD Asia: Power Sector Analysis
Non-OECD Asia is the most heterogeneous region of all IEA world energy regions 
because it includes not only all the ASEAN countries (ASEAN 2018) of South East 
Asia, but also central and south Asian nations, as well all 16 Pacific Island states. As 
for the Caribbean Islands, a power system assessment—especially with regard to 
possible storage demand—that examines all Pacific Island states together rather 
than individually, is not sufficient to provide the actual required storage demand. 
However, with this is in mind, the ratio of solar PV generation to storage require-
ments does provide some indication. A specific assessment for each of the Pacific 
Island states is required, but is beyond the scope of this study. Indonesia and the 
Philippines are selected as sub-regions because they are island states with some 
interconnection between islands.
8.11.2.1  Non-OECD Asia: Development of Power Plant Capacities
Non-OECD Asia’s renewable power market can be subdivided into the following 
categories: technologies for small and medium islands (mainly solar PV–battery 
systems, mini-hydro and small-scale bioenergy systems); and utility-scale solar and 
onshore wind for all major economies in mainland Asia or on the large islands of 
the Philippines and Indonesia. Several countries in this region are on the Pacific 
Ring of Fire and have significant geothermal energy resources. The annual market 
for geothermal power plants is one of the world’s largest, with a projected 3–4 GW 
each year for almost two decades between 2025 and 2045  in both scenarios 
(Table 8.72).
8.11.2.2  Non-OECD Asia: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
Due to the geographic diversity and wide distribution of all sub-regions of the Non- 
OECD Asia region, it is assumed that there are no interconnection capacities avail-
able, and that there will not be any at the end of the modelling period (Table 8.73). 
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In both scenarios, variable power generation will jump from only 1% today to 
around 25% in all sub-regions, whereas dispatchable renewables will remain stable 
at around 25%–30% until 2050.
Compared with other world regions, the capacity factors for limited dispatchable 
fossil and nuclear energy will remain relatively high until 2030, as shown in 
Table 8.74. The time required for variable power generation to replace fossil and 
nuclear generation will be greater than it is in other regions. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, 
all coal capacities across the region will be phased out by 2030, except for 4 GW 
(equivalent to 4–5 power plants), which will be off-line 5 years later.
8.11.2.3  Non-OECD Asia: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
Because both scenarios were calculated under the assumption that there are no 
interconnection capacities at the sub-regional level, more dispatch capacity will be 
deployed. Table 8.75 shows that only Asia North-West and Asia South-West will 
require some interconnection to avoid curtailment. The development of the maxi-
mum load, generation, and the resulting residual load—the load remaining after 
Table 8.72 Non-OECD Asia: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
Non-OECD-Asia power generation: average 
annual change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 2 −6 −7 −4 −1 0
Lignite −2 −4 −1 −2 0 0
Gas 4 10 19 14 −26 −22
Hydrogen-gas 0 1 0 6 33 24
Oil/diesel 0 −5 −4 −5 −1 0
Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0
Biomass 2 1 1 1 1 1
Hydro 3 2 0 0 0 0
Wind (onshore) 4 21 20 24 26 20
Wind (offshore) 3 7 6 7 5 4
PV (roof top) 10 36 40 47 50 37
PV (utility scale) 3 12 13 16 17 12
Geothermal 0 3 4 4 2 1
Solar thermal power plants 1 6 9 8 17 13
Ocean energy 0 0 1 1 3 2
Renewable fuel based co-generation 1 2 1 1 1 1
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variable renewable generation. According to the Philippine Department of Energy, 
the peak demand in the Philippines in 2016 was 13.3 GW (PR-DoE 2016) (9.7 GW 
in Luzon, 1.9 GW in the Visayas, and 1.7 GW in Mindanao). The calculated load for 
the Philippines in 2020 was 16.3 GW, which seems realistic. The load will increase 
to 75.5 GW by 2050 under the 2.0 °C Scenario. The results for all Asian regions 
show a quadrupling of load by 2050.
The lack of interconnection potential between or even within most sub-regions 
will lead to some curtailment.
Table 8.76 shows that whereas countries on the Asian mainland will use and 
increase their capacity for hydro pump storage electricity, batteries will be used for 
most of the storage requirements of islands and island states. Where available, gas 
infrastructure must be converted to hydrogen-operated systems.
Table 8.74 Non-OECD Asia: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
Non-OECD 
Asia 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 55.4% 52% 53% 45% 42% 33% 33% 34% 32%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 71.4% 52% 53% 44% 33% 31% 13% 25% 0%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 40.5% 61% 61% 59% 56% 58% 53% 45% 49%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 50.2% 32% 33% 23% 27% 37% 13% 28% 12%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 34.4% 75% 75% 74% 69% 41% 58% 53% 51%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 13.1% 19% 19% 36% 35% 26% 31% 30% 29%
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8.12  India
8.12.1  India: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.12.1.1  India: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The future development pathways for India’s final energy demand when the assump-
tions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are combined are 
shown in Fig.  8.80 for the 5.0  °C, 2.0  °C, and 1.5  °C Scenarios. In the 5.0  °C 
Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 201% from the current 
22,200 PJ/year to 66,800 PJ/year by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand will increase at a much slower rate by 57% compared with current con-
sumption and will reach 34,900 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 
1.5  °C Scenario will reach 31,900 PJ, 44% above the 2015 level. In the 1.5  °C 
Scenario, the final energy demand in 2050 will be 9% lower than in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario. The electricity demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power- 
to- heat or e-mobility) will increase from 750 TWh/year in 2015 to 3200 TWh/year 
in 2050 in both alternative scenarios. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (4720 TWh/
year in 2050), efficiency measures in the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios will save 
around 1520 TWh/year by 2050.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be  approximately 
1900 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector, 
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the electricity demand will be approximately 3400 TWh/year due to electric mobil-
ity. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process heat) 
and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an additional 
power demand of 1700 TWh/year. Therefore, the gross power demand will increase 
from 1400 TWh/year in 2015 to 8400 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
31% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity 
demand will increases to a maximum of 7700 TWh/year in 2050.
Efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the electricity 
sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equivalent to 
about 9500 PJ/year and 9800 PJ/year, respectively, will be avoided through effi-
ciency gains by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.12.1.2  India: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in India will come from 
renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—mainly wind, 
solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 90% of the total electricity genera-
tion. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 66% by 2030 and 
89% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 1060 GW by 
2030 and 3360 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation in 
2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 77%. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gen-
eration capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 3040 GW in 2050.
Table 8.77 shows the development of different renewable technologies in India 
over time. Figure 8.81 provides an overview of the overall power-generation struc-
ture in India. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV up to 1270 
GW and 1570 GW, respectively, is complemented by up to 210 GW solar thermal 
generation, as well as limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario will lead to a high propor-
tion of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 48% and 60%, respec-
tively, by 2030, and 75% and 72%, respectively, by 2050.
8.12.1.3  India: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.82 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated elec-
tricity generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 5.4 ct/kWh. In 
the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2040, when they reach 11 ct/
kWh, and then drop to 10.7 ct/kWh by 2050. The generation costs will increase in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario until 2030, when they reach 8.4 ct/kWh, and then drop to 5.7 ct/
kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 7.8 ct/kWh, and then 
drop to 5.8 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation costs in 2050 will 
be 5 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the generation 
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Table 8.77 India: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 46 68 81 97 117
2.0 °C 46 68 72 80 87
1.5 °C 46 68 72 80 87
Biomass 5.0 °C 8 13 16 20 25
2.0 °C 8 23 31 60 93
1.5 °C 8 23 31 60 93
Wind 5.0 °C 25 82 119 185 246
2.0 °C 25 200 421 938 1273
1.5 °C 25 275 543 1002 1110
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 3 8 42 68
1.5 °C 0 3 8 42 68
PV 5.0 °C 5 115 198 345 545
2.0 °C 5 230 469 1090 1572
1.5 °C 5 365 648 1185 1412
CSP 5.0 °C 0 0 1 1 2
2.0 °C 0 8 48 138 209
1.5 °C 0 8 48 138 209
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 1 11 33 59
1.5 °C 0 1 11 33 59
Total 5.0 °C 84 279 415 648 936
2.0 °C 84 532 1061 2381 3360
1.5 °C 84 742 1361 2540 3037
 0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
TW
h/
yr
Ocean Energy
CSP
Geothermal
Biomass
PV
Wind
Hydro
Hydrogen
Nuclear
Diesel
Oil
Gas
Lignite
Coal
Fig. 8.81 India: development of electricity-generation structure in the scenarios
8 Energy Scenario Results
348
costs in 2050 will be 4.9 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case. Note that these esti-
mates of generation costs do not take into account integration costs such as power 
grid expansion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $75 billion/year to more 
than $690 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C case, the total supply costs will be $500 
billion/year and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $470 billion/year. The long- term 
costs for electricity supply will be more than 27% lower in the 2.0 °C Scenario than 
in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and the electrifi-
cation of heating and mobility. Further demand reductions in the 1.5 °C Scenario 
will result in total power generation costs that are 32% lower than in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs, when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered, will increase in the 5.0 °C case to only 6.9 ct/kWh. In both alter-
native scenarios, they will still increase until 2030, when they reach 6.7 ct/kWh, and 
then drop to around 5.8 ct/kWh by 2050. The maximum difference in generation 
costs will be around 1 ct/kWh in 2050. If the CO2 costs are not considered, the total 
electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will rise to about $430 billion/year in 2050.
8.12.1.4  India: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $5640 billion will be required for power generation between 
2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants for the pro-
duction of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in the replacement of plants 
after the end of their economic lifetimes. This value is equivalent to approximately $157 
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billion per year on average, and is $3310 billion more than in the 5.0 °C case ($2330 
billion). An investment of around $5560 billion for power generation will be required 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, this will be an investment 
of $154 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the investment in conventional power 
plants will be around 48% of the total cumulative investments, whereas approximately 
52% will be invested in renewable power generation and co-generation (Fig. 8.83).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, India will shift almost 94% (95%) of 
its entire investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil fuel share 
of the power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas power plants that 
can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $3110 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $86 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 90% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $3330 billion, 
or $93 billion per year.
8.12.1.5  India: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 133%, 
from 11,900 PJ/year in 2015 to 27,800 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 34% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Fossil
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Fig. 8.83 India: investment shares for power generation in the scenarios
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Scenario, relative to the 5.0 °C case, and by 35% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply around 47% of India’s final energy demand for heating, with the 
main contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 53% of India’s 
total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 68% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In 
both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.84 shows the development of different technologies for heating in India 
over time, and Table 8.78 provides the resulting renewable heat supply for all sce-
narios. Up to 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. In the long term, the 
increasing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead to a biomass 
share of 38% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 36% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
under both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 1400 PJ/year 
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Table 8.78 India: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the direct use 
of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 5544 5633 5666 5595 5341
2.0 °C 5544 5726 5600 4854 4366
1.5 °C 5544 5600 5444 4758 4078
Solar heating 5.0 °C 28 77 115 200 310
2.0 °C 28 589 1537 2964 3693
1.5 °C 28 887 2271 3107 3626
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 1 1 1 2
2.0 °C 0 164 647 1627 2136
1.5 °C 0 189 725 1497 2103
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 2 299 1409
1.5 °C 0 0 2 437 1613
Total 5.0 °C 5572 5711 5781 5796 5653
2.0 °C 5572 6478 7787 9743 11,603
1.5 °C 5572 6675 8442 9800 11,420
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in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1600 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of 
electricity for heating will also increase by a factor of about 21 between 2015 and 
2050, and the electricity for heating will have a final energy share of 36% in 2050 in 
both alternative scenarios.
8.12.1.6  India: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
amount to around $930 billion in the 2.0  °C Scenario (including investments for 
replacement after the economic lifetimes of the plants), or approximately $26 billion 
per year. The largest share of investment in India is assumed to be for solar collectors 
(around $490 billion), followed by heat pumps and biomass technologies. The 1.5 °C 
Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technologies and results in a 
higher average annual investment of around $29 billion per year (Table 8.79, Fig. 8.85).
8.12.1.7  India: Transport
The energy demand in the transport sector in India is expected to increase in the 
5.0 °C Scenario by 377%, from around 3600 PJ/year in 2015 to 17,200 PJ/year in 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes 
will save 66% (11,280 PJ/year) by 2050 compared to the 5.0 °C Scenario. Additional 
modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the transport demand will lead 
to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 81% (or 13,930 PJ/year) in 
2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.80, Fig. 8.86).
By 2030, electricity will provide 10% (160 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 58% 
Table 8.79 India: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 2049 1923 1836 1633 1432
2.0 °C 2049 1954 1798 1311 856
1.5 °C 2049 1916 1756 1276 785
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 2 9 32 38
1.5 °C 0 5 12 28 37
Solar heating 5.0 °C 6 17 25 43 67
2.0 °C 6 126 327 619 777
1.5 °C 6 191 486 653 763
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 12 42 90 131
1.5 °C 0 11 46 82 129
Totala 5.0 °C 2055 1940 1861 1676 1499
2.0 °C 2055 2094 2177 2052 1802
1.5 °C 2055 2122 2300 2039 1715
a Excluding direct electric heating
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(950 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 860 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 560 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 590 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0 °C Scenario to a maximum of around 1000 PJ/year. 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be introduced, 
with a maximum amount of 610 PJ/year in 2050. Due to the lower overall energy 
demand in transport, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a maximum 
of 510 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 310 PJ/year.
8.12.1.8  India: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, India’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 236%, from 
2060 Mt. in 2015 to 6950 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures in both 
alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 930 Mt. in 2040 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and to 200 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further reductions to 
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almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions from 2015 
until 2050 will add up to 169 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the 
cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 55 Gt and 38 Gt, 
respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 67% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 78% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in the annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 
Table 8.80 India: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 180 238 278 353 423
2.0 °C 180 270 325 421 526
1.5 °C 180 219 234 332 446
Road 5.0 °C 3294 5861 7880 12,152 16,455
2.0 °C 3294 5017 5562 5301 5285
1.5 °C 3294 4253 3125 2977 2730
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 84 131 166 216 231
2.0 °C 84 89 81 66 52
1.5 °C 84 85 74 52 40
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 29 34 36 40 52
2.0 °C 29 34 36 40 52
1.5 °C 29 34 36 40 52
Total 5.0 °C 3587 6263 8360 12,762 17,161
2.0 °C 3587 5410 6006 5828 5914
1.5 °C 3587 4590 3470 3401 3268
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2.0 °C Scenario, the reduction will be greatest in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, 
followed by the ‘Power generation’ and ‘Industry’ sectors (Fig. 8.87).
8.12.1.9  India: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.88. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will increase by 43%, from around 35,600 PJ/
year in 2015 to 50,900 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
overall primary energy demand will decrease by 51% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 104,800 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand 
will be even lower (47,100 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conver-
sion losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 40% in 2030 and 
94% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 94% in 2050 (including non-energy consump-
tion, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased out by 
2050 in both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy con-
sumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 160 EJ, the cumulative coal 
consumption to about 1180 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 570 EJ. In contrast, 
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in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 120 EJ, the cumu-
lative coal demand to 360 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 220 EJ. Even lower 
fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 130 EJ for natural gas, 220 
EJ for coal, and 150 EJ for oil.
8.12.2  India: Power Sector Analysis
The electricity market in India is in dynamic development. The government of India 
is making great efforts to increase the reliability of the power supply and at the same 
time, it is developing universal access to electric power. In 2017, about 300 million 
Indians (RF 2018) had no power or inadequate power. In 2017, the Indian 
Government launched The Third National Electricity Plan, which covers two 5-year 
periods: 2017–2022 and 2022–2027. According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) Policies and Measures Database (IEA P + M DB 2018):
[…] “the plan covers short- and long-term demand forecasts in different regions and recom-
mend areas for transmission and generation capacity additions … However, as India sets to 
meet its first nationally-determined contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement … 
Highlights of the plan include, that during the period 2017–22, no additional capacity of 
coal will be added – except for the coal power plants under construction […]”.
 0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
5.
0°
C
2.
0°
C
1.
5°
C
2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
PJ
/y
r
net electricity
imports
Efficiency
Ocean energy
Geothermal
Solar
Biomass
Wind
Hydro
Natural gas
Crude oil
Coal
Nuclear
Fig. 8.88 India: projection of total primary energy demand (PED) by energy carrier in the sce-
narios (including electricity import balance)
8 Energy Scenario Results
356
In terms of renewable power generation, India aims to have a total capacity of 275 
GW for solar and wind and 72 GW for hydro, with no further increase in the coal 
power plant capacity until at least 2027.
8.12.2.1  India: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The Third National Electricity Plan for India is an important foundation for strength-
ening India’s renewable power market in order to achieve the levels envisaged in 
both alternative scenarios. Whereas the hydropower target is consistent with the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C targets, the solar and wind capacity of 275 GW must be reached 
between 2020 and 2025 for both scenarios. The annual installation rates for solar 
PV installations must increase to around 50 GW—the market size in China in 
2017—and remain at that level until 2040 to implement either the 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C 
Scenario. The installation rates for onshore wind must be equally high. In 2017, 
4.15 GW of new wind turbines were installed, and significant growth is required. 
Offshore wind and concentrated solar power plants have significant potential for 
selected regions of India. Both technologies are vital to achieving the 2.0  °C or 
1.5 °C targets (Table 8.81).
Table 8.81 India: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
India power generation: average annual change 
of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 7 −7 −6 −7 −15 −6
Lignite 0 −1 −1 −2 −2 −1
Gas 9 13 7 7 −14 17
Hydrogen-Gas 0 0 1 1 32 32
Oil/Diesel 0 −1 −1 −1 0 0
Nuclear 1 0 0 0 −1 −1
Biomass 2 2 2 2 4 4
Hydro 3 2 1 1 1 1
Wind (onshore) 20 55 54 59 44 21
Wind (offshore) 2 6 7 7 5 4
PV (roof top) 21 55 49 53 51 30
PV (utility scale) 7 18 16 18 17 10
Geothermal 0 1 3 3 4 4
Solar thermal power plants 1 6 11 11 10 10
Ocean energy 0 1 3 3 3 3
Renewable fuel based co-generation 0 1 2 2 3 3
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8.12.2.2  India: Utilization of Power-Generation Capacities
The division of India into five sub-regions is intended to reflect the main grid zones 
and it is assumed that interconnection will continue to increase to 15% in 2030 and 
20% in 2050. Both scenarios aim for an even distribution of variable power plant 
capacities across all Indian sub-regions. By 2030, the variable power generation 
will reach 40% in most regions, whereas dispatchable renewables will supply about 
one quarter of the demand by 2030 (Table 8.82).
India’s average capacity factors for the entire power plant fleet remain at around 
35% over the entire modelling period, as the calculation results in Table 8.83 show. 
Contributions from limited dispatchable fossil and nuclear power plants will remain 
high until 2030 and indicate that a significant replacement of coal for electricity 
must occur after 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, coal will be 
phased-out just after 2035.
8.12.2.3  India: Development of Load, Generation, and Residual Load
Table 8.84 shows that India’s load is predicted to quadruple in all five sub-regions 
between 2020 and 2050. Under the 2.0 °C Scenario, additional interconnection will 
increase—beyond the assumed 20% target—but may only be required for the west-
ern and southern sub-regions of India. However, for the 1.5 °C Scenario, intercon-
nections must increase in four of the five regions. In the northern region, the 
calculated generation increases faster than the demand. This region has significant 
potential for concentrated solar power plants and could supply neighbouring 
regions.
Table 8.85 shows the storage and dispatch requirements under the 2.0 °C and 
1.5 °C Scenarios. All the regions remain within the maximum curtailment target of 
10%. Table 8.71 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch power 
requirements by sub-region. Charging capacities are moderate compared with other 
world regions. Compared to all other world regions, hydrogen dispatch utilization is 
very low due to a relatively moderate increase in the gas and hydrogen capacities in 
India.
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Table 8.83 India: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
India 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 60.8% 53% 57% 35% 26% 33% 30% 37% 34%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 67.7% 57% 61% 48% 38% 37% 27% 37% 12%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 17.1% 24% 26% 38% 34% 58% 39% 44% 42%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 44.7% 12% 19% 11% 12% 30% 29% 24% 29%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 39.8% 60% 68% 57% 45% 40% 52% 65% 57%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 9.0% 8% 8% 19% 20% 27% 25% 29% 28%
Table 8.82 India: power system shares by technology group
Power 
generation 
structure and 
interconnection
2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Variable 
RE
Dispatch 
RE
Dispatch 
Fossil
Inter- 
connection
Variable 
RE
Dispatch 
RE
Dispatch 
fossil
Inter- 
connection
India-Northern 
Region
2015 4% 32% 64% 10%
2030 41% 28% 31% 15% 56% 24% 20% 15%
2050 60% 38% 2% 20% 48% 35% 17% 20%
India-North-
Eastern Region
2015 4% 32% 64% 10%
2030 44% 26% 30% 15% 58% 21% 21% 15%
2050 95% 5% 0% 20% 92% 5% 3% 20%
India-Eastern 
Region
2015 4% 32% 64% 10%
2030 51% 26% 23% 15% 68% 22% 10% 15%
2050 73% 26% 1% 20% 69% 29% 2% 20%
India-Western 
Region
2015 4% 32% 64% 10%
2030 44% 26% 30% 15% 57% 21% 22% 15%
2050 70% 29% 1% 20% 49% 24% 27% 20%
India-Southern 
Region
2015 4% 32% 64% 10%
2030 48% 23% 29% 15% 60% 18% 22% 15%
2050 78% 21% 1% 20% 62% 19% 19% 20%
India 2015 4% 32% 64%
2030 45% 26% 29% 60% 21% 19%
2050 72% 27% 1% 58% 26% 16%
S. Teske et al.
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8.13  China
8.13.1  China: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.13.1.1  China: Final Energy Demand by Sector
The future development pathways for China’s final energy demand when the assump-
tions on population growth, GDP growth and energy intensity are combined are 
shown in Fig.  8.89 for the 5.0  °C, 2.0  °C, and 1.5  °C Scenarios. In the 5.0  °C 
Scenario, the total final energy demand will increase by 56% from the current 73,600 
PJ/year to 114,600 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy demand 
will decreases by 26% compared with current consumption and will reach 54,400 
PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will reach 49,200 
PJ, 33% below the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final energy demand in 
2050 will be 10% lower than in the 2.0  °C Scenario. The electricity demand for 
‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will increase 
from 3470 TWh/year in 2015 to around 5230 TWh/year in both alternative scenarios 
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by 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (9480 TWh/year in 2050), the efficiency 
measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios save around 4250 TWh/year by 2050.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the electricity demand for heating will be approxi-
mately 2800 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps and in the transport 
sector, the electricity demand will be approximately 4200 TWh/year due to electric 
mobility. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process 
heat) and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an addi-
tional power demand of 3900 TWh/year. Therefore, the gross power demand will 
rise from 5900 TWh/year in 2015 to 13,800 TWh/year in 2050  in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, 11% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross elec-
tricity demand will increase to a maximum of 13,300 TWh/year in 2050.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the elec-
tricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 24,400 PJ/year and 27,600 PJ/year, respectively, will be avoided 
through efficiency gains by 2050 compared to the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.13.1.2  China: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power from renew-
able sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in China will come from 
renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—mainly wind, 
solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 77% of the total electricity genera-
tion. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 54% by 2030 and 
84% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 2170 GW by 
2030 and 5420 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation in 
2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 63%. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gen-
eration capacity from renewable energy will be approximately 5310 GW in 2050.
Table 8.86 shows the development of different renewable technologies in China 
over time. Figure 8.90 provides an overview of the overall power-generation struc-
ture in China. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and PV, up to 
1670 GW and 2220 GW, respectively, will be complemented by up to 680 GW solar 
thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, in the 
2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to a high proportion 
of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 28% and 34%, respectively, 
by 2030, and 51% and 52%, respectively, by 2050.
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Table 8.86 China: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 320 395 424 477 525
2.0 °C 320 383 396 420 450
1.5 °C 320 383 396 420 450
Biomass 5.0 °C 11 24 29 39 48
2.0 °C 11 57 101 158 195
1.5 °C 11 72 106 160 195
Wind 5.0 °C 132 343 408 536 667
2.0 °C 132 428 678 1299 1674
1.5 °C 132 508 877 1460 1652
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 1 3
2.0 °C 0 4 19 77 134
1.5 °C 0 7 29 77 119
PV 5.0 °C 43 265 330 430 565
2.0 °C 43 504 889 1614 2218
1.5 °C 43 604 1036 1781 2215
CSP 5.0 °C 0 3 5 7 11
2.0 °C 0 11 84 413 677
1.5 °C 0 16 103 391 614
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 0 0 1 1
2.0 °C 0 1 7 33 74
1.5 °C 0 1 7 33 62
Total 5.0 °C 505 1029 1196 1490 1819
2.0 °C 505 1390 2175 4015 5421
1.5 °C 505 1592 2555 4322 5307
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8.13.1.3  China: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.91 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated elec-
tricity generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 4.7 ct/kWh. In 
the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2030, when they reach 9.2 
ct/kWh, and then drop to 8.8 ct/kWh by 2050. The generation costs will increase in 
the alternative scenarios until 2030, when they reach around 8 ct/kWh, and will then 
drop to 6.5 ct/kWh by 2050, 2.3 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C Scenario. Note that 
these estimates of generation costs do not take into account integration costs such as 
power grid expansion, storage, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 °C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $310 billion/year to more 
than $1230 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C case, the total supply costs will be 
$1030 billion/year and $1010 billion/year in the 1.5  °C Scenario. Therefore, the 
long-term costs for electricity supply will be more than 16% lower in the alternative 
scenarios than in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0 °C case to 5.7 ct/kWh in 2030 and stabi-
lize at 5.5 ct/kWh in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, they increase continuously until 
2050, when they reach 6.6 ct/kWh. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 7 ct/
kWh and then drop to 6.6 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation 
costs will be a maximum of 1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case, and this will 
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occur in 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, compared to the 5.0 °C Scenario, the maxi-
mum difference in generation costs will be 1.6 ct/kWh in 2040. The generation costs 
in 2050 will be 1.1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case. If the CO2 costs are not 
considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 5.0 °C case will rise to about 
$810 billion/year in 2050.
8.13.1.4  China: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $9740 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments for plant replace-
ment at the end of their economic lifetimes. This value will be equivalent to approx-
imately $271 billion per year on average and will be $5680 billion more than in the 
5.0 °C case ($4060 billion). An investment of around $9840 billion for power gen-
eration will be required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On average, 
this will be an investment of $273 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the invest-
ment in conventional power plants will be around 29% of the total cumulative 
investments, whereas approximately 71% will be invested in renewable power gen-
eration and co-generation (Fig. 8.92).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, China will shift almost 97% (98%) of 
its entire investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil fuel share 
of the power sector investment will predominantly focus on gas power plants that 
can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in both alternative scenarios will reach a total of more than $6200 
billion in 2050, equivalent to $173 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost 
savings will be equivalent to 110% of the total additional investments compared to 
the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.13.1.5  China: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 38% 
from 42,300 PJ/year in 2015 to 58,200 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures 
will help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 42% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, relative to the 5.0 °C case, and by 47% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, 
renewables supply around 11% of China’s final energy demand for heating, with the 
main contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 32% of China’s 
total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 46% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In 
both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.93 shows the development of different technologies for heating in China 
over time, and Table 8.87 provides the resulting renewable heat supply for all sce-
narios. Up to 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. In the long term, the 
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growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead to a biomass 
share of 24% in both alternative scenarios.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. Hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 4100 PJ/year in 
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the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 4500 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of 
electricity for heating will also increase by a factor of 3.7–4 between 2015 and 2050 
and electricity for heating will have a final energy share of 27% in 2050 in both the 
2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario.
8.13.1.6  China: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $2780 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including investments 
for the replacement of plants after their economic lifetimes), or approximately $77 
billion per year. The largest share of investment in China is assumed to be for heat 
pumps (around $1200 billion), followed by solar collectors and geothermal heat 
use. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of renewable technolo-
gies. However, the lower heat demand (compared with the 2.0 °C Scenario) will 
result in a lower average annual investment of around $67 billion per year 
(Table 8.88, Fig. 8.94).
8.13.1.7  China: Transport
The energy demand in the transport sector in China is expected to increase in the 
5.0 °C Scenario by 107% from around 12,600 PJ/year in 2015 to 26,100 PJ/year in 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes 
will save 68% (17,840 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0  °C Scenario. 
Table 8.87 China: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the direct 
use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 2776 2095 2079 2291 2877
2.0 °C 2776 4609 5603 6254 5967
1.5 °C 2776 5378 6263 6055 5385
Solar heating 5.0 °C 892 1297 1515 1962 2535
2.0 °C 892 2066 2906 5454 5417
1.5 °C 892 2364 3242 4381 4360
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 306 452 526 743 1026
2.0 °C 306 1304 2720 6690 9225
1.5 °C 306 1269 2884 5706 7943
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 0 7 1020 4118
1.5 °C 0 0 7 1890 4549
Total 5.0 °C 3974 3844 4120 4996 6438
2.0 °C 3974 7978 11,237 19,417 24,727
1.5 °C 3974 9011 12,396 18,031 22,237
8 Energy Scenario Results
368
Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in transport demand 
will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 76% (or 19,900 PJ/
year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.89, Fig. 8.95).
By 2030, electricity will provide 21% (680 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 51% 
(1170 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 1600 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand is 860 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a hydro-
gen demand of 1100 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0  °C Scenario to a maximum of 1900 PJ/year. 
Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based on power-to-liquid will be intro-
duced, with a maximum amount of 560 PJ/year in 2050. Due to the lower overall 
energy demand in transport, biofuel use will be reduced in the 1.5 °C Scenario to a 
maximum of around 1400 PJ/year. The maximum synthetic fuel demand will 
amount to 720 PJ/year.
8.13.1.8  China: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, China’s annual CO2 emissions will increase by 25%, from 
9060 Mt. in 2015 to 11,320 Mt. in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures in both 
alternative scenarios will cause annual emissions to fall to 1990 Mt. in 2040 in the 
2.0 °C Scenario and to 760 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further reductions to 
almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions from 2015 
until 2050 will add up to 392 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, the 
Table 8.88 China: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 1194 764 648 519 468
2.0 °C 1194 1284 1214 921 578
1.5 °C 1194 1267 1280 808 481
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 20 46 187 272
1.5 °C 0 20 42 139 161
Solar heating 5.0 °C 281 409 478 618 799
2.0 °C 281 592 843 1546 1539
1.5 °C 281 688 956 1252 1275
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 52 76 89 126 174
2.0 °C 52 151 251 449 565
1.5 °C 52 136 213 349 446
Totala 5.0 °C 1527 1250 1214 1263 1441
2.0 °C 1527 2048 2355 3103 2954
1.5 °C 1527 2111 2491 2549 2361
a Excluding direct electric heating
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cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 174 Gt and 132 
Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 56% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 66% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in annual emissions will occur in both alternative scenarios. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario the reduction will be greatest in the ‘Residential and other’ sector, fol-
lowed by ‘Power generation’ and ‘Transport’ sectors (Fig. 8.96).
8.13.1.9  China: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.97. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 30%, from around 125,000 
PJ/year in 2015 to 87,800 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
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overall primary energy demand will decrease by 54% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 192,300 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand 
will be even lower (80,700 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conver-
sion losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios aim to rapidly phase-out coal and oil. This 
will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 28% in 2030 and 
92% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will have a 
primary energy share of more than 91% in 2050 (including non-energy consump-
Table 8.89 China: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 539 567 593 644 672
2.0 °C 539 589 637 687 762
1.5 °C 539 580 597 622 662
Road 5.0 °C 10,421 15,629 17,651 19,664 22,073
2.0 °C 10,421 11,509 9395 7143 5894
1.5 °C 10,421 9607 7372 4576 4020
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 754 1234 1590 2070 2213
2.0 °C 754 814 742 592 470
1.5 °C 754 777 653 463 366
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 877 984 1035 1113 1157
2.0 °C 877 984 1035 1113 1157
1.5 °C 877 984 1035 1113 1157
Total 5.0 °C 12,591 18,413 20,870 23,490 26,115
2.0 °C 12,591 13,895 11,809 9535 8284
1.5 °C 12,591 11,948 9657 6773 6206
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tion, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out by 
2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and by 2045 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The cumulative 
primary energy consumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 570 EJ, 
the cumulative coal consumption to about 3000 EJ, and the crude oil consumption 
to 1080 EJ.  In contrast, in the 2.0  °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will 
amount to 360 EJ, the cumulative coal demand to 1360 EJ, and the cumulative oil 
demand to 430 EJ. Even lower fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 
440 EJ for natural gas, 930 EJ for coal, and 340 EJ for oil.
8.13.2  China: Power Sector Analysis
China has by far the largest power sector of all world regions—about one quarter of 
the world’s total electricity generation. China’s National Energy Administration 
(NEA) released the 13th Energy Five-Year Plan (FYP) in January 2016 (IEA RED 
2016). The FYP that is in force from 2016 to 2020 introduces framework legislation 
that defines energy development for the next 5 years in China. In parallel to the main 
Energy FYP, there are 14 additional supporting FYPs, such as the Renewable 
Energy 13th FYP, the Wind FYP, and the Electricity FYP, which were all released 
at about the same time (GWEC-NL 2018). According to the Renewable Energy 13th 
FYP, by 2020, the total RE electricity installations will reach 680 GW, with electric-
ity production of 1900 TWh/year This will account for 27% of electricity produc-
tion. The wind power target is set to reach 210 GW by 2020, with electricity 
production of 420 TWh, supplying 6% of China’s total electricity demand. The 
target for offshore wind is 5 GW by 2020 (GWEC-NL 2018). For other renewable 
power-generation technologies, the 2020 targets are 150 GW for solar PV, 10 GW 
for concentrated solar power (CSP), 15 GW for bioenergy, and 380 GW for hydro-
power, including 40 GW hydro pump storage (IEA-RED 2016). The renewable tar-
gets are consistent, to large extent, with both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The 
onshore wind and solar PV capacities in both scenarios will increase to 50 GW and 
are within the current market size range. The targets for the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C 
Scenarios for CSP, bioenergy, and offshore wind are slightly higher than current 
market volumes. However, the first decade of the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will 
reflect the existing trends in China’s power sector.
8.13.2.1  China: Development of Power Plant Capacities
China’s solar PV and wind power markets are the largest in the world and represent 
about half the global annual market for solar PV (in 2017) and a third of the market 
for onshore wind. The continued growth of the annual renewable power market—
for all technologies—for the Chinese market will continue to have a significant 
impact on other world regions. To implement the project’s 2.0 °C Scenario, the cur-
rent solar PV market in China must remain at the 2017 level, and to achieve the 
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1.5 °C Scenario, it must double. The onshore wind market must increase by 50% 
compared with 2015 for the 2.0 °C Scenario and must triple to meet the 1.5 °C tra-
jectory. All these annual market volumes must be maintained until 2035, before a 
moderate reduction in the annual market sizes can occur (Table 8.90).
8.13.2.2  China: Utilization of Power Generation Capacities
Across all regions, an interconnection capacity of 10% is assumed for the base year 
calculation. The interconnection capacity will increase to 20% by 2030, with no 
further increase thereafter. For the entire modelling period, it is assumed that Taiwan 
is not connected to any other region. Under the 2.0 °C Scenario, variable renewables 
will attain a share of around 30% in all sub-regions, whereas the 1.5 °C Scenario 
will lead to shares of over 40% in five of the seven sub-regions (Table 8.91).
Table 8.92 shows the results of the capacity factor calculations done under the 
assumption that variable and dispatchable power plants will have priority access to 
the grid and priority dispatch. The average capacity factors for limited dispatchable 
power plants will remain at around 30% until 2030 under the 2.0 °C Scenario. This 
relatively low factor indicates an overcapacity in China’s power market. The curtail-
ment rates of 20% (REW 1-2018) and more in 2017—mainly for wind farms—con-
firm this.
Table 8.90 China: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
China power generation: average annual change 
of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal 5 −51 −55 −81 −41 −5
Lignite 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gas 4 28 6 30 −16 −17
Hydrogen-Gas 0 0 1 3 24 38
Oil/Diesel 0 −1 0 −1 0 0
Nuclear 3 0 −2 0 −3 −4
Biomass 6 10 9 8 5 5
Hydro 8 5 3 3 3 3
Wind (onshore) 31 65 46 64 36 29
Wind (offshore) 2 12 20 22 11 9
PV (roof top) 41 77 69 76 62 50
PV (utility scale) 14 26 23 25 21 17
Geothermal 1 4 5 6 8 6
Solar thermal power plants 1 13 34 29 40 30
Ocean energy 0 1 2 2 5 4
Renewable fuel based co-generation 4 9 10 9 8 8
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8.13.2.3  China: Development of Load, Generation, and Residual Load
The load for China is calculated to continue to increase. Table 8.93 shows that the 
maximum load will double across all regions. However, the assumed interconnec-
tion rates of 20% are sufficient for the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas significantly higher 
interconnection capacities will be required under the 1.5 °C Scenario. By 2050, all 
regions will have an oversupply under the 1.5 °C Scenario. This surplus electricity 
will be used to produce synthetic fuels and hydrogen. The [R]E 24/7 model does not 
interface with other world regions, so surplus generation will result in a negative 
residual load.
Finally, Table 8.94 provides an overview of the calculated storage and dispatch 
power requirements in the Chinese region. The calculated hydro pump storage 
increase by 2050 is consistent with the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’s requirement for 
40 GW additional capacity. Furthermore, curtailment is within the acceptable range, 
at significantly below 10% in both scenarios by 2050. Battery capacities must 
increase significantly after 2030. The central, southern, and eastern sub-regions of 
mainland China have by far the highest storage requirements.
Table 8.92 China: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
China 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 42.0% 30% 28% 26% 21% 37% 24% 37% 26%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 39.2% 34% 29% 32% 25% 20% 17% 9% 16%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 47.3% 20% 17% 21% 14% 68% 19% 47% 27%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 30.7% 28% 40% 46% 34% 24% 37% 11% 37%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 59.1% 27% 31% 28% 23% 47% 34% 62% 39%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 17.9% 15% 15% 17% 16% 22% 17% 22% 17%
S. Teske et al.
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8.14  OECD Pacific
8.14.1  OECD Pacific: Long-Term Energy Pathways
8.14.1.1  OECD Pacific: Final Energy demand by Sector
The future development pathways for OECD Pacific’s final energy demand when 
the assumptions on population growth, GDP growth, and energy intensity are com-
bined are shown in Fig. 8.98 for the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Scenarios. In the 
5.0 °C Scenario, the total final energy demand will decrease by 2%, from the current 
20,100 PJ/year to 19,600 PJ/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand will decrease by 46% compared with current consumption and will reach 
10,800 PJ/year by 2050. The final energy demand in the 1.5 °C Scenario will reach 
10,200 PJ, 49% below the 2015 demand. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the final energy 
demand in 2050 will be 6% lower than in the 2.0  °C Scenario. The electricity 
demand for ‘classical’ electrical devices (without power-to-heat or e-mobility) will 
decrease from 1520 TWh/year in 2015 to 1150 TWh/year in 2050 in both alternative 
scenarios. Compared with the 5.0 °C case (1890 TWh/year in 2050), the efficiency 
measures in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will save 740 TWh/year in 2050.
Electrification will lead to a significant increase in the electricity demand by 
2050. The 2.0 °C Scenario has an electricity demand for heating of approximately 
400 TWh/year due to electric heaters and heat pumps, and in the transport sector, 
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the electricity demand will be approximately 1100 TWh/year due to electric mobil-
ity. The generation of hydrogen (for transport and high-temperature process heat) 
and the manufacture of synthetic fuels (mainly for transport) will add an additional 
power demand of 1000 TWh/year. Therefore, the gross power demand will rise 
from 1900 TWh/year in 2015 to 3000 TWh/year in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
25% higher than in the 5.0 °C case. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the gross electricity 
demand will increase to a maximum of 3400 TWh/year in 2050.
The efficiency gains in the heating sector could be even larger than in the elec-
tricity sector. In the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, a final energy consumption equiva-
lent to about 3000 PJ/year and 3100 PJ/year, respectively, will be avoided by 2050 
through efficiency gains compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario.
8.14.1.2  OECD Pacific: Electricity Generation
The development of the power system is characterized by a dynamically growing 
renewable energy market and an increasing proportion of total power coming from 
renewable sources. By 2050, 100% of the electricity produced in OECD Pacific will 
come from renewable energy sources in the 2.0 °C Scenario. ‘New’ renewables—
mainly wind, solar, and geothermal energy—will contribute 82% of total electricity 
generation. Renewable electricity’s share of the total production will be 60% by 
2030 and 89% by 2040. The installed capacity of renewables will reach about 680 
GW by 2030 and 1420 GW by 2050. The share of renewable electricity generation 
in 2030 in the 1.5 °C Scenario is assumed to be 68%. The 1.5 °C Scenario will have 
a generation capacity from renewable energy of approximately 1590 GW in 2050.
Table 8.95 shows the development of different renewable technologies in OECD 
Pacific over time. Figure 8.99 provides an overview of the overall power-generation 
structure in OECD Pacific. From 2020 onwards, the continuing growth of wind and 
PV, up to 320 GW and 830 GW, respectively, will complemented by up to 60 GW 
solar thermal generation, as well as limited biomass, geothermal, and ocean energy, 
in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to a high 
proportion of variable power generation (PV, wind, and ocean) of 40% and 47% by 
2030, respectively, and of 68% in both scenarios by 2050.
8.14.1.3  OECD Pacific: Future Costs of Electricity Generation
Figure 8.100 shows the development of the electricity-generation and supply costs 
over time, including the CO2 emission costs, in all scenarios. The calculated 
electricity- generation costs in 2015 (referring to full costs) were around 8 ct/kWh. 
In the 5.0 °C case, the generation costs will increase until 2030, when they reach 
11.1 ct/kWh, and then drop to 10.9 ct/kWh by 2050. The generation costs will 
increase in the 2.0 °C Scenario until 2030, when they reach 10.5 ct/kWh, and then 
drop to 8.3 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will increase to 10.7 ct/
kWh, and then drop to 8.5 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the generation 
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Table 8.95 OECD Pacific: development of renewable electricity-generation capacity in the 
scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Hydro 5.0 °C 69 73 76 78 78
2.0 °C 69 76 78 82 84
1.5 °C 69 76 78 82 84
Biomass 5.0 °C 9 13 15 16 18
2.0 °C 9 23 26 35 43
1.5 °C 9 23 29 42 47
Wind 5.0 °C 9 23 28 40 56
2.0 °C 9 77 145 263 322
1.5 °C 9 84 198 335 384
Geothermal 5.0 °C 2 4 5 7 11
2.0 °C 2 4 14 27 37
1.5 °C 2 4 14 27 37
PV 5.0 °C 43 84 96 102 107
2.0 °C 43 225 394 701 831
1.5 °C 43 253 427 782 932
CSP 5.0 °C 0 0 0 1 1
2.0 °C 0 1 15 39 57
1.5 °C 0 1 20 49 67
Ocean 5.0 °C 0 1 1 2 4
2.0 °C 0 3 8 27 42
1.5 °C 0 3 8 27 42
Total 5.0 °C 132 197 221 246 275
2.0 °C 132 409 681 1176 1416
1.5 °C 132 444 774 1345 1594
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costs in 2050 will be 2.6 ct/kWh lower than in the 5.0 °C case, and in the 1.5 °C 
Scenario, this difference will 2.4 ct/kWh. Note that these estimates of generation 
costs do not take into account integration costs such as power grid expansion, stor-
age, or other load-balancing measures.
In the 5.0 ° C case, the growth in demand and increasing fossil fuel prices will 
cause the total electricity supply costs to rise from today’s $160 billion/year to more 
than $270 billion/year in 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, the total supply costs will be 
$270 billion/year, and in the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will be $310 billion/year. The 
long-term costs for electricity supply will be only 2% higher in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
than in the 5.0 °C Scenario as a result of the estimated generation costs and the 
electrification of heating and mobility. Further electrification and synthetic fuel gen-
eration in the 1.5 °C Scenario will result in total power generation costs that are 
17% higher than in the 5.0 °C case.
Compared with these results, the generation costs when the CO2 emission costs 
are not considered will increase in the 5.0 °C case to 8.3 ct/kWh in 2050. The gen-
eration costs in the 2.0 °C Scenario will increase until 2030, when they will reach 
9.3 ct/kWh, and then drop to 8.3 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, they will 
increase to 9.9 ct/kWh, and then drop to 8.5 ct/kWh by 2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
the generation costs will be a maximum of 1 ct/kWh higher than in the 5.0 °C case 
and this will occur in 2040. In the 1.5  °C Scenario, compared with the 5.0  °C 
Scenario, the maximum difference in the generation costs will be 1.4 ct/kWh, again 
in 2040. If the CO2 costs are not considered, the total electricity supply costs in the 
5.0 °C case will rise to about $200 billion/year in 2050.
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8.14.1.4  OECD Pacific: Future Investments in the Power Sector
An investment of around $2780 billion will be required for power generation 
between 2015 and 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario—including additional power plants 
for the production of hydrogen and synthetic fuels and investments in the replace-
ment of plants at the end of their economic lifetimes. This value will be equivalent 
to approximately $77 billion per year on average, and will be $1520 billion more 
than in the 5.0 °C case ($1260 billion). An investment of around $3100 billion for 
power generation will required between 2015 and 2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario. On 
average, this is an investment of $86 billion per year. In the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
investment in conventional power plants will be around 56% of the total cumulative 
investments, whereas approximately 44% will be invested in renewable power gen-
eration and co-generation (Fig. 8.101).
However, in the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario, OECD Pacific will shift almost 93% 
(95%) of its entire investment to renewables and co-generation. By 2030, the fossil 
fuel share of the power sector investment will predominantly focused on gas power 
plants that can also be operated with hydrogen.
Because renewable energy has no fuel costs, other than biomass, the cumulative 
fuel cost savings in the 2.0 °C Scenario will reach a total of $1420 billion in 2050, 
equivalent to $39 billion per year. Therefore, the total fuel cost savings will be 
equivalent to 90% of the total additional investments compared to the 5.0  °C 
Scenario. The fuel cost savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario will add up to $1510 billion, 
or $42 billion per year.
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8.14.1.5  OECD Pacific: Energy Supply for Heating
The final energy demand for heating will increase in the 5.0 °C Scenario by 17%, 
from 7100 PJ/year in 2015 to 8300 PJ/year in 2050. Energy efficiency measures will 
help to reduce the energy demand for heating by 35% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
relative to the 5.0 °C case, and by 37% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. Today, renewables 
supply around 7% of OECD Pacific’s final energy demand for heating, with the main 
contribution from biomass. Renewable energy will provide 33% of OECD Pacific’s 
total heat demand in 2030 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 42% in the 1.5 °C Scenario. In 
both scenarios, renewables will provide 100% of the total heat demand in 2050.
Figure 8.102 shows the development of different technologies for heating in 
OECD Pacific over time, and Table 8.96 provides the resulting renewable heat sup-
ply for all scenarios. Up to 2030, biomass will remain the main contributor. The 
growing use of solar, geothermal, and environmental heat will lead, in the long term, 
to a biomass share of 37% in the 2.0 °C Scenario and of 35% in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Heat from renewable hydrogen will further reduce the dependence on fossil fuels 
in both scenarios. The hydrogen consumption in 2050 will be around 700 PJ/year in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario and 800 PJ/year in the 1.5 °C Scenario. The direct use of elec-
tricity for heating will also increases by a factor of 1.6 between 2015 and 2050, and 
will achieves a final energy share of 21% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 22% in 
the 1.5 °C Scenario.
8.14.1.6  OECD Pacific: Future Investments in the Heating Sector
The roughly estimated investments in renewable heating technologies up to 2050 
will amount to around $530 billion in the 2.0 °C Scenario (including the invest-
ments for the replacement of plants after their economic lifetimes), or approxi-
mately $15 billion per year. The largest share of the investment in OECD Pacific is 
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assumed to be for solar collectors (around $240 billion), followed by heat pumps 
and biomass technologies. The 1.5 °C Scenario assumes an even faster expansion of 
renewable technologies, but with a similar average annual investment of around $15 
billion per year (Table 8.97, Fig. 8.103).
Table 8.96 OECD Pacific: development of renewable heat supply in the scenarios (excluding the 
direct use of electricity)
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 314 471 504 584 714
2.0 °C 314 633 815 1250 1579
1.5 °C 314 650 823 1229 1463
Solar heating 5.0 °C 45 76 92 150 236
2.0 °C 45 221 452 737 819
1.5 °C 45 252 543 772 795
Geothermal heat and heat pumps 5.0 °C 30 33 34 36 38
2.0 °C 30 157 307 737 1119
1.5 °C 30 197 420 830 1094
Hydrogen 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 6 16 251 728
1.5 °C 0 9 160 642 772
Total 5.0 °C 390 580 629 769 988
2.0 °C 390 1017 1591 2975 4245
1.5 °C 390 1107 1946 3473 4124
Table 8.97 OECD Pacific: installed capacities for renewable heat generation in the scenarios
in GW Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Biomass 5.0 °C 44 60 63 69 75
2.0 °C 44 77 92 117 94
1.5 °C 44 79 91 113 80
Geothermal 5.0 °C 0 0 0 0 0
2.0 °C 0 3 8 20 28
1.5 °C 0 3 7 22 26
Solar heating 5.0 °C 13 22 27 43 69
2.0 °C 13 64 128 207 230
1.5 °C 13 73 152 215 224
Heat pumps 5.0 °C 5 5 5 5 6
2.0 °C 5 11 23 54 74
1.5 °C 5 16 36 63 71
Totala 5.0 °C 62 87 95 117 150
2.0 °C 62 156 250 397 426
1.5 °C 62 171 287 413 401
a Excluding direct electric heating
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8.14.1.7  OECD Pacific: Transport
Energy demand in the transport sector in OECD Pacific is expected to decrease by 
37% in the 5.0 °C Scenario, from around 6200 PJ/year in 2015 to 3900 PJ/year in 
2050. In the 2.0 °C Scenario, assumed technical, structural, and behavioural changes 
will save 49% (around 1900 PJ/year) by 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario. 
Additional modal shifts, technology switches, and a reduction in the transport 
demand will lead to even higher energy savings in the 1.5 °C Scenario of 59% (or 
2300 PJ/year) in 2050 compared with the 5.0 °C case (Table 8.98, Fig. 8.104).
By 2030, electricity will provide 20% (200 TWh/year) of the transport sector’s 
total energy demand in the 2.0 °C Scenario, whereas in 2050, the share will be 53% 
(300 TWh/year). In 2050, up to 480 PJ/year of hydrogen will be used in the trans-
port sector as a complementary renewable option. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the annual 
electricity demand will be 240 TWh in 2050. The 1.5 °C Scenario also assumes a 
hydrogen demand of 360 PJ/year by 2050.
Biofuel use is limited in the 2.0 °C Scenario and the 1.5 °C Scenario to a maxi-
mum of approximately 200 PJ/year. Therefore, around 2030, synthetic fuels based 
on power-to-liquid will be introduced, with a maximum amount of 270 PJ/year in 
2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. Due to the lower overall energy demand in transport, 
the maximum synthetic fuel demand will amount to 210  PJ/year in the 1.5  °C 
Scenario.
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Table 8.98 OECD Pacific: projection of transport energy demand by mode in the scenarios
in PJ/year Case 2015 2025 2030 2040 2050
Rail 5.0 °C 158 162 163 162 161
2.0 °C 158 154 156 154 159
1.5 °C 158 156 156 162 161
Road 5.0 °C 5515 4317 3902 3365 2614
2.0 °C 5515 3961 2979 1837 1456
1.5 °C 5515 2891 1975 1399 1123
Domestic aviation 5.0 °C 331 524 663 863 922
2.0 °C 331 338 308 242 194
1.5 °C 331 307 240 147 109
Domestic navigation 5.0 °C 173 178 181 186 193
2.0 °C 173 178 181 186 193
1.5 °C 173 178 181 186 193
Total 5.0 °C 6176 5182 4908 4576 3890
2.0 °C 6176 4631 3624 2419 2002
1.5 °C 6176 3533 2551 1893 1586
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8.14.1.8  OECD Pacific: Development of CO2 Emissions
In the 5.0  °C Scenario, OECD Pacific’s annual CO2 emissions will decrease by 
21%, from 2080 Mt in 2015 to 1640 Mt in 2050. The stringent mitigation measures 
in both alternative scenarios will cause the annual emissions to fall to 280 Mt in 
2040  in the 2.0 °C Scenario and to 160 Mt. in the 1.5 °C Scenario, with further 
reductions to almost zero by 2050. In the 5.0 °C case, the cumulative CO2 emissions 
from 2015 until 2050 will add up to 67 Gt. In contrast, in the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
Scenarios, the cumulative emissions for the period from 2015 until 2050 will be 
31 Gt and 26 Gt, respectively.
Therefore, the cumulative CO2 emissions will decrease by 54% in the 2.0  °C 
Scenario and by 61% in the 1.5 °C Scenario compared with the 5.0 °C case. A rapid 
reduction in the annual emissions will occur under both alternative scenarios. In the 
2.0 °C Scenario, this reduction will be greatest in ‘Power generation’, followed by 
‘Transport’ and ‘Industry’ (Fig. 8.105).
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8.14.1.9  OECD Pacific: Primary Energy Consumption
The levels of primary energy consumption in the three scenarios when the assump-
tions discussed above are taken into account are shown in Fig. 8.106. In the 2.0 °C 
Scenario, the primary energy demand will decrease by 48%, from around 36,300 PJ/
year in 2015 to 18,900 PJ/year in 2050. Compared with the 5.0 °C Scenario, the 
overall primary energy demand will decrease by 45% by 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario 
(5.0 °C: 34,700 PJ in 2050). In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the primary energy demand will 
be even lower (19,900 PJ in 2050) because the final energy demand and conversion 
losses will be lower.
Both the 2.0 °C Scenario and 1.5 °C Scenario aim to rapidly phase-out coal and 
oil. This will cause renewable energy to have a primary energy share of 33% in 2030 
and 88% in 2050 in the 2.0 °C Scenario. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, renewables will 
have a primary energy share of more than 89% in 2050 (including non-energy con-
sumption, which will still include fossil fuels). Nuclear energy will be phased-out in 
2040 in both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. The cumulative primary energy con-
sumption of natural gas in the 5.0 °C case will add up to 230 EJ, the cumulative coal 
consumption to about 300 EJ, and the crude oil consumption to 380 EJ. In contrast, 
in the 2.0 °C Scenario, the cumulative gas demand will amount to 150 EJ, the cumu-
lative coal demand to 100 EJ, and the cumulative oil demand to 230 EJ. Even lower 
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fossil fuel use will be achieved in the 1.5 °C Scenario: 150 EJ for natural gas, 70 EJ 
for coal, and 190 EJ for oil.
8.14.2  OECD Pacific: Power Sector Analysis
South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand form the OECD Pacific region 
(also referred to as OECD Asia Pacific or OECD Asia Oceania). Like Non-OECD 
Asia, a regional interconnected power market with regular electricity exchange is 
unlikely. Therefore, the region is broken down into seven sub-regions: (1) South 
Korea; (2) the north of Japan; (3) the south of Japan; (4) Australia’s National 
Electricity Market (NEM) (covering the entire east coast); (5) the SWIS-NT grid 
region (comprising Western Australia and the Northern Territory); (6) the North 
Island of New Zealand; and (7) the South Island of New Zealand. The sub-regions 
have very different electricity policies, power-generation structures, and demand 
patterns. In this analysis, simplifications that may not reflect the local conditions are 
made to ensure that the results comparable on a global level. Therefore, the results 
for specific countries are only estimates.
8.14.2.1  OECD Pacific: Development of Power Plant Capacities
The region has significant potential for all renewables, including the dominant 
renewable power technologies of solar PV and onshore wind. Japan has significant 
geothermal power resources, and offshore wind potentials are substantial across the 
region. There is also potential for ocean energy across the region, although it is cur-
rently a niche technology. Australia has one of the best solar resources in the world, 
so concentrated solar power plants will be an important part of both scenarios in 
Australia. Coal and nuclear capacities will be phased-out as plants come to the end 
of their lifetimes. In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the last coal power plant will be phased out 
just after 2030.
The solar PV market will reach 8 GW in 2020 under the 2.0 °C Scenario—the 
same level as the actual regional market of 8.3 GW (REN21-GSR 2018) in 2017—
and increase rapidly to 43 GW by 2030. The 1.5 °C Scenario requires that solar PV 
will achieve an equal market size by 2030 and remain at this level until 2040.
However, the onshore market must increase significantly compared with the mar-
ket in 2017, which was only 0.54 GW (GWEC-NL 2018). By 2025, 12  GW of 
onshore wind capacity must be installed annually across the region under the 2.0 °C 
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Scenario, and 17 GW under the 1.5 °C Scenario. By 2030, geothermal, concentrated 
solar power, and ocean energy must increase by around 2 GW each (Table 8.99).
8.14.2.2  OECD Pacific: Utilization of Power Generation Capacities
The very different developments of variable and dispatch power plants in all sub- 
regions reflect the diversity the Pacific region. Table 8.100 shows that because there 
is no interconnection between the northern and southern parts of Japan, we assume 
that even within Japan, the separate electricity markets of the 50  Hz and 60  Hz 
regions will remain as they are. For Australia, it is assumed that the east- and west- 
coast electricity markets will have limited interconnection capacities by 2030. The 
North and South Islands of New Zealand are calculated to have an increased inter-
connection capacity by 2050.
Table 8.101 shows that for the region as a whole, the limited dispatchable power 
plants will retain a relatively high capacity factor, compared with other regions, 
until after 2020 and decrease thereafter. The average capacity factors from 2030 
onwards will be consistent with all other regions.
Table 8.99 OECD Pacific: average annual change in installed power plant capacity
OECD Pacific power generation: average annual 
change of installed capacity [GW/a]
2015–2025 2026–2035 2036–2050
2.0 °C 1.5C° 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Hard coal −4 −9 −5 −4 −1 0
Lignite 0 −1 −2 −2 0 0
Gas 2 −2 −1 −3 −14 0
Hydrogen-gas 0 1 1 5 12 12
Oil/diesel −3 −2 −2 −2 −1 −1
Nuclear 0 −5 −3 −3 −2 −2
Biomass 2 1 1 1 1 1
Hydro 2 1 0 1 0 0
Wind (onshore) 7 18 12 17 7 6
Wind (offshore) 1 4 5 5 2 2
PV (roof top) 17 33 33 33 16 21
PV (utility scale) 6 11 11 11 5 7
Geothermal 0 2 2 2 2 2
Solar thermal power plants 1 2 3 4 2 3
Ocean energy 0 1 2 2 2 2
Renewable fuel based co-generation 1 1 1 2 1 1
8 Energy Scenario Results
394
Ta
bl
e 
8.
10
0 
O
E
C
D
 P
ac
ifi
c:
 p
ow
er
 s
ys
te
m
 s
ha
re
s 
by
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 g
ro
up
Po
w
er
 g
en
er
at
io
n 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
in
te
rc
on
ne
ct
io
n
2.
0 
°C
1.
5 
°C
O
E
C
D
 P
ac
ifi
c
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
Fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
R
E
D
is
pa
tc
h 
Fo
ss
il
In
te
r-
 
co
nn
ec
tio
n
So
ut
h 
K
or
ea
20
15
4%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
40
%
18
%
43
%
20
%
46
%
17
%
38
%
0%
20
50
70
%
28
%
2%
25
%
62
%
24
%
14
%
0%
Ja
pa
n 
– 
N
or
th
 (
50
 H
z)
20
15
4%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
46
%
26
%
28
%
20
%
51
%
23
%
26
%
0%
20
50
72
%
26
%
2%
25
%
64
%
21
%
15
%
0%
Ja
pa
n 
– 
So
ut
h 
(6
0 
H
z)
20
15
4%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
36
%
38
%
26
%
20
%
41
%
35
%
24
%
0%
20
50
72
%
25
%
2%
25
%
64
%
20
%
15
%
0%
A
us
tr
al
ia
 –
 E
as
t a
nd
 S
ou
th
 (
N
E
M
)
20
15
5%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
17
%
82
%
0%
20
%
17
%
83
%
0%
10
%
20
50
73
%
26
%
2%
25
%
67
%
21
%
12
%
20
%
A
us
tr
al
ia
 W
es
t a
nd
 N
or
th
 (
SW
IS
 +
 
N
T
)
20
15
5%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
41
%
37
%
22
%
20
%
46
%
33
%
21
%
10
%
20
50
73
%
25
%
2%
25
%
67
%
21
%
12
%
20
%
S. Teske et al.
395
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
 –
 N
or
th
 I
sl
an
d
20
15
5%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
39
%
61
%
0%
20
%
45
%
55
%
0%
10
%
20
50
77
%
22
%
2%
25
%
70
%
18
%
12
%
20
%
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
nd
 –
 S
ou
th
 I
sl
an
d
20
15
5%
34
%
61
%
5%
20
30
39
%
61
%
0%
20
%
45
%
55
%
0%
10
%
20
50
77
%
22
%
2%
25
%
70
%
18
%
12
%
20
%
O
E
C
D
 P
ac
ifi
c
20
15
4%
34
%
61
%
20
30
40
%
31
%
30
%
45
%
29
%
27
%
20
50
71
%
26
%
2%
64
%
22
%
14
%
8 Energy Scenario Results
396
8.14.2.3  OECD Pacific: Development of Load, Generation, 
and Residual Load
Table 8.102 shows the development of the maximum load, generation, and resulting 
residual load in the Pacific region. To verify the calculation results, we compared 
the peak demands in Australia and Japan.
The peak load for Australia’s NEM was calculated to be 32.6 GW in 2020, which 
corresponds to the reported summer peak of 32.5 GW in the summer of 2017/2018 
(AER 2018). Japan’s peak demand was 152 GW in 2015 according to the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO -2018) and TEPCO predicts that it will be 
136 GW in 2020, which is 11% lower.
In the long term, the Pacific region will be a renewable fuel producer for the 
export market. Therefore, the calculated increased interconnection capacities indi-
cate overproduction, which will be used for international bunker fuels.
The storage and dispatch requirements for all sub-regions are shown in 
Table 8.103. The Pacific region has vast solar and wind resources and will therefore 
be one of the production hubs for synthetic fuels and hydrogen, which may be used 
for industrial processes, for bunker fuels, or to replace natural gas. Therefore, the 
storage and dispatch demand may vary significantly because they depend on the 
extent to which renewable fuel production is integrated into the national power sec-
tors or used for dispatch and demand-side management. The more integrated the 
fuel production is, the lower the overall requirement for battery or hydro pump stor-
age technologies. Further research is required to develop a dedicated plan to pro-
duce renewable bunker fuels in Australia.
Table 8.101 OECD Pacific: capacity factors by generation type
Utilization of 
variable and 
dispatchable 
power 
generation: 2015 2020 2020 2030 2030 2040 2040 2050 2050
OECD Pacific 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C 2.0 °C 1.5 °C
Capacity 
factor – average
[%/yr] 54.8% 55% 55% 29% 29% 29% 29% 34% 31%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
fossil and 
nuclear
[%/yr] 65.1% 54% 54% 26% 31% 19% 29% 25% 32%
Limited 
dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 42.7% 63% 54% 29% 30% 54% 25% 27% 25%
Dispatchable: 
fossil
[%/yr] 48.6% 48% 50% 20% 23% 35% 21% 19% 26%
Dispatchable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 43.1% 73% 73% 50% 52% 37% 46% 49% 46%
Variable: 
renewable
[%/yr] 23.2% 17% 17% 20% 20% 27% 27% 31% 28%
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Chapter 9
Trajectories for a Just Transition 
of the Fossil Fuel Industry
Sven Teske
Abstract This section provides historical production data for coal, oil and gas 
between 1980 and 2015. The 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenario lead to specific phase-out 
pathways for each of the fossil fuel types. Current regional production volumes are 
compared with future demands. The results provide the input for the employment 
analysis in the following chapter for the fossil fuel sector. This section discusses the 
need to shift the current political debate about coal, oil and gas which is focused on 
security of supply and price security towards an open debate about an orderly with-
drawal from coal, oil and gas extraction industries.
The implementation of the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C climate mitigation pathways presented 
here will have a significant impact on the global fossil fuel industry. Although this 
may appear to be stating the obvious, current climate debates have not yet involved 
open discussion of the orderly withdrawal from the coal, oil, and gas extraction 
industries. Instead, the political debate about coal, oil, and gas has focused on the 
security of supply and price security. However, mitigating climate change is only 
possible when fossil fuels are phased-out. This section provides an overview of the 
time-frame of this phase-out under the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios compared with 
the 5.0 °C pathway.
9.1  Fossil Energy Resources—The Sky Is the Limit
An unrelenting increase in fossil fuel extraction conflicts with the finite nature of 
these resources. At the same time, the global distribution of oil and gas resources 
does not match the distribution of demand. Therefore, some countries currently rely 
almost entirely on imported fossil fuels. Therefore, is the relative scarcity of fossil 
fuels an additional reason an energy transition? The Global Energy Assessment 
S. Teske (*) 
Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
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(GEA 2012), an integrated assessment of the global energy system, has published a 
comprehensive overview of estimated available fossil fuel reserves and resources. 
Table 9.1 shows the estimates for conventional and unconventional coal, oil, and gas 
reserves and resources. The distinction between reserves and resources is based on 
the current technology (exploration and production) and market conditions. The 
resource data are not cumulative and do not include reserves (GEA 2012).
The assessment shows that there is no shortage of fossil fuels. There might be a 
shortage of conventional oil and gas, but unconventional resources are still signifi-
cantly larger than our climate can cope with. Reducing global fossil fuel consump-
tion for reasons of resource scarcity alone is not essential, even though there may be 
substantial price fluctuations and regional or structural shortages, as we have seen 
in the past (Teske and Pregger 2015).
9.2  Coal—Past Production and Future Trajectories 
Under Three Scenarios
Global coal production is dominated by China, which in 2017, produced over 3.5 
billion tonnes of coal, 45% of the world volume, followed by India with 716 million 
tonnes, the USA with 702 million tons, and Australia with 481 million tons. The top 
10 producers, in order of annual production, are China, India, USA, Australia, 
Indonesia, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Germany (mainly lignite), Poland, 
and Kazakhstan. These countries account for 90% of the global coal production.
Figure 9.1 shows the historical time series for global coal production. The data 
are based on the BP Statistical Review 2018 (BP 2018), as are the following over-
views of oil and gas. Production volumes have declined in recent years, mainly due 
to changes in demand in China, but they rose again in 2017.
Under the 5.0 °C scenario, the required production of thermal coal (excluding 
coal for non-energy uses, such as steel production) will remain at the 2015 level, 
with an annual increase of around 1% per year until 2050. As shown in Fig. 9.2, 
under the 2.0 °C Scenario, coal production will decline sharply between 2020 and 
2030 at a rate of around 6% per year. By 2030, the global coal production will be 
equal to China’s annual production in 2017, at 3.7 billion tons, whereas that volume 
will be reached in 2025 under the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Table 9.1 Fossil reserves, resources, and additional occurrences
Energy carrier
Reserves
[EJ/year]
Resources
[EJ/year]
Demand in 2015
[EJ/year]
Conventional oil 4900–7610 4170–6150 41.9
Unconventional oil 3750–5600 11,280–14,800
Conventional gas 5000–7100 7200–8900 33.8
Unconventional gas 20,100–67,100 40,200–121,900
Coal 17,300–21,000 291,000–435,000 16.5
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9.3  Oil—Past Production and Future Trajectories 
Under the Three Scenarios
Oil production almost doubled between 1965 and 1975. After the early 1990s, it 
grew almost constantly and by 2017, the production volume was about three times 
higher than in 1965 and twice as high as in 1985 (Fig. 9.3). Unlike coal, there is no 
sign of a decline in oil production in response to reduced demand. Oil production is 
more widely distributed than coal production. Three countries, the USA, Russia, 
and Saudi Arabia, have global market shares of around 12–14% each, whereas four 
countries, Canada, Iran, Iraq, and China, produce around 5% each. The other oil- 
producing countries have significantly lower market shares.
Figure 9.4 shows the global oil production levels required by the three calculated 
scenarios. Oil for non-energy uses, such as the petrochemical industry, is not 
included in this graph. Again, oil production in the 5.0  °C Scenario will grow 
steadily by 1% until the end of the modelling period in 2050. Under the 2.0  °C 
Scenario, oil production will decline by 5% per year until 2030 and by 3% annually 
until 2025. After 2030, production will decline by around 7% per year, on average, 
until oil production for energy is phased-out entirely. The oil production capacity of 
the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Russia in 2017 would be sufficient to supply the global 
demand calculated for the 2.0 °C Scenario in 2035. The 1.5 °C Scenario will cut the 
required production volumes in half by 2030, reducing them further to the  equivalent 
of the production volume of just one of the three largest oil producers (the USA, 
Saudi Arabia, or Russia) by 2040.
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9.4  Gas—Past Production and Future Trajectories 
Under the Three Scenarios
Gas production has grown steadily over the past four decades, leading to an overall 
production of 3500 billion cubic meters—3.5 times higher than in 1970. The pro-
duction of natural gas is even more widely distributed than oil production. According 
to 2017 figures, by far the largest producers are the USA, with 20% of the global 
volume, and Russia with 17%. Four countries have market share of around 5% each: 
Canada (4.8%), Iran (6.1%), Qatar (4.8%), and China (4.1%). The remaining 43% 
of global gas production is distributed over 42 countries (Fig. 9.5).
In the 5.0 °C Scenario, gas production will increase steadily by 2% a year for the 
next two decades, leading to an overall production increase of about 50% by 2050. 
Compared with coal and oil, the gas phase-out will be significantly slower in the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios. Furthermore, these scenarios assume that infrastruc-
ture, such as gas pipelines and power plants, will be used after this phase-out for 
hydrogen and/or renewable methane produced with electricity from renewable 
sources (see Chap. 5, Sect 5.2). Under the 2.0 °C Scenario, gas production will only 
decrease by 0.2% per year until 2025, then by 1% until 2030, and on average by 4% 
annually until 2040. This represents a rather slow phase-out and will allow the gas 
industry to gradually transfer to hydrogen. The phase-out under the 1.5 °C Scenario 
will be equally slow, and a 4%/year reduction will occur after 2025 (Fig. 9.6).
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9.5  Overview: Required Fossil Fuel Resources 
Under the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, and 1.5 °C Trajectories
In summary, the global fossil fuel extraction industry must reduce production at a 
rate of 2% per annum under the 2.0 °C Scenario and 3% per annum under the 1.5 °C 
Scenario. A constant reduction in production seems unlikely if no international 
measures are taken to organize the economic and social transitions in the producing 
countries, and for the communities and workers involved. The idea of a ‘just transi-
tion’ is well documented in the international literature. According to the International 
Labour Organization (ILO 2015), the concept was first mentioned in the 1990s, 
when North American unions began developing the concept of just transition.
Initially, trade unionists understood ‘just transition’ to be a program of support 
for workers who lost their jobs due to environmental protection policies. Since then, 
several UNFCCC Climate Conferences have referred to the ‘just transition’ con-
cept. The Paris Climate Agreement 2015, during the 21st session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP 21) “decided to continue and improve the forum on the impact 
of the implementation of response measures (hereinafter referred to as the improved 
forum), and adopted the work programme, comprising two areas: (1) economic 
diversification and transformation; and (2) just transition of the workforce, and the 
creation of decent work and quality jobs” (UNFCCC-JT 2016).
Table 9.2 provides possible trajectories for global coal, oil, and gas production, 
consistent with the Paris Agreement targets. These trajectories are the results of the 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, documented in detail over the previous six chapters of 
this book. Chapter 10 uses these trajectories to calculate possible employment 
effects, both in terms of job losses in the fossil fuel industry, job gains in the renew-
able energy industry, and options for transitioning the gas industry towards a renew-
ably produced hydrogen industry.
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Table 9.2 Summary—coal, oil, and gas trajectories for a just transition under the 5.0 °C, 2.0 °C, 
and 1.5 °C Scenarios
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
5.0 °C: Primary energy [PJ/a]
Coal 140,895 147,324 153,529 167,795 179,666 191,078 196,692 200,680
Lignite 19,835 18,836 18,550 18,573 18,597 19,028 19,546 19,562
Natural gas 123,673 133,732 145,075 162,132 178,213 194,467 207,273 214,702
Crude oil 166,465 173,082 181,520 190,294 197,300 204,563 208,561 210,970
5.0 °C production units
Coal [million tons per 
year]
5871 6138 6397 6991 7486 7962 8196 8362
Lignite [million tons 
per year]
2088 1983 1953 1955 1958 2003 2058 2059
Natural gas [billion 
cubic meters]
3171 3429 3720 4157 4570 4986 5315 5505
Oil [thousand barrels 
per day]
94,836 98,606 103,414 108,412 112,403 116,541 118,819 120,191
2.0 °C—primary energy [PJ/a]
Coal 140,624 136,111 114,647 77,766 45,445 25,594 12,480 7568
Lignite 19,835 16,779 8333 3203 1630 912 288 0
Natural gas 123,770 132,209 130,797 126,054 105,321 78,390 42,535 9949
Crude oil 166,472 164,438 141,523 109,213 71,812 45,013 26,649 15,461
2.0 °C—production units
Coal [million tons per 
year]
5859 5671 4777 3240 1894 1066 520 315
Lignite [million tons 
per year]
2088 1766 877 337 172 96 30 0
Natural gas [billion 
cubic meters]
3174 3390 3354 3232 2701 2010 1091 255
Oil [thousand barrels 
per day]
94,840 93,682 80,627 62,219 40,912 25,644 15,182 8808
1.5 °C— primary energy [PJ/a]
Coal 141,275 125,431 84,267 41,360 14,243 9134 9363 9759
Lignite 19,835 16,956 5006 2056 777 0 0 0
Natural gas 123,426 132,241 125,494 104,349 80,940 50,883 23,202 7315
Crude oil 166,472 163,957 114,986 68,449 36,541 22,923 16,772 14,794
1.5 °C production units
Coal [million tons per 
year]
5886 5226 3511 1723 593 381 390 407
Lignite [million tons 
per year]
2088 1785 527 216 82 0 0 0
Natural gas [billion 
cubic meters]
3165 3391 3218 2676 2075 1305 595 188
Oil [thousand barrels 
per day]
94,840 93,408 65,509 38,996 20,818 13,059 9555 8428
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Chapter 10
Just Transition: Employment Projections 
for the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios
Elsa Dominish, Chris Briggs, Sven Teske, and Franziska Mey
Abstract This section provides the input data for two different employment devel-
opment calculation methods: The quantitative analysis, which looks into the overall 
number of jobs in renewable and fossil fuel industries and the occupational analysis 
which looks into specific job categories required for the solar and wind sector as 
well as the oil, gas, and coal industry. Results are given with various figures and 
tables.
10.1  Introduction: Employment Modelling for a Just 
Transition
The transition to a 100% renewable energy system is not just a technical task. It is 
also a socially and economically challenging process, and it is imperative that the 
transition is managed in a fair and equitable way. One of the key concerns is the 
employment of workers in the affected industries (UNFCCC 2016; ILO 2015). 
However, it should be noted that the ‘just transition’ concept is concerned not only 
with workers’ rights, but also with the well-being of the broader community (Smith 
2017; Jenkins et al. 2016; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). This includes, for example, 
community participation in decision-making processes, public dialogue, and policy 
mechanisms to create an enabling environment for new industries, to ensure local 
economic development.
Although it is acknowledged that a just transition is important, there are limited 
data on the impacts that the transition will have on employment. There is even less 
information on the types of occupations that will be affected by the transition, either 
by project growth or a decline in employment. This study provides projections for 
jobs in construction, manufacturing, operations and maintenance (O&M), and fuel 
and heat supply across 12 technologies and 10 world regions, based on the energy 
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scenario from the Leonardo Di Caprio project (see Chap. 3 ff. This study is funded 
by the German Greenpeace Foundation and builds on the methodology developed 
by UTS/ISF (Rutovitz et al. 2015), with an updated framework that disaggregates 
jobs by specific occupations. Projected employment is calculated regionally, but in 
this chapter, we present an overview of the global data, which are an aggregate of the 
results for the 10 world regions. Further details, including a further regional break-
down of employment data, are provided in the full report (Dominish et al. 2018).
10.2  Quantitative Employment Modelling
This section discusses the calculation factors used for the quantitative employment 
modelling (an overview of the methodology is given in Sect. 3.6 of Chap. 3). The 
factors were analysed on a regional basis where possible, to take into account the 
significant economic differences between world regions. The results are then pre-
sented in the following section.
10.2.1  Employment Factors
Employment factors were used to calculate the number of jobs required per unit of 
electrical or heating capacity, or per unit of fuel. The employment factors differ 
depending on whether they involve manufacturing, construction, operation and 
maintenance, or fuel supply. Information about these factors usually comes from 
OECD countries because that is where most data are collected, although local data 
were used wherever possible. For job calculations in non-OECD regions, regional 
adjustments were made when a local factor was not available (see Sect. 10.2.2). The 
employment factors used in the calculations are shown in Table 10.1.
The employment factors were based on coal supplies, because employment per 
tonne varies significantly across the world regions and because coal plays a signifi-
cant role in energy production in many countries. In Australia and the USA, coal is 
extracted at an average rate of more than 9000 tonnes per person per year, whereas 
in Europe, the average coal miner is responsible for less than 1000 tonnes per year. 
China has relatively low per capita productivity at present, with 650  tonnes per 
worker per year, but the annual increases in productivity are very high. India and 
Eurasia have significantly increased their productivity since a similar analysis was 
performed in 2015. Local data were also used for gas extraction in every region 
except India, the Middle East, and Non-OECD-Asia. The calculation of coal and 
gas employment per petajoule (PJ) drew on data from national statistics and com-
pany reports, combined with production figures from the BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy 2018 (BP-SR 2018) or other sources. Data were collected for as 
many major coal-producing countries as possible, and coverage was obtained for 
90% of the world coal production (Table 10.2).
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Table 10.1 Summary of employment factors used in a global analysis in 2012
Construction/installation Manufacturing
Operations & 
maintenance
Fuel – 
PRIMARY 
energy demand
Job years/ MW Job years/ 
MW
Jobs/MW
Coal 11.4 5.1 0.14 Regional
Gas 1.8 2.9 0.14 Regional
Nuclear 11.8 1.3 0.6 0.001 jobs per 
GWh final 
energy demand
Biomass 14.0 2.9 1.5 29.9 jobs/PJ
Hydro-large 7.5 3.9 0.2
Hydro-small 15.8 11.1 4.9
Wind onshore 3.0 3.4 0.3
Wind offshore 6.5 13.6 0.15
PV 13.0 6.7 0.7
Geothermal 6.8 3.9 0.4
Solar thermal 8.9 4.0 0.7
Ocean 10.3 10.3 0.6
Geothermal – heat 6.9 jobs/ MW (construction and manufacturing)
Solar – heat 8.4 jobs/ MW (construction and manufacturing)
Nuclear 
decommissioning
0.95 jobs per MW decommissioned
Combined heat 
and power
CHP technologies use the factor for the technology, i.e. coal, gas, biomass, 
geothermal, etc., increased by a factor of 1.5 for O&M only.
Note: For details of sources and derivation of factors see Dominish et al. (2018)
Table 10.2 Employment factors used for coal fuel supply (mining and associated jobs)
Employment factor
Jobs per PJ Tonnes per person per year (coal equivalent)
World average 36.2 943
OECD North America 3.5 9613
OECD Europe 36.2 942
OECD Asia-Oceania 3.6 9455
India 33.6 1016
China 52.9 645
Africa 13.7 2482
Eastern Europe/Eurasia 36.0 948
Developing Asia 6.5 5273
Latin America 12.5 2725
Middle East Used world average because no employment data were available
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10.2.2  Regional Adjustments
The employment factors used in this model for energy technologies other than coal 
mining were usually for OECD regions, which are typically wealthier than other 
regions. A regional multiplier was applied to make the jobs per MW more realistic 
for other parts of the world. In developing countries, there are generally more jobs 
per unit of electricity because those countries have more labour-intensive practices. 
The multipliers change over the study period, consistent with the projections for 
GDP per worker. This reflects the fact that as prosperity increases, labour intensity 
tends to fall. The multipliers are shown in Table 10.3.
10.2.2.1  Local Employment Factors
Local employment factors were used where possible. These region-specific factors 
were:
• OECD Americas—gas and coal fuel, photovoltaics (PV) and offshore wind (all 
factors), and solar thermal power (construction and operation and maintenance 
(O&M)
• OECD Europe—gas and coal fuel, offshore wind (all factors), solar thermal 
power (construction and O&M), and solar heating
• OECD Pacific—gas and coal fuel
• Africa—gas, coal, and biomass fuel
• China—gas and coal fuel, and solar heating
• Eastern Europe/Eurasia—gas and coal fuel
• Developing Asia—coal fuel
• India – coal fuel and solar heating
• Latin America—coal and biomass fuels, onshore wind (all factors), nuclear (con-
struction and O&M), large hydro (O&M), and small hydro (construction and 
O&M).
Table 10.3 Regional multipliers used for the quantitative calculation of employment
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
OECD (North America, Europe, Pacific) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Latin America 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.9
Africa 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.2 4.9
Middle East 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
Eastern Europe/Eurasia 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8
India 7.0 5.6 3.7 2.7 2.0
Developing Asia 6.1 5.3 4.2 3.5 2.9
China 2.6 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.1
Source: Derived from ILO (2012) Key Indicators of the Labour Market, eighth edition software, 
with growth in GDP per capita derived from IEA World Energy Outlook 2018 and World Bank 
data
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10.2.2.2  Local Manufacturing and Fuel Production
Some regions do not manufacture the equipment (e.g., wind turbines or solar PV 
panels) required for the introduction of renewable technologies. This model includes 
estimates of the percentages of renewable technology that are made locally and 
assumes that the percentage of local manufacturing will increase over time as the 
industry matures. Based on this, the jobs involving the manufacture of components 
for export were calculated for the region in which the manufacturing occurs. The 
same applies to coal and gas, because they are traded internationally, so the jobs in 
fuel supply were calculated regionally, based on historical data.
10.2.2.3  Learning Adjustments or ‘Decline Factors’
Learning adjustments are used to account for the projected reductions in the costs of 
renewables over time, as technologies and companies become more efficient and 
production processes are scaled up. Generally, jobs per MW are projected to fall in 
parallel with this trend. The cost projections for each of the calculated energy sce-
nario regions (see Sect. 5.3 of Chap. 5) were used to derive these factors.
10.2.3  Results of Quantitative Employment Modelling
The 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will result in an increase in energy-sector jobs in 
the world as a whole at every stage of the projection. The 1.5  °C Scenario will 
increase the renewable energy capacities faster, so employment will increase faster 
than in the 2.0 °C Scenario. By 2050, employment in te energy sector will be within 
the same range in both scenarios, at around 48–50 million jobs.
• In 2025, there will be 29.6 million energy-sector jobs in the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
42.3 million in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and 48.1 million in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
• In 2030, there will be 30.3 million energy-sector jobs in the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
49.2 million in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and 53.8 million in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
• In 2050, there will be 29.6 million energy-sector jobs in the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
50.4 million in the 2.0 °C Scenario, and 47.8 million in the 1.5 °C Scenario.
Figure 10.1 shows the changes in job numbers under the 5.0  °C, 2.0  °C, and 
1.5 °C Scenarios for each technology between 2015 and 2030. the 5.0 °C Scenario, 
jobs will drop to 4% below the 2015 levels by 2020 and then remain quite stable 
until 2030. Strong growth in renewable energy will lead to an increase of 44% in the 
total energy-sector jobs in the 2.0 °C Scenario and 66% in the 1.5 °C Scenario by 
2025. In the 2.0 °C (1.5 °C) Scenario the renewable energy sector will account for 
81% (86%) in 2025 and 87% (89%) in 2030, with PV having the greatest share of 
24% (26%), followed by biomass, wind, and solar heating.
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10.3  Occupational Employment Modelling
To plan for a just transition, it is important to understand the occupations and loca-
tions at which jobs are likely to be lost or created. The modelling of employment by 
type of occupation is based on a new framework developed by UTS/ISF and financed 
by the German Greenpeace Foundation. The framework is applied to the results of 
the employment modelling discussed in Sect. 10.2. This information can be used to 
attempt to understand where labour is likely to be required in the renewable energy 
transition, and where job losses are likely to occur.
10.3.1  Background: Development of Occupational 
Employment Modelling
The occupational employment modelling framework used in this study was devel-
oped for renewable energy (solar PV, onshore wind, offshore wind) and fossil fuels 
(coal and gas). The three primary studies that classified and measured the occupa-
tional composition of renewable energy industries were conducted by the 
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Through surveys of around 45 
industry participants across a range of developed and developing nations, IRENA 
estimated the percentages of person–days for the various occupations across the 
solar PV and onshore and offshore wind farm supply chains (IRENA 2017a, b, 
2018). Figure 10.2 is an example (in this case, for solar PV manufacturing).
IRENA’s studies are the most detailed estimates of the occupational composi-
tions of the solar PV and onshore wind industries to date. ISF has extended the 
application of IRENA’s work in two key ways:
 1. Mapping IRENA’s job categories against the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO): IRENA uses its own occupational clas-
sification system, which does not match the ISCO, which is the basis for national 
statistical agency data. For example, ‘regulation and standardization experts’ is 
not a category in the ISCO. Consequently, the IRENA job categories have been 
mapped and translated across to the ISCO to facilitate comparisons between 
renewable energy technologies and fossil fuel sectors. The best fit for each of the 
occupations in the IRENA studies has been identified at one-digit, two-digit, 
three-digit, and four-digit levels of the ISCO.
 2. Unpacking mid- and low-skill job categories in IRENA’s study: Some of the 
categories in the IRENA studies containe jobs that are of interest from a just 
transition perspective. Specifically, IRENA combines:
• ‘Factory workers’ for solar PV and onshore and offshore wind 
manufacturing
• ‘Ship crews’ for offshore wind construction and operation and maintenance
• ‘Construction workers’ for solar PV, onshore wind farm construction, and 
operation and maintenance.
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These categories combine a range of technicians, trades, machinery operators, 
drivers, and assemblers, and labourers.
For factory workers, industry data from the Benchmarks of Global Clean Energy 
Manufacturing study by the Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis Centre was 
combined with the occupational framework from the Australian census. The inter-
national standard classification of industries used for the Benchmarks of Global 
Clean Energy Manufacturing study were translated across to the Australian New 
Zealand Standard Classification of Industry framework (which is based on the inter-
national classification standard) (Australian Bureau of Statistics & Statistics New 
Zealand 2013).
Data from the Australian census on the occupational composition of these manu-
facturing sectors were then used to derive the breakdown of employment (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics 2017). The census includes a comprehensive stocktake of 
employment, with data at one-, two-, three- and four-digit levels for each industry. 
The Australian–New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations is based on 
the ISCO. Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis data on the relative share of the 
value added by component was used to weight the shares of employment. The 
Australian manufacturing sectors used are not wind or solar PV manufacturing 
activities, but as the Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis Centre notes, ‘Large 
portions of the wind energy supply chain connect well to core manufacturing indus-
Health and Safety
4%
Quality control
4%
Regulation and 
standardisation experts
4%
Factory workers and 
technicians
62%
Engineers
12%
Admin & Management
5%
Marketing and sales
5%
Logistics
4%
Fig. 10.2 Distribution of human resources required to manufacture the main components of a 
50 MW solar photovoltaic power plant. (IRENA 2017a)
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tries’ (CEMAC 2017). To clarify construction worker categories for onshore wind 
and PV construction, and for the operation and maintenance of solar PV, interviews 
were conducted with project managers who were currently overseeing or had 
recently completed construction projects (Table 10.4).
The IRENA studies are the richest data source on employment in solar PV and 
onshore wind projects, but further work is required to directly match renewable 
energy job levels against existing fossil fuel sectors and to generate data on mid- and 
low-skill jobs, which are of primary interest from a just transition perspective.
As an example, Table 10.5 shows the occupational hierarchy for solar PV con-
struction and how it is matched against ISCO. ISCO classifies occupations from a 
one-digit level (left) to a four-digit level (right). Each level is more detailed than the 
previous one in terms of the labour force required for the type of work. This meth-
odology has been transferred to an occupational hierarchy that has been constructed 
for solar PV, onshore wind, and offshore wind using IRENA and other data sources 
to map jobs against the ISCO. The result is a matrix with percentages allocated to 
each occupation at the one-, two-, three-, and four-digit levels of aggregation.
The framework for fossil fuels was derived from labour statistics from the 
Australian 2016 national census for coal mining, gas supply, and coal and gas gen-
eration (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017). Although these data are specific to 
Australia, these statistics provide the best source of data, and regional multipliers in 
the quantitative modelling can adjust the results to account for economic differences 
between regions.
Table 10.4 Wind and solar PV manufacturing–study methodology
Technology Component
I-O Industry 
Category Equivalent ANZSIC Classification
Wind Nascelles Machinery & 
equipment 
manufacturing, not 
elsewhere classified
22 fabricated metal product manufacturing
222 structural metal product manufacturing
2221 structural steel fabricating
Blades Manufacturing not 
elsewhere classified
22 fabricated metal product manufacturing
222 structural metal product manufacturing
2221 structural steel fabricating
Towers Fabricated metal 
product 
manufacturing
22 fabricated metal product manufacturing
222 structural metal product manufacturing
2221 structural steel fabricating
Steel Basic metal 
manufacturing
21 primary metal and metal product 
manufacturing
211 basic ferrous metal manufacturing
2110 Iron Smelting & Steel Manufacturing
Generators Electrical 
machinery & 
apparatus 
manufacturing,
24 Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing
243 electrical equipment manufacturing
2439 other electrical equipment manufacturing
Solar PV Modules Computers, 
electronic and 
optical equipment 
manufacturing
24 Machinery & Equipment Manufacturing
243 electrical equipment manufacturing
2439 other electrical equipment manufacturing
Cells
Wafers
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For each modelling run, the results for the installed capacity of the renewable 
energy technologies (MW) and full-time-equivalent jobs (FTE/MW) were used to 
generate an aggregate level of employment for construction, manufacturing, and 
operation and maintenance. The matrix was then used to calculate the number of 
jobs at different levels of disaggregation (Sect. 3.6.1.)
The final framework is shown in Table 10.4. This is based on a composite profile 
for each technology using a mix of one-, two-, three-, and four-digit levels of occu-
pation, depending on which best illustrates the breakdown of jobs and allows com-
parison to be made across technologies. Choices have been made based on the 
proportion of jobs and the labels that are most readily understandable to readers 
(noting that the categories used in the ISCO do not always correspond to popularly 
used titles). Note, for example, that ‘Managers’ is a one-digit category, but trades 
are broken down into construction trades, metal trades, and electricians because this 
provides more meaningful descriptions.
In the example shown in Table  10.6, it is notable that wind and solar farms 
employ higher proportions of professionals and technicians for their operations and 
maintenance than coal mining, and similar or higher proportions of elementary 
occupations, but much lower proportions of machinery operators and drivers.
10.3.1.1  Methodology and Limitations
• At the aggregate level, it is assumed that rising labour productivity over time will 
reduce the labour intensity (i.e., less FTE/MW) that is applied in the construc-
tion, manufacture, and operation and maintenance of each renewable energy 
technology. No assumptions have been made about changes to the relative labour 
intensity between occupations. Over time, we would expect that the proportion 
of less-skilled jobs would fall as a result of mechanization. Therefore, the share 
of less-skilled jobs is likely to be overestimated.
• IRENA estimates a single global figure for each occupation, averaged from sur-
veys of industry participants across different global markets. In practice, there 
are variations in labour intensity and the compositions of jobs across supply 
chains between different regions (broadly speaking, supply chains in lower-wage 
nations are more labour intensive). ISF takes account of regional conditions in 
the job factors applied at the level of major sub-sectors (construction, manufac-
turing, operation and maintenance), but not at the disaggregated level. Therefore, 
it is likely that the proportion of less-skilled jobs is overestimated for rich econo-
mies and underestimated for less-developed economies.
• The breakdown of the category of ‘construction workers’ is based on interviews 
with some Australian solar and wind project managers. The project managers 
had overseen recent projects and provided detailed estimates of the contributions 
of different jobs. Nonetheless, the breakdowns are based on a limited sample, 
and further research is required to generate more-accurate estimates.
E. Dominish et al.
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10.3.2  Results of Occupational Employment Modelling
There will be an increase in jobs in the 1.5 °C Scenario across all occupations 
between 2015 and 2025, except in metal trades, which will display a minor decline 
of 2%, as shown in Fig. 10.3.
There will be an increase in jobs across all occupations between 2015 and 2025 in 
the 2.0 °C Scenario, as shown in Fig. 10.4. The occupations with the highest number 
of jobs will be plant and machine operators and assemblers, followed by technicians 
(including electrical, mechanical, civil, and IT technicians) and electricians. The 
occupations that will have the largest percentage increase in jobs from 2015 to 2025 
will be labourers, engineers, electricians, and construction trades. The results are 
similar in the 1.5 °C Scenario, except for managers and metal trades, which will 
experience minor reductions in overall jobs (3% each) (Table 10.7).
However, the results are not uniform across regions. For example, China and 
India will both experience a reduction in the number of jobs for managers and cleri-
cal and administrative workers between 2015 and 2025, as shown in Table 10.8.
Table 10.8 and Fig. 10.6 show the employment changes between 2015 and 2025 
under the 1.5 °C Scenario. Across all eight employment groups, the net effect of the 
energy transition will positive or stable (Fig. 10.5).
However, the results are not uniform across regions. For example, China and 
India both foresee a reduction in the number of jobs for managers and clerical and 
administrative workers between 2015 and 2025, as shown in Table 10.9.
Table 10.10 and Fig. 10.5 show the employment changes between 2015 and 2025 
under the 2.0 °C Scenario. Across all eight employment groups, the net effect of the 
energy transition is positive. Further research is required to identify the training 
needs for all employment groups.
10.4  Conclusions
Under both the 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C Scenarios, the renewable energy transition is pro-
jected to increase employment. Importantly, this analysis has reviewed the locations 
and types of occupations and found that the jobs created in wind and solar PV alone 
are enough to replace the jobs lost in the fossil fuel industry across all occupation 
types. Further research is required to identify the training needs and supportive poli-
cies needed to ensure a just transition for all employment groups.
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Fig. 10.5 Employment changes between 2015 and 2025 by occupational breakdown under the 
2.0 °C Scenario
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Fig. 10.6 Employment changes between 2015 and 2025 by occupational breakdown under the 
1.5 °C Scenario
E. Dominish et al.
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Chapter 11
Requirements for Minerals and Metals 
for 100% Renewable Scenarios
Damien Giurco, Elsa Dominish, Nick Florin, Takuma Watari,  
and Benjamin McLellan
Abstract This chapter explores the magnitude of the changes in patterns of material 
use that will be associated with the increasing deployment of renewable energy and 
discusses the implications for sustainable development. In particular, this chapter 
focuses on the increased use of lithium and cobalt, metals which are used extensively 
in battery technologies, and silver used in solar cells. Consistent with the strong 
growth in renewable energy and electrification of the transport system required in a 
1.5°C scenario, the material requirements also rise dramatically, particularly for 
cobalt and lithium. Scenarios developed for this study show that increasing recycling 
rates and material efficiency can significantly reduce primary demand for metals.
11.1  Introduction
Globally, recent investments in new renewable energy infrastructure have been dou-
ble the investments in new energy from fossil fuels and nuclear power (REN21 
2018). This is strong evidence of the increasing momentum of the energy transition 
away from fossil fuels. A rapid transition to 100% renewables offers hope for reduc-
ing carbon emissions and increasing the chance that global warming will be main-
tained to below 2.0 °C. However, the transition to 100% renewables also comes with 
requirements for new patterns of material use to support the renewable energy infra-
structure, including wind turbines, solar cells, batteries, and other technologies.
This chapter explores the magnitude of the changes in patterns of material use 
that will be associated with the increasing deployment of renewable energy, and 
discusses the implications for sustainable development. In particular, this chapter 
focuses on the increased use of lithium (used extensively in battery technology), 
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cobalt (again used in batteries, particularly for vehicles), and silver (used in solar 
cells because it is an excellent conductor of electricity).
The importance of understanding how material use is affected by renewable 
energy technologies is already established (Ali et al. 2017; Valero et al. 2018). A 
range of studies have identified different aspects of the challenges associated with 
the supply of the materials needed for renewable energy. The first aspect is the avail-
ability of mineral supplies. For example, Mohr et al. (2012) developed commodity- 
focused supply projections for lithium, with an emphasis on the origins and locations 
of available lithium deposits over time, which are contrasted with a simple demand 
function. Other studies have placed more emphasis on demand scenarios, either for 
a specific geographic location, such as Germany (Viebahn et al. 2015) or globally 
(Valero et al. 2018; Watari et al. 2018), and some have explored the role of technol-
ogy mixes and material substitution in detail (Månberger and Stenqvist 2018).
In addition to issues of resource availability, environmental and social issues 
have also been explored (Giurco et al. 2014; Florin and Dominish 2017) and the 
need for improved resource governance has been highlighted (Prior et al. 2013; Ali 
et al. 2017). This chapter evaluates the total demand to determine which metals may 
present bottlenecks to the supply of renewable energy technologies. The potential to 
offset primary demand is explored through a range of scenarios for technology type, 
material efficiency, and recycling rates. This chapter draws on the results of a larger 
study funded by Earthworks (see Dominish et al. 2019).
This chapter has five sections. Following this introductory section, the second 
section outlines the material requirements for key renewable energy infrastructure 
technologies, namely solar photovoltaics (PV), wind turbines, and batteries. The 
key assumptions, and the energy and resource scenarios are described in Sect. 11.3, 
together with a summary of the methodology, which is described in detail in Chap. 
3. The requirements for selected materials (lithium, cobalt, and silver) are presented 
in Sect. 11.4. Following the results, a discussion is presented in Sect. 11.5.
11.2  Overview of Metal Requirements for each Technology
Renewable energy and storage technologies typically have high and diverse metal 
requirements. Moreover, there are often competing technologies or component 
technologies, which add to the complexity of material considerations. The key met-
als used for solar PV, wind power, batteries, and EV are discussed below.
11.2.1  Solar PV
A typical crystalline silicon (c-Si) PV panel, which is currently the dominant tech-
nology, with over 95% of the global market, contains about 76% glass (panel sur-
face), 10% polymer (encapsulant and back-sheet foil), 8% aluminium (frame), 5% 
silicon (solar cells), 1% copper (interconnectors), and less than 0.1% silver (contact 
lines) and other metals (e.g., tin and lead). Thin film technologies, 
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copper–indium–gallium–(di)selenide (CIGS) and cadmium telluride (CdTe), make 
up the remainder of the market. These technologies require less material overall 
than crystalline silicon. For CdTe panels, the composition is 96–97% glass, 3%–4% 
polymer, and less than 1% semi-conductor materials (CdTe) and other metals (e.g., 
nickel, zinc, tin). CIGS contain about 88%–89% glass, 7% aluminium, 4% polymer, 
and less than 1% semi-conductor material (indium, gallium, selenium) and other 
metals (e.g., copper) (Weckend et al. 2016). Figure 11.1 provides a simplified dia-
gram of the PV supply chain, including key materials and sub-components.
11.2.2  Wind
The major raw materials required for the manufacture of wind turbine components 
are bulk commodities: iron ore, copper, aluminium, limestone, and carbon. Wind 
turbines use steel for the towers, nacelle structural components, and the drivetrain, 
accounting for about 80% of the total weight. Some turbine generator designs use 
direct-drive magnetics, which contain the rare earth metals neodymium and dyspro-
sium (Fig. 11.2). The development of direct-drive permanent magnet generators 
(PMG) by major producers (e.g., Siemens and General Electric) simplifies the 
design by eliminating the gearbox, and this is attractive for offshore applications 
because it reduces maintenance (Zimmermann et al. 2013). It is estimated that about 
20% of all installed wind turbines (both onshore and offshore) use rare earth mag-
nets (CEMAC 2017).
Fig. 11.1 Overview of key metal requirements and supply chain for solar PV
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11.2.3  Batteries and Electric Vehicles
This study focuses on lithium ion batteries (LIBs), which power almost all electric 
vehicles (EVs) on the market today and are also an important technology for sta-
tionary energy-storage applications. LIBs are made of two electrodes (anode and 
cathode), current collectors, a separator, electrolyte, a container, and sealing parts. 
The anode is typically made of graphite, with a copper foil current collector. The 
cathode is typically a layered transition metal oxide, with an aluminium foil current 
collector. In between the electrodes is a porous separator and electrolyte. All of 
these components are typically housed in an aluminium container. LIBs are gener-
ally referred to by the material content of the cathode, which accounts for 90% of 
the material value and about 25% of the total weight (Gratz et al. 2014).
The size and type of the LIB has the greatest impact on the material require-
ments. Since commercialization in the 1990s, a range of different types (‘chemis-
tries’) have been developed for different applications, named according to the metals 
in the cathode. The most common LIB types for EV applications are nickel–manga-
nese–cobalt (NMC), lithium–iron phosphate (LFP), nickel–cobalt–aluminium 
(NCA), and lithium–manganese oxide (LMO) (Vaalma et  al. 2018). NMC is the 
most common battery type for passenger vehicles, and NCA is also common, with 
a small share for LMO. However, in China, LFP is the dominant chemistry. Electric 
buses have traditionally used LFP batteries (BNEF 2018) and lead–acid batteries are 
most commonly used for two-wheel vehicles. However, the application of LIBs in 
this market sector is growing (Yan et al. 2018).
For energy storage, NMC and NCA are the most commonly used chemistries. A 
simplified overview of the lithium-ion battery supply chain, including its key metals 
Fig. 11.2 Overview of key metal requirements and supply chain for wind power
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(for the NMC chemistry) and sub-components, is shown in Fig. 11.3. Rare earth 
permanent magnets using neodymium and dysprosium are common in most electric 
vehicle motors. Other motor technologies, or those that replace rare earths with 
lower-cost materials, are under development and are already used in some vehicles. 
However, rare earth magnets are expected to remain the standard for the foreseeable 
future because of their higher performance characteristics (Widmer et al. 2015).
11.3  Scenarios and Key Assumptions
11.3.1  Electricity and Transport Scenarios
The energy scenarios presented here were developed to achieve the climate target in 
the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement of limiting anthropogenic climate change to a 
maximum of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. This projection is more ambitious 
than the IEA’s annual World Energy Outlook (WEO) scenarios, which project that 
current policies, and therefore the global development of renewable power and elec-
tric mobility, will not change. In contrast, many scenarios have been proposed in the 
Fig. 11.3 Overview of key metal requirements and supply chain for LIB and EV
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academic literature that extend as far as zero emissions, whereas the IEA’s own 
“Energy Technology Perspectives” (ETP) scenarios include both a 2.0 °C scenario 
(2DS) and a more ambitious “Beyond 2.0 °C” scenario (B2DS), which aim to achieve 
the Paris targets. The scenario proposed here includes both a shift to 100% renewable 
electricity and a shift to renewable electricity and fuels in the transport sector.
In this scenario, solar PV will account for more than one-third of the installed 
capacity by 2050, with the remainder from wind and other renewables. Lithium-ion 
batteries will account for approximately 6% of energy storage (which will be domi-
nated by pumped hydro and hydrogen).
In the transport system, we focus on the material requirements for the batteries 
used in road transport, because other types of transport do not require batteries to 
power drivetrains or are assumed to rely on other forms of energy (e.g., biofuels for 
aviation). In 2050, most of the energy for road transport will come from electricity 
(55%) and hydrogen (22%), and the remainder will be from biofuels and synfuels. 
In the 1.5 °C Scenario, the batteries required to electrify road transport are specified 
for electric buses and passenger cars, including battery electric vehicles (BEV), 
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV), and commercial vehicles. Passenger cars 
will account for 92% of vehicles and 51% of battery capacity, whereas commercial 
vehicles are projected to account for 48% of battery capacity, although they will 
make up only 8% of the total fleet of vehicles. This is because the battery sizes for 
commercial vehicles (assumed to be 250 kWh in 2015 and rising to 600 kWh in 
2050) are larger than those for passenger vehicles (5–15 kWh for PHEV and 38–62 
kWh for BEV). Buses will account for a small percentage (1%) of both vehicles and 
batteries. Electric bikes and scooters have been excluded, because although they are 
currently a growing market in Asia, by 2050, their share of electricity consumption 
will be negligible compared with the predicted uptake of electric passenger and 
commercial vehicles. Lead–acid batteries are also the main type of battery for elec-
tric bikes and scooters, although lithium-ion may replace these in future.
11.3.2  Resource Scenario Development
Five resource scenarios were developed to estimate the metal demand for 100% 
renewables, as shown in Table 11.1. The scenarios were developed based on the 
current market trends and the likelihood of changes in material efficiency or tech-
nology. Our aim is to understand how primary demand can be offset through changes 
in technology or recycling rates.
11.3.3  Technology Assumptions
The total metal demand for renewable energy and battery technology each year is 
estimated based on the metal intensity of a specific technology and the capacity of 
each technology introduced in a specific year. This introduced stock will accounts 
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for the new capacity and the replacement of technologies at the end of their lives, 
based on a lifetime distribution curve for the average lifetime.
The values for metal intensity are given in tonnes/GW (for solar PV) or tonnes/
GWh (for batteries) of capacity, and two values are given for each metal to evaluate 
the impact of improving the material efficiency (for solar PV) and technology shifts 
(for batteries). To evaluate the impact of recycling, the primary demand is estimated 
by multiplying the discarded products by the recycling rate. The recycling rate is 
obtained by multiplying the collection rate by the recovery efficiency of a metal 
from a specific technology. This recycling rate is also varied to obtain a current rate 
and a potential rate. The potential recycling rate is technologically possible, but is 
not currently applicable because it is not economic. The detailed assumptions for 
batteries and solar PV are explained in detail in the following section.
11.3.4  Batteries
The ‘current materials intensity’ for LIB for EVs and storage (Table 11.2) is esti-
mated based on the assumed market shares of the LIB technologies: NMC (60%), 
LMO (20%), NCA (15%), and LFP (5%) (Vaalma et al. 2018). The dominant bat-
tery technologies in the future are not likely to be the same as those commercialized 
today. Therefore, for the ‘future technology scenario’, we assume that lithium–sul-
fur batteries will replace LIB for EVs (Cano et al. 2018). We have modelled a future 
market (Table 11.3) in which Li–S will achieve a 50% market share for EVs by 
2050, with deployment scaling up at a linear rate, assuming the first commercializa-
tion in 2030. In this scenario, the technology does not change for storage batteries.
We have assumed a collection efficiency of 100% for all batteries and a recovery 
rate of 90% for Co and Ni (Georgi-Maschler et al. 2012). A 10% recovery rate is 
assumed for Li, acknowledging that pyrometallurgical processing routes account 
for most of the current global capacity, and Li recovery may not be possible by this 
Table 11.1 Summary of metal scenarios
Scenario name Market share/ materials efficiency Recycling
Colour in 
figures
Total demand Current materials intensity and 
current market share
No recycling Red
Current recycling Current materials intensity and 
current market share
Current 
recycling rates
Pink
Potential recycling Current materials intensity and 
current market share
Improved 
recycling rates
Orange
Future technology Improved materials efficiency for 
PV and current market share
Technology shift for batteries
No recycling Dark blue
Future technology & 
potential recycling
Improved materials efficiency for 
PV and current market share
Technology shift for batteries
Improved 
recycling rates
Light blue
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route (King et al. 2018). For scenarios that assume a ‘potential future recycling’ 
rate, we have assumed 95% recovery for all metals. This is reasonable given that 
100% recovery has been reported in the laboratory (Gratz et al. 2014).1 However, 
some losses during processing seem unavoidable.2
11.3.5  Solar PV
For solar PV, we assume that the technology types do not change until 2050, and 
that they retain their current market shares, so that crystalline silicon will remain the 
dominant technology. We have modelled the potential to offset demand through 
increases in material efficiency and increases in recycling.
A high and a low value are given for silver to show the impact of material effi-
ciency on silver demand. The current data on silver intensity are from a survey of the 
PV industry (ITRPV 2018), and the future material efficiency is based on an assumed 
minimum amount of silver (Kavlak et al. 2015). The ‘current recycling rate’ sce-
narios assume a current collection rate of 85% for all panels, consistent with the 
target of the EU WEEE Directive.3 This should be considered an average rate, not-
ing that remote and/or distributed roof-top systems will be more costly to collect and 
transport than large utility-scale PV. We assume that no recycling is currently occur-
1 See: https://americanmanganeseinc.com/investor-info-3/investment-proposition/
2 Pers comms Boxall, N.
3 More details available here: http://ec. europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/index_en.htm
Table 11.2 Material intensity and recycling rates
Solar PV Batteries
Materials Silver Lithium Cobalt
Current materials intensity 20 t/GW 113 t/GWh 124 t/GWh
Future technology 4 t/GW 411 t/GWh
Current recycling rate [%] 0% 0% 90%
Potential recycling rate [%] 81% 95% 95%
Table 11.3 Market share
Solar PV Batteries
Technology c-Si Li-ion Li-S
Current market share 95.8% 100%
Future market share Decreases to 50% by 
2050
50% by 2050, beginning from 2030
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ring for silver from PV, but that 95% recovery may be possible. Therefore, for the 
‘potential recycling rate’ scenarios, we assume a 95% recovery efficiency and an 
85% collection rate, which will result in an 81% metal recycling rate.
11.3.6  Metal Assumptions
For each scenario, the annual primary demand is compared with the current produc-
tion (2017 data), and the cumulative demand to 2050 is compared with current 
reserves. The data presented (Table 11.4) highlight the annual production, total 
resources, and reserves. ‘Reserves’ are the subset of the total resources that can be 
economically mined under current conditions. They are dependent on a multitude of 
factors and can change over time. By contrast, resources are less certain economi-
cally and there may be no firm plan to mine them. Over time, new resources can be 
discovered and as economic conditions change, resources may be upgraded to 
reserves (for example, where the price for the metal increases, thus making lower-
grade or more- challenging ores profitable or where a new technology for extraction 
allows lower cost processing). In contrast, reserve estimates can also be downgraded 
over time (as occurred with coal reserve estimates in UK and Germany).
11.4  Results for Lithium, Cobalt, and Silver
The cumulative demand from renewable energy technologies for cobalt, lithium, and 
silver by 2050 has been modelled, and is compared to current reserves in Fig. 11.4. 
The cumulative demand for cobalt from renewable energy and transport exceeds the 
current reserves in all scenarios, and for lithium, the cumulative demand is exceeded 
in all scenarios, except the ‘potential recycling scenario’. For silver, the total demand 
for silver from renewable energy will reach around 50% of current reserves.
The annual demand in 2050 is compared with the current rates of production 
(based on 2017 data). Both cobalt and lithium have annual demands that far exceed 
the current rates of production—particularly lithium in the ‘future technology’ sce-
nario. However, the annual demand for silver will remain below current production 
levels (Fig. 11.5).
The detailed results for each metal are shown in the following section.
Table 11.4 Metal assumptions
Metal Production 2017 (tonnes/year) Reserve (tonnes) Resources (tonnes)
Cobalt 110,000 7,100,000 25,000,000
Lithium 46,500 16,000,000 53,000,000
Silver 25,000 530,000 N/A
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11.4.1  Cobalt
The annual demand for cobalt from EVs and storage could exceed the current pro-
duction rates in around 2023 (in all scenarios). In the ‘future technology’ scenario, 
shifting to Li–S instead of LIB will reduce the demand for cobalt. However, recy-
cling, rather than shifting technologies, will have the greatest impact on reducing 
the primary demand in both the current technology and future technology 
scenarios.
The cumulative total demand to 2050 (with current technology and no recycling) 
could exceed current reserves by 400%, and exceed current resources by 20%. Even 
with recycling and a shift to technologies that use less cobalt, the cumulative demand 
will still exceed reserves. However, in these scenarios, the demand will remain 
below the resource levels (Figs. 11.6 and 11.7).
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11.4.2  Lithium
The annual demand for lithium for EVs and storage could exceed the current pro-
duction rates by around 2022 (in all scenarios). In the ‘future technology and no 
recycling’ scenario, a shift to Li–S will increase the demand for lithium, because 
these batteries have a higher amount of lithium. Increasing recycling from its cur-
rent low levels (which are assumed to be 10%) will offer the greatest potential to 
offset the primary demand for lithium.
The cumulative demand for lithium by 2050 will be below the resource levels for 
all scenarios, but will exceed the reserves unless there is a shift to a high recycling 
rate. The cumulative demand could be as high as 170% of the current reserves with 
the current technology, and could be 280% of current reserves with a switch to Li–S 
batteries (Figs. 11.8 and 11.9).
11.4.3  Silver
The total annual demand for silver could reach more than 40% of the current pro-
duction rates by 2050, assuming no recycling and that the materials efficiency does 
not change (Fig. 11.10). The cumulative demand to 2050 could reach around half 
the current reserves with the current technology, and around one-quarter if the tech-
nology improves (Fig. 11.11). The reduction in material intensity in the ‘future tech-
nology’ scenario, in which silver use decreases from 20 to 4 tonnes/GW, has the 
greatest potential to reduce demand.
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11.5  Discussion
Within the context of the increasing metal resource requirements for the renewable 
energy and storage technologies, the rapid increase in the demand for both cobalt 
and lithium is of greatest concern, and the demand for both metals will exceed the 
current production rates by 2023 and 2022, respectively. The demand for these met-
als will increase more rapidly than it does for silver, partly because solar PV is a 
more established technology and silver use has become very efficient, whereas the 
electrification of the transport system and the rapid expansion of lithium battery 
usage has only begun to accelerate in the last few years.
The potential to offset the primary demand differs, depending on the technology. 
Offsetting demand through secondary sources of cobalt and lithium has the most 
potential to reduce total primary demand for these metals, as batteries have a com-
paratively short lifetime of approximately 10 years. The cumulative demand for both 
metals will exceed current reserves, but with high recycling rates, they can remain 
below resource levels. However, there is a delay until the period in which recycling 
will offset demand, because there must be enough batteries in use and reaching the 
ends of their lives to be collected and recycled. This delay could be further extended 
by strategies for the reuse of vehicular batteries as stationary storage, which might 
save costs in the short term and increase the uptake of PV. The efficiency of cobalt 
use in batteries also significantly reduces demand, and this is already happening as 
manufacturers shift towards lower-cobalt chemistries (Energy Insights by McKinsey 
2018). However, this is also likely to lead to an increase in the demand for lithium.
Increasing the efficiency of material use has the biggest potential utility in offset-
ting the demand for PV metals, whereas recycling will have a smaller impact on 
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demand. This is attributable to the long life-span of solar PV panels, and their lower 
potential for recycling. Although not as extreme as the growth of cobalt and lithium, 
the growth of silver and its demand in 2050 are still considerable. This is important, 
especially when considering that solar PV currently consumes approximately 9% of 
end-use silver (The Silver Institute & Thomson Reuters 2018), and although it is 
possible to create silver-less solar panels, these panels are not expected to be on the 
market in the near future (ITRPV 2018).
11.5.1  Limitations
This study only focuses on the metal demand for renewable energy and transport. It 
does not take into account other demands for these metals. It is expected that with 
the increase in renewable energy, renewable energy technologies will consume a 
greater share of these metals. In our modelling, the recycled content used in tech-
nologies comes only from metals from the same technologies at the end of their 
lives. However, the demand could potentially be offset by accessing other secondary 
sources of the metal. At the same time, these technologies are only one end-use 
within the overall economic demand for these metals. The expansion of renewable 
energy and storage technologies could have a significant effect on the overall market 
dynamics, including influencing prices, which may feed back to the efforts to reduce 
material intensity. These results only focus on cobalt, lithium, and silver because of 
their importance. However, further analysis is required of other metals that will be 
important in the renewable energy transition.
Another important limitation is that this analysis does not consider the impact of 
the demand for a mineral on the mining of that mineral and therefore on the amount 
of energy required for this mining and processing activity. In particular, as the 
potential ore grade declines, and polymetallic ore processing and the mining of 
deeper ore bodies increase, it is possible that this feedback loop could have a more- 
than- marginal influence on the overall sectoral energy consumption. To examine 
this is an area accurately will require much more-complex modelling.
11.5.2  Comparison with Other Studies
A large number of studies have examined scenarios for renewable energy and stor-
age technologies that will mitigate climate change. In recent years, there has also 
been an upsurge in studies of mineral ‘criticality’, which have paralleled the present 
study in terms of the high penetration of renewable and storage technologies and the 
potential constraints that certain minerals may impose. This increased interest has 
been prompted to some extent by China’s rare earth export restrictions of 
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2009–2011, which reflect the sense that mineral supply chains are still quite inse-
cure. Most of these studies have addressed specific technologies or specific coun-
tries or regions, rather than global climate targets. A number of studies have 
specifically and directly addressed the Paris Agreement targets (ensuring that the 
temperature rise does not exceed 2.0 °C), although the modelling frameworks have 
been slightly different. Some of the authors of the present chapter have been 
involved in these studies (Tokimatsu et al. 2017; Watari et al. 2018).
A range of variables affect the results, including the installed capacity and tech-
nology type in the energy scenario; the assumed market demand of technology 
types (e.g., type of battery or solar panel); and the material intensity assumptions. 
The projected future demand for lithium is higher than in previous studies, and that 
for cobalt is similar or higher (Månberger and Stenqvist 2018; Watari et al. 2018; 
Valero et al. 2018; Watari et al. 2018), as shown in Table 11.5. This is primarily 
attributable to the ambitious renewable energy scenario used in this study, which 
includes achieving a 100% renewable transport system by 2050, whereas the other 
studies have still included a large share of gasoline-powered cars in 2050. This 
study also includes batteries for stationary energy storage, whereas the other studies 
have only included batteries for road transport. Moreover, this study assumes a 
shorter battery life of 10 years, based on current warranties, whereas some scenarios 
assume a longer life.
The results for silver are in the middle of the range of results given by other stud-
ies. Our scenario includes a higher installed capacity of PV in 2050 than the other 
studies. However, this study also assumes a lower metal intensity than previous 
studies, because new data have been published based on the current material use by 
the PV industry (ITRPV 2018).
11.6  Supply Impacts and Challenges
In addition to the material requirements for renewable technologies explored earlier 
in this chapter, it is important to understand the changes in the available supply, the 
geopolitical landscape, and the associated social and environmental impacts, which 
are outlined below.
Table 11.5 Comparison of results with other studies
Study Energy Scenario
Metals (% of reserves up 
to 2050)
Cobalt Lithium Silver
This study 1.5 °C100% renewable energy 
scenario
420% 170% 50%
Watari et al. (2018) Beyond 2 degree scenario (IEA) 180% 130% 78%
Månberger and Stenqvist 
(2018)
Beyond 2 degree scenario (IEA) 440% 100% 18%
Valero et al. (2018) 2 degree scenario 70% 40% 70%
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11.6.1  Geopolitical Landscape
The geopolitical shift underway in the supply of the resources required for the 
globe’s future energy mix is clearly illustrated in Fig. 11.12. Whereas the value of 
the lithium industry is much less than the value of the oil industry, this comparison 
highlights a distinct shift in the energy commodities that society values. Oil’s rate of 
use is projected to decline somewhat in the decade ahead (Mohr et al. 2015), whereas 
lithium’s production is expected to grow rapidly (Mohr et al. 2012).
Although it is not a key focus of this particular chapter, the dominance of China 
in the supply of rare earths has encouraged manufacturing countries to look at diver-
sifying their supply sources, including through the recovery of rare earths from 
recycled material. A similar situation of heavily concentrated supply occurs for 
cobalt, where the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the largest supplier, at 
around 66,000 tonnes per year. The next four largest cobalt-producing countries 
(China, Canada, Russia, and Australia) only produce 5–7000 tonnes per year each. 
The supply chain is also concentrated downstream, with around 50% of cobalt 
smelted and refined in China.
11.6.2  Social and Environmental Impacts
The mining and supply chain for these metals can have adverse social and environ-
mental consequences for workers, local communities, and the environment. These 
impacts are most significant for the cobalt mined in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, where there are human rights violations, child labour, and severe environ-
mental pollution affecting health (Florin and Dominish 2017).
These types of impacts at mine sites and along the supply chain also influence the 
availability of primary resources. For example, whereas Australia and Chile are 
large producers of lithium, large deposits remain undeveloped in Bolivia, due in part 
to local concerns over the social and environmental impacts. The global silver mar-
ket receives less media attention than the market for lithium, but the world’s second- 
largest silver mine (Escobal) in Guatemala is currently closed by a constitutional 
Top 5 Oil
producing countries:
Northern hemisphere
features heavily
Top 5 Lithium
producing countries:
Southern hemisphere
features heavily
Fig. 11.12 Top five oil-producing countries (left) versus lithium-producing countries (right)
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court ruling that the Xinca Indigenous peoples were not adequately consulted before 
a mine licence was granted (Jamasmie 2018).
The increased use of materials such as lithium, cobalt, and silver has economic 
implications for the future of battery manufacture. For example, the cost of cobalt 
has risen dramatically from US$20000/t in 2016 to US$80000 in 2018 (Tchetvertakov 
2018). This is prompting manufacturers to look for alternatives, such as nickel, 
vanadium, and zinc (Tchetvertakov 2018). At the same time, a significant propor-
tion of these price fluctuations are attributable to non-industrial factors, such as 
investment and speculation in metal markets, which may also require greater regula-
tion to avoid unnecessary restrictions on renewable energy and storage 
technologies.
11.6.2.1  Recycling Challenges
Whilst recycling can help to offset primary material demand through recycled 
sources, there are technological, social and environmental challenges to increasing 
recycling. The collection systems and infrastructure required to recycle metals from 
renewable energy technologies are not well established. For example, although sil-
ver has an overall recycling rate of 30–50% (Graedel et al. 2011), almost no recy-
cling of silver from PV panels occurs, because most recycling of PV panels focuses 
on recycling the glass, aluminium, and copper. Most of the processes used to recycle 
lithium-ion batteries focus on the recovery of cobalt and nickel, because of their 
higher price, so that lithium is downcycled into less valuable products, such as 
cement. It should also be noted that the recycling of some key energy materials, 
such as rare earths in magnets, does not offer significant cost savings or environ-
mental benefits over their extraction from primary resources (McLellan et al. 2013).
The establishment of effective collection networks is important for recycling. 
Collection networks must be easily understood and must provide easily accessible 
deposit mechanisms. Recycling can be both informal and formal, and whereas in 
some cases, informal collection networks offer greater rates of recycling, the social 
and environmental impacts can be higher. For example, recycling electronic waste 
on open fires creates hazardous fumes for informal recyclers and has detrimental 
effects on the environment. There is also a potential tension between reducing mate-
rial intensity and the ability to effectively separate, recover, and recycle materials. 
Increasingly, thin layers of material are being utilized because of improved manu-
facturing processes, which can reduce the costs of products in their first lifetimes. 
However, as the material content decreases, the value of the secondary production 
decreases, making it a less attractive option for investment. Again, the use of 
advanced, complex materials can sometimes make valuable materials difficult to 
separate from each other, and this again increases the costs and reduces the profits 
for investors in recovery processes.
To ensure that social and environmental issues will be addressed, several initia-
tives across supply chains are being developed, including the China-led Responsible 
Cobalt Initiative, the Cobalt Institute, the Initiative for Responsible Mining 
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Assurance, Solving the Ewaste Problem (StEP), and the R2 standard for sustainable 
electronics recycling. In the USA, the Dodd-Frank Act has mandated the traceabil-
ity of the gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
This has arisen from the international concern over the social impacts and implica-
tions of sourcing metals from that country, and in particular, to avoid supporting 
conflict and environmental damage. However, cobalt is not explicitly mentioned in 
the Dodd-Frank Act.
International resource governance that looks beyond renewable energy and 
beyond a single commodity focus is increasingly recognised as a missing area in 
environmental policy (Ali et al. 2017). The transition to renewable energy and the 
associated requirements for resources to support this transition could be a catalyst 
for advancing such policies.
11.7  Concluding Remarks
This chapter has given an overview of the material requirements for key renewable 
energy technologies and the projected demands for lithium, cobalt, and silver. 
Consistent with the strong growth in renewable energy and the electrification of the 
transport system required by the 1.5 °C scenario, these material requirements will 
also increase dramatically, particularly those for cobalt and lithium. The high total 
demand requirements for these metals emphasize the importance of recycling, alter-
native chemistries, and transport planning and practices (including city design to 
encourage active and public transport, as well as car sharing and pooling). The key 
messages of this chapter are: it is important to design for both renewable energy and 
resource cycles; and it is important to adopt a systems view that considers the avail-
able supply and also social and environmental factors. To support sustainable devel-
opment goals, both the primary and secondary sources of the resources required to 
underpin the renewable energy transformation must be stewarded effectively as the 
supply chains develop.
References
Ali, S.  H., D.  Giurco, N.  Arndt, E.  Nickless, G.  Brown, A.  Demetriades, R.  Durrheim, M.  A. 
Enriquez, J.  Kinnaird, A.  Littleboy, L.  D. Meinert, R.  Oberhänsli, J.  Salem, R.  Schodde, 
G. Schneider, O. Vidal and N. Yakovleva (2017). “Mineral supply for sustainable development 
requires resource governance.” Nature 543: 367.
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2018., Electric Buses in Cities. Available at: http://www.ouren-
ergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/1726_BNEF_C40_Electric_buses_in_cities_
FINAL_APPROVED_2.original.pdf
Cano, Z.P., Banham, D., Ye, S., Hintennach, A., Lu, J., Fowler, M. and Chen, Z., 2018. Batteries 
and fuel cells for emerging electric vehicle markets. Nature Energy, 3(4), p.279.
11 Requirements for Minerals and Metals for 100% Renewable Scenarios
456
Clean Energy Manufacturing Analysis Center (CEMAC), 2017. Benchmarks of global clean 
energy manufacturing. Available at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/65619.pdf
Energy Insights by McKinsey, 2018. Metal mining constraints on the electric mobil-
ity horizon. Available at: https://www.mckinseyenergyinsights.com/insights/
metal-mining-constraints-on-the-electric-mobility-horizon/
Florin, N., Dominish, E. (2017). Sustainability evaluation of energy storage technologies, Institute 
for Sustainable Futures for the Australian Council of Learned Academies.
Georgi-Maschler, T., Friedrich, B., Weyhe, R., Heegn, H. and Rutz, M., 2012. Development of a 
recycling process for Li-ion batteries. Journal of power sources, 207, pp.173–182.
Giurco, D., B. McLellan, D. M. Franks, K. Nansai and T. Prior (2014). “Responsible mineral and 
energy futures: views at the nexus.” Journal of Cleaner Production 84: 322–338.
Graedel, T.E., Allwood, J., Birat, J.P., Buchert, M., Hagelüken, C., Reck, B.K., Sibley, S.F. and 
Sonnemann, G. (2011). What do we know about metal recycling rates?. Journal of Industrial 
Ecology, 15(3), 355–366.
Gratz, E., Sa, Q., Apelian, D. and Wang, Y., 2014. A closed loop process for recycling spent lithium 
ion batteries. Journal of Power Sources, 262, pp.255–262.
International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaic (ITRPV), 2018, International Technology 
Roadmap for Photovoltaic Results 2017, Ninth Edition. Available at: http://www.itrpv.net/
Reports/Downloads/
Jamasmie, C. (2018) Guatemala delays ruling on Tahoe’s Escobal mine reopen-
ing. Mining.com Accessed 26 September 2018, http://www.mining.com/
guatemala-delays-ruling-tahoes-escobal-mine-reopening/
Kavlak, G., McNerney, J., Jaffe, R.L. and Trancik, J.E., 2015. Metal production requirements for 
rapid photovoltaics deployment. Energy & Environmental Science, 8(6), pp.1651–1659.
King S, Boxall NJ, Bhatt AI (2018) Australian Status and Opportunities for Lithium Battery 
Recycling. CSIRO, Australia
Månberger, A. and B. Stenqvist (2018). “Global metal flows in the renewable energy transition: 
Exploring the effects of substitutes, technological mix and development.” Energy Policy 119: 
226–241.
McLellan, B. C., G. D. Corder and S. H. Ali (2013). “Sustainability of rare earths—an overview of 
the state of knowledge.” Minerals 3(3): 304–317.
Mohr, S. H., G. M. Mudd and D. Giurco (2012). “Lithium Resources and Production: Critical 
Assessment and Global Projections.” Minerals 2(1): 65.
Mohr, S. H., Wang, J., Ellem, G., Ward, J., & Giurco, D. (2015). Projection of world fossil fuels 
by country. Fuel, 141, 120–135.
Prior, T., P. A. Wäger, A. Stamp, R. Widmer and D. Giurco (2013). “Sustainable governance of 
scarce metals: The case of lithium.” Science of The Total Environment 461–462: 785–791.
REN21 (2018) Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, REN21 Secretariat, Paris
Tchetvertakov, G. (2018). “Panasonic and Tesla seek to remove cobalt from elec-
tric car batteries.” Retrieved 15 September 2018, from https://smallcaps.com.au/
panasonic-tesla-remove-cobalt-electric-car-battery/.
The Silver Institute and Thomson Reuters, 2018. World Silver Survey 2018. Available at: https://
www.silverinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/WSS-2018.pdf
Tokimatsu, K., H. Wachtmeister, B. McLellan, S. Davidsson, S. Murakami, M. Höök, R. Yasuoka 
and M. Nishio (2017). “Energy modeling approach to the global energy-mineral nexus: A first 
look at metal requirements and the 2 °C target.” Applied Energy 207: 494–509.
Vaalma, C., Buchholz, D., Weil, M. and Passerini, S., 2018. A cost and resource analysis of 
sodium-ion batteries. Nature Reviews Materials, 3, p.18013
Valero, A., A. Valero, G. Calvo and A. Ortego (2018). “Material bottlenecks in the future develop-
ment of green technologies.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 93: 178–200.
Viebahn, P., O.  Soukup, S.  Samadi, J.  Teubler, K.  Wiesen and M.  Ritthoff (2015). “Assessing 
the need for critical minerals to shift the German energy system towards a high proportion of 
renewables.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 49: 655–671.
D. Giurco et al.
457
Watari, T., B. McLellan, S. Ogata and T. Tezuka (2018). “Analysis of Potential for Critical Metal 
Resource Constraints in the International Energy Agency’s Long-Term Low-Carbon Energy 
Scenarios.” Minerals 8(4): 156.
Weckend, S.;Wade, A.; Heath, G. 2016 End-of-Life Management Solar Photovoltaic Panels; 
International Renewable Energy Agency and International Energy Agency Photovoltaic Power 
Systems: Paris, France
Widmer, J.D., Martin, R. and Kimiabeigi, M., 2015. Electric vehicle traction motors without rare 
earth magnets. Sustainable Materials and Technologies, 3, pp.7–13.
Yan, X., He, J., King, M., Hang, W. and Zhou, B., 2018. Electric bicycle cost calculation models 
and analysis based on the social perspective in China. Environmental Science and Pollution 
Research, pp.1–13.
Zimmermann, T., Rehberger, M. and Gößling-Reisemann, S., 2013. Material flows resulting from 
large scale deployment of wind energy in Germany. Resources, 2(3), pp.303–334.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, 
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative 
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not 
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from 
the copyright holder.
11 Requirements for Minerals and Metals for 100% Renewable Scenarios
459© The Author(s) 2019 
S. Teske (ed.), Achieving the Paris Climate Agreement Goals, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05843-2_12
Chapter 12
Implications of the Developed Scenarios 
for Climate Change
Malte Meinshausen
Abstract This section provides a summary of the implications of the developed 
2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios for global mean climate change. Specifically, we con-
sider atmospheric CO2 concentrations, radiative forcing, global-mean surface air 
temperatures and sea level rise.
The question addressed in this section is what the implications are for future climate 
change if the world were to follow the energy-related CO2 emissions developed here, 
complemented by land-use CO2 emissions and those of other greenhouses gases 
(GHGs). According to the high- emission scenario with unabated fossil fuel use, the 
world could experience 1400 ppm CO2 concentrations by the end of 2100, which is 
five times higher than the pre-industrial background concentration of 278 ppm. Our 
ice-core records have shown that over the last 850,000 years, the CO2 concentrations 
have only oscillated between approximately 180 ppm and 280 ppm. In fact, for the 
last 10  million years on this planet, the CO2 concentrations have probably not 
exceeded the CO2 concentrations that our thirst for fossil fuels would propel the 
world into in just two centuries.
That is a dramatic change to the thin layer of atmosphere that wraps our planet. 
Even if any climate change consequences that follow from this dramatic change in 
CO2 concentrations are disregarded, the consequences will be dramatic. At atmo-
spheric CO2 concentrations above 900 ppm, the acidity level in the oceans will drop 
below the so-called ‘aragonite saturation level’, which is the level required for coral 
reefs and other organisms with calciferous shells to sustain their structures (Ricke 
et al. 2013). Therefore, without even considering ocean warming and the associated 
bleaching, this would mean the end of much marine life as we know it.
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12.1  Background on the Investigated Scenarios
The international community uses various scenarios to explore these future changes 
to CO2, involving other GHGs and ultimately, temperature, precipitation changes, 
and changes involving extreme events. Here, we compare the scenarios developed 
in this study with the standard scenarios developed for the forthcoming 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report. The 
scenarios used in the forthcoming IPCC Sixth Assessment Report are the so-called 
‘SSP scenarios’. The full range of those nine SSP scenarios spans cases of unabated 
fossil fuel use at the higher-emissions end to two scenarios at the lower-emission 
end that are considered to be consistent with a 2 °C and 1.5 °C warming target. 
These two scenarios are called ‘SSP1_26’ and ‘SSP1_19’, respectively.
Both of those lower-emissions scenarios imply a substantial amount of biomass 
use for energy, combined with CCS, to draw down atmospheric CO2 levels. This is 
the key difference from the scenarios developed in the present study. Whereas we 
use a substantial amount of negative CO2 emissions in the reforestation and forest 
restoration options, our analysis does not depend on the assumption that biomass, 
combined with CCS, must be used on large scale to achieve either the 2 °C or 1.5 °C 
target.
If we do not rely on some negative CO2 emission options, in particular biomass 
and CCS, the questions are: (1) to what extent are those negative emissions created 
by other means (e.g., reforestation); or (2) whether CO2 emissions can be reduced 
in the first place so that we do not need to rely on negative emissions options; or (3) 
whether other non-CO2 gases can be reduced even further to make negative CO2 
emissions unnecessary. The scenarios developed in this study use all three options, 
as outlined in the previous chapters. Not only will energy-related CO2 emissions be 
radically reduced, CO2 uptake via reforestation and forest restoration will also play 
an important role. This study takes a more conservative approach to non-CO2 gases 
by being consistent with other stringent mitigation scenarios. Thereby, we ensure 
that the feasibility constraints implicitly or explicitly set by other modelling frame-
works are not violated.
12.2  Comparison of Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations 
and Radiative Forcing
As mentioned above, unabated fossil fuel use over the last century and the twenty- 
first century will dramatically change the oceans, simply by creating an atmospheric 
CO2 concentration beyond that present on the Earth for the last 10 million years. 
Currently, we just exceeded the historical maximum level of 400 ppm atmospheric 
CO2 and are continuing to add 2–3 ppm a year. If we consider the most stringent 
mitigation scenario used in the preparation of the forthcoming IPCC Sixth 
Assessment Report, SSP1_19, then we will reach 400 ppm concentrations again in 
the latter half of the century. Staying below 400 ppm is a prerequisite in the long 
term for remaining below 2 °C or reaching 1.5 °C warming.
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Figure 12.1 shows the global CO2, CH4, and N2O concentrations under the key 
RCP and SSP scenarios and the three scenarios developed as part of this study. Our 
1.5 °C scenario is clearly lower in terms of its CO2 concentrations than the lowest 
SSP scenario, SSP1_19, for practically the entire twenty-first century (upper panel). 
Only towards the end of the twenty-first century do the strongly negative CO2 emis-
sions in the SSP1_19 scenario bring the CO2 concentration closer towards our 
1.5 °C scenario.
Aggregating all the greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions by their radiative forc-
ing, and expressing the resulting radiative forcing again as if it were only caused by 
CO2 yields the so-called ‘CO2 equivalence concentrations’. In Fig. 12.2, the CO2 
equivalence concentrations for the four RCP scenarios, the nine SSP scenarios, and 
three scenarios developed in this study are shown. The reference scenario in this 
study is quite similar to both the RCP6.0 and SSP4_60 scenarios, providing a 
medium-high reference case. The radiative forcing and CO2 equivalence concentra-
tion of the 2 °C scenario of this study is actually quite closely aligned with the lower 
SSP1_19 scenario, at least initially until the middle of the second half of this cen-
tury. Thereafter, the net negative CO2 emissions implied by the SSP1_19 scenario 
lead to stronger reductions in radiative forcing than the 2.0 °C scenario of our study. 
However, our lower 1.5 °C scenario first undercuts the radiative forcing trajectory 
of the SSP1_19 scenario, but then ends up at a similar radiative forcing level by 
2100.
Figure 12.2 shows CO2 equivalence concentrations (upper panel) and radiative 
forcing (lower panel) of the main scenarios used in IPCC Assessment Reports and 
this study’s scenarios. The RCP scenarios (shown in thin dotted lines) underlie the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and the so-called ‘SSP scenarios’ provide the main 
basis for the scenarios considered in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report. The three 
scenarios developed in this study are shown in thick blue lines.
12.3  Comparison of Cumulative CO2 Emissions
Since the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, cumulative CO2 emissions have been 
introduced as a key metric into the international climate debate. Every tonne of 
additional CO2 emitted will add to that cumulative burden and warm the planet for 
the next hundreds and in fact thousands of years. The only way to halt further global 
warming is to halt cumulative CO2 emissions, which means bringing the annual CO2 
emissions to basically zero levels. Only with net negative emissions can the tem-
perature thermostat of the Earth be dialled back again. Therefore, while achieving 
such net negative emissions is tremendously challenging, it is the only way to main-
tain long-term climate change at levels close to those of today or well below 
1.5 °C. Few scenarios include very strong near-term reductions and no substantially 
negative CO2 emissions and can limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C, with no or 
only a slight overshoot (IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C). In this study, as well as 
very strong near-term reductions in energy-related CO2 emissions, we have used a 
range of land-use-based sequestration options. These are not unambitious, as 
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Fig. 12.1 Global CO2, CH4 and N2O concentrations under various scenarios. The so-called SSP 
scenarios are going to inform the Sixth Assessment Report by the IPCC, the RCP scenarios are the 
previous generation of scenarios and the LDF scenarios are those developed in this study
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forthcoming Sixth Assessment (so-called SSP scenarios), the RCP scenarios underlying the Fifth 
IPCC Assessment Report and the LDF scenarios developed in this study
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outlined in previous chapters. In fact, in the case of the 1.5 °C scenario, they practi-
cally require that the Earth’s forests be returned to their pre-industrial coverage—a 
substantial challenge given the widespread deforestation that has occurred over the 
last 100 years. By the end of the century, the cumulative CO2 emissions beyond 
levels will constitute around 300 GtCO2 (see Fig. 12.3).
Without going into too much detail about why cumulative emission numbers dif-
fer between various studies, the key point is that CO2 emissions must be reduced to 
zero. Otherwise, cumulative emissions and global warming will continue to increase. 
Therefore, there is no way to avoid emissions-free electricity, transport, and indus-
trial systems, that either learn to completely get rid themselves of fossil fuels or to 
compensates for any remaining use, either by CCS or land-based sequestration. 
Because the latter negative emissions option must be used to offset some remaining 
agricultural emissions, the story becomes simpler. There is no way around the fast 
and complete cessation of all fossil fuel use. This is the simple and powerful logic 
of carbon budgets.
Global cumulative CO2 emissions for the scenarios developed in this study (thick 
blue lines) and other literature-reported scenarios from the RCP and SSP sets. It is 
clear that this study’s 2.0 °C pathway initially reaches a similar cumulative emis-
sions level as the SSP1_19 scenario, before the cumulative CO2 emissions are 
reduced again in SSP1_19 with large-scale net negative CO2 emissions via bioen-
ergy with carbon capture and storage. In contrast, the reduction of cumulative CO2 
emissions in this study’s 1.5 °C scenarios starts to plateau much earlier (by 2035) 
and are then reduced by land -based sequestration options, such as reforestation and 
forest restoration (thick blue line at the lower end). The stated blue 1.5 °C carbon 
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Fig. 12.3 Global cumulative CO2 emissions – 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C scenarios
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budget range is the effective central value presented in the recent IPCC Special 
Report on 1.5 °C warming.1
12.4  Implications for Temperature and Sea-Level Rise
This section examines the implications of the three scenarios developed in this 
study for the probabilistic global mean temperature and sea level rise. Based on the 
latest version 7 of the reduced complexity carbon cycle and climate model MAGICC, 
we can derive a range of projections for every scenarios that provides a good mea-
sure of the projection uncertainties over the twenty-first century. We ran this model 
600 times for each scenario, varying wide ranges of feedback and forcing parame-
ters. For the sea-level rise projections, we used the new sea-level rise module of 
MAGICC7, as described by Nauels et al. (2017) and drove that with our probabilis-
tic temperature projections. We did not include the recent finding that possible 
Antarctic ice sheet instability could lead to a much greater sea-level rise this cen-
tury. These extra contributions to sea-level rise are also assumed to affect the higher 
end of the projections for high-emission scenarios, and do not therefore change the 
sea-level rise projections of the lower-emissions scenarios.
A key question regarding future temperature projections is whether the scenarios 
will stay below the envisaged 1.5  °C and 2.0  °C warming levels relative to pre- 
industrial levels. When answering this question in terms of the consistency of the 
1.5 °C and 2.0 °C warming levels, the uncertainty in historical reconstructions of 
temperatures must play a role. The latest IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C warming 
estimated from an average of four studies that the difference between early- industrial 
(1850–1900) and recent surface air temperature levels (2006–2015) was 0.97 °C. If 
we accept here the slightly oversimplified assumption that the 1850–1900 tempera-
ture levels can be equated with pre-industrial temperatures, we can evaluate the 
difference towards a 1.5 °C warming level, namely 0.53 °C. Note that this distance 
could be shorter—a matter of ongoing scientific debate.
Anyway, the median temperatures for the (lowest) 1.5 °C Scenario in this study 
do indeed—somewhat by design—reach the 1.5 °C target level by 2100. This means 
that after a slight overshoot, there will be a 50% chance by 2100 that the global 
mean temperature is at or below 1.5  °C warming—and without the widespread 
deployment of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
1 The IPCC Special Report estimates for a 0.53 °C distance of the 1.5 °C degree target from the 
2006–2015 level, a carbon budget of 560 GtCO2 from 1 January 2018 onwards. Reduced by 100 
GtCO2 for additional Earth System Feedbacks (see Table 2.2 in the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C) 
and adding approximately 270 GtCO2 emissions for the period from 2011 to 2017, the central 
estimate for a 50% chance of staying below 1.5 °C warming as stated by IPCC is approximately 
730 GtCO2 from 2011 onwards. This is for a definition of historical warming that is based on a 
consistent surface air temperature estimate over the land and oceans. A further reduction of 
approximately 150 GtCO2 would result, if we take into account that the IPCC carbon budget esti-
mate refer to a 1850–1900 early industrial reference period for the 1.5 °C warming, rather than a 
1750 pre-industrial reference period (which makes approximately a 0.1 °C difference, with +− 0.1 
°C uncertainty). 
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In the case of our 2 °C Scenario, the centric 66% range is almost entirely below 
the 2 °C warming level, which means that the chance of maintaining temperature 
change below 2 °C is 80%–85%, in the modelling framework used. This warming 
level and likelihood fits well with the adapted Paris Agreement target, which shifted 
from a ‘below 2 °C’ to a ‘well below 2°C’ formulation.
Of course, there are several uncertainties that are not addressed in those probabi-
listic temperature projections. Therefore, future investigations might shift the 
 estimates for a 50%, lower, or higher chance of staying below 1.5 °C warming level 
relative to the pre-industrial level.
Figure 12.4 shows the global mean surface air temperature projections, and their 
66% and 90% ranges, for the three scenarios developed in this study. The reference 
scenario is shown in red, the 2.0 °C pathway is shown in blue, and the 1.5 °C path-
way is shown in green. For historical temperatures, a mixture between ocean- surface 
and land-surface air temperatures is shown, namely the HadCRUT4 dataset. The 
most recent estimate by the IPCC of the pre-industrial air surface temperature levels 
is that they were around 0.97 °C below the 2006–2015 levels. The median projec-
tions of the three scenarios are shown in thick solid lines.
As a first approximation, the global mean temperature is proportional to the sum 
of all historical CO2 emissions. In a similar vein, sea-level rise is the sum over all 
past temperature rises relative to the pre-industrial level. Combining these two 
approximations yields the rule of thumb that sea-level rise is proportional to the 
double integral of CO2 emissions. Therefore, whereas temperatures are relatively 
agnostic about when CO2 emissions occurred, sea-level rise will be higher the lon-
ger ago the CO2 emission occurred.
This proportionality has implications for our scenarios. As we saw previously, 
our scenarios are relatively low in terms of radiative forcing early in the twenty-first 
century compared with the lower scenarios of the SSP and RCP sets. Towards the 
end of this century, the strongly net negative emissions of the SSP1_19 scenario will 
cause radiative forcing (and approximate temperature) to be similar under SSP1_19 
and our 1.5 °C scenario. That our scenarios will first entail lower and then similar 
forcing and temperature levels suggests that the implied sea-level rise will be lower 
for the second half of the twenty-first century and beyond, even though the 2100 
temperature level might be similar. This is a clear benefit of our scenarios and should 
be investigated further in the future.
Thus, there is clearly an advantage in undertaking concerted early action rather a 
slower decline in emissions followed by strong negative emissions. This is impor-
tant. However, in the larger scheme of things, it is clearly a second-order effect. 
Even under the strongest mitigation scenarios, we cannot expect sea-level rise to 
stop any time soon. To halt sea-level rise in the 21st or even the twenty-second cen-
tury, we will require massively negative CO2 emissions, drawing back out of the 
atmosphere a lot of the CO2 that we emitted this century. Therefore, even under our 
low 1.5 °C and 2.0 °C scenarios, the expected sea-level rise by 2100 will be above 
30 cm relative to the 2010 levels—and will continue to rise to 2100 (Fig. 12.5).
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Fig. 12.4 Global-mean surface air temperature projections
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Fig. 12.5 Global-mean sea level rise projections under the three scenarios developed in this study
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Abstract The following section focuses on the main findings in all parts of the 
research, with priority given to high-level lessons, to avoid the repetition of previous 
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Renewable energy potential mapping, Transport scenario and long-term energy 
scenario development, power sector analysis, employment and mineral resource 
implications for the 2.0C and 1.5C scenarios and non-energy GHG scenarios,
Policy recommendations for the energy sector with a focus on policies for build-
ings sector decarbonisation, for the transport and industry sector as well as a recom-
mended political framework for power markets are provided.
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The Paris Agreement central aim is to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global 
temperature rise this century well below 2 °C above pre- 
industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
increase even further to 1.5 °C.
UNFCCC (2015)
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The Paris Agreement’s goals require significant change in how we use and produce 
energy on a global level. This energy transition must be started immediately and 
without further delay, and concerns energy-producing industry and utilities as well 
as every energy consumer—from the industry level down to the residential sector. A 
combination of energy efficiency and the use of renewable energies will involve 
new business concepts for the energy sector, which will require entirely new poli-
cies that provide a new market framework. The implementation of new technologies 
and business concepts will include policy changes on the community level as well 
as by national governments and international organizations. While the 2.0  °C 
Scenario allows for a 3–5 years transition period in which to implement policy mea-
sures, the 1.5 °C Scenario allows no further delay but requires an immediate start, 
at the latest in 2020. Therefore, the 1.5 °C Scenario presented in this book provides 
a technical pathway that assumes and allows no political delay, and may therefore 
be seen as a technical benchmark scenario.
However, this energy transition cannot be seen in isolation. To stay within the 
Paris Agreement Goal requires reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emission that 
are greater than can be delivered by the energy transition alone (see Chap. 4). 
However, there are technical and logistical limits to how fast new technologies can 
be implemented. The establishment of efficient transport systems and industry pro-
cesses, or simply the provision of required renewable energy and storage technolo-
gies will require a minimum time. Production capacities must increase significantly, 
people must be trained, and existing buildings must be retro-fitted. Infrastructural 
changes, such as smart power grids, must be planed, construction permits must be 
issued. The energy transition will require political determination and public accep-
tance. Therefore, the planning process will require resolute stakeholder involve-
ment. Furthermore, a fundamental shift in today’s resource-intensive lifestyles 
seems unavoidable if we are to limit global warming. In particular, the way con-
sumption and mobility are organized in developed countries today will challenge 
planetary boundaries to the extreme if they remain at their current levels.
During the development of the energy scenario pathways, it became clear that 
even the most ambitious ‘man-on-the-moon’ program—if focussed only on the 
energy sector—would not be enough. Therefore, the political framework required to 
implement the Paris Agreement on national levels must also take the land-use sec-
tor, as well as the main GHGs, methane, N2O, and fluorinated gases, into account.
The following sections present the main findings and lessons of this research proj-
ect, and highlight its limitations and further research requirements. Finally, we pro-
vide policy recommendations for the energy sector in order to implement the -energy 
scenarios.
13.1  Findings and Limitations—Modelling
The following section focuses on the main findings in all parts of the research, with 
priority given to high-level lessons, to avoid the repetition of previous chapters.
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13.1.1  Key Findings—Renewable Energy Potential Mapping
Various research projects have analysed renewable energy potentials and all have in 
common that the renewable energy potential exceeded the current and projected 
energy demands over the next decades by an order of magnitude. However, regional 
distributions are uneven, and especially in densely populated regions, such as urban 
areas, the local renewable energy resource might be unable to supply the demand. 
Therefore, renewable energies might have to be transported by power lines or in the 
form of gasified or liquid renewable fuels to the demand centre. However, all 10 
regions and 75 sub-regions examined had sufficient renewable energy resources to 
meet the regional needs.
13.1.2  Limitations and Further Research—Renewable Energy 
Potential
The quality of data varies significantly across the regions and especially detailed 
high-resolution surveys have their limits. Due to the limited available data, detailed 
mapping of the Eurasia region—especially for Russia and parts of central Asian 
countries—was not possible. Therefore, in this case, we relied on research published 
in the scientific literature. Onshore wind data were generally only available for 80 m 
above the ground, whereas no data for 100–120 m were available in most cases. 
However, modern wind turbines operate at those higher levels and wind resources 
are generally better at these elevations. Therefore, further research is required using 
open source data for onshore and offshore wind data at the 100 m level.
13.1.3  Key Findings—Transport Scenario
Transport modelling has shown that the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C pathways can be met 
when strong and determined measures are taken, starting immediately. They include 
rapid electrification across passenger and freight transport modes, a shift towards 
more energy-efficient transport modes, and a build-up of biomass and synfuel 
capacities for the transport modes that are less inclined towards electrification due 
to range or constructional constraints, as is the case in aviation. In the road sub- 
sector, which is the most relevant emission source in the transport area, battery 
electric and fuel-cell electric vehicles must be widely introduced, which will also 
require a stringent parallel build-up of recharging and refuelling infrastructures.
In general, we found that beyond pure technical measures with regard to pow-
ertrain shifts and overall efficiency enhancements, fundamental changes in today’s 
mobility patterns will also be required to meet the 2.0 °C Scenario, and even more 
so for the 1.5 °C pathway. This will apply particularly to the car use habits in the 
OECD countries. In essence, definite limitations on transport activities and modal 
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shifts towards mainly buses and railways in some world regions and sub-sectors will 
be required to meet the Paris goals. However, the Non-OECD world regions will 
mainly increase their overall transport activity until 2050. The 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C 
transport scenario pathways will not be achieved automatically, but will require 
long-sighted infrastructural and transport policy framework settings on both inter- 
and intra-governmental levels.
13.1.4  Limitations and Further Research 
Requirement—Transport
The statistical databases for several world regions on transport activities and fleet 
and powertrain shares are limited, and in those cases, projections, conclusions by 
analogy, and estimations were required in our modelling. Therefore, further studies 
should focus on enhancing these databases and specify the modelling in more detail, 
which could also include case studies of countries instead of regions, to better 
address spatial particularities in the transport models. Detailed investigations of 
mode shift potentials, based on infrastructure capacity constraints, were considered 
to some extent, but deserve more in-depth modelling in future works. Further 
research is required to refine the coupling of renewable energy potentials, transport 
infrastructure upgrades, and the expansion of on-board energy storage usage.
13.1.5  Key Findings—Long-Term Energy Scenario
The 2.0 °C and the 1.5 °C scenarios both represent ambitious pathways that require 
fundamental changes in current energy consumption and supply. The key strategies 
of these pathways are the implementation of renewable energy technologies and 
efficiency improvements in all sectors. The electrification of the transport and heat-
ing sectors and the diversification of supply technologies are core elements of both 
alternative scenarios. Besides numerous technical and structural improvements, 
behavioural changes among end-users and major changes in investment activities 
and strategies must be achieved. This applies, for example, to the per capita electric-
ity consumption (electric appliances without heating) of ‘residential and other sec-
tors’, which will decrease in OECD countries by one third between 2015 and 
2050 in the 1.5 °C Scenario, but will grows in the non-OECD regions by only 70% 
in the same period. This could imply limitations on personal consumption compared 
with today’s standards, particularly in OECD countries—at least for as long as fos-
sil fuels still play a significant role. Another example is the final energy demand per 
$GDP in the ‘Industry’ sector, which will decrease by 65% in OECD regions and by 
80% in non-OECD regions, an ambitious pathway that will require stringent 
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technology change and replacement strategies and supporting regulatory and gover-
nance measures to trigger huge investments for its realization.
On the energy supply side, considerable contributions in the future are assumed 
from wind and solar power, electrification and synthetic fuel use in transport and 
heating, sustainable biomass use, especially for co-generation and biofuels, and dis-
trict heating systems that integrate solar, geothermal, and ambient heat potentials. 
The exploitation of renewable energy potentials depends strongly on regional con-
ditions. In regions such as India and China, a 100% renewable electricity supply 
will require the extensive use of existing potentials. The global installed capacities 
of renewable power generation technologies will increase by a factor of more than 
12, from 2000 GW in 2015 to more than 25,000 GW in 2050. Cumulative invest-
ments for power generation are estimated to increase between 2015 and 2050 by up 
to around US$ 50,000 billion compared with around US$20000 billion in the refer-
ence case. Fuel cost savings could offset around 90% of the additional investment 
costs as consequence of the fossil fuel phase-out and reductions in demand, but 
without considering the additional infrastructure demands of the transition arising 
from grid expansion, storage, and other flexibility demands. In the scenarios, large- 
scale and long-range electricity transport between Europe and the MENA countries 
is assumed to be a possible and promising example of supra-regional exchange 
between regions of production and regions of demand. Many of these import/export 
relationships must also be realized among countries within individual world regions 
(which are thus not resolved in our model) to increase the security and cost- 
efficiency of the energy supply. Decentralization and digitalization, but also the 
efficient implementation of new respectively the expansion of existing central infra-
structures, are other implicit core elements of the scenario narratives. The large- 
scale generation and use of synthetic fuels are expected to play key roles in the 
deep-decarbonisation scenario, at least if the intensity of today’s freight transport 
and air traffic is to be maintained, despite the huge energy losses this option will 
have. Both alternative scenarios, especially the 1.5  °C Scenario, require a rapid 
reduction in the final energy demand and, as far as possible, stagnation in the strong 
global growth in the demand for energy services, at least for as long as fossil ener-
gies dominate the energy supply structures.
Besides the structural similarities between both the 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios, 
one main difference between them is the rate of transformation: To maintain the 
average global temperature increase due to climate change below 1.5 °C, the trans-
formation must be accomplished as fast as technically possible. The trend in increas-
ing global energy-related CO2 emissions must be reversed as soon as possible (in 
the early 2020s, at the latest) and emissions must be reduced by 70% in 2035 and by 
85% in 2040 (compared with emission levels in 1990). Every single year without 
significant emission reductions on the global level will dramatically reduce our 
chance to confine global warming to 1.5 °C.  In contrast, in the 2.0 °C Scenario, 
emission reductions in 2035 may be in the order of 40% and 65% in 2040, leaving 
a little more time for the transition process.
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13.1.6  Limitations and Further Research Requirement—
Long-Term Energy Scenario
The 1.5 °C Scenario may seem more difficult than similarly ambitious scenarios 
that were made 10 to even 20 years ago. However, the opportunities to respond to 
climate change have been largely wasted in the last two decades, and all transition 
processes have faced huge obstacles in the past due to the inertia and conflicting 
aims of societies, governments, and most relevant stakeholders. Too often, more 
attention has been paid to doubters than to facts. Therefore, the scenarios also show 
that the longer the governments wait, the more difficult it will be to prevent severe 
climate damage and the greater will be the technical and economic challenges that 
will be encountered in the energy system transformation.
The coarse regional resolution of such global scenarios does not allow sufficient 
account to be taken of sub-regional differences in energy demand and the character-
istic and favourable possibilities of sustainable supply. However, it can provide 
rather fundamental insight into basic technical and structural possibilities and 
requirements of a target-oriented pathway. Our results clearly reveal and quantita-
tively describe that the coming years will be most critical regarding a successful 
energy transition because for both parts of the energy transition—efficiency 
improvement/demand reduction and the implementation of new technologies—
huge investments and fundamental changes in producing, distributing, and consum-
ing energy will be needed. Such transformation processes must be analysed and 
planned carefully under the complex economic and societal framework conditions 
of each region, down to the country, sub-country, and community levels. Such anal-
yses can then form the basis for the further investigation of the economic implica-
tions of these pathways.
Another limitation of this approach is that the economic, technical, and market 
assumptions made probably have limited consistency. Carbon, fuel, and technology 
costs are assumed independently of the assumptions regarding overall economic 
development and the final energy demand. It also remains unclear to what extent the 
energy transition will change the overall material demand and activity of the manu-
facturing industry. Furthermore, which economic framework conditions and market 
mechanisms will be necessary for rapid decarbonisation remain largely unclear, as 
is whether the current market mechanisms are capable of supporting the fundamen-
tal paradigm shift of this target-oriented energy transition.
13.1.7  Key Findings—Power Sector Analysis
Although there are significant differences across all the regions and sub-regions 
analysed, there are some similarities:
Increasing loads: The loads in all regions will increase significantly between 2020 
and 2050, due to increased electrification of the transport and, to some extent, the 
heating sectors. Higher loads will require the adaptation of power-lines and 
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transformer stations, especially on distribution grids where electric vehicles are 
most likely to be charged.
Increasing reverse power flows: Almost all regions will have periods of negative 
residual load, when generation is higher than the required load within a specific 
period of time. This leads to reversed power flow, and the generated electricity 
must be transported to other regions. The dominant power-generation technolo-
gies are wind and solar photovoltaic (PV). Solar PV is mainly connected to the 
distribution grid and export requires that the electricity must be able to flow from 
low- to medium-voltage levels, which requires adaptation at transformer 
stations.
Ratio between maximum variable generation capacity and maximum load: The 
results presented in Chap. 8 suggest that a ratio of 180% variable renewable 
capacity to the maximum load represents the optimum relationship. If the capac-
ity were higher, short-term peaks would appear more frequently, which would 
lead to higher curtailment, or high storage and transmission demands. Example: 
The maximum load of a region is 100 GW and the installed capacity of wind and 
solar PV combined is 180 GW. Short-term peaks are relatively rare, and curtail-
ment is below 10% of the total annual generation potential. If the variable power 
generation were above 200 GW, while the load remained at 100 GW, the curtail-
ment rates would increase significantly, to 15% and higher.
Technology variety reduces storage demand: The combination of solar PV and wind 
leads to a lower storage demand than does a solar- or wind-dominated supply 
scenario. The relative interaction between the available wind and solar resources, 
not just in regard to day and night, but also seasonally, will reduce the storage 
demand in all regions. Therefore, the levelized cost of electricity generation can-
not be seen in isolation. Even if, for example, wind is more expensive than solar 
PV in one region, a combination of wind and solar will lead to a reduction in 
storage demand and lower systems costs.
Variety in storage technology and sector coupling: The combination of battery and 
hydro pump storage technology and the conversion of the gas sector to hydrogen 
and synthetic fuels will be beneficial. The hydrogen produced can be used for the 
management of demand, and hydrogen-fuelled power plants can provide valu-
able dispatch services.
13.1.8  Limitations and Further Research Requirement—
Power Sector Analysis
Measured load curves for regions, countries, or states/provinces are often unavail-
able and, in some countries, are even classified information. Therefore, it was not 
always possible to compare the calculated loads with actual current actual. However, 
the comparison of 2020 calculations with current maximum loads for regions and 
countries with published data showed that the calculations were within a ± 10% 
range. However, verification was not possible for several regions. Therefore, our 
analysis may over- or underestimate the current loads and therefore the future 
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projections of loads as well. Therefore, the optimal ratio of maximum load to 
installed variable capacity requires further research.
More research is also required to verify the thesis of an optimal ratio between the 
variable generation and maximum load, because the sample size of this study was 
not sufficient to ensure validity. Furthermore, the optimal mix of solar and wind 
requires better meteorological data and actual measured load profiles. Access to 
more detailed data to calculate more case studies is vital to determining the possible 
optimal combination of wind and solar.
13.1.9  Key Findings—Non-energy Scenarios
The key finding of the land-use-related emission scenarios is that a dedicated con-
certed effort to sequester carbon by reforestation and forest restoration could re- 
establish the terrestrial carbon stock of pre-industrial times. That would undoubtedly 
come with multiple co-benefits, but would not be without challenges. After all, there 
is a reason why humans in the various corners of the planet pursued deforestation, 
whether for short-term and short-sighted gains or to establish agricultural areas that 
fed an increasing population. Therefore, land-use conflicts and trade offs are an 
inherent part of future mitigation actions, whether CO2 sequestration is pursued by 
reforestation sequestration or by some biomass and CCS use. Nevertheless, the 
important result of this study is that the addition of land-use CO2 and other GHG 
emission pathways to energy-related scenarios yields scenarios that stay below or 
get below 1.5 °C warming without a reliance on massive net negative CO2 emission 
potentials towards the second half of this century.
Going beyond the land-use CO2 emission pathways that we sketched for a series 
of sequestration options, we also designed trajectories for all the other GHGs and 
aerosols. An unprecedented wealth of scenario information is now available thanks 
to the recent concerted efforts of the larger integrated assessment community. 
Designing a novel method here, the Generalized Quantile Walk method, we were 
able to distil non-CO2 pathways from this rich scenario database—in a way that 
respects the correlations and dependencies between energy-related CO2 and other 
gas emissions. This is not only a new methodological advance in scenario research, 
but also key to the proper estimation of the climate effects of the energy-related CO2 
scenarios designed in the main part of this study.
13.1.10  Limitations and Further Research Requirement—
Non-energy Scenarios
There are a number of limitations associated with the derived non-energy-related 
emission trajectories. Possibly the most important opportunity for future research 
will involve a more fine-grained look at land-use-based sequestration options in 
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various countries and biomes. This study assumed only a rather coarse approxima-
tion of the available land areas, sequestration rates, and cumulative changes in land 
carbon stocks to estimate the potential and time trajectories of those reforestation, 
forest restoration, agroforestry, and other land-based sequestration options.
In terms of the non-CO2 emission trajectories, this study relied heavily on the 
collective wisdom embodied within a large set of literature-reported scenarios. 
Although we have designed probably the most advanced method to distil that 
knowledge into emission trajectories that are consistent with our energy-related 
pathways, this meta-analytical approach is not without its limitations. In particular, 
a bottom-up energy-system and land-use/agricultural model must be able to esti-
mate methane and N2O emissions from various agricultural activities in a more 
coherent way, which could provide results on a regional level. Such regionally and 
sectorally specific information would, in turn, allow the examination of various 
mitigation options for non-CO2 emissions. This bottom-up modelling capacity is 
missing from our meta-analytical approach.
13.1.11  Key Findings—Employment Analysis
The occupational employment analysis was developed in 2018 to improve the data-
base for the ‘just transition’ concept. Not only is the number of jobs that will be 
created or lost as a result of a global or regional energy transition important, but also 
the specific occupations that will be to develop a socially sound transition. This 
analysis breaks new grounds because very little information has been available. 
However, the results indicate that even within the seven occupation types, job losses 
are the exception and almost all trades will gain more jobs.
Very specialized jobs, such as machine operators in coal mines, will be lost and 
there will be no replacement. Therefore, a detailed analysis of all sectors is required 
to identify those highly specialized tasks and to develop re-training possibilities.
13.1.12  Limitations and Further Research Requirement—
Employment Analysis
The data available on the detailed employment requirements for renewable energies 
are very limited. Although there are some data for solar PV and onshore and off-
shore wind, there are almost none for concentrated solar power plants or geothermal 
energy. Furthermore, occupational surveys of the heating and energy efficiency sec-
tors are required.
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13.1.13  Key Findings—Mineral Resource Analysis
Lithium sees the highest projected increase from mined ore of around 40 times cur-
rent production to above 80 times current production should future technologies be 
introduced without recycling.
Cumulative primary lithium demand by 2050 for the majority of scenarios is 
above current reserves of lithium except for the “potential recycling” scenario but 
less than known resources. The scenarios anticipate a scale up in resource explora-
tion, discovery and production for primary resources to meet demand—assuming 
lithium-ion batteries continue to dominate as the chemistry of choice. It is important 
that future mines be responsibly developed and that battery designs be compatible 
with circular-economy thinking. Significant infrastructure for reuse and recycling 
will need to be developed to achieve high rates of lithium recycling.
For cobalt, future scenarios exceed currently known reserves and approach cur-
rently known resources in 2050. Given the concentrated supply source from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, this will continue to keep pressure on exploring 
alternative battery chemistries and on increasing cobalt recycling. Attention must 
continue to be paid to reducing the social and environmental impacts of supply 
whilst supporting development noting the significant adverse impacts on human and 
environmental health associated with cobalt mining. While the value of cobalt in EV 
battery recycling is already an important component of the recycling economics 
because of supply limitations, the social and environmental challenges provide a 
further driver for increasing recycling.
For silver, the potential of materials efficiency (using less silver per GW solar PV 
panel) has potential to reduce demand owing to the long lifetimes of PV panels. 
Under some scenarios using future technology with recycling, the levels of silver 
demand are similar to current production.
13.1.14  Limitations and Further Research Requirement—
Mineral Resource Analysis
This study focuses only on the metal demand for renewable energy (generation and 
storage) and transport and does not consider other demands for these metals. 
However, it is expected that with the increase in renewable energy, renewable energy 
technologies will consume a greater share of these metals and it is anticipated that 
this growth will have significant influence on overall market dynamics, including 
influencing prices, which may feedback to efforts to reduce material intensity and 
invest in reuse and recycling infrastructure.
Promoting the transition to circular economy for both renewable energy and 
resource cycles; and adopting a systems view that considers available supply as well 
as social and environmental factors is critically important. To support sustainable 
development goals, both the primary and secondary sources of the resources 
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required to underpin this renewable energy transformation needs to be stewarded as 
the supply chains develop. The high total demand requirements for energy metals, 
demonstrates the importance of redesigning technologies and systems to eliminate 
the adverse social and environmental supply chain impacts, to promote long-life 
products, and to actively encourage efficient material use in both energy and trans-
port sectors.
13.2  Policy Recommendations by Sector
To implement the 2.0 °C or 1.5 °C Scenario will require a significant shift in current 
policies. This section documents the policy measures that have been assumed for 
the scenarios presented in the previous chapters, as well as policy measures known 
to be successful. The global legal frameworks and regulations differ significantly on 
national and community levels. Therefore, only the functions and aims of suggested 
policy measures can be discussed, but not how they can be integrated into current 
jurisdictions. That said, it is assumed that the Paris Agreement will be the global 
basis.
13.2.1  Energy
The energy sector is not a homogeneous sector but is highly diverse. Therefore, 
policy measures can follow different strategies and can address different aspects and 
stakeholders. The supply side can be divided into the main sub-sectors of electricity, 
heating, and fuel supply. The demand side can be broken down further into build-
ings, industry, and transport. However, because all these sub-sectors are directly or 
indirectly connected via resources and energy markets, policy interventions can 
have different effects.
The basic principles for the development of the 2.0  °C and 1.5  °C Scenarios 
derive from the long-term experiences with scenario development of the authorship 
team, and have led to a ‘seven-step logic’.
This logic extends from the definition of the final state of the energy systems in 
the long-term future to the key drivers of the energy demand and the energy effi-
ciency potentials, a technological analysis of supply and demand and the market 
development potential, and the specific policy measures required to implement a 
theoretical concept in the real market-place.
The seven steps are:
 1. Define the maximum carbon budget and other targets, milestones, and con-
straints to achieve the climate goal;
 2. Define the renewable energy resource potentials and limits within a space- 
constrained environment;
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 3. Identify the economic and societal drivers of demand;
 4. Define the efficiency potentials and energy intensities by energy service and 
sector;
 5. Establish time lines and narratives for the technology implementation on the 
end-user and supply sides;
 6. Estimate the infrastructure needs, generation costs, and other effects;
 7. Identify the required policies and discuss the policy options.
13.2.1.1  General Energy Policies
The energy sector requires both very specific measures, such as grid codes and effi-
ciency standards, and overarching measures. International collaboration and co- 
operation are required to define and implement mandatory standards and to 
effectively develop energy policy and its regulative interventions. The most impor-
tant interventions to accelerate the energy transition are:
• Renewable energy targets and incentives for their deployment and expansion;
• Internalization of external costs by carbon tax or surcharge;
• Phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies;
• Accelerated replacement of fossil and inefficient technologies.
Renewable energy targets are vital to accelerate the deployment of renewable 
energy. Experiences of the past two decades clearly show the effectiveness of renew-
able energy policy development. The Renewable Policy Network for the 21st 
Century (REN21) states in their annual market analysis, Renewables 2018, that 
“Targets remain one of the primary means for policy makers to express their com-
mitment to renewable energy deployment. Targets are enacted for economy-wide 
energy development as well as for specific sectors” (REN21-GSR-2018). To achieve 
these goals, innovation processes must be initiated, markets developed, and 
 investment stimulated. For the latter, auctions and feed-in tariffs have proven suit-
able. It is important in this context to guarantee investment security and to enable 
long-term but appropriate revenues.
Climate change leads to a number of types of environmental damage. Carbon 
emissions lead to climate change. Therefore, it is vital to put a price on carbon to 
internalize the external costs. Carbon-pricing schemes can be established as cap- 
and- trade schemes or taxes. Carbon pricing is not sufficient on its own to achieve 
the objective of the Paris Agreement, and many leading international agencies and 
institutions argue that a much more concerted and widespread global take-up of 
carbon pricing will be necessary (Carbon Tracker 2018). To make carbon pricing an 
efficient measure, the price of carbon must be sufficient to reflect the environmental 
damage it causes and it must be reliable. Therefore, a minimum price should be 
implemented to provide planning security.
Subsidies of fossil fuels counteract any efforts to make energy efficiency and 
renewable energy competitive. According to the International Energy Agency, the 
total amount of global fossil fuel subsidies was estimated to be around US$260 bil-
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lion in 2016 (IEA-DB 2018). The governments of the G20 and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) reached an agreement to “rationalize and phase out 
over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful con-
sumption” (OECD-IEA 2018).
Setting legally binding national targets for 100% renewable energy pathways 
will lead to an orderly phase-out of fossil fuels. This is vital in planning the socio- 
economic effects of the energy transition (see Chap. 10). Supporting measures to 
achieve the replacement of fossil and inefficient technologies and energy sources 
will be necessary because targets and economic incentives may not be sufficient in 
all areas. Regulatory interventions for the decommissioning and replacement of 
facilities are a way to stop opposing business scenarios and to overcome the inertia 
of consumers and investors. Moreover, economic policy measures and the clearer 
definitions and stringent enforcement of international standards will accelerate the 
implementation of the best available technologies in the industry.
Both a minimum price on carbon and the immediate phase-out of fossil fuel 
subsidies must be implemented in order to support the global energy transition. 
Policy support for technology innovation is another important measure to create the 
basis for the energy transition processes.
13.2.1.2  Policies for Buildings Sector Decarbonisation
To reduce the energy demands of existing building stock and new buildings, con-
stantly most stringent energy demand standards (= building energy codes) are 
required for all building types and across all countries. The goal must be to achieve 
(near) zero-energy buildings, so that each building reduces its heating and cooling 
demand to the lowest possible level and aims to supply the remaining energy with 
on-site renewable energy technologies, such as solar collectors, electric heaters, 
advanced bioenergy and heat pumps, or with low-temperature heating networks. 
Mandatory municipal heating plans are an appropriate way to define an efficient 
strategy that balances insulation, local heating systems, and the grid-connected heat 
supply in regions with a significant space-heating demand. An analysis of building 
energy codes in 15 countries (Young 2014) distinguished between residential and 
commercial buildings and listed six technical requirement categories, ranging from 
heating and cooling requirements and the insulation of the building envelope to the 
building design. However, building energy codes must be mandatory and include 
existing building stock as well as new buildings. The most urgent need for action is 
in developing countries, where the rapid growth in building construction can be 
expected over the next decades. Economic measures to increase heating/cooling 
costs, e.g., by introducing fossil energy taxes or surcharges or by phasing-out fossil 
fuel subsidies, could support efforts to save energy. However, they must be accom-
panied by social policies.
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13.2.1.3  Policies for more-Efficient Electrical Appliances
To reduce the electricity demand of consumer goods in households and equipment 
in buildings, the efficiency standards for electrical appliances, all forms of informa-
tion and communication technologies (computers, smart devices, screens, televi-
sions, etc.), white goods (washing machines, dryers, dishwasher, fridges, and 
freezers), electrical building equipment for thermal comfort, and lighting technolo-
gies are required. These efficiency standards must be dynamic and designed to sup-
port competition for the most efficient design. The Japanese front runner system 
(IEA-PM 2018) is a positive example of dynamic efficiency standards. Labelling 
programmes and purchase subsidies for the best available technologies can support 
the replacement of old devices with the most efficient technologies. Measures for 
training and capacity building are also essential, most importantly in non-OECD 
countries.
13.2.1.4  Policies for the Transport Sector
As well as resolute electrification and further technical advances in all transport 
modes, decision-makers in politics and the urban planning context must carefully 
steer transport habits and infrastructure development toward a climate-friendly 
transport system. Their aim should be to promote the use of less ecologically prob-
lematic transport modes. This can be done by, for example, the introduction of fiscal 
and regulatory measures that effectively reduce the subsidization of currently 
untaxed and internalisation of external costs.
In parallel, environmentally less harmful transportation modes should be incen-
tivized. Investments must also be channelled towards highly productive and energy- 
efficient passenger and freight railway systems and towards a dense network of 
battery recharging and hydrogen refuelling infrastructures for road vehicles. In the 
passenger car and truck context, direct subsidies or tax incentives for electric 
 vehicles will speed up the electrification of fleets. CO2 taxation, road tolls, and con-
gestion charges could be applied, in addition to parking-space management schemes 
to reduce road traffic and thus internal combustion engines in a transition to car- 
reduced cities. The assignment of parking lots and driving lanes exclusively to elec-
tric cars will speed the phase-out of internal combustion engines.
In aviation, measures could include the taxation of jet fuel and CO2, the applica-
tion of an emission trading scheme on the direct and indirect climate effects of flight 
at high altitudes. Direct and indirect public subsidies for carriers and airports should 
be abolished (investment and operational grants should be reduced and funding 
should be allocated to a competitive and attractive rail system).
All measures curtailing the use of individual passenger transport should be 
accompanied by the promotion of ubiquitous, fast, comfortable, and price- 
competitive public transport systems, ride and car sharing and on-demand services 
(especially for less densely populated semi-urban and rural areas). Last but not 
least, an attractive and safe infrastructure for bicycles and e-bikes will help to reduce 
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emissions and other unwanted side-effects of transport. In this arena, Copenhagen 
and Amsterdam are at the cycling forefront and inspiring more and more cities in 
following their path. Cities must also curtail tendencies to urban sprawl and ‘rein-
vent’ the compact city ideal, which means becoming pedestrian-friendly cities, thus 
reducing the need for motorized individual mobility and freeing up space for recre-
ation and green spaces.
Cities in developed countries should aim to transform their transport systems 
(often) from passenger-car-centred urban structures and policies towards pedes-
trian-, bike-, and mass-transport-friendly environments. The often densely popu-
lated emerging megacities in the upcoming economic powerhouses of Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia should invest, right from the start, in resilient public-transport- 
oriented urban structures instead of relying too strongly on individual passenger car 
traffic, as the OECD countries have done in the past.
13.2.1.5  Policies for the Industry Sector
Policies to achieve the implementation of new highly efficient technologies and to 
replace fossil fuel use in industry must be defined region-wide or even on the global 
level, and will require stringent and regulatory implementation. Economic incen-
tives, national initiatives, and voluntary agreements with industrial branches will 
most probably not, by themselves, see the achievement of a rapid technological 
change. Concrete standards and requirements must be defined at a very detailed 
level, covering as far as possible all technologies and their areas of application. The 
systematic implementation of already-identified best-available technologies could 
begin in the next few years. Mandatory energy management systems should be 
introduced to identify efficiency potentials and to monitor efficiency progress. The 
sustainability features along process chains and material flows must also be taken 
into account when designing political measures. Particular attention must be paid to 
the material efficiency of both production processes and their products, because this 
can open up major energy efficiency potentials and reduce other environmental 
effects. Public procurement policies and guidelines can help to establish new mar-
kets and to demonstrate new more-efficient products and opportunities. The effec-
tiveness of policy interventions must be assessed by independent experts and the 
further development of efficiency programs and measures will require ongoing 
coordination by independent executive agencies. The public provision of low- 
interest loans, investment risk management, and tax exemptions for energy-efficient 
technologies and processes will significantly support technological changes and 
incentivize the huge investments required. Knowledge transfer between sectors and 
countries can be achieved through networks initiated and coordinated by govern-
ments. Public funding for research and development activities with regard to tech-
nological innovation, low-carbon solutions, and their process integration will be 
vital to push the technological limits further. Innovative approaches to the realiza-
tion of material cycles and recycling options, the recovery of industrial waste heat, 
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and low-carbon raw materials and process routes in industry must also be identified 
and implemented.
13.2.1.6  Political Framework for Power Markets
The 2.0 °C and 1.5 °C Scenarios will lead to 100% renewable electricity supply, 
with significant shares of variable power generation. The traditional electricity mar-
ket framework has been developed for central suppliers operating dispatchable and 
limited dispatchable (‘base load’) thermal power plants. The electricity markets of 
the future will be dominated by variable generation without marginal/fuel costs. The 
power system will also require the built-up and economic operation of a combina-
tion of dispatch generation, storage, and other system services whose operation will 
be conditioned by renewable electricity feed-ins. For both reasons, a significantly 
different market framework is urgently needed, in which the technologies can be 
operated economically and refinanced. Renewable electricity should be guaranteed 
priority access to the grid. Access to the exchange capacity available at any given 
moment should be fully transparent and the transmission of renewable electricity 
must always have preference. Furthermore, the design of distribution and transmis-
sion networks, particularly for interconnections and transformer stations, should be 
guided by the objective of facilitating the integration of renewables and to achieve a 
100% renewable electricity system.
To establish fair and equal market conditions, the ownership of electrical grids 
should be completely disengaged from the ownership of power-generation and sup-
ply companies. To encourage new businesses, relevant grid data must be made avail-
able from transmission and distribution system operators. This will require 
establishing communication standards and data protection guidelines for smart 
grids. Legislation to support and expand demand-side management is required to 
create new markets for the flexibility services for renewable electricity integration.
Public funding for research and development is required to further develop and 
implement technologies that allow variable power integration, such as smart grid 
technology, virtual power stations, low-cost storage solutions, and responsive 
demand-side management. Finally, a policy framework that supports the electrifica-
tion and sector coupling of the heating and transport sectors is urgently needed for 
a successful and cost-efficient transition process.
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Annex
Glossary, regions, and countries included in the scenarios, further detailed descrip-
tions of the assumptions (tables) of all models and methodologies, are detailed 
results tables.
 Acronyms
2DS 2.0 °C Scenario – published in the IEA ETP
ACEC Africa Clean Energy Corridor
ACOLA Australian Council of Learned Academies
B2DS beyond 2.0 °C Scenario – published in the IEA ETP
BC (emissions) Black carbon emission
BECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
BEV Battery electric vehicles
BP British Petrol
CCGT Closed-Cycle Gas Turbine (gas power plant technology)
CCS Carbon Capture and Sequestration
CdTd Cadmium Telluride (Solar photovoltaic cell technology)
CEDS Community Emissions Data System (for Historical Climate rel-
evant Emissions)
CHP Combine Heat and Power (=co-generation)
CIGS Copper Indium Gallium Di-Selenide (Solar photovoltaic cell 
technology)
CMIP6 Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project Phase 6 (computer cli-
mate model)
CO2 Carbon Dioxide
CSP Concentrated Solar Power
DBFZ Deutsches Biomasse Forschungs-Zentrum (German Bio Mass 
Research Centre)
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DLR Deutsche Luft und Raumfahrt, German Aero Space Centre
DREA Distributed renewables for energy access
EAPP East Africa Power Pool
EJ/year Exa-Joule per year
EJ Exa-Joule
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity
ESM Earth System Model (computer climate model)
ETP Energy Technology Perspectives (publication of the International 
Energy Agency)
EU-WEEE Waste electronic equipment  – Environment, Directive of the 
European Commission
EV Electric Vehicles
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCEV Fuel-Cell-Electric-Vehicle
FYP Five-Year-Plan
G20 Group of 20 (The G20 is an international forum for the govern-
ments and central bank governors from Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GIS Global Information System
GLOBIOM GLObal BIOsphere Model (computer model for land-use)
GW Gigawatt
GWh/year Gigawatthours per year
HDV High Duty Vehicle (= truck)
HOV High Occupancy Vehicle lanes (transport modelling)
HST High Speed Trains
HWP Harvested Wood Product (computer model for carbon flows)
IAM Integrated Assessment Modelling
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organization
IMAGE Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment (computer 
climate model)
IMO International Maritime Organization
INDC Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
ITRPV International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaic
LCOE Levelized Cost of Electricity
LDF Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation
LDV Light Duty Vehicle (= passenger car)
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LIB lithium Ion Batteries
MAGICC Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate 
Change
MEPC Marine Environment Protection Committee
MESSAGE Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General 
Environmental Impact (computer energy model)
MJ/year Mega-Joule per year
MW Megawatt
MWh/year Megawatthours per year
NDC Nationally Determined Contributions
NEA National Energy Administration (China)
NGV Natural gas vehicles
OC (emissions) Organic Carbon emission
OD Origin Destination (transport modelling)
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PJ/year Peta-Joule per year
PMG Permanent magnet generators
PPMC Paris Process on Mobility and Climate
PPP Purchasing Power Parity (economic term)
PRIMAP Potsdam Real-time Integrated Model for probabilistic Assessment 
of emissions Paths (computer climate model)
PV Photovoltaic
QGIS Quantum - Global Information System (open source software)
RCP Representative Concentration Pathway
REF Reference scenario
REN21 Renewable Energy Network for the 21st Century
SAPP South Africa Power Pool
SF6 Sulphur Hexafluoride
SHS solar home systems
SOx Sulphur Oxides
SSP Shared Socio Economic Pathways (for climate scenarios)
TWh/year Terawatthours per year
TYNDP Ten-Year-Network Development Plan
UIC Union Internationale des Chemins de fer; International union of 
raiways
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USA-EPA United States of America – Environmental Protection Agency
USD  US Dollar
UTCE Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity
UTS-ISF University of Technology Sydney  – Institute for Sustainable 
Futures
VRE Variable Renewable Energy
WEO World Energy Outlook (publication of the International Energy 
Agency)
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